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ABSTRACT

The international communications section of the Proceedings contains the following 14 papers: "Spinning Stories: Latin America and the World Wide Web" (Eliza Tanner); "Private-Enterprise Broadcasting and Accelerating Dependency: Case Studies from Nigeria and Uganda" (Folu Folarin Ogundimu); "The Transitional Media System of Post-Communist Bulgaria" (Ekaterina Ognianova); "Comparing Canadian and U.S. Press Coverage of the Gulf Crisis: The Effects of Ideology in an International Context" (James E. Mollenkopf and Nancy Brendlinger); "Privatization in Indian Telecommunications: A Pragmatic Solution to Socialist Inertia" (Divya C. McMillin); "'Caribscope'--A Forum for Development News?" (Lisa A. McClean); "Ideology and Market: The Political Economy of Russian Media Industry" (Soobum Lee); "The Construction of Cuba in 'The New York Times' and 'The Washington Post'" (William M. Kunz and Alan G. Stavitsky); "Globalization of Mass Communications in the West and East Asia: Towards a New East Asian Model of Mass Communications" (Min Soo Kim); "Agenda Setting in Japan: A Framework for Studying the Media and Politics" (Beverly Horvit); "Japanese and American Coverage of the 50th Anniversary of World War II: Different Stories for Different Audiences" (Koji Fuse and James E. Mueller); "David and Godzilla: Anti-Semitism and 'Seppuku' in Japanese Publishing" (Tom Brislin); "Burma or Myanmar? Determinants of Country-Name Usage by International Newspapers and News Agencies" (Carolyn J. Davis); and "The Impact of Cultural and Market Distance on International Advertising: A Content Analysis of Ad Appeals in Ads from US, Japan and Korea" (Yoo-Kyung Kim and Hao-chieh Chang). Individual papers contain references. (RS)

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Spinning Stories:

Latin America and the World Wide Web

by

Eliza Tanner

University of Wisconsin—Madison

Abstract

Although the Internet may create an "ultimate open society," the reality is quite different in Latin America. Two important considerations—access and representations—were illuminated through ninety email interviews with Latin American Webmasters. Access to the Internet is quickly expanding in Latin America, especially in Chile, Mexico, and Brazil; however by mid-1996 less than one percent of the population had access to the new communication technology. The Webmasters spoke about their efforts to combat negative portrayals or stereotypes found in traditional Western media through their on-line representations and stories.

In two years, the World Wide Web has popularized and fueled the growth of the Internet to the point that by the beginning of 1996, one popular Web index boasted that it searches more than ten billion words on twenty-one million Web pages. To put this in perspective, the creators of this index write that if you were to spend ten hours every day, looking at one Web page a minute, it would take four and a half years to look at a million Web pages.[1]

News organizations, governments, commercial enterprises, educational institutions, and individuals all are racing to "publish" information on the Web. Estimates in 1995 placed the number of host computers on the Internet between six million and seven million, with projections of 187 million or more hosts in the next five years.[2] Although the Web was first developed at the European Center for Particle Research (CERN) in Switzerland as a method for scientists to share information across computer networks, it is no longer restricted to scientific circles. On the Web, one can find information addressing almost every conceivable topic—recipes for Fettucine Alfredo, scientific papers on Fermat's Last Theorem, direct sales catalogues, Shakespeare's plays, comic strips, email directories at universities, job listings, electronic versions of newspapers and magazines, real-time sports coverage, weather maps, library catalogs, U.S. State Department publications, virtual art museums, music stores, and so on.

Popular literature about the Web and the Internet is almost as expansive and feeds off the multi-faceted debate surrounding the Internet. On one side of the controversy are those who highlight the positive aspects. For example, U.S. Vice President Al Gore said in 1994, "Our new ways of communicating will entertain as well as inform. More importantly, they will educate, promote democracy, and save lives."[3] Enthusiastic proponents hail the Internet as the democratic mass medium of the future, allowing for free communication on a global basis. "I believe in the power of Internet communication," writes Cristian Espinoza T., who maintains a Web site in Chile. For many years he said he felt helpless while he watched events unfold around him. "This time, I have the opportunity to shout to the world and feel that someone is listening," Espinoza says.[4] Moreover, these supporters tout the Web as a step to truly creating a "global village" and unifying the world. Horacio Diaz R. of the University of Tarapaca, Chile, notes that the

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[1] Alta Vista: Main Page, [http://www.altavista.digital.com/].

[2] Scott Rosenberg, "Internet Revolution is On-line and Growing," *San Francisco Examiner*, 2 July 1995, C-11. See also Network Wizards, July 1995 survey data, [http://www.nw.com/].

[3] Quoted in Stephen Bates, *The Potential Downside of the National Information Infrastructure* (Washington, D.C.: The Annenberg Washington Program in Communications Policy Studies of Northwestern University, 1995), 6.

[4] Cristian Espinoza T., [cet@ing.puc.cl], "Re: Preguntas WWW," email to author, 17 November 1995.

Internet has been converted into a sociological phenomenon. "Everyone wants, in one form or another, to be on the Internet and access this infinite world of information, presented without borders or hierarchies." For Diaz, the Web "really has contributed to the unification of our planet."[5]

In contrast to many of these statements, some critics emphasize negative aspects of the Internet, such as the distribution of obscene and pornographic materials, hate speech, and illegal activities. Many fear the lack of security, especially for financial data and credit card numbers, while legal experts debate the applicability of copyright and patent laws to the new technologies. Not the least of the concerns are those involving freedom of expression and government regulation of the Web. Since the Internet is world-wide, government regulations in one country may have implications for all other countries as witnessed during debate over the U.S. Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995.[6] The section imposing criminal penalties on those who publish indecent material on the Internet is now being challenged in the courts.

In some ways, the Internet and the Web differ markedly from traditional mass media. During the 1970s and early 1980s, developing or Third World nations contended that the international news agencies controlled the flow of information, often forcing the countries to look at themselves and their neighbors through the eyes of Western media.[7] Radio, television, newspapers, and magazines gather information through elaborate organizations, edit the information, and create a product for the public. However, even though people can read news stories from newspapers or magazines on the Internet, they are not limited to these accounts. They can look at original documents, talk to people directly involved with the event, and find alternative sources and views. Information on the Internet is not filtered through just a handful of large media organizations. As stated earlier, information can be published on the Web by a variety of people and organizations. With the Web, it is feasible that people, groups, countries, and institutions can create their own representations, narratives, and stories. "In its ultimate extrapolation, it is the ultimate open society where anyone, anywhere can provide or receive any information to anyone within seconds," said Anthony-Michael Rutkowski, executive director of the Internet Society.[8]

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[5] Horacio Diaz R., [hdiaz@visviri.electa.uta.cl], "Re: Preguntas," email to author, 17 November 1995.

[6] See Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995, S. 652, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).

[7] See Mustapha Masmoudi, "The New World Information Order," *Journal of Communication 29* (1979): 172-185.

[8] Anthony-Michael Rutkowski, [amr@isoc.org], "Bottom-Up Information Infrastructure and the Internet," Keynote Address, Founders Day Symposium, University of Pittsburgh, [http://info.isoc.org:80/speeches/upitt-foundersday.html], 27 February 1995.

If the Internet and the Web offer alternatives to traditional news media as well as expanded sources of information, then they may address many of the concerns voiced by Third World countries during the "New World Information Order" debates. As part of the dependency critique, Third World countries said the structure of international news organizations forced them to see themselves and other nations through a "Western" perspective. This paper will assess claims of the Internet as the "ultimate open society" and "free global communication" as it relates to Latin America. Many fundamental issues and problems concerning the Web throughout the world are dramatically exaggerated in Latin American countries. I argue that although the Internet has the potential to fulfill a dream of an "open society," the reality of the new medium is quite different.

To examine these issues, I sent out more than a hundred and fifty requests for information to Webmasters—the people in charge of Web sites—in Latin America. I received about ninety email responses, ranging from pages of detailed notes and theoretical considerations, to brief statements, to a critique of the typical "gringo" survey. Almost all surveys and answers were in Spanish; a few were in English. These emails are not meant to be a statistically representative survey. Rather, they provide an insight to how these Webmasters work with the new technology in Latin America. The Webmasters explained who was responsible for the Web site, their intended audiences and goals, and the types of representations or portrayals they wanted to create. They also sent me an estimated number of people with access to the Internet in their countries and other commentaries. I contextualized the responses by including data from indices of Web sites, such as Yahoo, hundreds of Web sites themselves, and statistics on Web usage and development. To find out more about the types of information on the Internet, I also looked at all the available Web sites for one country—Chile—in South America. These various sources illuminated two important considerations relating to the spread and usage of the Web in Latin America—access and respresentations.

"The purpose of Internet . . . right?"[9]

"The ideal would be that soon the most interesting works, projects, and other [research] would begin to be published on the Web pages, not only as a means of diffusion, but to establish contacts with people in different places who are interested in the subject," writes Marcelo Espinosa Alliende of the University of Bio-Bio in Chile.[10] For Espinosa, the main function of the Internet is to facilitate communication among people around the world who are interested in similar subjects. "This is the purpose of the Internet . . . right?" Espinosa wrote. Access can be defined as the ability of people to use a medium of communication, as senders or receivers of information. Access to the Internet can become a complicated issue since there are various levels of use—everything from people occasionally browsing the Web or reading email to the engineers maintaining the computers. In its most simplistic form, access depends on the availability of computers and the hardware connection to the global computer network.

Various organizations have attempted to track the growth of the Internet and gather some information on the people who use the Web. Though the Internet has expanded phenomenally since early 1994, this rapid growth is severely skewed when viewed globally. Of the millions of host computers in 1995, about 94 percent are located in North America, Europe, Australia, and Japan.[11] In Latin America, Internet development relies on many variables, such as the communication infrastructure within a nation, government policies, overall "development status," and the existence of satellite or fiber optic connections with the rest of the world. With these constraints, the presence of Latin American countries on the Web varies greatly. Brazil and Mexico each boast thousands of host computers and Web sites, while some nations, such as Bolivia and Guatemala, barely have a handful, if any. Full Internet services only became available to Bolivia in mid-1995.[12] The major challenge facing Internet development in Bolivia, writes Hubert Abasto Revilla, is the lack of resources. He says it takes months to secure telephone lines, people in charge of telecommunication do not understand the importance of the Internet, organizations see the new communication businesses as threatening to their monopolies, and the telephones are of low quality or the equipment is bad in some places. "Also there is the economic problem that does not allow us to immediately count on the means necessary for a better connection [to the Internet]," Abasto writes.[13] Dr. Juan Rivero of the Venezuelan Institute of Scientific Investigations was more succient in his appraisal of the problems facing Internet development: "The lack of resources—in other words, there are no funds for anything."[14]

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[9] Marcelo Espinosa Alliende, [marcelo@zeus.dci.ubiobio.cl], "Re: (no subject)," email to author, 17 November 1995.

[10] Marcelo Espinosa Alliende, [marcelo@zeus.dci.ubiobio.cl], "Re: (no subject)," email to author, 17 November 1995.

[11] Peter Costantini, "Development-Communications: Third Wave Hits Third World," Inter Press Service, 9 October 1995, LEXIS/NEXIS.

[12] Karim Salome M., [karim%mcs@umcs.bo], "Re: Preguntas WWW," email to author, 26 January 1996.

Table 1 shows data gathered by the company Network Wizards in July 1995 in an attempt to track the number of host computers on the Internet. The ten countries with the largest number of host computers are listed, followed by countries in Latin America for comparison.[15] The most computers by far are located in the United States, with more than four million hosts. Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Japan follow with hundreds of thousands of host computers connected to the Internet. Of the Latin American nations, Brazil has the largest number of computers connected to the Internet, with more than 11,000. From there, the numbers quickly drop to the hundreds and then to single digits.

Although computer programs, such as the one used by Network Wizards, can tabulate host computers, they are unable to determine the number of people actually using the Internet. In fact, Network Wizards refused to speculate on the number of people using the Internet, saying, "No one has any clue how many users there are."[16] Part of this reluctance stems from the fact that one host computer may be used by a number of people.

However, some organizations have attempted to survey Web users and gather demographic data. One Web survey, performed by the Graphic, Visualization, & Usability Center at the Georgia Institute of Technology, started tracking users in 1994. The Fourth WWW User Survey in October-November 1995 collected responses from 23,000 people with the on-line survey. Although the survey suffers from problems of self-selection and non-probabilistic sampling, it does provide a "snap-shot" of the characteristics of these users. The average age of the respondents is 32.7-years-old, with 29.3 percent female and 70.7 percent male. Compared with earlier surveys, the GVU team said they see an increase in the number of female users answering the survey. However, the percent of U.S. respondents (32.5% female, 67.5% male) is far from reflecting the 52 percent female and 48 percent male composition of the entire US population (1995 Estimated US Census). In Europe, the percentages were even more striking, with 89.5 percent males and only 10.5 percent females responding to the survey.

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[13] Hubert Abasto Revilla, [hubert@utama.bolnet.bo], "Re: Preguntas WWW," email to author, 26 January 1996.

[14] Juan Rivero, [juanr@stat.ivic.ve], "Re: Preguntas sobre el WWW," email to author, 12 March 1996.

[15] This list excludes Caribbean countries, as well as Suriname, Guyana, French Guyana, and Belize since they are traditionally studied as part of the Caribbean.

Table 1. Host Distribution by Top-Level Domain Name for July 1995[17]

Domain	Hosts	Domains Queried	Domains Missed
TOTAL	6,641,541	120,256	29,045
U.S.[18]	4,268,648	80,108	25,416
Germany (de)	350,707	3,701	245
United Kingdom (uk)	291,258	5,184	532
Canada (ca)	262,644	3,781	438
Australia (au)	207,426	2,683	148
Japan (jp)	159,776	5,477	240
Netherlands (nl)	135,462	1,021	71
France (fr)	113,974	1,686	111
Finland (fi)	111,861	886	30
Sweden (se)	106,725	1,538	163
...	...	...	...
Brazil (br)	11,576	613	204
Mexico (mx)	8,382	255	62
Chile (cl)	6,664	177	12
Argentina (ar)	3,270	109	8
Colombia (co)	2,075	22	7
Costa Rica (cr)	1,029	28	5
Venezuela (ve)	853	32	13
Ecuador (ec)	372	1	0
Peru (pe)	367	28	1
Uruguay (uy)	273	13	4
Panama (pa)	127	7	0
Nicaragua (ni)	59	11	1
El Salvador (sv)	0	1	0
Paraguay (py)	0	1	0
Honduras (hn)	0	1	0
Guatemala (gt)	0	1	0
Bolivia (bo)	0	0	1

The overall median income is between US$50,000 and US$60,000, with an estimated average income for all respondents of US$63,000. European respondents had an average income of US$56,000. The respondents were from the United States (76.2%), Europe (8.4%), and Canada and Mexico (10.2%). About 40 percent reported being married and 40 percent single. Almost half (47.4%) of those surveyed reported owning a single computer, 25.2% owning two computers, and 10.5% of the users reported not

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[16] Network Wizards, July 1995 survey data, [http://www.nw.com/].

[17] Network Wizards, July 1995 survey data, [http://www.nw.com/]. The table lists the top ten countries and then the Latin American countries, excluding the Caribbean, for comparison. The computer program that searches out all the host computers connected to the Internet queries the domains or smaller networks and collects data from the computers. However, sometimes the computers are not working or the connections are bad, so the domains are "missed" and the computer program is unable to collect the relevant data. Network Wizards reports that about 20 percent of all the domains are missed, so these figures are seen as minimum numbers.

[18] The category for the United States was created by combining the domains com, edu, net, gov, mil, org, and us. The United States is generally the only country not to consistently use a country code in naming the computers connected to the Internet. This combination may be a bit problematic because a few com, org, and net domains are located in countries other than the United States.

owning a personal computer. The majority of the respondents had occupations in computer-related (29.1%) or education-related (30.9%) fields. The remaining categories were professional (19.9%), management (10.2%), and "other" (9.8%). The largest ethnic group was white with 83.2 percent, with no other group reporting more than 5 percent.[19] From the data gathered by the GVU team, the typical person responding to the questionnaire is male, 32 years old, from North America, married, white, working in computers or education, and earning about US$60,000.

CommerceNet and Nielsen Media Research conducted a scientific survey of Internet users in the United States and Canada in August 1995. They combined a telephone survey with an on-line survey and found widespread access to the Internet within the United States and Canada. They reported 17 percent or 37 million people aged 16 or above in the United States and Canada have access to the Internet. The survey found that 66 percent of the users are male. The researchers pointed out that data collected only from on-line surveys may overstate Internet usage, overestimate the skill level of the Internet users, and downplay the size of the female market for Internet services. The typical Internet user is "an extremely attractive target (educated, professional, and upscale)" for businesses.[20]

A survey conducted by New York market researcher Find/SVP indicated Internet use may be much less than that found by the Nielsen survey. From a November–December 1995 survey, Find/SVP estimated there are about 9.5 million Internet users in the United States.[21] However, the difference between the two surveys may be related to how they define "Internet users" and "access." For example, Find/SVP did not define email as "Internet use" while Nielsen counted people who used the Internet anytime in the previous three months.

Despite the debate over the number and definition of Internet users, the various surveys seem to indicate that those who have access to the Web are an elite segment of the population. The question of who is using the Web becomes a very important consideration for Webmasters, especially those with commercial sites. The Webmasters who sent me information wrote that they target specific audiences with their Web sites. Commercial Web pages have a goal to increase business possibilities. Sistemas Distribuidos in Mexico wants to attract people to Tijuana to increase business investments and tourism in the area. They especially target U.S. or Japanese companies that own maquiladoras and need computer, communication, or Internet services.[22] Francisco Romero and Luis Enrique Romero began a tourist business over the Internet because they had a friend who wanted to vacation in Mexico and they were unable to mail him the information he needed. The reported that this Web site, Mexicohost, with its tourist information about Cancún attracts some 2,500 people each day.[23] Even non-commercial Web pages often target specific people. For example, the Mexican President's homepage has as its main objective "to give the people [in Mexico] a place where they can express their feelings and needs regarding the Office of the President, but especially the crises we are living (economic, political and social)."[24] The Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana in Mexico places the emphasis on serving the needs of the students and professors at the university and then reaching out to industrial and government sectors at the national and international level.[25] The Chilean Web Scout Server has as its goal to facilitate communication among those interested in Scouting and publicize information about the 1999 World Jamboree. The Internet allows Scouters in Chile to communicate much more rapidly than by regular mail and exchange information on campouts and various activities.[26] Scientific institutions and university departments wrote that one of their main goals was to facilitate the interchange of information between scientists and researchers around the world. At the Universidad de Chile, the Astronomy department attempts to contact scientists who are interested in the 1994 solar eclipse.[27] A Webmaster at Universidad Católica del Norte writes that their goal is "to show to the world that, in a corner of the planet, there is a group dedicated to astronomy" and thus interchange information and maintain contact with other astronomy groups in the world.[28] Hubert Abasto Revilla maintains a Web site in Bolivia and states that local users are his principle audience, but that the Internet provides a way to maintain contact with Bolivians living in other countries. Abasto says they want to give local users access to the Internet in their own language and provide technical support to help resolve problems and questions.[29]

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[19] Graphics, Visualization, & Usability Center, College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, "Fourth WWW User Survey," http://www.cc.gatech.edu/gvu/user_surveys/], October-November 1995.

[20] The CommerceNet/Nielsen Internet Demographics Survey, Executive Summary, [http://www.nielsenmedia.com/whatsnew/execsum2.htm], 1995.

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[21] Leslie Helm, "Surf's Down on the Net, Survey says," *Los Angeles Times*, 12 January 1996, D-1.
[22] Rene Ernesto Marmolejo, [rene@dns.cincos.net], "Info of our WWW," email to author, 14 November 1995.
[23] Francisco Romero, [fromero@infosel.net.mx], "Answers to questions via Mexicohost," email to author, 22 November 1995.
[24] Eduardo Davila G., [edavila@dash.com], "Re: (no subject)," email to author, 15 November 1995.
[25] Jose M. Dominguez, [jmdg@tonatiuh.uam.mx], "Re: your mail," email to author, 15 November 1995.
[26] Rodrigo Arenas at Servidor WEB Scout, [scout@dcc.uchile.cl], "Re: Preguntas WWW," email to author, 17 November 1995.
[27] Patricio F. Ortiz, [ortiz@calan.das.uchile.cl], "Re: WWW," email to author, 17 November 1995.
[28] Jaime Pavlich at Grupo de Astronomia U.C.N., [astro@sanpedro.cecun.ucn.cl], "Respuestas," email to author, 17 November 1995.
[29] Hubert Abasto Revilla, [hubert@utama.bolnet.bo], "Re: Preguntas WWW," email to author, 26 January 1996.

Although the Webmasters often had a specific group of people in mind, a common theme is that they want to reach an international audience. One Chilean Webmaster indicated that his priorities are first the local audience, second, people in the country or Spanish-speakers in various countries, and finally the world at large.[30] The Universidad Católica de Chile sees its Web pages as a link to the global village and a way integrate the university community into the world community.[31] The Mexican magazine *Proceso* wants to give their magazine more of a world-wide presence, especially because before they created the Web page, there had not been a way to distribute the magazine outside of Mexico.[32] The radio station 98.5 Radioactivo in Mexico City said their primary goal is to bring the radio into a global environment and "convert themselves into informants for all of the Internet community."[33] An Argentine business magazine wrote that they wanted to become part of the vanguard for the new electronic world.[34]

Beyond the general pronouncements about audiences, some of the Webmasters listed the people they know are accessing the information on their Web pages. These reports match many of the characteristics found in the GVU Web users survey. The Chilean electronic newspaper *Copesa* attracts diplomats, all types of professionals, university students, private individuals, institutions, businesses, and Chileans living abroad.[35] A tourist publication in Chile wrote that they have received inquiries from tourists, U.S. and Dutch journalists, a Brazilian senator, and a seventh-grader in Massachusetts who was working on a project for his Spanish class.[36] Many of the universities responded that they wanted to reach students, graduates of their programs, faculty, researchers, professionals, lawyers, as well as government and business leaders.[37] The virtual Museo de Arte Contemporaneo Carrillo Gil in Mexico said they were aware that people in higher education, business, museums, and research were the main users of the Web. At the same time, in the future they hope elementary and secondary schools can also participate in the Internet.[38] One Webmaster in

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[30] Rudolf Busch, [rudolf.busch@rimpex.cl], "Re: Preguntas WWW," email to author, 17 November 1995.
[31] Juan Carlos Soto S., [jcsoto@puc.cl], "Re: (no subject)," email to author, 16 November 1995.
[32] Enrique A. Sánchez Núñez, [esanchez@spin.com.mx], "Re: (no subject)," email to author, 14 November 1995.
[33] Ricardo Massuttier at Radioactivo 98.5 FM, [radioactivo@spin.com.mx], "Re: Radioactivo," email to author, 14 November 1995.
[34] Florencia, [apertura@pinos.com], "(no subject)," email to author, 17 November 1995.
[35] Ernesto Salaberry, [edidec@loa.copesa.cl], "Responde," email to author, 15 November 1995.
[36] Bruce Rule at Publicaciones Golden Rule Ltda., [chilerul@tmm.cl], "hpginfo," email to author, 19 November 1995.
[37] William R. Herrera, [wherrera@mail.integer.mx], "Re: (no subject)," email to author, 15 November 1995; Jose M. Dominguez, [jmdg@tonatiuh.uam.mx], "Re: your mail," email to author, 15 November 1995; Claudia Duran Olmos, [cduran@servidor.unam.mx], "Forwarded mail....," email to author, 15 November 1995; Jose Leopoldo Vega Correa, [vega@servidor.unam.mx], "Re: (no subject)," email to author, 28 November 1995.
[38] Erika Ruiz Vieyra at Museo de Arte Contemporaneo Carrillo Gil, [macg@www.conet.com.mx], "respuesta MACG," email to author, 28 November 1995.

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Mexico commented that he believes "the people that view our pages in Mexico have a strong economic potential."[39] The Webmasters who responded were doctors, professors, engineers, journalists, university students, and business people. The audiences and people using the Web, including those producing Web sites, seem to be drawn from well-educated, middle and upper classes.

Data from the 1995 survey by CommerceNet and Nielsen Media Research support these findings. The researchers found 25 percent of Web users in the United States and Canada have an income of more than US$80,000, 50 percent consider themselves to be in professional or managerial occupations, and 64 percent have at least college degrees. This is clearly an elite group of users, especially compared with the total U.S. and Canadian population. Only 10 percent of U.S. and Canadian population has an income of more than US$80,000, 27 percent are employed in professional or managerial positions, and 29 percent have college degrees.[40]

From a practical standpoint, it comes as no surprise that access to the Web is restricted to middle and upper classes. Even though many computer products have become less expensive in recent years, the cost is often prohibitive for lower-income families. In Chile, wrote Webmaster Bruce Rule, "home computers are not as widespread as in the U.S. because of the higher prices here and also the lower income levels for the majority of Chilean people."[41] Internet providers in Chile estimate there are 4,000 commercial users of the Internet. If they add users at universities, institutions, and corporate local area networks, estimates increase to 10,000, 15,000, or 40,000 people with access to the Internet.[42] According to the 1992 census, Chile has 13.3 million people, with a statistical projection of 14.2 million people by mid-1995. Internet users thus comprise a very small group—between 0.1 and 0.3 percent of the population in Chile.

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[39] Pedro Hernandez, [ids@mail.internet.com.mx], "Re: (no subject)," email to author, 15 November 1995.
[40] The CommerceNet/Nielsen Internet Demographics Survey, Executive Summary, [http://XXXX], 1995.
[41] Bruce Rule at Publicaciones Golden Rule Ltda., [chilerul@tmm.cl], "hpginfo," email to author, 19 November 1995.
[42] Emilio Filippi, [efilippi@netup.cl], "Re: Gracias," email to author, 7 December 1995.

Table 2. Comparative Access to the Internet.

Country	Population 1994[43]	People with access to Internet	Percent of population with access to Internet	Per capita real gross national disposable income (1993)[44]
United States (us)	260,651,000	9,500,000-?	3.6%-17%(?)	$14,696
Brazil (br)	159,147,000	60,000-	0.04%-	$177
Mexico (mx)	89,571,000	200,000-300,000	0.2%-0.3%	$231
Chile (cl)	13,994,000	10,000-40,000	0.1%-0.3%	$255
Argentina (ar)	34,180,000	15,000	0.04%	$366
Colombia (co)	34,546,000	18,000	0.05%	$141
Costa Rica (cr)	3,347,000	*	*	$145
Venezuela (ve)	21,377,000	4,000-9,000	0.02%-0.04%	$283
Ecuador (ec)	11,221,000	*	*	$106
Peru (pe)	23,333,000	10,000-60,000	0.04%-0.3%	$78
Uruguay (uy)	3,168,000	*	*	$235
Panama (pa)	2,585,000	3,000	0.1%	$161
Nicaragua (ni)	4,278,000	3,500?	0.08%	$32
El Salvador (sv)	5,642,000	*	*	$71
Paraguay (py)	4,830,000	*	*	$137
Honduras (hn)	5,494,000	*	*	$65
Guatemala (gt)	10,322,000	600-2,500?	0.01%-0.02%	$97
Bolivia (bo)	7,238,000	1,500-3,500	0.02%-0.05%	$58

* Data not yet available.

Table 2 provides a rough comparison of the people who have access to the Internet in various countries. It also lists, for contextual purposes, the per capita real gross national disposable income. All of these figures are problematic and often highly contested. The number of people who have access to the Internet is often no more than an educated guess—and estimates vary from person to person. Per capita disposable income is also problematic for a variety of reasons. For example, it does not include factors related to the distribution of weath. Despite the problems, the numbers can give a broad sense of some of the challenges to Internet access in Latin America. The most obvious is a practical question of who can actually afford to buy the hardware necessary to connect to the Internet.

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[43] *Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 1994 edition* (Chile: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, United Nations, 1995), 173; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1995*, 115th edition (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1995), 8.

[44] *Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 1994 edition*, 173, 210-211 (1980 prices); U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1995*, 456 (constant 1987 dollars).

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"The main goal is to have ourselves known worldwide"[45]

Those who do have access to the Internet in Latin America often have specific goals for their Web sites, such as international recognition, and create many types of representations. Representations can be created by people within or outside a country. Portrayals of countries can also be seen in the types of information available from that country. To demonstrate this aspect, I will use a specific case example of Chile, one of the most economically developed nations in Latin America. I compiled listings from various indices of Web sites that originate in Chile and arrived at 179 Web sites as of December 1995. This list is limited in that excludes those Web sites not listed in any index, as well as those added after I began my investigations. It was also impossible for me to examine sites where the computer was not functioning or where I received an error message. I classified the Chilean Web sites by the predominant type of information found on the pages, such as art, education, literature, news, science, and sports. The Web sites were also categorized by the owner or source of the information: commercial, education, government, institutes or organizations, and private (both commercial and educational). About 50 percent of the 179 Web sites originated in educational institutions, with another 24 percent as commercial sites. The remaining one-fourth of Web sites in Chile were divided among the government, various institutes and organizations, and private or personal pages.

The largest category of information on the various Chilean Web sites was science, at 23 percent. The next largest category was education—pages about various schools and universities—with 16 percent. Other than the 18 commercial sites (about 10 percent), the rest of the categories (art, economic, environment, general, government, index, Internet, literature, music, news, sports, and tourism/society) only had between 2 and 12 instances or 1 to 7 percent. If one were to look just at the types and sources of Web sites in Chile, the picture would be of a country that emphasized education, science, and commerce. Of every four Web sites, two would be located at educational institutions (universities) and one of the four would be about some scientific topic, such as astronomy or engineering.

However, more important than just the type of available information are the self-portrayals of Latin America that the Webmasters create. Several themes emerged in the Webmasters' email responses. A few disavowed any intention of portraying their country or institution on their Web pages. "Representations" of Chile as a country should be left to the government and its associates, wrote Rodolf Busch. But he wants to demonstrate to the world that his business is capable of working with the latest technology.[46] Even though Cristian Espinoza T. wants to emphasize Chilean cinema on his Web pages, he wrote that this is not because of "blind nationalism," but rather because there is not another source of information.[47]

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[45] Lourdes C. de Villafani, [lourdes@uasb.nch.edu.bo], "Re: Preguntas WWW," email to author, 11 January 1996.

However, some Webmasters directly spoke out against international mass media images of their nations. Scholars have investigated international news flows and the representation of certain nations or groups in the mass media, especially U.S. mass media. Early research found the majority of foreign news concerned developed nations and less developed nations were the subjects of mainly negative stories.[48] Political developments in the 1970s brought global news flow issues to the forefront of international debates, especially in the United Nations, though nothing was actually done about the news flow.[49] Third World nations claimed Western news coverage was "disproportionate and distorted, with too little coverage and too much concentration on the violent, the bizarre, and the conflictual."[50] This phenomenon became known as the "coups and earthquakes" syndrome.[51] Researchers attempted to investigate these claims in myriad news studies.[52] The studies, conducted for both print and broadcast mediums, generally found the news coverage or the number of stories about certain geographical areas did not change substantially during the 1970s and 1980s. In several regional studies of news flow, only Africa received less coverage than

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[46] Rudolf Busch, [rudolf.busch@rimpex.cl], "Re: Preguntas WWW," email to author, 17 November 1995.

[47] Cristian Espinoza T., [cet@ing.puc.cl], "Re: Preguntas WWW," email to author, 17 November 1995.

[48] J. Galtung and M. H. Ruge, "The Structure of Foreign News," *Journal of Peace Research 2* (1965): 64-91; A. Hester, "An Analysis of News Flow from Developed and Developing Nations," *Gazette 17* (1971): 29-43; International Press Institute, *The Flow of the News* (Zurich: Author, 1953); K. E. Rosengren, "International News: Methods, Data and Theory," *Journal of Peace Research 11* (1974): 145-156; Ø. Sande, "The Perception of Foreign News," Journal of Peace Research 8 (1971): 221-237; P. J. Shoemaker, L. H. Danielian, and N. Brendlinger, "Deviant Acts, Risky Business and U. S. Interests: The Newsworthiness of World Events," *Journalism Quarterly 38* (1991): 781-795.

[49] S. MacBride, *Many Voices, One World* (Paris, France: Unesco Press, 1980); Mustapha Masmoudi, "The New World Information Order," *Journal of Communication 29* (1979): 172-185.

[50] D. H. Weaver and G. C. Wilhoit, "Foreign News Coverage in Two U.S. Wire Services," *Journal of Communications 31* (1981): 55.

[51] M. Rosenblum, *Coups and Earthquakes* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 2.

[52] P. Dahlgren with S. Chakrapani, "The Third World on TV News: Western Ways of Seeing the 'Other,'" in *Television Coverage of International Affairs*, ed. W. C. Adams (Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex, 1982), 45-63; G. Gerbner and G. Marvanyi, "The Many Worlds of the World's Press," *Journal of Communication 27* (1977): 52-66; W. J. Gonzenback, M. D. Arant, and R. L. Stevenson, "The World of U.S. Network Television News: Eighteen Years of International and Foreign News Coverage," *Gazette 50* (1992): 53-72; A. Hester, "Five Years of Foreign News on U.S. Television Evening Newscasts," *Gazette 24* (1978): 88-95; J. F. Larson, "International Affairs Coverage on U.S. Network Television," *Journal of Communication 29* (1979): 136-147; J. F. Larson and A. Hardy, "International Affairs coverage on Network Television News: A Study of News Flow," *Gazette 23* (1977): 241-256; A. K. Semmel, "Foreign News in Four U.S. Elite Dailies: Some Comparisons," *Journalism Quarterly 54* (1976): 732-736; A. Sreberny-Mohammadi, "The 'World of the News' Study," *Journalism of Communication 34* (1984): 121-134; J. B. Weaver, C. J. Porter, and M. E. Evans, "Patterns in Foreign News Coverage on U.S. Network TV: A 10-year Analysis," *Journalism Quarterly 61* (1984): 356-363; Weaver and Wilhoit, "Foreign News Coverage"; D. Wilhoit and G. C. Wilhoit, "Foreign News Coverage in Two U.S. Wire Services: An Update," *Journal of Communication 33* (1983): 132-148.

Latin America.[53] Researchers also found stories from or about less developed nations focused more on political violence, internal conflict or crisis, and armed conflict than did stories from developed countries.

Although many of the news flow studies emphasized quantitative data, some scholars examined how various nations or groups were portrayed by the media. The levels of qualitative analysis vary greatly in the different studies. One researcher wrote that the "composite portrait of the developing countries that emerges depicts them as being relatively more prone to internal conflicts and crises; more likely to be the setting of armed conflict; more frequently the recipients of disaster relief, or economic and military aid; and proportionately more often the location of criminal activities."[54] Dahlgren with Chakrapani performed a thoughtful analysis of Third World coverage on television. They found the main motifs for coverage of the Third World were social disorder (political violence, political subversion, military combat), flawed development (governmental corruption, human rights abuses, communism), and primitivism (exoticism, barbarism). They concluded that these themes implied a commitment by news media to a certain type of international order.[55] In the case of these news studies, the representations are created through institutional constraints in media businesses.[56] However, with informal channels of communication such as those afforded by the Internet and the Web, people have the opportunity to create narratives that are not processed through news organizations.

Some of the Webmasters wanted to counteract negative representations of their countries with their Web pages. The coordinator of information systems at Integer, Centro de Excelencia Empresarial, Mexico, wrote that their Web page was designed and elaborated with international standards of quality to demonstrate "that in Mexico we find ourselves with a very good level of technology, capable of competing on a world level." He continued: "The image that many people have of Mexico many times is not correct, given that the news that is published outside [of Mexico] does not always denote the reality of the country.

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[53] J. F. Larson, E. G. McAnany, and J. D. Storey, "News of Latin America on Network Television, 1972-1981: A Northern Perspective on the Southern Hemisphere," *Critical Studies in Mass Communication 3* (1986): 169-183; E. G. McAnany, "Television and Crisis: Ten Years of Network News Coverage of Central America, 1972-1981," *Media, Culture and Society 5* (1983): 199-212; W. Q. Morales, "Revolutions, Earthquakes and Latin America: The Neworks Look at Allende's Chile and Somoza's Nicaragua," in *Television Coverage of International Affairs*, ed. W. C. Adams (Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex, 1982), 79-113.

[54] C. A. Giffard, "Developed and Developing Nation News in U.S. Wire Service Files to Asia," *Journalism Quarterly 61* (1984): 19

[55] Dahlgren with Chakrapani, "The Third World on TV News."

[56] One example of institutional pressures on the creation of news is Mark Pedelty, *War Stories: The Culture of Foreign Correspondents* (New York: Routledge, 1995).

This is a way in which we can better this image."[57] A small Web Publishing business wants to "present Mexico as it really is," especially those things that are unique.[58] Amigo! Mexico Web Center "wants that the people who never have visited Mexico or that think bad about Mexico learn more about the country."[59] In Bolivia, Hubert Abasto writes, "We want to show a country with many facets, with culture and enthusiasm, and free of the prejudice of drugs. We want the people to see in Bolivia a friendly country, open to the world, as well as a country that is adopting the new technologies and the new forms of communication."[60]

At the same time these Webmasters wanted to counteract negative images of their countries, many accepted and participated in the dominant development discourse. Anthropologist Arturo Escobar maintains that development policies and the "Western capitalist paradigm" with their categories and labels shape the thinking of both supporters and critics of "development" in the Third World.[61] In the development discourse, the "early models had an implicit standard (the prosperous, developed countries), and development was to be measured by the yardstick of Western progress. Their notion of underdevelopment occupied the discursive space in such a manner that it precluded the possibility of alternative discourses."[62] In other words, Escobar writes that the notions of progress as measured by "Western standards" have become so pervasive that it is difficult, if not impossible, to find alternative ideas. The language some of the Webmasters use illustrates this point. Radioactiva 98.5 FM in Mexico City responded that they want to show the world "a country in which the people are capable of producing products (speaking in market terms) of quality and capable of competing in the international market."[63] An Argentine business magazine wants to show the world that Argentina has a strong, growing industry and that it is the most advanced Latin American country with respect to fiber optics and cable TV. Argentina, wrote the Webmaster, has an enormous capacity for development.[64] Alfredo Pinochet, of the electronic magazine *Estrategia*, wrote that they wanted to create an image of "an advanced country within Latin America in both economic and technological aspects."[65] An astronomy department wants "to show that astronomy is very viable in Chile" because international institutions have installed telescopes in the country allowing "Chilean astronomers the important opportunity of using first class instrumentation." They "want to stress the point and transmit the message that doing science is feasible in Chile."[66] These Webmasters seem to accept the "Western" standard of progress and development, and want to show that their institutions and countries conform to these expectations. One implication of this limited way in which these Webmasters conceive of development is that the Internet will continue to be used in much the same manner as previous forms of communication—and will receive the same criticisms concerning their representations of marginalized groups, such as women.[67]

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[57] William R. Herrera, [wherrera@mail.integer.mx], "Re: (no subject)," email to author, 15 November 1995.

[58] Luis Enrique Romero, [leromero@mail.internet.com.mx], "Comments on Web," email to author, 15 November 1995.

[59] Mexico Online, [mexinfo@mexonline.com], "Re: (no subject)," email to author, 30 November 1995.

[60] Hubert Abasto Revilla, [hubert@utama.bolnet.bo], "Re: Preguntas WWW," email to author, 26 January 1996.

[61] Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).

[62] Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 83.

[63] Ricardo Massuttier at Radioactivo 98.5 FM, [radioactivo@spin.com.mx], "Re: Radioactivo," email to author, 14 November 1995.

[64] Florencia, [apertura@pinos.com], "(no subject)," email to author, 17 November 1995.

Spinning new stories?

"People struggle with uneven access to power and knowledge in order to construct and tell their stories," wrote Florencia E. Mallon in her book about peasants and nationalism in Peru and Mexico.[68] This same concern with the ability of people to speak for themselves occurs in a variety of settings, including the debate over the role of the mass media. Marginalized groups and countries can gain power through their control of representations. Escobar writes that recent technological developments "might offer unexpected opportunities that groups at the margin could seize to construct innovative visions and practices."[69] New models for developmental journalism emphasize two-way participatory communication, social change, and the empowerment of marginalized groups.

Latin American Webmasters are rapidly implementing Internet technologies and their responses highlighted various issues relating to access, representations, and the ability to spin new stories. Emilio Filippi seemed to suggest that the Web pages in Chile were not much different from Web pages in other places. "I believe that in Chile the media are just beginning to use these electronic means [of communication] and, while they become accustomed and learn, they will not do different things. I suppose that the second step is that yes, they will do so."[70] Filippi does see the potential for creating new sources of information, even though that does not seem to be happening at the moment. Already, some Latin American Webmasters seem to wish to counteract negative stereotypes they perceive in foreign mass media or to offer information not available in other locations.

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[65] Alfredo Pinochet at Servicio de Portada para Internet, [estrate@reuna.cl], "Re: (no subject)," email to author, 16 November 1995.

[66] Patricio F. Ortiz, [ortiz@calan.das.uchile.cl], "Re: WWW," email to author, 17 November 1995.

[67] See, for example, H. Leslie Steeves and Rebecca Arbogast, "Feminism and Communication in Development: Ideology, Law, Ethics, Practice," pp. 229-277 in Brenda Dervin and Usha Hariharan (eds.), *Progress in Communication Sciences, Vol XI* (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1993).

[68] Florencia E. Mallon, *Peasant and Nation* (XXXX), 5.

[69] Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 225.

Perhaps one of the largest contraints for creating "new stories" now in Latin America is that it appears the people who use or have access to the Web belong to elite classes. Moreover, the perspectives and representations on the Web sites are created for these specific audiences. For example, although various institutions note the increase in the number of women using the Web, one survey found only a third of the respondents were women in the United States. Escobar questions how new technologies "enact mechanism of ruling."[71] In this case, the Internet may be viewed from the perspective of how it allows "various groups of people to negotiate specific forms of power, authority, and representation."[72] Generally, the Web seems to foster communication among the "elites" around the globe, excluding the poor, women, and other marginalized groups.

In an article on the anthropology of "cyberculture," Escobar offers some suggestions and theoretical considerations for research on technology and culture. Although the article does not specifically address the Web and only briefly deals with the Internet, some of his points can be applied to both. One series of questions deals with the relationship between the First and Third Worlds or rich and poor nations in light of new technologies.[73] Several of the Webmasters pointed out the necessity of publishing Web pages in order to "keep up" with global developments. One Webmaster quoted Larry H. Landweber, president of Internet Incorporated, who said on a visit to Chile, "Whoever is not incorporated into these systems will be considered a second-class citizen."[74] This viewpoint relegates almost 99 percent of the people in Latin America, not to mention about 83 percent of the people in the United States and Canada, to "second-class" citizenship since they do not have access to the Internet. Anthropologist David Hess writes, "As all of us know only too well, for many people in the world most of Cyberia is a distant Siberia located well above the global glass ceiling."[75] To the extent that the Internet does not reach a more "mass" audience, it could increase the gap between the rich and poor and solidify existing power structures. In an article about changes in news agencies, Mohammed Musa wrote that "while the public is deprived of information the corporate elite is living in information affluence. In other words, the gap between the information rich and the information poor is widening at an alarming rate."[76] If the Web is used by elites around the globe, the types of information, narratives, and stories may not differ that much in various countries. We may start to hear some of the same criticisms of communication that existed with the debate over the New World Information Order in the 1970s and 1980s. At the present time, the Internet is not yet an "ultimate open society" with "free global communication" for all people in Latin America. Rather it is an elite form of communication for less than one percent of the people in many Latin American countries.

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[70] Emilio Filippi, [efilippi@netup.cl], "Re: Gracias," email to author, 7 December 1995.
[71] Escobar, "Cyberia," 220.
[72] Escobar, "Cyberia," 216.
[73] Arturo Escobar, "Welcome to Cyberia: Notes on the Anthropology of Cyberculture," *Current Anthropology 35* (1994): 214, 220.
[74] Ernesto Salaberry, [edidec@loa.copesa.cl], "Responde," email to author, 15 November 1995.

However, on a more positive note, once Third World countries, businesses, or individuals have connections to the Internet and the appropriate hardware, they are conceivably on equal footing with other countries, businesses, or individuals. A homepage in Peru could be similar to a homepage produced in California—both even offering Spanish and English versions of the text. Despite the obstacles, as the necessary hardware moves into the countries, the Internet offers at least a possibility groups and individuals who have access in Latin America can create their own stories.

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[75] David Hess, "Comments on the Anthropology of Cyberculture," *Current Anthropology 35* (1994): 224.
[76] Mohammed Musa, "News agencies, transnationalization and the new order," *Media, Culture and Society 12* (1990): 328.

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Private-Enterprise Broadcasting And Accelerating Dependency: Case Studies From Nigeria And Uganda•

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Abstract

This paper shows how political economy transformations in sub-Saharan Africa have led to the proliferation of privately-owned, commercial broadcasting stations. Despite assumptions that political economy constraints and weak market factors would inhibit private-enterprise broadcasting, the paper shows that none of these constraints have prevented indigenous (African) entrepreneurs from establishing viable broadcast stations. Using cases from Nigeria and Uganda, the paper argues that notwithstanding the potential for reverse export earnings, the existing private-enterprise stations are heavily dependent on foreign vendors for equipment and programming, with the region spending an estimated $300 million between 1995 and 1996 on broadcast-related services.

Introduction

The emergence of privately-owned (independent) commercial broadcasting in sub-Saharan Africa the last few years calls for a major revision of the literature on the region's media regimes. Presently, this literature is inadequate for at least three reasons. First, political reforms and media privatization in sub-Saharan Africa have so far outpaced writings on the subject, with several newly-formed, indigenously-owned, private and commercial enterprise broadcast stations going on the air the last two years. This is in addition to experiments with point-to-point (telecommunication) in some countries. Second, the emergence of private-enterprise broadcasting exposes the fallacy of assumptions regarding the failure of the African press because of what Hachten and others have sweepingly identified as the crisis of political economy transformation (Hachten, 1993, pp. 29-35). Thirdly, no one has yet given a definitive account of the profile of existing privately-owned broadcasting enterprises in sub-Saharan Africa beyond confirming their existence.

This paper addresses these three shortcomings. It uses the examples of Nigeria and Uganda, two sub-Saharan Africa countries that have allowed privately-owned commercial broadcasting, as illustrative case studies. I will use a political economy framework, as suggested by Galtung (1993), to show how press transformation is taking place in this region. Furthermore, in updating the profile of commercial broadcasting in the two countries, I will use recent field data to show how privatization is accentuating structures of dependency within Africa's broadcast sector.

Developments In Private-Enterprise Broadcasting[1]

The explosion of private-enterprise broadcasting in sub-Saharan Africa has largely been a phenomenon of the past decade. Whereas very few such stations existed barely a decade ago, some 137 such stations are now said to exist in 27 countries of the region (Dokpesi, 1996). The growing number of stations in Nigeria and Uganda the last two years alone bears testimony to the dynamic state of private-enterprise broadcasting in the region. As at April 1996, there were six such stations in Uganda. Two of them, Radio SANYU, 88.2 FM, and SANYU TV (STV), 28 UHF, are owned by the Katto family. The Katto family has other business holdings in banking, insurance, and manufacturing. The other station, Capital Radio, 91.3 CAPITAL FM, is owned by a consortium of 12 individuals. The principal owners are Patrick Quarcoo, a Ghanaian entrepreneur with past Reuters and BBC experience, and William Pike, the British-born editor of the Ugandan government-owned New Vision daily newspaper. These two account for 51 percent of the controlling stock of CAPITAL FM, the remaining stock being held by 10 Ugandan minority shareholders. The two Kampala-based radio stations are FM (frequency modulation) signal stations. Capital Radio broadcasts on a 2-Kilowatt transmitter with a total transmitter power output of 20 Kilowatt and a coverage of 45--67 miles around Kampala. The station was launched on December 31, 1993. Radio Sanyu broadcasts on a 5-Kilowatt transmitter with a total transmitter power output of 40 Kilowatt which covers 67 miles around Kampala. The station was launched on December 12, 1993. Its sister station, STV, was launched on October 8, 1994. It broadcasts on a 1-Kilowatt transmitter, with coverage limited to 28 miles around Kampala. Three other stations, all television re-transmission facilities, also operate from Kampala, but their services are offered to much smaller audiences.They are Stem Cable and Cablesat, both with South African and Kenyan connections; and Madhvani TV, the close-circuit station owned by the Ugandan-Asian Madhvani family. Both of the Kampala-based FM Radio stations recovered the costs of their investments within the first nine months of operation and are grossing revenues in excess of $100,000 a month. As a measure of the health of these stations, four private-enterprise stations accounted for 58 percent of the total billings of the top 10 advertiser product categories during the month of February, 1995, the top four public-enterprise stations accounted for only 16 percent share. The other 26 percent share of the billings went to newspapers, magazines, and outdoor advertising.[2]

In Nigeria, 114 licenses have been issued since the National Broadcasting Commission decree was enacted in 1992.[3] As at May, 1996, 31 of the 114 licensees had paid license fees, seven over-the-air television stations had commenced transmissions, plus another 15 satellite re-transmission services. Two FM radio stations had also begun broadcasting. One of them, RAY POWER 100 FM, based in Nigeria's commercial capital, Lagos, has already established itself as Nigeria's leading commercial broadcast operation, with revenues in excess of $250,000 a month during the first year of operation. The station is owned by DAAR Communications Limited whose principal owner is the Nigerian businessman and shipping magnate, Raymond Dokpesi. DAAR Communications has also obtained approval from the Nigerian government to commence broadcasting Africa's first independently-owned, commercial, global satellite television network. The project, known as African Independent Television, (AIT), is backed by a consortium of eight Nigerian banks, and it is scheduled to be on the air by the end of 1996. As at May, 1996, DAAR had invested some $25 million in the AIT project. The AIT complex at Alagbado, just outside Lagos, is equipped with the latest broadcast technology, including completely redundant video compression and RF compression technology, which are the international standards for television broadcasting and High Definition TV broadcasting. AIT expects to broadcast 24 Hours a day, beaming news and entertainment programming around the globe by utilizing the Global beam of INTELSAT 601 at 332.5 degrees EAST.

The other Nigerian FM radio station is based in the eastern Niger River town of Obosi, Onitsha. The station is one of three broadcast operations currently under the ownership of Minaj Systems, which is owned by M.A. Ajegbo, the Nigerian businessman who contracts extensively with the Nigerian military for defence industry supplies. Ajegbo also owns Minaj Systems Television, (MST), a 5-Kilowatt commercial TV station broadcasting out of Obosi, and Minaj Cable Network, (MCN), a 20-Kilowatt satellite re-transmission facility which also broadcasts out of Obosi. Although the Minaj Network says it plans to launch six more cable franchises over the next five years, there were indications as at April 1996 that the Obosi stations might already be facing some questions of financial viability.[4]

Literature

I suggested earlier that one of the shortcomings of international communications literature on sub-Saharan Africa is the failure to update knowledge on how rapid changes in political liberalization have led to the privatization of both mass media and point-to-point (telecommunication) in the region. The omission is particularly glaring in the case of private-enterprise broadcasting. For example, at the time Merrill's book on global journalism was published in 1995, it was thought that comparative advantage, economic, technological, and programming limitations pose major handicaps for the emergence of private-enterprise broadcasting in a number of these countries (Merrill, 1995, pp. 61-62). Moreover, it was assumed that African states were unwilling to allow private-enterprise broadcasting despite constitutional provisions (Merrill, 1995, pp. 224-225). Louise Bourgault's recent book on the mass media in sub-Saharan Africa provided some of the most recent developments on the privatization of broadcasting and the trend towards commercialization by existing state-owned operations. But this study, like many others, fail to provide accurate accounts of what has now emerged as indigenously-owned, commercial, private-enterprise broadcast stations. For example, Bourgault's speculation that private-enterprise broadcasting in Uganda was most likely to be launched by foreign operators (Bourgault, 1995a, p. 100), has proven not to be the case. Similarly, the 1993 extensive survey on West African broadcasting conducted by the PANOS Institute of Paris, and the West African Union of Journalists, is now considerably dated, although the study itself provides some of the most useful context for evaluating the emerging private broadcast regimes in the sub-region (PANOS, 1993). Moreover, assumptions about the in-roads likely to be made by powerful international broadcasting entities, (Bourgault, 1995a, pp. 101-102), needs evaluation and clarification. Similarly, we need to know more about the anticipated impact on domestic African polities, of programming, news control, and commercial considerations (Bourgault, 1995a, pp. 223-225).

Until now, the application of development theory to international communications research has essentially focused on the contribution of mass media to national development (Schramm, 1964; Lerner, 1958; McAnany, 1980), and the growth of media within the larger framework of global transformations in international communications (Hachten, 1993). The discussion of transformations occurring within the sub-Saharan Africa region is marginal, at best. Also missing from these studies are explanations of how mass media thrive or develop within and across different polities of the region. This is not to say that international communications scholars fail to recognize the usefulness of political economy explanations. Indeed, other scholars have called for greater recognition of political economy factors in the studies of such transformations (Galtung, 1993), although few works have yet examined or suggested how such political economy factors effect transformations.

Method

In examining the emerging privately-owned broadcast enterprises in sub-Saharan Africa, I have adopted an analytic framework which combines a review of the structure and function of the new private stations with observations on their operations, plus deductions about transformations taking place in the political, economic, and social environments of the enterprises. This is the logic of political economy, according to John Neville Keynes (Keynes, 1917). Recognizing the limitations of definitions, and given the debate regarding the origin and nature of political economy, Keynes says "political economy may be defined as the science which treats of the phenomena arising out of the economic activities of mankind in society" (Keynes, 1917, p. 101). Considering the question of method, Keynes argues that neither pure induction nor pure deduction is appropriate to political economy. As he puts it, "it is only by the unprejudiced combination of the two methods that any complete development of economic science is possible" (Keynes, 1917, p. 172). In particular, he mentions two processes that are of fundamental importance: (i) observation, from which "even deductive economics obtains its ultimate premises," (Keynes, 1917, p. 173), and (ii) investigation of the "physical and other circumstances by which economic activities are

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Features of Communications Dependency

Academic analysis of international media activities reveal two outstanding features of communications regimes which amount to influence by developed states on developing countries. These features relate to (a) the uni-directional nature of international media flows, mostly from the United States to the rest of the world; and (b) the dominance of a small number of source countries in international media flows, with the U.S., Britain, France, West Germany, Russia, Italy, and Japan accounting for a substantial share of the flows (Boyd-Barrett, 1977, p. 117). More recent analysis of these international media flows reveal that the flows between countries are closely related to limits in national media production, the difficulty of producing media at home having a great deal to do with what media contents are exported and imported across borders (Straubhaar & La Rose, 1996, p. 124). In general, this media dependency on the more developed states is regarded as a manifestation of media imperialism (Boyd-Barrett, 1977). Of the weak comparative position of developing countries in relation to international communications, Bourgault states that the economic positions of periphery states render them largely cut off from the profits of global information expansion, noting that existing infrastructures are only partially ready to be converted to use by local citizens (Bourgault, 1995a). On the marginal position of the periphery states in controlling the outcomes of communications within their own polities, Boyd-Barrett argues that the overall context of power imbalance within which media activities occur and are transmitted indicates that far greater freedom of choice or option accompanies the process of export and dissemination (from the developed countries) than the process of adoption and absorption in the developing countries (Boyd-Barrett, 1977, p. 119). The relevance of this argument is underscored by recent data on international media flows. For example, Straubhaar & La Rose show that TV news flows across borders has been increasing dramatically since the 1970s as CNN, BBC, and other direct broadcast satellite (DBS) providers began to offer entire newscasts and even all-day news coverage across borders, primarily to satellite TV receivers and cable television operators (Straubhaar & La Rose, 1996, p. 125). Bourgault's observation concerning the diffusion of DBS programs and the class differences in the exposure to, and acquisition of foreign programs and technology in Nigeria (Bourgault, 1995b), shows that the phenomenon described by Straubhaar & La Rose is already prevalent in Nigeria. I will show in my own discussion that in the case of Uganda, the incursion of DBS and other foreign programming via private-enterprise broadcasters is far more pervasive than was previously known.

Several reasons account for the dominance of core country media influences over those of the periphery.[5] Most of the explanations relate to economies of scale, production attributes, and trade policy regimes. Regarding American film exports to the rest of the world, for example, Straubhaar and La Rose mention three attributes that ensure success and dominance: (1) the enormous size of the U.S. market for movies permit cost recoveries in domestic release, as does the element of disposable income and size of an affluent national audience. (2) The narrative forms of American films are much simpler and more universal, thus ensuring the ability of American films to capture large, diverse audiences around the world. (3) Under the leadership of the Motion Picture Export Association (MPEA), American film producers have been able to work together in promoting exports and in controlling overseas distribution networks. (Straubhaar & La Rose, 1996, pp. 124-130). This dominant feature of America's film industry is duplicated by the music industry which is also primarily based in the U.S., and which appeals to a globalized youth culture. But the dominant position of U.S. film and music industry notwithstanding, Straubhaar & La Rose note that the developing countries are not without options for successfully developing local film and music industries, especially if the domestic market is large, or if production aims at capturing a multicountry audience that is defined and to some degree protected by a shared language and culture. In particular, they point to ratings in many countries that reflect audience preferences for local programming if they can get it and if it is well produced. American programming they argue, is attractive to a highly stratified segment of world audiences, especially those who are cosmopolitan in tastes and previous media exposure. Otherwise, it seems that people more frequently look for television programming that is more culturally proximate --i.e. closer to their own languages, cultures, histories, and values (Straubhaar & La Rose, 1996, p. 128).

Origin of Private-Enterprise Broadcasting In Uganda

The origin of private-enterprise broadcasting in Uganda is sketchy. Unlike Nigeria where the stations evolved from public advocacy, in Uganda the opposite was the case. Evolution was conceived as private demand, which was governed by patrimonous connections. Although the authority to issue private licenses for broadcasting lies with the Department of Posts and Telegraph (P&T), this power is meaningless without prior sanction by an authorizing minister. Hence, Katto's "chat" with his friend, the information minister, is significant because it was a precursor to the issuance of license for Uganda's first private-enterprise radio station. Katto is a businessman with close friendships with the Museveni government. Before venturing into broadcasting, he owned seven manufacturing companies which made toilet paper, cotton wool, toothpaste, and soaps. He also owns interests in banking, insurance brokerage, and marketing/distribution services.[6] He lost his businesses twice, once during the tumultuous years of Idi Amin, and again under the dictator, Milton Obote. For six years, he went into exile in Kenya, returning to Uganda in 1986 on the heels of the Museveni National Resistance Army (NRA) government. His application for a broadcast license was considered and approved within one month. Radio Sanyu was on the air six months later.

The Katto concession spurred demands for licenses by other entrepreneurs, with the Capital FM group gaining the next franchise for radio broadcasting. They were on the air within three weeks of Radio Sanyu. One of the two principal owners of the Capital group is William Pike, the British-born editor of the Ugandan government-owned newspaper, The New Vision. Pike's connections with Museveni's NRA group and the Ugandan military go back many years. He has remained as the Vision's managing editor for nine years, in addition to having other business interests around Kampala. Other licenses have been issued to ethnic, communal, and religious groups. They include the Voice of Toro (western Uganda kingdom), the Anglican Church in Mbarara Town (south-western Uganda) and the Roman Catholic Church in Lira Town (northern Uganda)[7]. None of these stations had gone on the air by the summer of 1995, but they were expected to do so at the end of the year.

Given that the first licensees in Uganda were entrepreneurs with close ties to the Museveni government, one must agree with Tangri's observation that privatization in sub-Saharan Africa is often governed by "the logic of patrimonialism" (Tangri, 1995, p. 181). By this, he means that in general, those with access to political influence tend to monopolize access to credits, contracts, and concessions. Although Tangri's discussion was in the context of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the logic is nevertheless applicable to private-enterprise broadcasting in Uganda. Furthermore, one must accept the argument that economic liberalization in these countries has been aided by the need to comply with donor-driven economic reform programs of which divestiture and greater political and economic liberalization constituted an integral part (Tangri, 1995).

Profile of Uganda's Private-Enterprise Stations

Both Capital Radio and Radio Sanyu, as well as Sanyu-TV are equipped with modern hardware. In the case of Sanyu-TV at least, it would appear there was a need for significant upgrading of technical capacity, in order to make productive use of the technology and attain quick cost-recoveries through innovative programming, marketing, and economic management. Collectively, the three Ugandan private-enterprise stations I visited reported investing $2.24 million to launch the stations. In 1994--95, the stations spent a combined $700,000 on equipment purchases and another $555,000 on programming. All equipment and programming were acquired from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Community.

Capital Radio, 91.3 FM broadcasts 22 hours daily, seven days a week. The station originates its own programs 16 hours daily, and carries British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) programming for the remaining six hours daily. Capital FM estimates DBS transmissions account for 27 percent of its programming, the bulk of the shows consisting of live shows and taped local programs. Foreign programs make up 65 percent of Capital's schedule, and advertising is estimated at 13 percent. The target audience is the 24 -- 35 year-old age group. Most of the programs are "American Top 40 Hits", classifying 90 percent of its programs as "commercial music only"; "News & Sports", 7 percent; and "Public Affairs", 3 percent. The station has 20 full-time employees and 15 part-timers. It spends heavily on promotions, market research and training, estimating about 3 -- 4 percent of recurrent expenditure as training, research, and development costs. The station recovered its investments within eight months. Its major expansion plans for the next five years include studio upgrades, computerization, the hiring of more news staff, increasing research expenditures, and starting new radio stations.

Radio Sanyu, 88.2 FM broadcasts 24 hours daily, seven days a week. Foreign productions account for 75 percent of its programs. It originates its own transmissions for 17 1/2 hours daily, from 6:30 a.m. until Midnight. From Midnight until 6:00 a.m., it carries VOA/Europe, and from 6:00 a.m. until 6:30 a.m., it carries VOA/Washington, D.C. Radio Sanyu estimates it receives 27 percent of its programs via direct broadcast satellites. Advertising as a proportion of all broadcasts is 10 percent. Its target audience is the 18 -- 35 year-old age group, with its focus on "urban contemporary music." The station classifies 80 percent of its programs as "commercial music only"; "News & Sports", 10 percent; and "Public Affairs", 2 percent. Other types of programs make up 8 percent. As with Capital FM, Radio Sanyu recovered its costs in nine months. Its sister station, STV, also broadcasts 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Its dependence on foreign programming is more substantial than Radio Sanyu. Sanyu-TV programs consist of 95 percent foreign content. And although the station could develop capacity for local origination programming, it was yet to develop its comparative advantage in this area, particularly with regards to export programming. Five percent of Sanyu-TV broadcasts are commercials, far less than is possible for its market. All of its foreign broadcasts consist of the Atlanta-based Cable News Network (CNN) programming, and the United States Information Service (USIA) WorldNet Television Service. It hooks up with CNN from Midnight until 3:00 p.m. daily, and with Worldnet from 3:00 p.m. until 6:00 p.m. Between 6:00 p.m. and Midnight, it originates its own programs, the bulk of which consists of British and American films. Sanyu-TV's long-range plans include extension of coverage nationwide, expansion of local production capacity, expansion of its news, upgrades of marketing, and involvement in export programming. Both Radio Sanyu and Sanyu TV have a combined staff of 71 full-time employees and 10 part-timers.

Private-Enterprise Broadcasting In Nigeria

Nigeria presents the most dynamic environment for private-enterprise broadcasting in sub-Saharan Africa. Its 24 stations represent an increase of four stations since the last known report (Ajia, 1994). The proliferation of private-enterprise broadcasting despite a highly unstable polity attests to the resilience of both the private economy and the ability of Nigerian institutions to function in environments of uncertainty and instability. The private-enterprise stations are additional to 43 public-enterprise television stations and 35 public-enterprise radio stations, all of which operate as commercial operations owned by federal and state governments. The political origin and character of the Nigerian press has already been well documented by others (Uche, 1989; Obe, 1992; PANOS, 1993). Private-enterprise broadcasting in Nigeria fits into this mold. Although the 1979 Nigerian constitution established the principle of private-enterprise broadcasting, no government was willing to tackle the issue until the impetus for real change coalesced around serious advocacy by leading industry professionals, professional journalists, and other practitioners (Ajia, 1994). This unity of purpose resulted in a national conference and the release of the National Mass Communication Policy document in 1990. This document preceded by two years, the enactment of legislation creating the National Broadcasting Commission, the regulatory agency empowered to issue broadcast licenses in Nigeria. However, the reformist effort to weaken state monopoly over broadcasting in Nigeria was aided by the pluralist choice policies being pushed on Nigeria since the middle 1980s by the World Bank, the IMF, and other international lending institutions. In contrast with Uganda, where private-enterprise broadcasting evolved through patrimonous, ad hoc, and carte blanche policy, the opposite was the case in Nigeria.[8] The Nigerian policy framework shows that public interest groups and practicing professionals spearheaded the campaign for privatization, capitalizing on the climate of broad structural adjustment and pluralist reform choice policies.

Regulatory Environment for Nigeria's Private-Enterprise Broadcasting

On paper, Nigeria's National Broadcasting Commission Decree (No.38 of 1992) is a sweeping legislation, which if scrupulously enforced, could cripple the industry in its infancy. The power of the NBC covers 16 categories, proceeding from the general to the particular. This includes authority to regulate and control programming content, adjudicate over programming disputes, uphold national standards, codes, ethical, and technical standards (Nigeria Gazette, 1992, p. A316). Perhaps the most threatening of the legislative provisions, is the "national interest clause", by which a station is required "to promote national interest, unity, and cohesion" or risk the loss of a license (Nigeria Gazette, 1992, p. A319). The commission cannot grant licenses to religious organizations or political parties. It also bars ownership and control of more than two TV stations. The 3rd Schedule to the decree requires stations to keep programming and transmitter output logs daily. Furthermore, a license application must contain proposed programs over a given period, e.g. quarterly, and local program content must not be less than 40 percent. The NBC has since stipulated a local content provision in carving distinction between Over-the-Air radio and television stations and satellite re-transmission services. Over-the-air stations must carry a minimum of 60 percent local programming. The satellite re-transmission services must meet a 20 percent local content minimum (NBC Documents, undated: Section 10). The NBC has a governing board of 11 members, including its chairman, and a director-general who functions as the commission's chief executive. The nine other members represent seven disciplinary interests: law, business, performing arts, education, social science, media, and public affairs.

The Minaj Systems TV And Cable Network

Whereas RAY POWER, 100 FM, the Lagos-based radio operation is clearly the most successful broadcast operation in Nigeria, data on the station was incomplete at the time of writing. Consequently, I will use the Minaj Systems TV and Cable Network as an illustrative case, paying particular attention to how it compares with Uganda's Sanyu group. The Minaj Systems TV and cable operations are surprisingly capital intensive projects, given that the stations are located in a very small market on the eastern Niger River. The group reportedly spent $3 million on capital investment. Minaj Cable Network was launched on December 15, 1993. Its TV franchise, MST, was launched on June 19, 1994 --on record as Africa's first independently-owned, commercial television station. The Minaj group spends about $950,000 a year on equipment and programming. All of its equipment purchases are from the USA and the United Kingdom. Its program acquisitions are obtained from the USA, Britain, Germany, and the domestic (Nigerian) market.

Minaj Systems TV broadcasts 12 hours daily, seven days a week; its cable operation broadcasts 18 hours daily. The group does not break down its programs by content categories, claiming a "general" audience as its target audience. It, however, reports that 55 percent of its programs are local, for its Over-the-Air TV station. Its cable (satellite re-transmission service) reports 80 percent foreign programming. Advertising accounts for 10 percent of all broadcast content on the Over-the-Air station, 5 percent for the cable service. Long-range plans included the establishment of six other cable franchises. Since it furnished this information, the Minaj group has since launched an FM radio station, also in Obosi.

Conclusion

I have shown in this paper that the growth of private-enterprise broadcasting in sub-Saharan Africa is being accelerated by political economy transformations taking place in the region. These transformations have been aided by a combination of internal demands for liberalization and external pressures to democratize institutions of public choice in both the political and economic arenas. In the case of mass media, the privatization of broadcasting has attracted significant attention, partly on account of the profit potentials it holds for private entrepreneurs who see a window of opportunity for cashing in on the global expansion of information and entertainment, and partly because of desires to widen the spaces for public debate over public policy through de-monopolization of state power over information. Contrary to speculations in international communications literature, neither weak market factors nor political constraints have so far prevented the emergence of these private-enterprise stations. Moreover, many of the enterprises have been pioneered by indigenous African entrepreneurs, not the big multinational companies foreseen by western-based communications scholars.

In the two cases I have reviewed in this paper, I have shown that whereas private entrepreneurs are already enjoying significant success in private-enterprise broadcasting, particularly radio, they are far more dependent on foreign programming than is probably necessary. Collectively, African private and public-enterprise stations are currently spending an estimated $300 million annually on equipment and programming, most of which is in foreign imports from the United States and the European Community. Where regulatory policy is effective, as in Nigeria, private-enterprise stations carry far less foreign programs than otherwise. Furthermore, there is an absence of foreign propaganda programming such as those of the BBC, VOA, Worldnet, and CNN that is evident in Uganda. Given their comparative advantages regarding opportunities for culturally-proximate programming, small economies of scale, and provided they invest in capacity building initiatives in strategic planning, marketing, and management, many of the newly emergent private-enterprise stations would more than likely significantly quadruple their profit potentials. Whereas it is still too early to say whether or not private-enterprise broadcasting is widening the space for choice in the public arena as alternative information channels, one is persuaded by anecdotal evidence that this indeed may be the case. Given the enthusiasm with which the new private-enterprise stations have been received in the metropolis of Lagos, Nigeria, and Kampala, Uganda, one is convinced that these stations could indeed improve the climate of political liberalization. Whether or not this enthusiasm can be sustained is largely dependent on the willingness to sustain the course of democratization by the political authorities of sub-Saharan Africa.

Endnotes

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[1] Information in this section based on author's field notes collected during site visits to Uganda and Nigeria in 1995 and 1996.

[2]. This pattern was stable over a six-month period, according to Steadman & Associates, the Nairobi-based marketing research firm that monitors advertising expenditures in East and Southern Africa. See Steadman & Associates, Advertising Expenditure Report, February 1995.

[3]. Decree No. 38, National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) Decree 1992 established the NBC for the purpose of "receiving, processing and considering applications for the ownership of radio and television stations including cable television services, direct satellite broadcast and any other medium of broadcasting" (Nigeria Gazette, 1992, p. A316).

[4] See "No more sack fever at Obosi." The (Nigerian) Guardian, Thursday, April 25, 1996, p.35.

[5]. Use of the terms "core" and "periphery" in this paper is consistent with usage in political economy literature, with the core states referring to the more developed states (mostly western market economies) and periphery states referring to those in developing countries (including sub-Saharan Africa countries).

[6]. Author's field notes (Kampala, Uganda, June -- July, 1995).

[7] See Sam Obbo, "Radio, TV promoting Western culture." The New Vision, June 28, 1995, p. 21.

[8]. Some of the private-enterprise entrepreneurs in Uganda say as far as they know, no rules govern the content or any aspect of broadcasting in Uganda, with the possible exception of obscenity. Whereas some of them would like to see this laissez affaire approach continue, some actually called for the establishment of an Independent Broadcast Authority to formulate guidelines for broadcast operation. (Author's notes, Uganda, 1995).

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THE TRANSITIONAL MEDIA SYSTEM OF POST-COMMUNIST BULGARIA

by

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Abstract

This study reviews media developments in Bulgaria in the first five years after the ousting of communism. An analysis of the existing press typologies shows that none is appropriate for describing the rapid changes that occurred in post-communist Bulgaria. The study proposes and defines a descriptive transitional press concept in terms of the coexistence of prescriptive press concepts. The media system of post-communist Bulgaria is used as an example and a case to test the proposed transitional press concept.

The examination of the developments in three areas of Bulgarian journalism: media management and economics, media, political parties and the government, and media law and ethics, reveals a coexistence of five prescriptive concepts: libertarian, authoritarian, communist, social responsibility, and democratic socialist.

Introduction

Purpose of the study: This study explores the development of the Bulgarian media system in the first five years after the ousting of the communist regime.[1] The study is guided by three objectives. The first is to evaluate the literature on press philosophies and media systems in terms of their applicability to the post-communist media system of Bulgaria. The second is to propose a concept that would appropriately describe the development of Bulgarian media in the first five years after the fall of communist rule. The third is to provide support for the proposed concept by analyzing the transitional processes in key aspects of Bulgarian post-communist journalism, such as media economics and management, journalists' attitudes toward the government and political parties, and media law and ethics.

Research questions: The study, exploratory in nature, seeks to answer two main questions. The first question is which press concept would most accurately describe the Bulgarian media system in the first five-year period after the fall of communism and during the transition of Bulgarian society to an open market and a liberal democracy. The second question is how the introduction of an open market and a pluralistic political system in post-communist Bulgaria has affected the country's media system.

Method: Analyzing the development of the post-communist Bulgarian media system over a course of five years, rather than providing a snapshot of it at one point in time, requires an abundance of information collected over time. Four complementary methods of data collection were employed:

1) Personal, in-depth interviews with Bulgarian journalists, media managers and educators were conducted in 1994 and 1995. The first series of interviews was conducted in March 1994 with a group of twelve Bulgarian print, radio and television journalists, journalism educators, and journalism students who were visiting the United States as fellows at the International Center for Community Journalism and the Iowa State University Department of Journalism and Mass Communication. The second series of interviews was conducted in Bulgaria in June 1994 with editors, reporters, circulation and advertising managers, and advertising agents from fifteen newspapers, and program directors, managers, editors, anchors, reporters, and advertising agents from six private radio stations. The third series of interviews was conducted with six senior-level print journalists traveling in the United States on a grant from the Unites States Agency for International Development in March 1995. The fourth series of interviews was conducted the same month in Bulgaria with thirty-three print, television and radio journalists, newspaper managers, news

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[1] Throughout the study, the terms media, press and journalism are used interchangeably. The study focuses specifically on newspapers, magazines, radio and television. When the term Eastern Europe is used it refers to all countries of the former communist bloc, including Southeastern and Central Europe, as well as Russia and the newly independent states.

librarians, journalism educators and researchers. In addition, seven other interviews used for the study were conducted in 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995 with three journalists, three journalism educators, and a researcher.

All interviewees were asked specific questions pertaining to the current developments and problems in Bulgarian journalism. While this method does not lead to generalizable results, it offers the opportunity to establish rapport with the interviewees and to distill their personal experiences and insights.[2]

2) Three surveys were conducted with convenience samples of Bulgarian journalists, media managers, advertising directors, and educators who participated in American-sponsored, journalism-related seminars in Bulgaria. The first one took place in October 1994 with forty-two participants in a media management seminar. Thirteen completed questionnaires were returned by mail--a response rate of thirty-one percent, which is considered normal in social science research today.

A group of forty-five journalists who participated in a seminar for investigative reporters and editors in Bulgaria in May 1995 completed the second survey. Sixteen questionnaires were filled and returned at the end of the seminar--a response rate of thirty-six percent.

The third survey took place in July 1995 with forty-three media managers, journalists and advertising directors who participated in three media management seminars in Bulgaria. Questionnaires were filled and returned after each seminar. A total of thirty-four surveys was filled and returned--a response rate of seventy-nine percent. In summary, information from surveys with a total of sixty-three Bulgarian journalists, media managers, advertising directors, and educators was used for this study.

3) Thirdly, the content of the Bulgarian press was examined for a period of five years--from 1990 to 1995. This was not a quantitative content analysis but a survey of Bulgarian newspapers, ranging from influential largest-circulation national dailies to regional weeklies and monthlies published in some of the smallest towns. A systematic analysis could not be done due to lack of regular access to a publication's issues, but this review of a variety of newspapers makes possible some consideration of common characteristics and differences among publications of different size and location.

4) Finally, the primary sources of information for this study included the two publications of the Union of Bulgarian Journalists, the weekly newspaper Pogled (Look) and the magazine Bulgarski Zhurnalist (Bulgarian Journalist). Of special interest were individual journalists' columns on media developments in the country, published regularly in these two outlets.

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[2] Roger D. Wimmer and Joseph Dominick, Mass Media Research: An Introduction, 3rd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1991), p. 128.

The study first reviews the existing press concepts on which the typology proposed here is built. It then proposes and defines a descriptive transitional press concept in terms of the coexistence of prescriptive press concepts. The media system of post-communist Bulgaria is used as an example and a case to test the proposed transitional press concept.

An Update of Press Concepts

Current press typologies: None of the existing press concepts, developed since the 1950s to provide a framework for understanding the world's press, would alone describe today's post-communist press.[3] Three criticisms emerge from an evaluation of the existing press typologies: 1) They have mixed prescriptive (or normative) concepts with descriptive (or reflective) concepts; 2) They have used mostly ideological criteria which has led to oversimplified categorizations of the world's media systems; 3) They have ignored the element of transition for all but the media systems of the traditionally called Third World.

The underlying idea of most press typologies is that the press reflects the political system of a society.[4] As a result, the main category for systematization has been the different societies' political perspective on government-press relations. This has brought a confusion between "the actual working principles of a given media system; the theoretical ideals of the system; and the dominant ideology of the society (capitalist, socialist, revolutionary, developmental, or whatever)."[5]

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[3] Although most of the world press typologies are called theories, they are not really theories in the social science sense of the term, e.g., they are not based on empirical research and do not provide a realistic picture, but mix it with the ideal for a given system. [See for example, Maxwell E. McCombs and Lee B. Becker, Using Mass Communication Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1979), p. 10.] Therefore the various typologies are referred to here as concepts.

[4] The Four Theories book set forth the thesis that "the press always takes on the form and coloration of the social political structures within which it operates." [See Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm, Four Theories of the Press: The Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility and Soviet Communist Concepts of What the Press Should Be and Do, 2nd ed. (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1963), p. 1.] The view that the different media systems are based on political differences was also part of Hachten's Five concepts of the press. [See William A. Hachten, The World News Prism: Changing Media, Clashing Ideologies, 2nd ed. (Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1987), p. 15, and William A. Hachten, The World News Prism: Changing Media of International Communication, 3rd ed. (Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1992), p. 15.] Merrill added that the press not only reflects the ideology of the system in which it functions, but supports it and cannot exceed this system's limits. See John C. Merrill, The Imperative of Freedom: A Philosophy of Journalistic Autonomy, 2nd ed. (White Plains, N. Y.: Longman, 1990), pp. 23, 24; John Merrill, "A Conceptual Overview of World Journalism," in International and Intercultural Communication, eds. John C. Merrill and Heinz-Dietrich Fischer (New York: Hastings House, 1976), p. 18; John C. Merrill and Ralph Lowenstein, Media, Messages and Men: New Perspective in Communication 2nd ed. (New York: David McKay Company, 1979), p. 173; John C. Merrill and S. Jack Odell, Philosophy and Journalism (New York: Longman, 1983), p. 151. Others also suggested that. [See Lucian W. Pye, ed., Communication and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 4, 11, and Chachal Sarkar, "Journalists' Organizations in Socialist Society," in International and Intercultural Communication, p. 37. This definition was shared, almost verbatim, by media theoreticians from the former communist countries. C.f., Hungarian theorist Tamas Szecsko who argued that the system of mass communications adjusts itself to the structure of political and educational-cultural institutions. See Tamas Szecsko, "The Development of a Socialist Communication Theory," in Mass Media Policies in Changing Cultures, ed. George Gerbner (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), p. 227.

[5] Denis McQuail, Media Performance: Mass Communication and the Public Interest (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992), p. 66. See also Carl P. Burrowes, "Measuring Freedom of Expression Cross-Culturally: Some Methodological and Conceptual Problems," Mass Comm Review (Winter/Spring 1989):38-51.

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While this study does not dispute that a press system is related to the political structure of a society, it starts with the assumption that the categorization of media systems should also include economic criteria, that, in fact, the underlying dimension of descriptive press concepts is economic. All societies can be placed on a continuum between a planned economy and a free market.[6] In contrast, the underlying dimension of prescriptive press concepts is philosophical. All societies can be placed on a continuum between authoritarianism and libertarianism.[7] Following this clarification, the study proposes a typology that describes the world press by dividing it into three classes: planned economy, transitional, and free market. Within any of these press systems, a variety of prescriptive concepts may coexist.

In light of the 1989 changes in the former communist bloc, a transitional, descriptive press concept is appropriate to describe the media systems of today's East European countries. It would describe the press system of the post-communist society that is undergoing a transition from a centralized economy to an open market. In such a transitional system, several or even all dominant prescriptive concepts may exist together, e.g., the newly introduced libertarianism and the remaining heritage of authoritarianism may characterize the press philosophy simultaneously.

Before outlining the proposed framework, however, a close look at the typologies upon which it builds is required. The Cold War model of the dominant Four Theories presented the world's press according to the ideologies of the time: authoritarian, libertarian, Soviet Communist, and social responsibility. These were ideologies, i.e. prescriptive concepts, not necessarily reflecting the true nature of the 1950s societies and their press systems.

But the Four Theories also had the ambition of describing the press systems of the world in its purpose to answer the question of why the press "is as it is."[8] The result was a model that simplified the characteristics of a press system to elements of the societal ideology prescribing what the press ought to be. Later scholars found such simplification inadequate. Jane Curry, for example, observed that the press in communist countries was more than an element of government organization, as it was defined by Wilbur Schramm's Soviet Communist concept.[9] Similarly, Ellen Mickiewicz noted, in a broader debate among social scientists about the nature of communist systems, that the

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[6] See J. Herbert Altschull, Agents of Power: The Media and Public Policy, 2nd ed. (White Plains, N.Y.: Longman, 1995), pp. 373-395.

[7] See Merrill, "A Conceptual Overview," p. 19; Merrill, Imperative, p. 25; Merrill and Odell, Philosophy, p. 153. It should be noted that the two dimensions mentioned above are not mutually exclusive. A prescriptive press concept, that is a concept of "how the media ought to behave"also includes directives on whether the media should be privately- or state-owned [See Burrowes, p. 40].

[8] Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, Four Theories, p. 1

[9] Jane L. Curry, "Media Control in Eastern Europe," in Press Control Around the World, eds. Jane L. Curry and Joan R. Dassin (London: Praeger, 1982), p. 121.

Soviet press was "far more complex than the totalitarian theory."[10] In addition, the political framework of the Four Theories neglected the economics of the press. It also ignored transition in press systems and was later criticized for its inapplicability to the Third World press.[11]

Four Theories was published before many former colonies became independent countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Reflecting the changing world, Ithiel De Sola Pool's classification categorized press systems into a Western, Communist, and non-Communist developing model.[12] Pool's contribution to press typologies was the placement of this model in the traditional-transitional-modern society continuum of Daniel Lerner.[13]

Ralph Lowenstein was among the first to add an economic criterion to press classifications.[14] To the standard of government-press relations he added the category of press sponsorship. Lowenstein's model distinguished between various levels of economic development and different types of media ownership. His argument for a constant transition of media philosophies, depending on changes of ownership, media consumerism and technologies, recognized the transitional stages of the press in all societies.

This transitional element was expanded in John Merrill's concepts. His "Developmental Triangle" model emphasized the progression of normative concepts in a press system, naturally flowing from one into another, e.g., from authoritarian to libertarian and vice versa.[15] Merrill further developed this idea in his "Political-Press Circle" model, which, of all existing press typologies, most convincingly presented the continuing evolution and transition of the world' s societies and press.[16]

The importance of Merrill's circle for this study is in the emphasis on transitional societies, a current example of which is the evolving countries of Eastern Europe. Merrill's media development continuum from conservatism to liberalism is also an example of the philosophical continuum from authoritarianism to libertarianism on which every society can be placed. Both Merrill and Lowenstein modified the definitions of societies and press systems as "authoritarian tending" or "libertarian tending," contributing to a more realistic description of the current press systems of the world.

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[10] Ellen Mickiewicz, Media and the Russian Public (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 147.

[11] Robert Picard, "Revisions of the 'Four Theories of the Press' Model," Mass Comm Review (Winter/Spring 1982-83): 25-28.

[12] Ithiel De Sola Pool, "The Mass Media and Politics in the Modernization Process," in Communication and Political Development, pp. 234-53.

[13] See Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (New York: The Free Press, 1958), pp. 398-412.

[14] Merrill and Lowenstein, Media, Messages and Men, p. 164.

[15] Merrill, Imperative, p. 37.

[16] Ibid., pp. 40-43.

William Hachten noted the economic and corporate influences on journalism, too. He also suggested that, in practice, media systems exist along a continuum from authoritarianism to libertarianism, that they are complicated and cannot be neatly classified.[17] However, he still adhered to the Four Theories' model of applying prescriptive theories to divide the world's press into authoritarian, communist, developmental, revolutionary and Western systems.[18]

The model proposed here has benefited both from the work of scholars who extensively considered the role of economics in media systems and those who suggested that normative concepts can coexist in a single media system.[19] Robert Picard's revision of press concepts is particularly relevant to the post-communist transition of the East European press from a planned to a market economy:

> A major premise of Anglo-American libertarianism has been that transition from state market control to commercial market control ended the press subservience to government and thus bolstered freedom. But economic developments in the press during the twentieth century--especially since the Second World War--have made it clear that the press can become subservient to market forces that can also restrict freedom.[20]

Picard's revision included a democratic socialist concept referring to the Western libertarian systems with state ownership of broadcast media. Implementing Merrill and Lowenstein's "authoritarian-tending" and "libertarian-tending" definitions, Picard proposed three types of media systems: libertarian-tending, that may be either libertarian or socially responsible or democratic socialist ; duo-directional, that may be developmental or revolutionary, and authoritarian-tending, that may be authoritarian or communist.

Herbert Altschull used the economics of the media as the criterion for describing the world press systems. Economics was the basis for his world press typology of planned economy, market, and advancing systems. He further expanded the idea of the economic dependence of the press in a capitalist society to a concept of universal economic restrictions on the press. No matter what the political system, press freedom is restricted by the press's dependence on capital, he argued.[21]

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[17] Hachten, Prism, pp. 16.

[18] Ibid., p. 33.

[19] Among those emphasizing economics were Robert Picard and J. Herbert Altschull. [See Picard, "Revisions", and J. Herbert Altschull, Agents of Power (1995), p. 49.] Among those suggesting a co-existence of normative theories or philosophies in one media system were Raymond Williams, Bonnie Brownlee, and Kaarle Nordenstreng. [See Raymond Williams, Communications 2nd ed. (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966), p. 19, and Bonnie Brownlee, "The Nicaraguan Press: Revolutionary, Developing or Socially Responsible?" Gazette 33 (1984): 155-172.] Also, Kaarle Nordenstreng, "Normative Theories of the Press," lecture at the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Journalism, Columbia, MO, 14 April 1995.

[20] Picard, "Revisions," p. 27.

[21] Even before Gorbachev came to power, Altschull, in his first edition of Agents of Power, used the notion of universal economic restrictions on the press, establishing a bridge between the press systems of communism and capitalism. See J. Herbert Altschull, Agents of Power: The Role of the News Media in Human Affairs (White Plains, N.Y.: Longman, 1984), pp. 107, 123, 141, 150, 202, 298. Such emphasis on the similarities among press systems, instead of stressing their differences, was a major break in the typical, Cold-war, us vs. them ideological framework for classification of the world press. [See also Leonard Sussman, "Developmental Journalism: The Ideological Factor," in The Third World and Press Freedom, ed. Philip C. Horton (New York: Praeger, 1978), p. 77.]

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Indeed, economics is a more comprehensive criterion than that of social and political control, while still including the nature of government-press relations. As Altschull noted, media in the communist societies were controlled through economic means, too. In the former communist countries the press was politically restricted because it was economically dependent on the government.

Borrowing from Altschull's work, the main criterion used in this study to describe the world press is economics. This criterion determines the classification of the world's media into three systems of planned economy, transitional, and free market. These are clearly descriptive concepts of the press. Once media systems are described using an economics criterion, they can the be further identified by determining what normative press concepts dominate or coexist in them.

Coexisting prescriptive concepts: As early as 1969, Raymond Williams distanced himself from media theorists' contrasting of "free" and "controlled" press. His classification of press concepts into authoritarian, paternal, commercial, and democratic, all found at the same time in the press system of his native Britain, is an example of prescriptive concepts coexisting in one press system.[22] Altschull agreed that there is no pure system, that every press has degrees of freedom and control. In Nicaragua of the 1980s, Bonnie Brownlee found "a press chock full of vestiges of the authoritarian past and present but sprinkled with tokens of libertarianism," and observed that "any system is likely to contain elements of several of the theories."[23]

A transitional press, such as those of Nicaragua in the 1980s or Bulgaria in the 1990s, highlights the coexisting of elements of various prescriptive concepts in one press system. Philosophic aspects characteristic of the old systems coexist with new values in a press in transition. As with the Sandinista government in the 1980s, the Bulgarian post-communist governments in the early 1990s promised the people of Bulgaria that they would end corruption, reconstruct the national economy, improve living conditions, and assure pluralism in political life.[24] Such changes should lead to a change in the press system, too, as Brownlee suggested.

The transitional concept proposed here is closest to Picard's duo-directional (wavering between authoritarianism and libertarianism) and Altschull's advancing press systems. Picard's duo-directional system, however, could be either developmental or revolutionary and Altschull's advancing system was equivalent to

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[22] See Williams, Communications, p. 19.

[23] Brownlee, "Nicaraguan Press," pp. 169, 157.

[24] See, for example, the Programme of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF)1994-1998, accessible on-line (http://ASUdesign.eas.asu.edu/~bliznako/Bulgaria/news/94-11/nov17.scb). The same promises were made in political ads aired on Bulgarian National Television in the 1990, 1991 and 1994 parliamentary election campaigns.

Hachten's developmental system. It is necessary therefore to examine if the developmental press concept would not overlap with the transitional press concept.

Irrelevance of the developmental press concept to post-communist Bulgaria: Since the post-communist countries are often referred to as "developing" or "emerging" countries or even a "Third-World environment," it is necessary to examine if the developmental press concept would fit the media system of post-communist Bulgaria. The developmental press concept is a mixture of prescription and description, while the transitional concept is proposed here as a descriptive concept. The developmental concept has been viewed as a transitional concept, however, bound to disappear when a country reaches a civil society.[25]

There are a number of other similarities between the developmental and the transitional press concepts. Similar to the developmental concept, created to describe the post-colonial countries' press, the starting point of the transitional concept is the irrelevance of previous press concepts to the transitional societies of the post-communist countries. The post-Cold War societies of Eastern Europe challenge established societal and press philosophy in the same way the post-colonial states of the late 1950s and early 1960s did when the developmental press concept was born.[26]

Moreover, the Third World and the former communist bloc countries experience similar processes of dramatic change from dictatorships to democracy. As did the post-colonial countries of the late 1950s and the early 1960s, Bulgaria of the 1990s belongs to societies that are restructuring themselves.[27] Post-communist Bulgaria has endured some of the problems typical of the Third World transitional societies: a relative lack of democratic experience, of direction, of confidence, of security, and constant uncertainty leading to frustrations among its citizens and in society overall.[28]

In the same way that citizens of many Third World countries identified colonialism as the sole cause for their troubles, many Bulgarians, at least initially, in the post-communist period tended to blame communism for their economic and social problems. Similar to the Third World countries' emphasis on economic development, Bulgarians set as one of their highest priorities the restructuring of their economy.[29]

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[25] Hachten, Prism, p. 37.

[26] See Max Millikan's foreword in Lucian Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. vii.

[27] Indian journalist Dilip Mukerjee as quoted by Roger Tatarian, "News Flow in the Third World," in The Third World and Press Freedom, ed. Philip C. Horton (New York: Praeger, 1978), p. 43; Filip Dimitrov, "Freeing the Soul from Communism," The Wall Street Journal, 23 March 1992, p. A10.

[28] Lerner, Passing, p. 385; Pye, Politics, p. 6.

[29] Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1966), p. vii.

Most definitions of development emphasize economic advancement and growth.[30] Because of Bulgaria's focus on economic reform during the post-communist period, these definitions of development are applicable to its society. Broader variations of the definition--those including social and cultural aspects--are also relevant to post-communist Bulgaria, for economic problems cannot be isolated from the entirety of life in a transitional society.[31]

For the purpose of this study, Bulgaria is classified as a middle-income developing country with high literacy, school enrollment, and higher education rates.[32] The 1992 World Development Report placed Bulgaria's economy among the "lower middle-income" ones, along with Algeria, Mauritius, Malaysia and Argentina, due to its 1990 GNP per capita of U.S. $2,250.[33] But it is not the listed GNP per capita that determines Bulgaria's developing status. The simple measure of GNP per capita was proven deceitful even in the early research on communication and development.[34] Presently, several high-income countries with a GNP per capita of $7,620 or more, are also considered "developing" by their governments or the United Nations.[35]

It has become customary among social scientists to refer to various categories of developing countries. The East European countries, in the process of transition from a centralized to open-market economy, form one of these categories.[36] Bulgaria's developing status is determined by the rapid changes going on in its post-communist society. These changes, mainly economic, are inevitably accompanied by political, ideological, and psychological changes in the mindset of its citizens.

In spite of Bulgaria's status of a developing country, the developmental press concept is not relevant to the Bulgarian press system. The country possesses all conditions necessary for a developed press system, such as outlined by Denis McQuail: "communication infrastructure, professional skills, production and cultural resources, available

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[30] C. R. Irani as quoted in John Vilanilam, "Ownership versus Developmental News Content: An Analysis of Independent and Conglomerate Newspapers of India," Gazette 12:1 (1976):5; Everett Rogers, "The Rise and Fall of the Dominant Paradigm," Journal of Communication 28:1 (Winter 1978):65; Goran Hedebro, Communication and Social Change in Developing Nations: A Critical View (Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1982), p. 19; Christine Ogan and Jo Ellen Fair, "A Little Good News: The Treatment of Development News in Selected Third World Newspapers," Gazette 33 (1984):191.

[31] See Frederick T. C. Yu, "Communication Policy and Planning for Development: Some Notes in Research," in Communication Research--a Half-Century Appraisal, eds. Daniel Lerner and Lyle M. Nelson (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1977), p. 168; Rogers, "Rise and Fall", p. 68; Pye, "Introduction," in Communication and Political Development, p. 15.

[32] Charles E. Morrison, Director of the East-West Center Program on International Economics and Politics, Honolulu, Hawaii, letter, 19 July 1993.

[33] World Development Report 1992: Development and the Environment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 219. The Report (p. xi) defined countries with GNP per capita of more than $610 but less than $7,610 as middle-income, which in turn were divided into lower and upper middle-income at the level of $2,465. The data are generally reliable, at least allowing comparisons with other countries more than the data provided by the 1993 Statistical Reference Book of Republic of Bulgaria (Sofia: National Statistical Institute) and by Natsionalen Statisticheski Institut, Statisticheski Spravochnik 1994 [Statistical reference book] (Sofia: Statistichesko Izdatelstvo i Pechatnitsa) which did not list GNP or GNP per capita and gave data only in the Bulgarian monetary unit of *leva*.

[34] Wilbur Schramm, Mass Media and National Development: The Role of Information in the Developing Countries (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 9; Harry T. Oshima, "Development and Mass Communication--a Reexamination," and Everett Rogers, "The Passing of the Dominant Paradigm--Reflection of Diffusion Research," in Communication and Social Change: The Last Ten Years--and the Next, eds. Wilbur Schramm and Daniel Lerner (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1976), pp. 19, 49, 65; Vilanilam, "Ownership," p. 4.

[35] World Development Report 1992, p. 215.

[36] Morrison, letter.

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audience."[37] Illiteracy has been virtually eliminated. The country has ranked fifth in the world for the ratio of university students to its population.[38] In terms of communication infrastructure, Bulgaria has long ago exceeded the UNESCO minimum requirements of two cinema seats, ten copies of daily newspapers, and five radios for every one hundred persons.[39] In the early 1970s Bulgaria had eight cinema seats for one hundred persons; in the late 1970s/early 1980s daily newspapers reached a circulation of sixty-two per one hundred citizens; and in 1988 there were twenty-two radio receivers per every one hundred inhabitants.[40] In 1990, the annual circulation of newspapers per capita was 122.2.[41] Should the infrastructure criteria be updated, in 1993 one and a half million Bulgarian households (of a population of eight and a half million) had registered television sets. The same year, in spite of outdated equipment, Bulgaria had more than two million telephones and a mobile cellular system had been started in 1992.[42] In 1995, the major national and local dailies had regular Internet access. Their newsrooms were also equipped adequately for practicing intermediate levels of computer-assisted reporting.[43]

As regards to professionalism, in 1994 Bulgaria celebrated 150 years of the birth of its first periodical, a magazine called Ljuboslovie (Love for the Word). The first congress of Bulgarian journalists met no later than 1894. The country has had a professional association of journalists since 1905.[44] Radio broadcasting started in the 1920s; television broadcasting in the 1950s.[45] Journalism education has been a competitive and prestigious major in the country's oldest university for five decades.

Production resources are also available. The Bulgarian capital, Sofia, houses the biggest modern pre-production and printing plant in the Balkans. Most national circulation newspapers and the large local newspapers have their own computer pre-production facilities, using state-owned printing plants for printing only.[46] In addition,

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[37] Denis McQuail, Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1983), p. 94.

[38] Paul Underwood, "Bulgaria," in World Press Encyclopedia vol. 1, ed. George T. Kurian. (New York: Facts on File, 1982), p. 178; Richard Schwarzlose, "Press Freedom in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia: A Tale of Two Nations," in Revolutions for Freedom: The Mass Media in Eastern and Central Europe, eds. Al Hester and L. Earle Reybold (Athens, GA: The James M. Cox, Jr. , Center for International Mass Communication Training & Research, The Henry W. Grady College of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Georgia, 1991), p. 16. According to UNESCO, the Bulgarian illiteracy rate is less than 5 percent. [The World Bank Atlas 1989 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1989), p. 6.

[39] Wilbur Schramm, "World Distribution of the Mass Media," in International and Intercultural Communication, p. 185.

[40] World Communications: A 200-Country Survey of Press, Radio, Television and Film (New York: Unipub, 1975), p. 369; Underwood, "Bulgaria," p. 169; and Department of Economic and Social Development Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook 1988/89 (New York: United Nations, 1990), p. 213.

[41] Statisticheski Spravochnik 1994, p. 30.

[42] Ibid., p. 179; Krasimir Tsigularov, "Bulgarskite Telekomunikatsii Se Opitvat Da Nastignat Razvitite Strani" [Bulgarian telecommunications attempt to overtake the developed countries], Duma, 19 February 1992, p. 6.

[43] Tracy L. Barnett, "Cooperation Translates in Bulgaria: IRE Goes Abroad," The IRE Journal, July-August 1995, p. 4.

[44] Ivan Ganev, "The Union of Bulgarian Journalists--A Portrait Put Together from Facts," The Democratic Journalist 33:9 (September 1986):14.

[45] Vesselin Dimitrov, Bulgarite i Radioto [Bulgarians and radio]. (Sofia: Sofia University Kliment Ohridski Press, 1988), pp. 97-141; John Edgar Reid, Jr., "A Media System on the Verge of Change: TV Broadcasting in Bulgaria," in Al Hester, L. Earle Reybold and Kimberly Conger, eds., The Post-Communist Press in Eastern and Central Europe: New Studies (Athens, GA: The James M. Cox, Jr., Center for International Mass Communication Training & Research, The Henry W. Grady College of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Georgia, 1992), p. 108; Elena Statelova, "Bulgarskoto Radio--Minalo i Traditsii" [Bulgarian radio--past and traditions], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 1 (1995):45.

[46] Bill Kuykendall and Ekaterina Ognianova, "Attitudes of Bulgarian Journalists Toward the Use of Photojournalism in Newspapers & Magazines in the

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the largest newspaper companies have built their private printing plants, which are also available for commercial printing.[47]

A factor for classifying developing countries, according to McQuail, is the countries' awareness of their "similar identity and interests in international politics."[48] By contrast, some of the former communist countries have not stressed the similarities in their identity or in their political and economic interests. Instead, they have preferred to emphasize their uniqueness. Post-communist nationalism has been perceived as a way to break with the communist ideology and its myth of proletarian internationalism.[49]

Furthermore, while developing countries grew to oppose Western assistance, post-communist Eastern Europe welcomed it, at least initially. In 1990, East European editors saw Robert Maxwell as bringing "manna from heaven" to failing, formerly state subsidized newspapers.[50] Like much of the rest of Eastern Europe, post-communist Bulgaria looked to the West for direction and cooperation. The first non-government radio frequencies after the fall of communism were allocated to Western broadcasting companies and most Bulgarian private radio stations had partnerships with them to cooperate with news and music. The Western radio stations were seen as crucial contributors to the establishment of private broadcasting in Bulgaria.[51]

McQuail also noted the tendency of developing countries to place an emphasis on collectivism rather than individualism. This is not characteristic of post-communist Bulgaria. After 1989, Bulgarians increasingly took charge of their lives, rediscovering individualistic values, such as personal freedom and incentive.[52]

The developmental press concept, therefore, is not an accurate description of the post-communist Bulgarian society and press system. In addition, the prescriptive elements of the concept are not applicable to the current Bulgarian context. According to Hachten, the main tasks of developmental journalism are to help increase the literacy rate, to build political consciousness, and to promote economic development.[53] Neither Bulgarian post-communist governments nor journalists suggested the press take on such functions.

Post-Communist Era," report presented at a Freedom Forum discussion "Aiding Bulgarian Media," Arlington, VA, January 1993, pp. 7, 14; personal observations and information from interviews conducted between June 6 and 17 1994, with fourteen regional newspapers in Bulgaria, all of which had equipment for pre-production.

[47] An advertisement in 24 Chasa [24 Hours], 4 July 1995, p. 24.

[48] McQuail, Mass Communication Theory, p. 94.

[49] Slavko Splichal, "Media and State-Supported Nationalism in Eastern Europe," Media Development 3 (1992):10. See also Christopher Cviic, Remaking the Balkans (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), p. 9.

[50] Jim Boumelha, "What is in Store for East European Media--Pergamon Press Experience," The Democratic Journalist 32:12 (December 1990):6.

[51] These were the Voice of America, BBC-World Service, Radio Free Europe, Radio France International and Deutsche Welle. [See Vesselin Dimitrov and Snezhana Popova, Novoto Radio. [The new radio]. (Sofia: Vitrage, 1995], p. 84. C.f., Lilia Raycheva, "Bulgarian Media in Transition (1988-1994)," paper presented at a conference of the International Association for Mass Communication Research, Portoroz, Slovenia, June 27-30, 1995, p. 9.]

[52] Dimitrov, "Freeing the Soul," p. A10.

[53] Hachten, Prism, p. 36.

The first two goals of developmental journalism are not relevant to Bulgaria. As noted above, there is no need to increase the literacy rate. There is also a high level of political consciousness. Political scientists generally regard high voter turnout as an indication of high citizen involvement and political consciousness. In the first five years after the fall of communist rule, the average voter turnout for national elections in Bulgaria was seventy-five percent.[54] As could be expected, the first free elections of June 10, 1990 had a very high turnout of ninety-one percent.[55] The October 13, 1991 parliamentary elections, which featured forty-two political parties, had a turnout of eighty-four percent.[56] The significant voter turnout continued in the third parliamentary elections, held on December 18, 1994 with forty-nine political parties and coalitions.[57] That year in Burgas, the fourth largest Bulgarian city, four out of every five eligible voters cast a ballot, despite a predicted low voter turnout.[58]

Further, although the third goal of developmental journalism, economic reform, is relevant to post-communist Bulgaria with its efforts to develop a free market, this never became a journalists' priority in the five years after communism. Bulgarian journalism was neither officially designated to assist in economic restructuring, like the developmental press, nor did it take this task on itself, as development journalists did. In the new context of severe market competition, the Bulgarian periodicals' priority was survival--by giving their audience what it was perceived to want, rather than what it was believed to need. Bulgarian journalists increasingly saw their job as a business, and worked to provide the information the audience was willing to buy. Audience surveys became common in Bulgaria, in addition to the strict monitoring of what types of newspapers sold best in the street kiosks.[59] Even when topics covered in newspapers related to economics, the audience had had an indirect input in editorial decisions.[60]

Finally, while developmental journalism is seen, much like the authoritarian press, as a propaganda tribune utilized by governments to steer a country's development, the Bulgarian post-communist press began moving in the opposite direction. Bulgarian journalists, painfully familiar with communist government controls, defined as

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[54] Centre for Social Practices-Sofia, "Political Situation in Bulgaria Following the Local Elections of October-November 1995," ad hoc paper, June 1995, accessible on-line (http://eternity.osf.acad.bg/dg-piper/dg2/insider/izbori.htm).

[55] Georgi Karasimeonov, "The Legislature in Post-Communist Bulgaria," paper presented at a Conference on the New Parliaments in Eastern Europe, Stirin, Czech Republic, 14-17 August 1994, p. 36.

[56] Ibid.; "Chetirideset i Edna Partii i Koalitsii Registrira do Snoshti CIK, no Mozhe da Stanat Poveche," [Forty-one parties and coalitions were registered until last night by the Central Electoral Commission but there may be more], Duma, 14 September 1991, p. 1.

[57] Tsentralna Izbiratelna Komisija, "Reshenie 249, Sofia, 16 Noemvri 1994, Otnosno Registriraneto i Uchastieto na Zastupnitsite, Nabljudatelite i Predstavitelite na Partii i Koalitsii pri Provezhdaneto na Izborite za Narodni Predstaviteli na 18 Dekemvri 1994 Godina" [Decision 249, Sofia, 16 November 1994, regarding the registration and participation of supporters, monitors, and representatives of parties and coalitions during the elections for members of Parliament on 18 December 1994].

[58] "Chetirima ot Vseki Pet Glasuvaha," [Four out of five voted], Chernomorski Far, 19 December 1994, p. 1.

[59] Interview with Dimitar Naidenov, Director of Balkan British Social Surveys-Sofia, Bulgaria, and Assistant Professor of Print Journalism, Sofia University Department of Journalism and Mass Communications, 10 March 1995.

[60] Eva Assenova, "Nashiat Sujuznik sa Chitatelite" [Our allies are the readers], Pogled, 24 May 1993, p. 12.

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unhealthy journalists' subservience to the state.[61] As will be shown further, they increasingly criticized authorities and resented government interference in their work.

Of the regions normally included in the Third World, the closest to the transitional East European societies is Latin America, with its developed and relatively independent press system, higher literacy rate, and increasing democratization. Since the developmental concept has been applied to Latin America in general, it is possible that the concept is relevant to an Eastern European press system. But Latin American and East European press systems differ in a critical aspect. Totalitarian regimes in Latin America never interrupted the traditional commercial operation of the media, while Eastern Europe did not have private ownership for nearly half a century. The communist system produced generations of journalists with a limited sense for the economics of the media. Despite the rapid privatization of newspapers in Eastern Europe, the lack of experience in financing, marketing, and advertising remained a great obstacle.[62]

To sum up, the developmental press concept does not accurately describe the post-communist media system of Bulgaria, in spite of certain similarities between it and the "developing" countries.

The transitional press concept: A transitional press concept is most relevant to describe the current stage of the Bulgarian post-communist press. Transition has become a popular term to define the processes experienced by the East European societies after 1989. It is also a vague term. "Transition to what, by what institutional means, with what societal ends, in what endogenous and/or exogenous circumstances?" asked a Bulgarian media sociologist.[63] For this study, the definition of transition is limited to mean economic transition from a state-owned and controlled planned economy to a free market and vice versa. The definition recognizes that such transition is inevitably accompanied by other rapid changes in society and in the mindset of its citizens.

In spite of the initial euphoria surrounding the changes in Eastern Europe, transition is understood to be neutral; it does not imply positive or negative meaning, progressive or regressive direction. Thus, a transitional society is not only Bulgaria in the post-communist change from planned to market economy, but also Bulgaria in the pre-communism interim between market and planned economy of the late 1940s. The Bulgarian society was then in a different but still transitional stage.

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[61] Juliana Metodieva, "Enichari Hodjat, Maino Ljo," [Janissaries are coming, mother], Svoboden Narod, 7-13 February 1992, p. 7.

[62] Janos Horvat, "How Free are East European Media without State Control?" Media Development 4 (1992): 37.

[63] Todor Petev, "Transitive Democratization of the Bulgarian Press: Postponed Victories," in Sociology in a Society in Transition, ed. Nikolai Genov, (Sofia: Bulgarian Sociological Association, 1994) p.103.

It is also necessary to distinguish between this study's definition of transitional society and the established more specific definition reflecting a society in the process of modernization, especially the Third World.[64] In the post-Cold War political and economic context, Third World countries were no longer the only transitional societies. Other regions, including Eastern Europe, experienced transition, too, but not in the sense of modernization, which they had already achieved as noted above in regards to media infrastructure.[65]

In line with the above definition of transition, a transitional press system is defined here as the press system of a society that is in transition from one economic order to another. Due to the state of its society, a transitional press system is both authoritarian- and libertarian-tending, like Picard's duo-directional system. But unlike Picard's duo-directional system which could be either revolutionary or developmental, the transitional system can host several prescriptive press concepts, that is, the developmental, authoritarian, communist, libertarian, revolutionary, and social responsibility normative concepts can all be present in a transitional media system.

McQuail noted that in a developmental press system media operations could follow the principles of different press concepts--authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility, or Soviet--because a developmental press system is a press system in transition.[66] In the post-communist Bulgarian press system, the new currents of the commercial (Western, libertarian) concept found their place between the remains of the communist and authoritarian ideologies, the journalists' sense of professional responsibility (social responsibility), and the European model of state-owned broadcasting (democratic socialist). In the first five years after the ousting of communism this mixture marked the key aspects of the Bulgarian press system, including media economics and management; relationships among the media, political parties and the government; and media law and ethics. The transitional processes in these areas will be analyzed in the next chapter.

The mixture previously puzzled researchers. Brownlee faced such a puzzle when trying to identify the Nicaraguan press of the 1980s. The revolutionary, developmental, and social responsibility concepts all seemed to fit the Nicaraguan press context.[67] The descriptive concept of a transitional press system is a solution to the puzzle. This concept reflects the evolving nature of societal and press systems. It has been suggested that a transitional concept of a media system is not appropriate because it only suggests that the system is in a state of change.[68] However, the purpose of press typologies does not go further than sorting out the world's media systems to help understand them. They cannot have predictive power and accordingly change as the world media systems change.[69]

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[64] Lerner, Passing, p. 93; Merrill, Imperative, pp. 58-59.

[65] In Lerner's 1963 survey of the Middle East, every society with urbanization above 25 percent and literacy above 50 percent rated as modern. According to these criteria, Bulgaria is a modern country with its high literacy rate and urbanization. (The urban population is 68 percent. See World Development Report 1992, p. 279.)

[66] McQuail, Mass Communication Theory, p. 94.

[67] Brownlee, "The Nicaraguan Press," pp. 168-69.

The coexistence of elements from different prescriptive concepts is basic to the media system typology proposed here. Thus, a researcher analyzing the Nicaraguan press of the 1980s could identify it as follows: descriptive concept--transitional/prescriptive concepts coexisting in the press system--revolutionary, authoritarian and socially responsible. It has been argued that a developmental concept actually means either the dominance of the authoritarian concept or the dominance of the social responsibility concept, depending on the functions that a developing country's journalism takes on and whether it operates within or outside government controls.[70] Following this argument, Brownlee's conclusion that the Nicaraguan press of the 1980s included elements of the developmental, the revolutionary and the social responsibility concepts can be summarized in this model: transitional press system/authoritarian, revolutionary, and socially responsible prescriptive concepts. Figure 1a presents this model.

A more current example is the Bulgarian post-communist press system, which can also be described as transitional, including a mixture of prescriptive concepts. This model accounts for the plurality of press philosophies that could be found in a post-communist media system in the first five years after the fall of the regime. In the case of Bulgaria between 1990 and 1995, a variety of normative press concepts could be observed: political parties and governments shared the communist and the authoritarian press philosophies, as well as the democratic socialist concept of state-owned broadcasting; individual journalists differed in their degree of acceptance of the communist, the libertarian, the social responsibility, and the democratic socialist concepts. Figure 1b shows this model of the Bulgarian post-communist press system.

In addition, the democratic-participant concept has been discussed as the ideal normative concept for East European media.[71] The democratic-participant concept, as McQuail described it, was an attempt in developed liberal media systems to react against the commercialization of private media and the centralization of state broadcasting. Unlike the social responsibility concept or the democratic socialist concept, the democratic-participant concept envisioned a grass-roots, small-scale, local-level role of the media in interacting with the public and meeting its needs.[72] The model of coexisting prescriptive concepts proposed here for describing a transitional press system can also be used to describe the press systems of societies with stable economies, either planned or open market. For example, a West European press system could be described as: open market/mixture of libertarian, social responsibility, democratic socialist, and democratic-participant prescriptive concepts.[73] Figure 1c shows this model.

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[68] Chris W. Allen, "The Absence of Theory in the Russian Media," paper presented at a conference of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Washington, D.C., August 9-12, 1995, p. 36.

[69] See the conclusion of Edmund B. Lambeth, "Global Media Philosophies, " in Global Journalism, p. 16.

[70] Christine L. Ogan, "Development Journalism/Communication: The Status of the Concept," Gazette 29 (1982):10-11.

[71] France Vreg, "Political, National, and Media Crises," in Glasnost and After, pp. 55-61.

Insert Figures 1a, b, c about here

These models solve the problem of mixing descriptive and prescriptive concepts. They use an economic criterion to identify types of press systems and then list the dominant prescriptive concepts that guide the practice of their media. This study is limited to testing the transitional model of the Bulgarian post-communist media system. Further research needs to test the usefulness of the other proposed models.

The Transition in Bulgaria's Post-Communist Media

This section of the study tests the proposed transitional concept by analyzing the post-communist developments in key aspects of the Bulgarian media system: media economics and management; relationships among the media, political parties, and the government; and, media law and ethics.

Media economics and management: In the five years after the fall of communism, the most obvious example of the transition in the Bulgarian media system was the privatization of the media. If a true free market emerged in post-communist Bulgaria, it was the media market where competition was most intense.[74] New publications appeared on the stands every day but some were gone in just a few months.[75] The growth of newspapers followed a pattern previously unseen in Bulgaria. In 1989, only two months after the ousting of the communist regime, two newspapers were born. In 1990, the number of new newspapers was 108. In the succeeding three years the number founded was 201 in 1991, 451 in 1992, and 322 in 1993.[76] In one year alone (1993), there were 2,664 news publications offering subscriptions to the

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[72] McQuail, Mass Communication Theory, pp. 96-98. The movement for public or civic journalism in the United States of the 1990s seems to be based on this or a similar normative concept.

[73] Based also on Picard's democratic socialist theory describing press systems in Western Europe, which include state-owned broadcasting to ensure that the audience receives information it is believed to need, not just the type of information that is most wanted commercially [See Robert Picard, "Revisions," p. 27]. The democratic socialist system is similar to Williams's paternal system [See Williams, Communications, p. 19].

[74] "Politika i Zhurnalistika: Namordnik ili Informatsionen Teror" [Politics and journalism: Muzzle or information terror], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 5 (1992):4; Nevena Gjurova, "Nie, ot Erata na Divia Kapitalisum" [We, from the era of the wild capitalism], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 3 (1994):15; Stefan Krause, "Purges and Progress in Bulgaria," Transition, 6 October 1995, p. 46.

[75] "Bulgarian Publications Tally Tops 1,000 after Births, Deaths," Center for Foreign Journalists Clearinghouse 11 (November 1993):151-152.

[76] Raycheva, "Bulgarian Media in Transition," p. 7; "Na Bulgarskia Informatsionen Pazar za 366 Dni--451 Vestnika" [On the Bulgarian information market for 366 days--451 newspapers], Pogled, 1 June 1992, p. 8.

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Bulgarian population of eight and a half million.[77] No license was required for publishing, but all publications had to register in court, like any other business.

Insert Figure 2 about here

In broadcasting, the introduction of cable television and private radio stations created an intense competition as well.[78] In 1991 the state monopoly over broadcasting was eliminated and in 1992 an Interim Committee for Radio Frequencies and TV Channels was authorized to register private channels. In the next two years, the Committee gave licenses to seventy-six broadcast radio stations, forty-four wire radio stations, thirty-five television stations, and 134 cable stations.[79] The number of channels that could be registered per person was unrestricted at the time, which quickly resulted in chains of local radio stations throughout Bulgaria.[80] Even Bulgarian National Radio (BNR) and Bulgarian National Television (BNT) were affected by the economic reform. They had to compete with all other media for the same audience and the same, still scarce, advertising resources. For many of the media, each day became a trial of survival.

The change from a state-planned economy to a decentralized media system was most painfully experienced by newspapers. They had to fight government allocation of newsprint, state monopoly over printing services and control of their prices, as well as centralized distribution. The first year and a half after communism was marked by constant concern among newspaper managers about the availability of newsprint, which determined publications' circulation and subscriptions. Moreover, the lack of newsprint could put the existence of publications at stake. Journalists actively opposed the government's monopoly, going on strike while holding slogans written on their last newsprint.[81] In April 1991 the government stopped its allocation of newsprint and the regulation of prices. This was the beginning of a market economy in post-communist Bulgaria.

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[77] Ekaterina Slavova, "2664 Abonamentni Zaglavia Vkliuchva Katalogut na RP za 1993 g." [2,664 titles included in the Postal Service catalog for 1993], Pogled, 14 December 1992, p. 3.

[78] Georgi Sarakinov, Start-Up and Development of Private Electronic Media in Bulgaria. (Sofia, Bulgaria: Applied Research and Communications Fund, September 1994); Snezhana Popova, Bulgarian Private Radio: Second Season. (Sofia, Bulgaria: Applied Research and Communications Fund, September 1994); Frank Aycock, "The Birth of a New Industry: Private Radio in Bulgaria: The Terrible Two," American University in Bulgaria, Blagoevgrad, Bulgaria, 1995 (mimeographed).

[79] Sarakinov, p. 4.

[80] Dimitrov and Popova, Novoto Radio, pp. 19-20.

[81] Mira Radeva and Sonja Gulubarova, "Narod bez Vestnitsi - Narod bez Svoboda" [People without newspapers--people without freedom], Trud , 14 February 1991, pp. 1-2.

The desired change, however, meant experienced media leaders, with no knowledge of the economics of their operation, were left face to face with the market. "I'm helpless in finances. Everything was so easy before. I would get a letter once a year saying: 'This is your circulation for the next year, this is your salary,'" said Evgenii Stanchev in 1994, then editor-in-chief of Pogled.[82] Stanchev's experience was typical.[83] He and his colleagues had to teach themselves the entirely new and foreign concept of the newspaper as a business. For individual journalists, this was as much a change in economics as it was in their psychology and philosophy.

The hardships of government control were immediately replaced by harsh market conditions. In a matter of days, Bulgarian newspapers had to pay between 300 and 1000 percent more for newsprint.[84] Other economic challenges piled up: the price reform affected the prices of printing and the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (BTA) raised its subscription rates. The immediate reaction to the new prices was for newspapers to raise their cover prices.[85]

There was no simple solution. Some newspapers went bankrupt, due to the economic pressures and their managers' lack of market experience. Others had to drastically decrease their volume, circulation and periodicity.[86] Long-term subscription became impossible to offer due to rising inflation.[87] At this time, many Bulgarian newspaper managers showed remarkable adaptability and ingenuity. Anything that could sell the newspaper was tried: from front page imitations of British tabloids to bingo and lottery games to free classified ads or free city transit tickets. Journalists were encouraged to bring advertising for a commission; editors-in-chief used their personal contacts with state companies and new businesses to solicit advertising.[88] Newspapers started to experiment with side publications, e.g., Pogled's digests of the Bulgarian press, of the Soviet press, and of cross-word puzzles. This trend remained, leading to the establishment of newspaper chains, such as the press group 168 Chasa (168 Hours), the publishing chain Erkjul, and the Media Holding Company.

In the process, however, technical problems with printing and distribution continued. The printing complex Rodina (Homeland), though the biggest in the Balkans, became overloaded with the number of newspapers it had to

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[82] Interview with Evgenii Stanchev, Sofia, Bulgaria, 1 June 1994.

[83] In 1990, Ofelia Hadjikoleva, then editor-in-chief of Svoboden Narod, admitted she knew nothing about business although she understood its importance. [See "Hadjikoleva Seeks Excellence" in "Business of Print Journalism," Nieman Reports 5 (Winter 1990):22.]

[84] Cynthia F. Wilson, "Freedom Tests the Press in Eastern Europe," Presstime, March 1991, p.25; Kjell Engelbrekt, "The Media Adjust to Their New Environment," Report on Eastern Europe 2:23 (7 June, 1991):6; Paul Simpson, "East is Eden: Newspaper Publishers with the Urge to Gamble Should Look East and South Where the Rewards (and the Risks) are as High as an Elephant's Eye," Newspaper Focus, June 1991, p. 11.

[85] Ivan Bakalov, "S Primka na Shiiata Vestnitsite se Ritat pomezhdu si" [With a noose on the neck, newspapers are kicking each other], Duma, 7 April 1992, p. 4; Engelbrekt, "The Media Adjust," p. 6.

[86] Miglena Velinova, 1000 Vestnika: Spravochnik na Bulgarskata Presa sled 10.XI. 1989g. [1000 Newspapers: A Guidebook to the Bulgarian Press after November 10, 1989] (Sofia, Bulgaria: Department of Journalism and Mass Communications), 1992, p. 11.

[87] Paul Simpson, "The Fall and Rise of a Newspaper Industry," Newspaper Focus, November/December 1991, p. 28.

[88] Ibid.; Velinova, "1000 Vestnika," p. 11.

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print. As a monopoly, it set the printing schedules and even the circulations of its clients, in addition to setting prices. This new monopoly prompted newspaper managers to purchase new technology that would allow them to do their own, as well as commercial, pre-printing. When inflation was more than one hundred percent, buying at today's prices became an investment for tomorrow.

The tremendous growth in newspapers overloaded the distribution system. During communism, newspapers were distributed to subscribers by the state postal service and sold in its kiosks. This system was not suitable to meet the needs of the new publications. First, the centralized distribution system was not viewed as appropriate in the otherwise already established newspaper free market. Second, it was not trusted by all newspapers because of its vulnerability to government control. As early as the first election campaign in 1990, opposition parties accused the postal service of not distributing their newspapers across the country. Third, groups of Bulgarian entrepreneurs were ready to start private distribution businesses. These promised to be more credible and effective, as they had the incentive of getting a commission from the number of newspapers sold.

Some of the most entrepreneurial newspaper groups, such as Erkjul, 168 Chasa, and the Media Holding Company created their own distribution networks.[89] By 1995, the largest national and regional newspapers owned kiosks and trucks across the country (or the region of circulation). Several newspaper companies even signed agreements to handle each other's distribution and subscriptions in order to save on commission other distributors took.[90]

For the smaller and especially local newspapers, however, distribution remained a problem. First, private distributors were not willing to take smaller publications, unsure whether they would be able to make a profit with them.[91] Second, it was not uncommon for a wealthy competitor to bribe a distributor not to sell another newspaper, although that newspaper had its own contract with the distributor.[92] Third, smaller publications were more vulnerable to organized crime whose involvement was rumored in newspaper distribution.[93]

Many journalists adapted smoothly to their new roles as managers. As a rule, however, the managers of the most successful publications, including those who had been journalists before, focused only on management and business operations. Those who continued their editorial or writing work could not manage both. Thus, a new distinction between the business management of the newspaper and its editorial guidance was established.

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[89] Velinova, p. 12.

[90] Aleksei Lazarov, "'Trud,' 'Standart' i Presgrupa '168 Chasa' Svaliat Turgovskite Otstupki" [Trud, Standart and the pressgroup 168 Chasa decrease commercial concessions]. Kapital, 9-15 October 1995, p. 39.

[91] "Za Razprostranenieto--Ahilesovata Peta na Vestnikarstvoto" [About distribution--Achilles' heel of the press], Pogled, 31 May 1993, p. 5.

[92] Interview with Ivan Mishev, editor-in-chief of the local daily Dobro Utro, Veliko Turnovo, Bulgaria, 15 June 1994.

[93] Teresa Keller, "Bulgarian Journalists: Job Satisfaction in the Early Post-Communist Era," paper presented at a conference of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Washington, D.C., 9-12 August 1995, p. 15.

In broadcasting, a similar, though less dramatic, transition occurred. Even the state media experienced it. After 1989, the state provided eighteen percent of the budget for national television. The rest had to come from advertisers, producers, and sponsors.[94] Private broadcasting came to life almost three years after the ousting of the communist regime when many of the new economic challenges were already evident. Visits to private local stations throughout Bulgaria in 1994 and 1995 showed that they had separate departments of advertising, circulation and marketing, used self-promotion kits, and regularly polled the audience about the stations' programming. Cross-promotions of media, e.g., of local newspapers on radio or of local radio stations in newspapers, were common. Twelve local radio stations were members of the First Radio Advertising National Chain (FRANC), exchanging ads and media plans, thus attracting national advertisers.

By 1995, advertising had become a critical part of media operations, though it did not fully serve consumers because ads did not popularize sales. Banks, insurance companies, car dealers, and electronics businesses were the main advertisers; ads were mostly boxed announcements of their services and addresses.[95] The total revenue from advertising in Bulgarian media in 1994 was thirty-five million dollars, but most advertisers were Western firms.[96] Advertising was especially popular in the business-oriented publications, e.g., those of the 168 Chasa press group, which attracted forty percent of the total advertising in all major newspapers and magazines.[97] Another big share of advertising was in the largest-circulation national newspapers, including Duma (Word), Standart (Standard), Kontinent, (Continent), and Dneven Trud (Daily Labor).[98] The amount of advertising on national television and radio gradually increased in the early 1990s and revenues from it in were stable in 1994 and 1995.[99]

For local media, however, advertising remained a challenge even five years after the ousting of the communist regime. The intense media competition in smaller towns, combined with the old consumer culture of a planned economy, made provincial media's business more difficult. The number of stable enterprises outside the capital was smaller and

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[94] "S Hacho Boyadzhiev Razgovaria Ajsehel Rufi" [Ajsehel Rufi talks with Hacho Boyadzhiev], Trud, 27 September 1995, p. 15.

[95] Interview with Vessela Ilieva, Deputy Director of Advertising, Denyat (The Day) (defunct), Plovdiv, interviewed on 8 June 1994; also Reid, Jr., "A Media System on the Verge of Change," pp. 111-112.

[96] Dimitar Naidenov, "Lichnata Turpimost na Zhurnalista i Mediiniat Pazar" [Personal tolerance of the journalist and the media market], paper presented at an international seminar "Tolerance in Journalism," Sofia, Bulgaria, February 1995, p. 4.

[97] "Reklamniat Pazar v Periodichnia Pechat: January 1995" [The advertising market in the periodical press: January 1995], in Balkan British Social Surveys, Media Index, January 1995, no page number.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Ibid.; also Reid, Jr., "A Media System on the Verge of Change," p. 111-112.

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these were more interested in export, not seeing a need to advertise in local media. Smaller businesses, on the other hand, could not afford to pay for advertising. In addition, business people outside the capital remained socially conservative, reluctant to pay for something whose benefit they did not recognize. Similarly, the consumers, accustomed to life in an economy of deficiencies, still believed that quality goods do not need advertising. For these consumers advertising could be counter-productive. The introduction of advertising was further complicated by the illegitimate status of some businesses that avoided media attention.[100]

Because of their efforts to educate provincial audiences and businesses about what advertising could do for them, local media's advertising agents called themselves "apostles, teachers, and enlighteners of advertising."[101] Like newspaper managers in their daily struggle to attract readers, advertising agents invented various games and lotteries as means to sell ads.[102] As a result, even for local newspapers, the revenue from advertising was twice that from street sales and subscriptions, covering salaries and production expenses.[103] Local broadcasting and cable stations depended mostly on advertising, too.[104]

To sum up, the Bulgarian post-communist media adjusted relatively quickly to the new conditions of a market economy introduced in the country in 1991. Both print and broadcast media began to rely on strategies necessary to survive in a competitive market. There were still obstacles to these strategies, rooted in the unstable Bulgarian economy and the limited number of local producers who could pay for advertising. But this is not surprising for a transitional economic system in which the local structures are still not established and are unable to support the media. What is more important is the deep change in philosophy that occurred within the successful Bulgarian media. Their managers recognized the market necessities and learned to control them. By 1995, the philosophy preached by successful Bulgarian media was the libertarian press concept.

Media and political parties, government: The most remarkable example of transition in the Bulgarian post-communist media system is the change in journalists' attitudes toward the government and politicians. This transition had two stages: from tribunes of the Communist party--to tribunes of a diversity of political parties--to ideologically

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[100] Interviews with Elisaveta Kamenichka, head of the advertising bureau, and Diana Chochova, advertising agent, Pirinsko Delo (Pirin Cause), Blagoevgrad, 6 June 1994; and Russi Russev, Editor-in-Chief, Burgas Dnes i Utre (Burgas Today and Tomorrow), Burgas, 10 June 1994; also see Ed Dulin, "Newspapers in Bulgaria: An American's Viewpoint," Press Lines, September 1995, p. 9.

[101] Interview with Elisaveta Kamenichka, 6 June 1994. The same idea was expressed by Diana Chochova and Vessela Ilieva; as well as by Janka Dimitrova and Tsvetana Kalpazanova, advertising agents for CLK radio-television center in Velingrad, interviewed on 7 June 1994.

[102] Based on interviews with twenty-five advertising agents in Bulgarian local newspapers and radio/television stations in June 1994.

[103] Interview with Russi Russev, Burgas, 10 June 1994.

[104] "Regional Television in Bourgas," BalkanMedia 4:1 (1995):25.

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independent information agents. In the first stage the communist press concept was still the most-widely endorsed, while in the second stage the libertarian concept predominated.

Until November 10, 1989, the day communist dictator Todor Zhivkov was overthrown and the day recognized as the fall of communism in Bulgaria, the media system served as a tribune of the communist party. As in any communist country, the mission of the media was to popularize party policy and to mobilize citizens in following it. A special Mass Media Department of Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) sought to insure that Lenin's theory of the media as a collective agitator, propagandist and organizer was implemented in practice.[105] There was no official pre-censorship but many journalists cultivated self-censorship in order to avoid the punishment of the system for any technical or ideological violation that could be labeled as "political error."[106] Some journalists had also mastered writing with meaning concealed between the lines. Perhaps partly because of their skills, no strong underground press existed in Bulgaria during communism.[107]

It did not take long after the fall of communism, however, for the feeling of liberation to take over the entire media system. This feeling was indicated in the responses to a survey of 102 Bulgarian journalists only three months after communist rule was overthrown. The survey found that the majority of those polled believed:

--the press in Bulgaria had liberated itself from the taboos of the communist period;

--pluralism in the media was a fact, and widely approved;

--government control of the media was unanimously rejected.

One response summarized the change: "The Berlin Wall in the mass media has been destroyed."[108] Similarly, a survey of 107 Bulgarians found that freedom of expression was considered the most important accomplishment on the fourth anniversary of the regime's ousting.[109]

Insert Figure 3 about here

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[105] Radoslav Bobchev, "Osnovi na zhurnalistikata" [Fundamentals of journalism] (Sofia: Sofia University "Kliment Ohridski," Zhurnalisticheski fakultet, 1987), pp. 84-98.

[106] Interview with Dimitar Naidenov, assistant professor of print media, Department of Journalism and Mass Communications, Sofia University, Bulgaria, 25 August, 1990.

[107] There were only two known underground newspapers, both published in 1989, but before the ousting of communism: Alternativa (Alternative) and Nezavisimost (Independence), which were distributed as computer printouts. [See Velinova, 1000 Vestnika, p. 19.]

[108] "Ima li Obektivna Promiana" [Is there an objective change], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 11/12 (1990):5-7; Elena Gjurova, "Prerazhdane na Presata" [Rebirth of the press], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 4 (1991):7-11.

[109] "Barometer," Pogled, 8 November 1993, p. 8.

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Within months of Zhivkov's overthrow journalists had disassociated themselves with the past regime. One of the first newspapers to do so was the organ of the BCP Rabotnichesko Delo (Workers' Cause). Stigmatizing totalitarianism was a way for journalists to break with the image of BCP heralds that had been cultivated for the forty-five years of communism. Another way of breaking with the past was giving coverage and unlimited access, space, and time to members of the newly-formed coalition of thirteen anti-communist parties and movements, the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). The first roundtable discussions between the UDF and the still-communist government were broadcast live on national radio. But the image of the entire media system as a BCP tribune was truly changed only when an opposition press was established in Bulgaria in the spring of 1990.

Still, the development of the relations between political parties and the press immediately after the fall of communism reflected both the communist past and the history of the Bulgarian press. The tradition of the communist regime--that a party must have a tribune and that a mass medium furthers the cause of a party--was very strong. In addition, it had followed the European pattern of polarized press and a history of passionate partisanship that characterized the Bulgarian press from the beginning of the century to the establishing of communism.[110]

In the first two years after communism, years filled with political tension, most of the new publications, such as Demokratsiya [Democracy], Svoboden Narod [Free People], Narodno Zemedelsko Zname [People's Agricultural Banner], Podkrepa [Support], were party organs.[111] These were publications of the opposition UDF which had their ideological opponents in Duma, Otechestven Vestnik (Fatherland Newspaper), Zemedelsko Zname (Agricultural Banner), and Trud (Labor) in the camp of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) that had replaced the BCP. Clearly, newspapers in the early transition period were highly political copies of the old one-party newspaper system. Like the communist party organs that served the communist definition of truth, the new party newspapers promoted their parties' truth as the whole and the sole truth.[112] Ideological duels among party leaders and journalists permeated the opponent newspapers in that stage of the post-communist period.[113]

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[110] Johnson, "Whose Voice?" pp. 28-29; Jeffrey C. Alexander, "The Mass Media in Systemic, Historical, and Comparative Perspective," in Mass Media and Social Change, eds. Elihu Katz and Tamas Szecsko (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1981), pp. 27-32; Jordanka Blagoeva, "Pishtialka s Edin Zvuk" [A penny whistle with one tone], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 10 (1990): 2; Rasho Rangelov, Svobodata na Pechata v Bulgaria [Freedom of the press in Bulgaria], vol. 1: Izsledvania vurhu Zakonodatelstvoto 1865-1900 g. [Studies of the Legislation 1865-1900] (Sofia: Husky, 1994), pp. 56-72.

[111] Slavenka Draculic, "Struggling to be Born; Bulgaria," The Nation , 28 May, 1990, p. 735;
"Bulgaria: First Opposition Paper," Mass Media in the World: Excerpts from the Press (July 1990):2; "Opposition Daily Published," Report on Eastern Europe, 1:23 (2 March, 1991)57, Engelbrekt, "The Media Adjust," p. 8; Ursula Ruston, "Mediaitis: A Foreign View of Bulgaria's 'Democratised' Media," Balkan Media (Winter 1991/92):47; Velinova, 1000 Vestnika, p. 8.

[112] Vera Ivanovicova, "The Joys and Difficulties of Bulgarian Journalism Today," The Democratic Journalist 38:1 (January 1991):21; Ruston, "Mediaitis," p. 48.

[113] Ibid.; "The Bulgarian Media Are Seeking A New Image," The Democratic Journalist 38 (August 1991):7.

Journalists quickly became disenchanted with serving the political parties' agenda again. As early as 1990, Dimitar Kostov of Duma compared journalists to "participants in a dirty political fair."[114] The propaganda style of the newspapers--old and new--especially irritated journalists striving for change. Both the newspapers of the BSP and the UDF were criticized for their lack of reliable information.[115] One journalist's lament was not uncommon:

> What spiritual freedom can we talk about when a number of newspapers are written exactly in the same Bolshevik way as before? What difference does the political idea make when it is promoted to us in the same clumsy, brutal, venomous and primitively admonishing style from the communist era?[116]

This disenchantment might have been accelerated when journalists faced the demands of their party-publishers. In 1990, Ivan Danov, then editor-in-chief of Ekopolitika (Eco-politics), the weekly of the Green Party, admitted that he was ordered by the party-publisher to "write now what the National Council of the Party thinks."[117] Several newspapers, among them Ekopolitika, Vesti, (News), and Narodna Mladezh (People's Youth) were closed and the editors-in-chief of others, including Svoboden Narod, Zemedelsko Zname, Podkrepa, and Demokratsiya, were fired or forced to resign for allegedly failing to satisfy their party-publishers' demands.[118] Bulgarian journalists who had been given orders in the past regime resented the same manipulative style used by the new parties.

There was another reason besides the uncomfortable feeling of serving another master that replaced the initial euphoria of liberation. The opposition newspapers, which had been started with great enthusiasm in journalists' apartments, on their personal typewriters, and without anyone's financial help, were expected to give their profit to the parties.[119] Svoboden Narod, Ekopolitika, Demokratsiya, and Duma were not only financially self-supporting but profitable, and they gave money to their publishers, the parties.[120] The editor of Ekopolitika was even asked to pay the party's share before he had paid his staff.[121] Ofelia Hadjikoleva, former editor of Svoboden Narod, complained that journalists were "forced to yield the newspapers, created by them, to their owners, the politicians."[122] The financial demands of the parties could have contributed to the journalists' weariness of the parties and to the desire for editorial and financial independence.

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[114] Dimitar Kostov, "Politicheski Panair" [Political fair], Duma 60 (1990), day and page number not available.

[115] Genka Markova, "Nezavisim Vestnik. Shto e To" [Independent newspaper. What is this?], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 8 (1990):7.

[116] Asparuch Panov, Vek 21 4 (January 1991), page number not available.

[117] Markova, "Nezavisim Vestnik," p. 9.

[118] "Ofelia Hadjikoleva Veche Ne e Glaven Redaktor na 'Svoboden Narod'" [Ofelia Hadjikoleva is no longer editor-in-chief of Svoboden Narod], Duma, 11 June 1991, p. 2; "Volno Pozhertvuvanie Pred Oltara na Demokratsiyata" [Voluntary sacrifice at the altar of democracy], 168 Chasa, 25 February 1992, pp. 16-17; "Kak be Smenen Karaulut na Ofitsioza" [How the guard of the official newspaper was changed], 168 Chasa, 3 March 1992, pp. 16-17; "Da ne Dava Gospod Da Ostanesh bez Redaktsia" [God forbid that you are left without a newsroom], Pogled, 25 May 1992, p. 5; Jordanka Blagoeva, "Sluga na Novi Gospodari" [A servant to new masters], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 5 (1992):2.

[119] Markova, "Nezavisim Vestnik," p. 9; "Volno Pozhertvuvanie Pred Oltara na Demokratsiyata," pp. 16-17; "Kak be Smenen Karaulut na Ofitsioza," pp. 16-17; "Da ne Dava Gospod Da Ostanesh bez Redaktsia," p. 5.

[120] "Hadjikoleva Seeks Excellence," p. 22; Simpson, "The Fall and Rise," p. 29.

[121] Markova, p. 9.

[122] Ofelia Hadjikoleva, "Zhurnalistikata e Neshto Po-Visshe ot Politikata" [Journalism is something higher than politics], Pogled 35, September 1991, p. 5.

Journalists became further disappointed with politicians from the once enthusiastically-supported UDF. Once the UDF was elected and formed a government in October 1991, journalists saw that it was repeating the authoritarian media policy of its predecessors. If the communist governments understood journalism solely as a communist ideological tool, the UDF government recognized as journalists only those who served the UDF.[123] It even used the communist vocabulary in regards to the media. A member of the Parliament said on national television that information needed to be "appropriately prescribed."[124] A minister in the UDF cabinet called the Bulgarian National Radio--during a program celebrating the international day of press freedom--to recommend that it air only "serious opinions."[125] Journalists found the situation analogous to the communist supervision they had experienced before.

The UDF government was especially challenging for Bulgarian journalists. In the period after 1989 they had quickly become critical of the communist government, investigating its members' corruption and making it public. In 1990, television coverage of a mass anti-communist meeting, showing President Peter Mladenov say that tanks were needed, helped oust him from office.[126] But the governments between 1989 and the end of 1991 were formed by the BSP, the heir of the denounced communist party.

With the UDF, the first anti-communist coalition in power, journalists were forced to rethink their role in society. They had once again to define their loyalty: this time to "the fragile democracy or to truth?"[127] Every media criticism of the UDF government could be interpreted by the audience as an attempt to stop the democratic process in the country and to restore the communist order.[128] The UDF government itself dismissed criticism to its policies as a manifestation of communism and a sabotage to democracy.[129]

Developmental journalism was clearly not a philosophy shared by Bulgarian journalists. To the question of whether journalism should support the government, Ivo Indjev, then director of the BTA, replied that in no case should journalism play such a role.[130] Journalists did not allow the restoration of self-censorship or a decline in media openness in the name of "the fragile democracy." The government's slogans that the media support democracy by unquestionably backing the government only reinforced journalists' critical voices. Journalists took the role of scrutinizing the powerful, no matter what party or cause they claimed to represent.[131] As a result, the only UDF newspaper that faithfully supported the UDF during its government term was Demokratsiya, which was given the status of an official government publication.[132] Other UDF newspapers were known to provide unbiased coverage.[133]

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[123] Ruston, "Mediaitis," p. 48; Blagoeva, "Sluga na Novi Gospodari," p. 3.

[124] Yulita Grigorova, "Opozitsiiata e Orisiia za Istinskia Tvorets" [Opposition is destiny for the truly creative], Svoboden Narod , 10-16 April 1992, p. 10.

[125] "Izvadki ot Skandalnata 'Nedelia 150' na 3 Mai--Mezhdunarodnia Den na Svobodata na Pechata, Kogato Svobodata na Slovoto Ne Struvashe i Puknata Para" [Excerpts from the scandalous radio program "Sunday 150" of May 3--The international day of freedom of the press when freedom of expression was not worth a penny], Pogled, 11 May 1992, p. 5.

[126] "Chronology of Events," The Insider 1 (1990):11-12; Margarita Pesheva, Televizionnoto Mahalo [The television pendulum] (Vratsa, Bulgaria: Exacta, 1995), p. 118; Lilia Raycheva, "Political Advertising in Bulgarian Television (1990-1994)," paper presented at the 46th conference of the International Communication Association, Chicago, 23-27 May 1996.

[127] Howard Davis, "Media Change and Democratization: The Bulgarian Case," paper presented at a Conference on Restructuring of Television in Eastern Europe, London, University of Westminster, 19-22 October 1993, p. 13.

[128] Eliezer Alfandari, "Zhurnalistikata kato Opozitsia" [Journalism as opposition], Pogled, 17 August 1992, p. 8.

[129] Interview with Evgenii Stanchev (by telephone), 20 September 1992.

The same discrepancy between the journalists' mindset and the government's and politicians' way of thinking could be observed in broadcasting. National broadcast media were especially vulnerable to government control since they remained a state monopoly for at least five years after the communist regime's overthrow. Immediately after November 10, 1989, Bulgarian journalists in BNT and BNR faced the challenge to take a political position, choosing between the two main political forces, the BSP and the UDF.[134] Both the politicians and the audience expected them to do so. As a result, in the first months after communism, newscast information was often mixed with journalists' own political opinions. There appeared to be a constant presence on the air of two political extremes, the left and the right, playing a kind of "division of territories." Journalists, politicians, and the audience usually knew which program served which party.[135]

On the other hand, the political tension in these first months after totalitarianism was so high that simple stating of facts on the air was perceived as a political act. Bulgarian journalists found it hard to maintain a neutral position.[136] It was common to receive phone calls both from the socialists and the UDF, accusing journalists of favoring their opponent party--for the same coverage.[137] BNT and BNR journalists, much like their colleagues in the press, experienced the old mentality of politicians threatening them with punishment for violating their interests.[138]

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[130] "Dialog v Efira" [Dialogue on the air], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 9 (1991):41.

[131] Grigorova, p. 10; Alfandari, p. 8; Petyo Bluskov, "Neshtata sa Mnogo Elementarni i Zatova Mnogo Strashni" [Things are very basic and therefore very frightening], Pogled, 17 August 1992, p. 8; Nikolai Stefanov, "Tuhlomet Strelia Kirpich" [A brick-thrower is shooting at adobe], Pogled, 17 August 1992, p. 8; interview with Stanchev, 20 September 1992; and interview with Nikolai Stefanov, head of the international news department of Trud, conducted by telephone on 20 September 1992 during Stefanov's visit to the Freedom Forum in Arlington, VA.

[132] The status of Demokratsiya as an official government newspaper was openly protested by journalists--both working in it and their colleagues from other UDF publications. See Asparuch Panov's article in Vek 21 (January 1991, and Blagoeva, "Sluga na Novi Gospodari," p. 3.

[133] Interview with Elena Doicheva, Director of the Burgas State Archive, Bulgaria (conducted in Columbia, Missouri), 10 August 1994.

[134] For example, in 1992, Ivan Garelov, anchor of the television political affairs program Panorama, said that some politicians very aggressively pressured him for positive coverage, harassing him with continuous telephone calls. (See Svetlana Bozhilova, "Polititsite ni Zavladiaha, Prevurnaha ni v Mikrofoni" [Politicians conquered us, turned us into mouthpieces], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 2 (1992):10.)

[135] Petar Dertliev, "A Politician's View of Television in Bulgaria," BalkanMedia (Winter 1991/92):17.

[136] A Bulgarian radio anchor quoted in Schwarzlose, " Press Freedom in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia," p. 18.

[137] Experienced personally by the author during her work in Pogled in 1990 and 1991.

[138] Miko Petrov, "Stariat Leninov Vupros e na Vlast v Radioto" [The old Lenin's question is in power in radio], 168 Chasa, 12 May 1992, p. 12.

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Early patterns of coverage in BNR showed that some journalists could not ignore the interests of the powerful. A discussion about direct and indirect control over broadcast media arose in May '91 after a visit by the sister of the dethroned Bulgarian King Simeon II. While the visit was widely covered by newspapers (the former princess even visited Sofia newsrooms), no reference to her presence in the country was made on national radio. Alexander Vladkov, then BNR director, prohibited any coverage of the visit, following the Bulgarian President's expression of concern about restoration of monarchy in the country.[139]

Regardless of their political convictions, however, broadcast journalists quickly demonstrated their preference for journalistic independence. They unanimously rejected a resolution adopted by the Parliamentary Radio and Television Committee on July 18, 1991. Formally, the resolution guaranteed freedom of speech. Its Act 4, however, demanded that a working committee audit tapes of the BNR's most-listened to program, Horizont (Horison), and evaluate the anchors' performances. Journalists openly criticized the resolution, defining it as an overt attempt at censorship with the intention of protecting state institutions from criticism on national radio. Some journalists also interpreted the resolution as a government attempt to divide the journalistic community according to their employer: state-employed vs. privately-employed journalists, with state-employed journalists required to serve the state.[140]

Broadcast journalists, however, did not see their job as different from that of their colleagues in the privately-owned press.[141] On BNR, the UDF government was critically scrutinized in a commentary show Postfactum, which contributed to the new image of Bulgarian broadcast media as independent from government.[142] On BNT, Svetoslava Staeva, then a reporter for a political affairs program Panorama, was no exception and she symbolized television journalists' aggressive approach to politicians. She was threatened with a law suit by every politician-- from any side of the political spectrum--whom she had interviewed after November 10, 1989.[143] Still, she asserted:

> Politicians do not have an objective evaluation of our work. They can only evaluate us from the stance of how favorably they are presented in our coverage. For all of us, journalists, there is only one rule: We should always be in opposition to politicians.[144]

In March 1993, BNR's program Horizont went so far as to introduce a talk show called "Forbidden for Politicians," the rules of which included not inviting, listening to, or even mentioning politicians. Other talk shows with the same format followed.[145] Similarly, many private radio stations started to depend on a formula of "no politics and popular music."[146] This does not mean that political events were not announced in newscasts but journalists tried to maintain a neutral tone.[147]

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[139] Engelbrekt, "The Bulgarian Media Adjust to Their New Environment," p. 9; Encho Enev, "Bolestite na Bulgarskoto Radio" [The diseases of Bulgarian radio], Vek 21, 14 April 1992, p. 5.

[140] Svetla Zhelyazkova, "Media Muzzled," The Insider 9 (1991):13. The resolution was not implemented in practice.

[141] Interviews with Zornitsa Gjurova, March 1995.

[142] Dimitrov and Popova, Novoto radio, pp. 103-104.

[143] Margarita Pesheva, " Vinagi Kontra na Polititsite" [Always against politicians], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 9 (1991):19-20.

[144] Ibid.

Both in broadcasting and in the press then, journalists experienced a transition in their attitudes toward the government and political parties. As early as 1990, Ofelia Hadjikoleva said: "I do understand that the time of the party newspaper has passed."[148] "The party newspapers will die. We say to our colleagues working in these publications 'Start behaving like journalists. Don't be a slave to the politicians,'" said Petyo Bluskov, president of the 168 Chasa press group in 1991.[149] "Parties may silence the partisan press. Our concern, however, is not what politicians want us to write but what readers want to read," Krum Blagov, owner of the independent weekly Reporter 7, wrote in 1991.[150]

To sum up, immediately after 1989, Bulgarian journalists could not take advantage of their new freedom. They began serving the propaganda goals of the newly-born parties in the same way they had been expected to serve the communist party in the times of totalitarianism. This time, however, journalists voluntarily submitted themselves to the politicians in the name of the long-awaited democracy. This was the first stage of a transition--breaking with the old mission of being a communist tribune and supporting, both ideologically and financially, the numerous political parties of post-communism.

Within two years however, the initial euphoria of promoting parties was over for journalists, replaced by a sober realization they had been manipulated again. The second stage of the transition in media attitudes toward the government and politicians was the decision of most Bulgarian newspapers and broadcasting stations to shape themselves as independent information and entertainment institutions.

Five years after the ousting of the communist regime, Bulgarian journalists saw their future in total independence from parties, believing that unbiased political information or no political information was to their advantage. This does not mean that political interests did not stand behind some of the hundreds of publications. However, such dependence became mostly financial. It still could, on occasion, lead to overtly controlled political coverage or to questionable credibility. But there was a significant difference between an economic dependence with its implications and the open, party-propagating press of the early 1990s that led journalists to be accused of making politics and forgetting journalism.[151]

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[145] Dimitrov and Popova, Novoto radio, p. 104.

[146] Svobodin Lambrev, quoted in Dimitrov and Popova, Novoto Radio, pp. 130. Lambrev was then a journalist in Radio 99, the second most popular private radio station in Sofia, according to a Gallup poll of September 1995 [see Balkan British Social Surveys, Radio Audience in Sofia, September 1995, p. 3].

[147] Interviews with Stratsimir Kulinski, Deputy Director, Program Director, and anchor, and Albena Zhelyazkova, News Director, Radio AURA, Blagoevgrad, 6 June 1994; Ivan Asjov, President of the CLK radio-television center, Velingrad, 7 June, 1994; Todor Ivanov, Program Director of Radio Vesselina, Plovdiv, 8 June 1994; Vanyo Vulchev, Program Director, Radio Iuzhen Bryag (South Beach), Burgas, 10 June 1994; Nikolai Kolev, Program Director, Radio Veliko Turnovo, 15 June 1994; and Nikolai Hristov and Krasimir Dimitrov, Directors, Radio Glarus (Seagull), Burgas, 17 March 1995..

[148] "Hadjikoleva Seeks Excellence," p. 22.

[149] Simpson, "The Fall and Rise of a Newspaper Industry," pp. 29..

[150] Krum Blagov, "Filegate a la Bulgare," The Insider 6 (1991):11.

It is evident, however, that the pro-democracy transition occurred mainly on the part of the journalists. In the five years since the fall of communism, Bulgaria had six governments (plus a caretaker one) and with them, six different directors of the BNT and several different directors of the BNR and the BTA. Every government sought to appoint directors who would propagate its policies and protect its interests.[152] In turn, all new directors made personnel changes in accordance with their party's line, firing executives and journalists perceived to support the opponent party.[153]

Other developments demonstrated that the post-communist governments were equally authoritarian in their attempts to manipulate the media. First, it was not until a year and a half after the fall of communism that the government gave up its regulation of prices and distribution of newspaper or printing.[154] Second, the Parliamentary Committee on Radio and Television, founded during a BSP government term, remained during a UDF, two independent, one caretaker, and another BSP government. It even added the BTA to the media under its control in 1994.[155] (Journalists resisted the Committee's existence as anti-democratic, no matter what party its members represented.[156]) Third, despite the proliferation of private local radio and cable television stations, no private national radio and television stations were licensed in the five years after the fall of communism.[157]

Because of the discrepancy between Bulgarian journalists' view of their relationship with politicians and the politicians' own philosophy, it is necessary to distinguish between journalists working in the state-owned radio, television, and telegraph agency, and their government-appointed directors. Most of the directors were viewed merely as an extension of the government. Their actions were not representative of Bulgarian journalists' attitudes toward the government and politicians but rather of what the government required of them.[158]

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[151] Hadjikoleva, "Zhurnalistikata e Neshto Po-Visshe ot Politikata," p. 4.

[152] "Back to the Bad Old Days?" International Press Institute Report (September 1993):17; Dina Iordanova, "Restructuring of Bulgarian TV within the Current Political Context," paper presented at a Conference on Restructuring of Television in Eastern Europe, London, University of Westminster, 19-22 October 1993, pp. 5-6; "Bulgarian Parliament Replaces State Media Bosses," Open Media Research Institute's (OMRI) Daily Digest, 25 June 1995, delivered electronically.

[153] "Bulgarian TV Boss Sacks Top Executives," OMRI Daily Digest, 28 July 1995, delivered electronically; "Bulgarian State Radio Boss Sacks Deputy," OMRI Daily Digest, 7 December 1995, delivered electronically; Krause, "Purges," p. 48.

[154] "The Bulgarian Media are Seeking a New Image," p. 7.

[155] "Parliament to Tighten Control Over BTA," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Report, 25 April 1994, delivered electronically.

[156] Elena Bradvarova, "Informatsiata e Vlast" [Information is power], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 2 (1992):5-8.

[157] See Milena Neshkova, "Zashto Durzhavata Krie Efira ot Chastnitsi?" [Why the state hides the ether from private entrepreneurs], 24 Chasa, 19 January 1994, p. 13. A 1995 Law on Concessions ruled that private electronic media must be relicensed and that private broadcasting stations with a national range must be approved by the Council of Ministers. Bulgarian journalists feared the new law would put private electronic media under direct dependence from the government. See Assen Assenov, "Media Under New Regulations," accessible on-line (http://eternity.osf.acad.bg/dgpiper/dg2/insider/i11media.htm).

Clearly, the five years after communism showed a coexistence of four press philosophies in the relationships among media, political parties, and the government. In the early period after 1989, most journalists continued to work under the norms of the communist press concept, serving as propagandists, agitators and organizers for the causes of their parties. In the second stage of transition, this press concept was shared only by the minority of journalists who continued to work in party publications and to see their roles as ideological agents. In both stages, the political parties' philosophy of media resembled the communist view of using media as their mouthpieces. Similarly, in both stages, the government and the few journalists supporting them shared the authoritarian press philosophy.

By 1995, however, most Bulgarian journalists endorsed the libertarian philosophy in their attitudes toward government and politicians. After seeing the rise and fall of so many governments, and after opposing the equally manipulative efforts of politically opposing platforms, journalists declared faithfulness to their audience alone. For it, they adopted the motto: "Parties and politicians come and go but you cannot afford to lose your journalistic face by showing bias to any of them."[159]

Finally, the protection of state-owned national broadcasting in the five years after communism also indicates the presence, at least to some degree, of the democratic socialist concept in the Bulgarian transitional media system. In 1992, John Edgar Reid, Jr. examined the Bulgarian state television as a case study of Picard's democratic socialist concept, where the state medium fulfills the needs of the audience and ensures the public good in a democratic society.[160] Support for the democratic socialist concept in Bulgaria was shown by both the government, which consistently maintained state broadcasting even on a limited budget, and journalists, who, while encouraging private broadcasting, saw benefits in the professional standards of BNR and BNT's journalism.[161] In addition, despite their will for independence, newspaper managers and journalists called for certain types of selected state subsidies, including exemption of the value-added tax and elimination of rent for newspaper distributors.[162]

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[158] Pesheva, Televizionnoto Mahalo , p. 174; Dimitar Frangov, "Bulgarian Television in the Time of Saparev: The Price of a Compromise," BalkanMedia (Winter 1991/92):15; "Top TV Reporter Sacked," and "TV's Blind Obedience," International Press Institute Report 43:1 (January 1994):12; OMRI Daily Digest, 25, 26, 28 July, 17 October, 8, 14 November 1995, delivered electronically; "Durzhavnite Medii se Vurnaha Otnovo v Izhodno Polozhenie" [The state media returned back to start point], Kontinent, 23 July 1995, p. 6; "Parlamentut Jahna Durzhavnite Radio i TV" [The Parliament mounted the state radio and TV], 24 Chasa, 4 July 1995, p. 23.

[159] Advice by Ivan Garelov, quoted by Svetoslava Staeva in Pesheva, " Vinagi Kontra na Polititsite," p. 22.

[160] Reid, Jr., "A Media System on the Verge of Change," p. 117.

[161] Interview with Daniela Boyanova, BNT anchor for the program Planeta, Sofia, 11 March 1995.

[162] "Newspaper Strike in Bulgaria," p. 43; "VAT and Other Issues," p. 252; "Za Razprostranenieto," p. 5.

Media Law and Ethics: The post-communist developments in Bulgarian journalists' ethical concerns, in the current media legislation, and in journalists' attitudes towards it also show the transitional state of the media system. A significant change occurred among journalists who came to resist legal provisions for responsibility in the media and to favor a journalists-initiated code of ethics.

The ethics of journalism in Bulgaria during communism represented the constant discrepancy between official propaganda and personal conscience that marked the entire life in the communist state. Media laws were included in the 1971 communist constitution which explicitly stated the domination of the Party over all social and state institutions, including the press, and in various policies endorsed at party congresses that delegated the press with the responsibility of being the party tribune.[163] Bulgarian journalists at the time did not have a Code of Professional Ethics. But part of their guidelines were included in the Statute of the Union of Bulgarian Journalists whose first article accepted the guidance of the communist party.[164] In the textbook on journalistic ethics used in the Department of Journalism in Sofia University until 1989, the professional morality of journalists was framed in the Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Despite this ideological structure, there was also a great deal of idealism and faith in journalism's mission to serve the people in the forty-five years of communism in Bulgaria. The main functions and principles of journalism, outlined by Lenin, included not only loyalty to the Party but also service to the people. Bulgarian journalists translated this commitment to the people into an idealistic version of press responsibility, equivalent to the social responsibility press concept. Journalism was a prestigious profession, attracting many ambitious young Bulgarians.

The audience also treated journalists as agents of social justice. Many letters to newspapers, radio and television were requests for help in solving personal problems, from inadequate housing to unjust treatment by authorities. With their mere presence in a region and intention to dig into a problem brought by audience members, journalists from national media could put a pressure on local authorities.[165] Some journalists were able to disclose corruption of authorities. As a result, these journalists were fired, moved to smaller and unpopular publications, forced to resign or to retire early. But their work showed a strong belief in the responsibility of journalism to serve truth and justice.

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[163] Eliezer Alfandari, "Bulgarian Media Today: The Censor and His Mentor," BalkanMedia 3 (1994):32.

[164] Kiril Neshev, Problemi na Zhurnalisticheskata Etika [Problems of journalistic ethics] (Sofia: Nauka I Izkustvo, 1978), p. 89.

[165] Nedialka Karalieva, Zhurnalistkata: Zapiski iz Bulgarskata Dushevnost v Perioda 1944-1958 [The journalist: Notes about the Bulgarian mentality in the 1944-1958 period] (Sofia: IK "Alisa," 1995), back page cover.

Immediately after the ousting of the communist regime, the press experienced a state of no regulation--neither legal nor moral.[166] The several variations of broadcast laws that were considered in Parliament were not adopted due to the extreme polarization of the Bulgarian society and the Bulgarian Parliament.[167] The only provisions regulating journalism remained in the 1991 Constitution.

This first post-communist constitution itself exemplified the transitional mixture of media-related philosophies in the Bulgarian society. On the one hand, Articles 40 (1) and 41 (1) and (2) of the Constitution guaranteed freedom of the mass media and the right to seek information. On the other hand, Article 32 directly contradicted them, providing that: "no one shall be followed, photographed, filmed, recorded or subjected to any other similar activity without his knowledge or despite his express disapproval...."[168] It seemed to be a privacy statute. It was logical that the first post-communist constitution would specifically prohibit spying on citizens, so characteristic of the past regime. However, this imposed potential restrictions on the freedom of information-gathering by the media, since there was no specific provision that they would be excluded from observing the article.

Similarly, the existence of the Parliamentary Committee on Television, Radio and the BTA contradicted the guarantees of mass media freedom in the constitution, as the Committee directly interfered with the management, programming, scheduling and content of stories related to Parliament, the President, and the government.[169] Still, these were relatively few regulations since the Parliamentary Committee controlled only the three state-owned media. The rest of the media enjoyed freedom from the government.

In the years following the communist monopoly of power, journalists began gradually to oppose a press law. Until 1989, ninety percent of Bulgarian journalists favored a press law. Three years later, in 1992, the percentage was the same, due to journalists' view that a press law was necessary to delineate and thus, to protect, the long awaited

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[166] Petev, "Transitive Democratization of the Bulgarian Press" p. 103.

[167] Verginia Jordanova, "The Politics of Change in Bulgaria," Intermedia 20:3 (May-June 1992):16; Milena Neshkova, "Radioto i Televiziata Pak bez Zakon?" [Radio and television without a law again?], 24 Chasa, 27 February 1995, p. 11; Ljudmila Zasheva, "Komisiiata po Radio i Televizia Skoro Shte Bude Razformirovana" [The Committee on Radio and Television will soon be discontinued], Trud, 12 April 1995, p. 3.

[168] Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, Established by the Grand National Assembly on 12 July, 1991 (Sofia: Sofia Press, 1992), p. 12.

[169] The provision that allows the Committee's supervision of the state media was under investigation and ruled unconstitutional by the Bulgarian Constitutional Court in 1995. [See "Bulgarian Constitutional Court Reviews Media Statute," OMRI Daily Digest, 19 July 1995, and "Parliamentary Control Over Bulgarian State Media Unconstitutional," OMRI Daily Digest, 20 September 1995, delivered electronically; also "Tatarchev Dade na KS Statuta na Mediite" [Tatarchev gave the media statute to the Constitutional Court], 24 Chasa, 15 July 1995, p. 5;"Konstitutsionen Sud Reshenie No.16 ot 19 Septemvri 1995 g. po Konstitutsionno Delo No. 19 ot 1995 g." [Constitutional Court Decision No. 16 of September 19, 1995, on constitutional case No. 19 of 1995], Durzhaven vestnik [State newspaper] 86, 1995, pp. 2-4; "Parlamentut s Otriazani Prava nad Natsionalnite Medii " [Parliament with cut authority over national media], Duma, 20 September 1995, p. 2; Vassil Vassilev, "Svobodata na Slovoto ne Skri Politicheskata Golota na Konstitutsionnia Sud" [Freedom of the press did not hide the Constitutional Court's political nudity], Duma, 25 September 1995, p. 1]. The Court ruled that the Committee cannot make decisions regarding the management, structure, programming, and legal statutes of the state media, but instead, can make propositions to be discussed with and decided upon by the Parliament. [See "Freedom of Information Update," CFJ Clearinghouse on the Central & East European Press 21 (October 1995):315; "Bulgarian Constititional Court Rules on Media Control," OMRI Daily Digest, 13 December, delivered electronically.]

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freedom of the press.[170] In 1991, a draft of a "Law on Mass Information Activities," created by two law professors in Sofia University, was proposed by the Union of Bulgarian Journalists. The draft was so restrictive that journalists rejected it themselves.[171] As early as 1991 some journalists argued that a separate media law was not necessary.[172]

In 1993, the ratio of press law proponents and opponents reversed, with only ten percent in favor of a press law.[173] In 1995, a press law was viewed mostly as a restriction on freedom. A survey conducted with a convenience sample of fifty Bulgarian journalists and media managers who participated in journalism-related seminars indicated that, generally, they opposed a press law. The respondents did think that Bulgarian journalism needed legal provisions guaranteeing the security and safety of journalists and a free access to information. But they also saw a possible law as inevitably including hidden, if not open, restrictions on journalism. One journalist wrote: "A media law in the current conditions will be repressive and limiting." Another journalist wrote: "If there is a law on the press, it would probably serve politicians better than journalists."[174]

The increased number of publications, together with the fewest restrictions on the press in the history of the country, made Bulgarian post-communist journalism especially susceptible to the violation of basic, universally respected journalistic values. Modern history shows that post-communist Bulgaria was no exception in the licentious journalism that usually accompanies the early period after liberation.[175] Immediately after 1989, Bulgarian newsstands displayed an overwhelming abundance of rumors presented as news, shocking headlines unsupported by stories, crude language, graphic pictures, and uncritical citing of unidentified sources.[176] A comparative study of reporting and writing styles of the Bulgarian media conducted in 1993, concluded that an accepted way to beat the competition was simply to alter the facts. The Bulgarian language includes a conditional verb form that, operationally at least, means: "I did not see, but it has been said...." This verb occurred in as much as eighty percent of the front page stories in leading newspapers.[177]

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[170] "Zakon za Pechata: Dali, Zashto, Kakuv?" [Law on the press: If, why, what], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 8 (1991):2-8; Chavdar Krumov, "Koito ne Doide--Zagubi! Hak da mu e" [Those who didn't come--lost! Serves them right], Pogled, 5 July 1993, p. 6.

[171] "Zakon za Masovata Informatsionna Deinost" [Law on the mass information activities], Pogled, 24 June 1991, p. 5; "Pokushenie sreshtu Svobodata" [A crack on freedom], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 7 (1991):2-7; Alexander Angelov, "Vednuzh da! Vednuzh sakun" [Once yes! Once no!] Bulgarski Zhurnalist 9 (1991):second cover; Vasilka Tankova, "Svobodata e Po-Stara ot Zakona" [Freedom is older than the law], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 9 (1992):7.

[172] Reid, Jr., "A Media System on the Verge of Change," p. 111.

[173] Krumov, "Koito ne Doide--Zagubi!" p. 6.

[174] Responses to an anonymous survey with a convenience sample of fifty Bulgarian journalists and media managers who participated in journalism-related seminars in Bulgaria in May and July 1995. The survey was conducted by the author.

[175] See Jeremy Popkin, Revolutionary News: The Press in France 1789-1799 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990), pp. 96-168, and Margaret Blanchard, Revolutionary Sparks: Freedom of Expression in Modern America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 23-26.

[176] Julia Piskulijska, "Uzh Neprikosnovena Istina" [Allegedly inviolable truth], 150 g. Bulgarska Zhurnalistika, 24 May 1994, p. 7.

[177] Byron Scott, "Bringing American Journalism to the Balkans," report for the Meredith Corporation, 1993 (mimeographed), p. 10.

Some of these practices were attributed to the new generation of journalists who entered the media immediately after 1989. The new media, founded after the ousting of the regime, needed new, uncorrupted voices. These could only come from very young reporters or people with no journalistic experience, the new media managers thought.[178] Indeed, visits to Bulgarian local newsrooms in 1994 and 1995 showed that about half of the interviewed reporters and media managers had no prior journalistic experience.[179] The post-communist media were created by journalists with no formal training, no professional experience, and often with little life experience, but with plenty of aggressiveness.[180]

After years of dull or pompous ideological indoctrination or effortful reading between the lines, the audience embraced these new journalists, but soon realized it could not trust them either.[181] Amidst the truth-distortion and lies in the media, the audience faced the challenge of how to be truly informed. A 1992 Gallup survey showed that forty-four percent of the interviewed Bulgarians throughout the country read four or more newspapers.[182] Audience members read side by side a variety of newspapers, comparing quotes and figures, trying to reconstruct the truth by taking the median on a continuum of extremes. The phenomenon has been called "triangulating for the truth."[183]

These developments were accompanied by the dependency of Bulgarian media on ideological and financial institutions. Even after the decline of party publications, many of the national and local newspapers were tied directly to or were indirectly dependent on financial groups with certain political interests. The media were expected to serve these interests in exchange for the sponsorship. For example, many weeklies in provincial cities published under the auspices of the city government and had their offices in the city halls. Reporting in these publications could not be trusted as independent of the agenda, actions, and position of the publisher.[184] Not surprisingly, in two polls of Bulgarian audience members in the 1990s, forty-two percent answered negatively to the question "Is Bulgarian

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[178] Naidenov, "Lichnata Turpimost na Zhurnalista i Mediiniat Pazar," pp. 6-7.

[179] The visits were made by the author. See the method section in Chapter 1 for details.

[180] Genka Markova, "Agresiata kato Zhurnalistika" [Aggression as journalism], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 8 (1990):51-53.

[181] There were exceptions, of course. For example, the entire staff of the respected national economics weekly Kapital (Capital), in which Reuters had shares, was made by people under the age of thirty who were concurrently completing their higher education in economics. In this case, the staff's expertise in economics was to their advantage and contributed to their credibility. Interviews with Filip Harmandjiev, Director, and Ivo Prokopiev, Editor-in-Chief, both under the age of thirty, were conducted in Kapital 's newsroom located in an apartment downtown Sofia on 13 March 1995. Kapital was recommended by other Bulgarian journalists as the most trusted newspaper in the country, especially for its independence and investigative scoops (e.g., interview with Diana Ivanova, Radio Free Europe, Sofia, Bulgaria, 12 and 13 March 1995). See also Krause, "Purges," p. 47.

[182] Nikolai Konstantinov, "Vestnitsi Mnogo, no 'Pogled' e Edin" [Many newspapers, one Pogled], Pogled, 1 June 1992, p. 5.

[183] Scott, "Bringing," p. 11.

[184] "The Bulgarian Media Are Seeking a New Image," p. 7; Angel Grigorov, "Polusvobodno li e Slovoto," [Is the word semi-free], Pogled, 6 May 1991, p. 8. It must be noted that journalists did not accept such arrangements uncritically. Russi Russev, Editor-in-chief of Burgas Dnes (Burgas Today), a weekly published by the city of Burgas, and his staff left the paper in 1994 when a new mayor started interfering with their work. The journalists registered a private firm and founded an independent local weekly called Burgas Dnes i Utre (Burgas Today and Tomorrow). [Interview with Russi Russev, Burgas, 10 June 1994.]

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journalism independent?" and fifty-one percent said no to the question: "In general, are Bulgarian journalists ethical in their coverage and commentaries on events?"[185]

Even at that time of deserved audience distrust, however, Bulgarian journalists shared concerns about ethics in their work. Contrary to the practice of rumor-spreading and fact-slanting, most journalists realized the need to abide by universally accepted ethical values. As early as 1990 the Union of Bulgarian Journalists issued an appeal to all Bulgarian journalists to abide by international ethical principles followed by their colleagues in the rest of Europe.[186] Members of the editorial board of the magazine Bulgarski Zhurnalist regularly discussed in opinion columns their desire for the ethical practice of journalism.[187] Other discussions of ethics included essays on the state of ethics in the country historically and presently and cited international codes of ethics.[188] In addition, in the face of fierce verbal fights among journalists of different political convictions, made public through the media, a new "ethic of debate" was advocated.[189]

In March 1994, Pogled came out with a front page appeal: "The word is morality, therefore, do not write a lot--write the truth!" [190] At the same time, the Tenth Congress of the Union of Bulgarian Journalists proposed Rules for Journalistic Ethics and adopted them after a majority vote in their favor. The same year, a survey of reporters, writers, and media managers, had shown ninety-five of one hundred Bulgarian journalists agreed that:

--journalists in any circumstances must defend freedom of speech;

--journalists must respect the truth, no matter what their political beliefs and affiliations;

--journalists bear the whole responsibility for their work;

--journalists must protect their sources;

--journalists should not take advantage of people's honesty and suffering.

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[185] "Nezavisima li e Bulgarskata Zhurnalistika" [Is Bulgarian journalism independent], Pogled, 7 March 1994, p. 4; Hristo Butsev, "Gildiata Ottuk Natatuk" [The guild from here on], Pogled, 7 March 1994, p. 3.

[186] "Bulgaria: Appeal to Abide by Journalistic Code of Ethics," Mass Media in the World (May 1991):4.

[187] Zhivko Georgiev, "Novite Realnosti" [The new realities], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 2 (1991):second cover; Manol Manolov, "Neuteshitelen Pogled v Nastoyashteto" [Not a comforting look at the present], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 3 (1991):second cover; Zhivko Georgiev, "Vlastnicheska Interventsia" [Authorities' intervention], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 1 (1992):second cover; Manol Manolov, "Kogato Suvestta Ne Pozvoliava" [When conscience forbids], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 10 (1992):second cover; Julia Piskulijska, "Profesionalisum s Miarka--Bez Marki" [Professionalism within limits, not with (Deutsche) marks], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 4 (1994):second cover.; Rumjana Bratovanova, "Zhurnalistikata Izplita Sama Primka na Shiiata si" [Journalism itself makes a noose for its neck], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 2 (1995):57; Kornelia Bozhanova, "Razstrelvai Istinata" [Shoot the truth], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 3 (1995):23.

[188] Erika Lazarova, "Eskalatsia na Beztseremonnostta" [Escalation of aggressiveness], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 8 (1992):4-7; Kamka Novakova, "Etika v Mediite i Svoboda na Pechata" [Ethics in the media and freedom of the press], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 2 (1995):42-45.

[189] Kiril Neshev, "I Prokletite Moralni Pitania" [And the damned moral questions], Bulgarski Zhurnalist 8 (1992):2-4.

[190] Pogled, 7 March 1994, p. 1.

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In addition, seventy-five percent said that journalists' work should not set people of different racial, ethnic, and religious background against each other; seventy-five percent agreed that journalists should not collaborate with intelligence services; seventy-three percent said that journalists should not put their personal or commercial interests before their work; seventy-one percent agreed that media should be politically independent; and sixty-five percent said that journalists should not reveal the identity of criminals under age. The study concluded that the majority of Bulgarian journalists expressed concerns about ethics but failed in its practice. The principles upon which the respondents agreed served as the basis for the adopted Rules of Journalistic Ethics.[191]

The growing concern for ethics was further demonstrated in a series of interviews with more than thirty Bulgarian journalists and journalism educators conducted in 1995.[192] The interviews revealed the ethical questions that Bulgarian journalists faced daily in the fifth year after the fall of communism. Reporters were struggling with ethical questions even more then than in the early post-communist times of unlimited freedom. In 1995 journalists had to fight the unfavorable image left by their colleagues in the earlier times of chaos and euphoria after the end of government control on the press. Journalists realized that irresponsible use of documents, distortion of information, and failure to protect sources had led many Bulgarians to lose trust in the media as institutions and in journalists as individuals. In 1995 more than ever before, journalists faced refusals by potential sources to talk to reporters, citing previous negative encounters with sensationalist media.

In addition, in a country with increasing inflation, poverty, and cynicism, Bulgarian journalists began asking essential ethics questions. Should they pay sources for information? If it is not wrong, what would be considered a payment--a free meal, reimbursement for time and travel expenses, or simply buying the information with cash? Is it right to do undercover reporting? How long and before whom is a promise from a journalist not to reveal a source valid? Is it not wrong for journalists to eavesdrop, or secretly audio and videotape, especially after years of communist secret police's spying on citizens? Eavesdropping and secret taping were forbidden constitutionally as well as by a "Law on the special means" that banned listening to police scanners. But it was no secret among journalists that the most successful newspapers got the hottest information by violating these laws.[193]

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[191] "Pravila na Zhurnalisticheskata Etika Prieti ot Desetia Kongres na Sujuza na Bulgarskite Zhurnalisti, 6 Mart 1994" [Rules of journalistic ethics adopted by the Tenth Congress of the Union of Bulgarian Journalists on 6 March 1994], Pogled, 14 March 1994, p. 8; also Bulgarski Zhurnalist 4 (1994):10-11.

[192] Interviews conducted by the author. Also see Barnett, "Cooperation, pp. 3-4.

[193] Interview with Alexenia Dimitrova, investigative reporter for Pogled, Sofia, 10 March 1995.

Even if not all of these questions were new, they were asked in a new environment. Paying for information had not been an issue for at least the forty-five years of communism. Eavesdropping of police communication was unthinkable before 1989. Undercover reporting was sometimes practiced even before 1989 but within clearly delineated limits.[194] The ethical questions of Bulgarian journalists in the mid-1990s came after several years of experimenting with the borders of press freedom. The stage of exploring just how far one can go had passed, leaving a realization that, instead of sensations, it was truthful, balanced and respectful (for sources and readers) journalism the audience wanted.

To sum up, transition also occurred in the area of journalism ethics in the Bulgarian post-communist media system. While in the early post-communist period journalists were testing the limits of their new freedom, they gradually began to consider ethical behavior an essential part of the journalist's work. The adopted Rules of Journalistic Ethics, while not immediately stopping unethical journalism, was a step toward a socially responsible press.

This clearly shows a mixture of the libertarian and social responsibility press philosophies among Bulgarian journalists in the area of media ethics. In the area of media law, the libertarian concept is evident in the journalists' later opposition to media laws. In addition, the state regulation over national broadcasting shows the presence of the democratic socialist concept.

Conclusion

Projections for the future: In a media system that is changing so rapidly, any attempt to predict future development must be cautious. However, the interviews and surveys with Bulgarian journalists, media managers and educators showed distinct tendencies of development within the next five years and a great deal of optimism for Bulgarian journalism in twenty years.

In five years, Bulgarian journalists predict a decreased number of newspapers. Only those newspapers that are most popular and/or those backed by powerful economic groups will survive the intense competition. In general, the audience considers these publications the most professionally written newspapers, too. A further consolidation of national and local newspapers in country-wide chains is predicted. Any new publications are expected to be politically independent. A further decay of party-affiliated newspapers is expected. The new print media that may appear in the future are likely to be specialized technical publications for target audiences, such as specialized magazines.

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[194] For example, two books based on undercover reporting described the lives of women in a mental institution and in a prison. The authorities were informed in advance and permitted both projects.

Growth in radio and television, especially in the private regional stations, seems inevitable. Breaking the monopoly of BNR and BNT and the start of national private broadcasting is also expected, but not soon. In general, there is hope for more journalistic independence and opportunities for unfettered service to the audience. Journalists see a trend to a growing influence of local press and broadcasting, which might suggest the introduction of the democratic-participant concept in the Bulgarian media system.

In twenty years, Bulgarian journalists believe, their media system will be entirely westernized. They envision economically powerful newspapers and broadcasting media, higher quality of information, and prestige for the journalistic profession.

The media system of Bulgaria will remain transitional until the economy stabilizes and reaches the state of a true free market. Because of the mixture of press philosophies among journalists (libertarian, self-responsibility, remains of communist), discrepancy with the government's and politicians' press philosophies (authoritarian, communist) and the existence of state-supported media (an element of Picard's democratic socialist concept), several normative concepts will continue to coexist in the Bulgarian media system. Some of these prescriptive press concepts may disappear (most likely the communist one) and new philosophies (perhaps the democratic-participant) may be adopted. But it is unlikely that a media scholar in the near future will be able to classify the Bulgarian media system with one normative concept alone.

Discussion: This study reviewed the existing press typologies and proposed a new approach for describing the media systems of the rapidly changing societies of post-communist Europe. The examination of the developments in three areas of Bulgarian journalism: media management and economics, media, political parties and the government, and media law and ethics, revealed a coexistence of five prescriptive concepts: libertarian, authoritarian, communist, social responsibility, and democratic socialist. Specifically, the examination of post-communist developments in media economics and management demonstrated dominance of the libertarian press concept. The examination of developments in the relationships among media, political parties, and the government showed a coexistence of the libertarian, authoritarian, communist, and democratic socialist concepts. The examination of developments in media law and ethics revealed a coexistence of the libertarian, social responsibility, and democratic socialist concepts. Therefore, the proposed transitional concept is suitable for describing developments in the major aspects of the Bulgarian post-communist media.

FIGURES:

Figure 1a:
The press system of Nicaragua in the 1980s


Transitional
Revolutionary
Authoritarian
Social responsibility

Figure 1b:
The press system of Bulgaria in the 1990s


Transitional
Authoritarian
Communist
Libertarian
Social Responsibility
Democratic Socialist

Figure 1c:
The press system of a West European country


Open market
Libertarian
Social Responsibility
Democratic Socialist
Democratic Participant

Figure 2: Bulgarian Newspapers--Number of Titles vs. Circulation



Source: Statistical Reference Book of Republic of Bulgaria (Sofia: National Statistical Institute, 1993), p. 23.

Figure 3: What Is The Most Important Thing That We Have Accomplished In The Four Years After November 10, 1989?



Source: "Barometer," Pogled 8 November 1993, p. 8.

COMPARING CANADIAN AND U.S. PRESS COVERAGE OF THE GULF CRISIS: THE EFFECTS OF IDEOLOGY IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

by James E. Mollenkopf and Nancy Brendlinger

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines how ideological differences affect press coverage by comparing Canadian and U.S. news of the military buildup against Iraq, Aug. 2, 1990 to Jan. 16, 1991. The New York Times was compared with the (Toronto) Globe and Mail, and the U.S. newsmagazine Time with the Canadian Maclean's.

Findings indicate that the U.S. media had more anti-Iraq and pro-intervention material than did the Canadian media, with differences more pronounced in the magazines than in the newspapers.

COMPARING CANADIAN AND U.S. PRESS COVERAGE OF THE GULF CRISIS: THE EFFECTS OF IDEOLOGY IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

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Media critics and researchers have long argued that news content is influenced by economic and ideological constraints. These constraints might intensify during potential or actual international conflicts, according to Mowlana (1984).

> As was illustrated in the U.S. v. Iranian case, the media often side with the perceived national interests of the system of which they are a part, making it difficult to maintain journalistic independence and neutrality in the face of patriotism and national loyalty. (Mowlana, 1984, p. 86).

This paper examines how ideological differences affect press coverage by comparing two countries' news of the United Nations coalition's buildup, lead by U.S. President George Bush, against Iraq after Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had his army invade Kuwait Aug. 2, 1990, continuing until Jan. 16, 1991, the date the coalition began to bomb Iraq. The countries chosen for this comparison are Canada and the United States; they were chosen because they share many similarities, but differ in significant ways.

Canada is probably the country most similar to the United States in the world. While certainly not identical, both are capitalist democracies, both share a similar form of English as their dominant language (although Canada also recognizes French as an official language), both are countries populated mostly by immigrants and their offspring from the same countries and regions, both are heavy consumers of Mideast oil, and both were members of the United Nations coalition against Iraq, albeit Canada's military presence was fractional to that of the United States.

Media critics and media research in both countries have also addressed concerns raised by concentration of ownership, corporate ownership, and that the owners of news outlets come from the same social strata of other political and cultural elites. (For U.S. critics, see among others, Bagdikian, 1992; Bennett, 1996; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Lee & Solomon, 1991; Rachlin, 1988; Schiller, 1989. For Canadian critics, see, for example, Bruck, 1989; Clement, 1975; Hackett, 1995; Porter, 1965.)

The ideological differences between these countries however, are also telling. For example, the United States was formed as an independent country after a revolution against England. Canada, a country born of evolution rather than revolution, achieved nationhood by way of a considerably more peaceful process, the Confederation of 1867.

Being a less populous country and having many times felt taken for granted or ignored by the United States, Canadians tend to "sympathize with small or weak countries that are in conflict with the United States" (Lipset, 1990, p. 33). Differing national experiences have also led to differing world views. People from the United States "more than other Western people tend to view international politics in nonnegotiable moralistic and ideological terms" while Canadians see foreign policy conflicts as "reflections of interest differences and therefore more subject to negotiation and compromise"

(Lipset, 1990, p. 33).

At the end of World War II, Canada rejected the development of nuclear weapons and later rejected any nuclear roles in its NATO alliances. Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister from 1969 to 1984, was a frequent critic of the U.S. Vietnam policy and was known for his firm opposition to the arms race and to Cold War rhetoric in general. And Canadians are proud of their tradition of full participation in United Nations' peacekeeping missions. "Peacekeeping -- a non-military use of the military -- is Canada's most notable contribution to stopping the spread of international violence....'Warriors for Peace' is a role Canadians relish" (Axworthy, 1993, pp. 320, 322).

While Canada may have elite-driven media similar to that of the United States[1], it can reasonably be presumed those elites were less interested in a war with Iraq than their U.S. counterparts given the relatively small military investment made by Canada and the less militaristic and interventionist traditions and values of the Canadian people. Based on our assumptions that 1) a corporate/elite owned press reflect the views of those elites and 2) U.S. and Canadian elites would have different stakes in the Iraq/Kuwait conflict, we formed the following hypotheses:

H1: Between Aug. 2, 1990, and Jan. 16, 1991, the U.S. press would contain a greater amount of material favorable to the necessity and validity of a military solution in the Gulf than would the Canadian press.

H2: During the same time period, the U.S. press would contain a greater amount of material that was hostile to Saddam Hussein and Iraq than would the Canadian press.

Method

Qualitative content was used to compare the New York Times newspaper and Time magazine in the United States with the (Toronto) Globe and Mail newspaper and Maclean's magazine in Canada. The New York Times and the Globe and Mail were the third and second largest circulating dailies respectively in their countries of origin in 1990 and both papers circulated nationally. Time and Maclean's were the largest circulating newsweeklies in their countries of origin in 1990.

A random sample of Gulf crisis-related news stories were selected and analyzed from the two newspapers by using constructed weeks, one from each month, from August through January. Six-day weeks were used as the Globe and Mail does not publish on Sundays. For the magazines, articles related to the Gulf crisis were analyzed from every magazine, beginning Aug. 13, 1990, the first post-invasion issue, until Jan. 21, 1991, the last issue before the war began. (These magazines are on the newsstands before their listed date of issue.)

For both newspapers and magazines, news articles in the sample included all those directly related to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the subsequent U.S. and allied military build-up in the region, the Bush administration's Gulf policy and related pronouncements and military moves, reactions by the United Nations and major U.S. allies, conditions in post-invasion Kuwait, articles on internal U.S. and Canadian debates of their Gulf roles, as well as Iraqi military moves, policy statements and reactions by public figures or countries sympathetic to Iraq. Editorials, columns by regular or guest columnists, articles labeled "news analysis," feature stories, and sidebars and other short articles adjacent to a main article were not included as the objective of this study was to determine if differences existed in traditional "straight" news stories presented by the newspapers and magazines.

This sampling yielded a total of 244 articles; 89 in the New York Times, 57 in the Globe and Mail, 55 in Time, and 43 in Maclean's. All news articles analyzed in this are listed by publication and chronologically in Appendix A.

Comparisons were made between the newspapers and between the magazines; magazines and newspapers were not compared with each other.

The unit of analysis was the article. Each article had its own coding sheet on which was recorded the article's headline, the publication it was from, the date of publication, the page number on which it began and coder valuations on three elements -- 1) it's headline, subhead and lead paragraph, 2) the concluding paragraph, and 3) the article as a whole. Headlines, subheads, and lead paragraphs are important as many readers scan an article deriving most of their information from these elements. For those reading an article to its conclusion, the last paragraph is significant as it represents the final thought the reader is left with. Each of these three elements (whole article, beginning, and conclusion), were coded on two attitudinal dimensions. The first was the attitude toward military intervention (pro, con, neutral or not applicable). The second was the attitude toward Iraq (pro, con, neutral or not applicable).[2] Coder comments and examples from the articles justifying the coder's decision were also recorded on the coding sheets. A copy of the coding sheet is found in Appendix B.[3] Following Rachlin's (1988) lead, the coder also was alert for material that appeared in one country's press but not in the other.

Newspaper Results

The analysis revealed differences in all six categories between the U.S. and Canadian newspapers consistent with the hypotheses. The New York Times's beginning of articles, conclusions and entire articles had more material that was pro-intervention and less anti-intervention material than the Globe and Mail. In addition, the Globe and Mail's beginnings of articles, conclusions, and entire articles had more pro-Iraq material and less anti-Iraq material than the New York Times. (See Table 1).

In fairness it should be pointed out that the New York Times was obligated to give virtually daily coverage to the positions and movements of the Bush administration, which adopted a firm anti-Iraq stance shortly after the invasion of Kuwait and maintained it throughout the course of the crisis. The Globe and Mail was not as obligated to give as detailed coverage of the events in Washington to its Canadian readers.

The differences in the newspapers grew greater as the deadline for war drew near. The anti-war articles in the New York Times reported on the positions of those opposed to military action in the Gulf and on the peace movement in general. The Globe and Mail anti-war articles also covered these topics, however on Jan. 11 and 14, 1991, it carried page one articles written by a staff writer in Baghdad that conveyed the heightening fear of the residents there, people whose city would soon be attacked by U.S.-led forces. The Globe and Mail ran several more articles that gave the views of Palestinians and other Arabs who saw Saddam Hussein as a leader and a hope for their own liberation. As the newspaper sample was not comprehensive, it is possible the New York Times ran similar articles on other days.

However, the coder did ascertain that one article published in the Globe and Mail did not appear in any edition of the New York Times. This Jan. 2, 1991, article was striking in its description of conditions in Kuwait, which to this point had been those of a war-ravaged country desperately awaiting liberation by the West. This article reported that "thousands" of Kuwatis were returning to Kuwait where they "rubbed shoulders" with Iraqi army officers in busy markets. The article also reported that markets were stocked with food, clubs and restaurants were reopening, and shopping areas were doing a brisk trade. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the article was the report that Kuwati youth, apparently feeling quite unthreatened by the Iraqis, were making weekend trips to Baghdad to enjoy the nightlife there.

Lastly, the New York Times quoted Saddam Hussein's inflammatory boast that if attacked he would make U.S. soldiers "swim in their blood" in a two column headline on Jan. 10, 1991. The Globe and Mail reported the quote in a single sentence well into the body of a Gulf-related story.

Magazine Results

In almost every category the U.S. magazine Time had more pro-intervention and less anti-intervention material, as well as more anti-Iraq and less pro-Iraq material than did the Canadian magazine Maclean's (See Table 1). The differences were more pronounced between the magazines than between the newspapers.

First we will discuss the coverage in Time. All statements referred to in the articles below were written by Time staff writers and none are quotations from people interviewed in the articles.

In the first post-invasion issue of Time, the final paragraph on the initial story of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait called on the international community to ensure that Saddam Hussein should "get away with nothing" and that "the time to draw a line in the sand is now." These statements set the general tone of Time's coverage of the Gulf crisis in the months to follow.

Before the U.S. election in November, the United States assembled a coalition of countries allied against Iraq in what were characterized as defensive forces in the Gulf region. However, after the November 1990 elections the Bush administration nearly doubled those forces and it became clear these forces were there for offensive reasons. It was during this period between the elections and the start of the actual war that Time became increasingly supportive of the Bush administration.

In a Nov. 19, 1990, article Time argued that repelling Iraq was essential for ordering the post-cold war world. It noted the increasing number of anti-war protesters but attributed this phenomenon to Bush's failure to better clarify his goals to the U.S. public. In the Nov. 26, 1990, issue Time again noted increasing public and Congressional discontent and again attributed it to Bush's failure to explain his positions properly, repeating the call for him to do this.

Time backed off this stance briefly in a Dec. 17, 1990, article that reported on Iraq's somewhat surprising announcement to release all the hostages it was holding. In this piece, some doubt was expressed that Bush had enough justification for war. This was the last Time article that could be coded anti-war.

In a quick reversal of this position, Time asked on the cover of its following issue was Kuwait "worth dying for?" The related article stated that criticisms of Kuwait were "simplistic" and "overdrawn" and that the country's flaws could be corrected by the "New Kuwait" created by its liberation. This article concluded that Kuwait was a "good country" that if liberated "could become a great one."

The Jan. 7, 1991, issue featured Time's annual "Men of the Year" selections, which included George Bush and Saddam Hussein. In profiles of the two, Bush was lauded throughout for his "virtuosity" in handling the Gulf crisis as he "begins to shape a brave new world order." The article approved of virtually every aspect of his Gulf policy; a "sheriff rounding up a posse of law-abiding nations." Saddam Hussein was likened to Adolph Hitler, a "dumb thug" and a "desert bumpkin."

In the Jan. 21, 1991, issue of Time, the last before the war, the lead article stated flatly that Saddam Hussein "must be stopped" and concluded somewhat enigmatically, "If he is not, what will survival be worth?" A second article characterized war as inevitable and noted the "resignation and resolve" of the U.S. people toward a war with Iraq. This seemed at odds with a Time/CNN poll on the same page that showed only 41% of the U.S. people willing to go to war after the Jan. 15, 1991, deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, with 45% favoring continued sanctions. The article also reiterated that Saddam Hussein remained "the villain who raped Kuwait."

Maclean's magazine had no sympathy for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait or Saddam Hussein personally and referred to him in denigrating terms in its Aug. 13, 1990, issue and, generally speaking, throughout its coverage of the Gulf in the months ahead. However, the magazine was more reserved in its coverage of the military build-up and the need for a war to resolve the conflict. Unless noted, quotes from Maclean's are those written by staff writers and not quotes from people interviewed in the articles.

An article in the Aug. 20, 1990 issue of Maclean's referred to the sending of U.S. troops to the Gulf as a "risky gamble" and called Bush's analogizing of Saddam Hussein with Adolph Hitler a "public relations weapon to banish other, more troubling memories," that is, Vietnam. An article in the Aug. 27, 1990, issue was somewhat cautious in tone about U.S. military muscle-flexing in the Gulf, quoted an analyst referring to it as an "800-lb. gorilla," and worried that the unity of the coalition could "unravel if the President (Bush) went too far beyond U.N.-sanctioned action." The article also cautioned Bush that he could become a victim of his actions much in the manner that the Iranian hostage situation made a political victim of former President Jimmy Carter.

The Sept. 24, 1990, issue of Maclean's contained an article that cited concerns of Middle East experts that Washington's "obsession" with gaining international support for its Gulf policy might lead to the disregard of longer-term considerations and over the "sudden frenzy" of military commitments. The article concluded with a quote implying that part of Bush's motivation might be to dispel the "wimp" image that followed him during his 1988 election campaign.

An article in the Oct. 1, 1990, issue of Maclean's quoted a peace activist who stated that the United States' motive was to declare war and "wipe out the Iraqi government" and that Canada should have no part of this. The Oct. 8, 1990, issue carried an article reporting on Palestinian support for Iraq and that some Palestinians in refugee camps were donating their cash and jewelry to buy Iraqis food.

After the Bush administration doubled the troops in the Gulf, an article in the Nov. 26, 1990, issue carried the subhead "Bush struggles to explain why U.S. troops might have to fight -- and die -- to stop Saddam Hussein." The Dec. 10, 1990, edition of the magazine contained an article that stated the United States was paying too high a price for its Gulf stance by cozying up to China, despite its recent Tiananmen Square massacre and to Syria, with its record of "brutal acts of international terrorism." The article also quoted an analyst who said the UN label on the forces in the Gulf was a "very impressive international facade to what really is U.S. operation" and a defense critic who characterized the United States as a "dangerous ally." The article concluded that there was a "cautious glimmer of optimism" that the Gulf situation could be resolved peacefully.

A Dec. 17, 1990, article reporting on the Iraqi hostage release opened with "perhaps it will end peacefully after all" and reported on Canadian concerns on why the coalition seemed to be "rushing towards war" with the Canadian government "blindly following the Americans down the precarious path to confrontation." The article concluded with the hope for "peace on earth."

The headline of an article in the Dec. 24, 1990, issue seemed not to choose sides as it characterized both Washington and Baghdad equally as "playing a game of chicken." Likewise an article in the Jan. 14, 1991, edition of Maclean's again characterized both sides as intransigent and concluded with predictions that a war would have serious environmental consequences along with a "large number of deaths."

The Jan. 21, 1991, edition of Maclean's carried several articles on the soon-to-be-war including one titled "War and Peace," a summary of arguments for and against the war. The "pro" arguments basically recited the Bush administration positions. The "con" arguments took the United States to task sharply as the article stated that U.S. forces "do not belong" in the Gulf and are there only for the "pools of oil" that lie beneath Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. It worried that a war would have "disastrous political consequences" that would "destabilize an already volatile region." It accused the allied side for "pushing the crisis to the brink" and warned the coalition side that if it went to war, it would be emulating Saddam Hussein whom Washington supported in the past when it was politically convenient. It concluded by stating flatly that if a war occurs, it will be because "the Americans will start it."

Discussion and Conclusion

Generally the articles in both the newspapers and magazines supported the two hypotheses, that is the U.S. press contained greater amounts of material favorable to a military intervention and greater amounts of material hostile to Saddam Hussein and Iraq than the Canadian press did. However it is interesting to note that the magazines differed more strongly than the newspapers. This raises the possibility that ideology, as well as other influences, may affect newspaper and magazine reporting differently. Perhaps the newspapers were more alike because newspapers in democratic/capitalist countries are more likely to adhere to the idea of "objectivity" so stressed in journalism schools in these two countries. By their very nature, magazine articles tend to be more subjective than those found in newspapers because in "magazine writing...writers offer their perspectives on the subject" (Garrison, 1989, p. 11). Research of the similarities and differences among different genres of print news, as well as among and between print and broadcast venues, could lead to a more complete understanding of how news is constructed.

The significance of this research is that it uncovered differences in a selection of news outlets in two countries that share a common border and are quite similar to one another politically, economically, socially and ideologically -- but who did differ in telling ways in relationship to the Persian Gulf crisis. While the Canadian press examined had no more positive regard for the actions of Iraq and Saddam Hussein than did the U.S. press, they were, especially in the case of the newsmagazines, able to present the crisis more objectively as it wound its course toward war.

Endnotes

1. For example, Clement (1975) presented evidence that the large majority of the owners of mass media outlets in Canada attended the same schools, belonged to the same exclusive national men's clubs, were Anglican in religion and Anglo in ethnicity, and were born in Ontario or Quebec (pp. 340-341). Clement concluded that "the media elite and the economic elite turn out to be the same people" who "through the ideology they present, reinforce the existing political and economic system" (pp. 341, 343).

2. An article was considered to be pro-Iraq if it treated Iraq, its claim against Kuwait, or Saddam Hussein in a positive manner. These were items that portrayed the Iraqis to be involved in a legitimate dispute, Saddam Hussein to be a legitimate ruler, or material that painted a positive picture of the country.

An article was considered anti-Iraq if it treated Iraq or its actions in a negative manner. These were items that portrayed the Iraqis to be ruthless with no legitimate claim against or dispute with Kuwait. This category also included personal attacks on or negative characterizations of Saddam Hussein.

An article was considered to be pro-intervention if it treated the U.S.-led effort in a positive light, specifically that of a legitimate joint effort to combat an international menace. Articles that reported on the Gulf military build-up and related political and military maneuvering, on U.S. and allied threats toward Iraq, and articles with a predominant theme of war as the only option if Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait were included in this category.

An article was considered to be anti-intervention if it presented the coalition effort in a negative light. This included articles that portrayed the Iraq/Kuwait dispute to be a regional one not requiring outside intervention or one that should end only in compromise rather than confrontation. This included articles that attributed ulterior motives to the effort such as access to Kuwait's oil supply, U.S. hegemonic interests, or items that opposed war on a moral basis.

An article was coded neutral to Iraq or neutral to intervention if it contained a balance of positive and negative material, gave both sides of the argument, and stayed away from value-laden adjectives or stereotypes.

An article was coded not applicable if it did not fit into any of the above categories.

3. The articles were coded by one coder (the first author). A coder reliability test was conducted on a randomly selected 10 percent of articles using Holsti's (1969) formula. The test coder agreed with 91.7% of the original coding decisions. Three of the test coder's disagreements involved coding pro-intervention in Time articles the original coder had coded as neutral, perhaps reflecting a conservatism on the part of the original coder.

TABLE A: MAGAZINE AND NEWSPAPER CODING RESULTS

	Time N=55 %	Maclean's N=43 %	NYT N=89 %	G&M N=57 %
Impression of headline, subhead, and lead paragraph.				
Pro intervention	14.5	20.9	39.3	24.6
Anti intervention	7.3	9.3	5.6	14.0
Neutral intervention	30.9	30.2	22.5	19.2
N/A intervention	47.3	39.6	32.6	42.1
Pro Iraq	0.0	4.7	0.0	7.0
Anti Iraq	50.9	44.2	55.1	35.1
Neutral Iraq	20.0	14.0	33.7	49.1
N/A Iraq	29.1	37.1	11.2	8.8
Impression of concluding paragraph.				
Pro intervention	27.3	9.3	20.2	15.8
Anti intervention	9.0	44.2	6.7	17.6
Neutral intervention	27.3	18.6	18.0	7.0
N/A intervention	36.4	27.9	55.1	59.6
Pro Iraq	1.8	2.3	0.0	3.5
Anti Iraq	49.1	34.6	29.2	26.3
Neutral Iraq	16.4	7.0	30.4	26.3
N/A Iraq	32.7	55.8	40.4	43.9
Impression of article as a whole.				
Pro intervention	29.1	20.9	46.0	35.0
Anti intervention	14.5	23.3	7.9	21.1
Neutral intervention	47.3	44.2	32.6	26.3
N/A intervention	9.1	11.6	13.5	17.6
Pro Iraq	0.0	2.3	1.1	7.0
Anti Iraq	72.7	67.4	62.9	47.4
Neutral Iraq	21.8	14.0	34.9	45.6
N/A Iraq	5.5	16.3	1.1	0.0

APPENDIX A: CHRONOLOGY OF NEWS ARTICLES

The New York Times

Gordon, M.R. (1990, August 13). Bush orders Navy to halt all shipments of Iraq's oil and almost all its imports. The New York Times, pp. A1, A8.

Wines, M. (1990, August 13). U.S. aid helped Hussein's climb; now, critics say, the bill is due. The New York Times, pp. A1, A11.

Ibrahiam, Y.M. (1990, August 16). Iraq seeks peace with Iran, turning back spoils of war in move to end its isolation. The New York Times, pp. A1, A15.

Apple, R.W. (1990 August 16). Bush says Iraqi aggression threatens 'our way of life.' The New York Times, p. A14.

Barringer, F. (1990, August 16). With loyalty split, Arab-Americans fault Hussein but question U.S. too. The New York Times, p. A16.

Bradsher, K. (1990, August 16). Fleeing Kuwait: An American tells of four hours of terror. The New York Times, p. A16.

Apple, R.W. (1990, August 18). Bush said to approve plan to activate some reserves; U.S. taking over 38 airliners. The New York Times, pp. 1, 4.

Krauss, C. (1990, August 18). 35 Americans are removed from their Baghdad hotel The New York Times, p. 4.

Gordon, M. R. (1990, August 18). Cheney foresees long stay for U.S. The New York Times, p. 5.

Rosenthal, A. (1990, August 21). Bush vows not to be cowed by taking of 'hostages'; Iraq shifts them to targets. The New York Times, pp. A1, A12.

Gordon, M.R. (1990, August 21). Cheney, on quick tour, reaches agreement on more bases in the Gulf. The New York Times, pp. A1, A16.

Belkin, L. (1990, August 21). For kin of trapped Americans, the one word they dreaded. The New York Times, p. A13.

Malcolm, A.H. (1990, August 21). Few from left or right protest Bush's big stick. The New York Times, p. A16.

Rosenthal, A. (1990, August 22). U.S to call up 40,000 reserves to support Saudi trooplift; rejects Iraqi offer to talk. The New York Times, pp. A1, A8.

Treaster, J.B. (1990, August 22). Iraq proposes peace talks, then lashes out at the U.S. The New York Times, p. A9.

Brinkley, J. (1990, August 22). Egyptians tell of Iraqi rule in Kuwait. The New York Times, p. A12.

In Kuwait, quiet but for the troops. (1990, August 22). The New York Times, p. A8.

Apple, R.W. (1990, August 31). Bush urges allies to bear 'their fair share' of costs of military effort in Gulf. The New York Times, pp. A1, A10.

Treaster, J.B. (1990, August 31). Iraq moves some captives to hotel in possible step toward departure. The New York Times, pp. A1, A10.

Gordon, M.R. (1990, August 31). Iraqis playing waiting game, U.S. officers in region say. The New York Times, pp. A1, A12.

Kifner, J. (1990, August 31). 13 of 21 in Arab League meet on avoiding a war. The New York Times, p. A12.

Schmitt, E. (1990, September 1). U.S. ready to send Israelis new arms as signal to Iraq. The New York Times, pp. 1, 5.

Treaster, J.B. (1990, September 1). Life in emptied Kuwait City: diplomats long for comforts. The New York Times, pp. 1, 4.

Burns, J.F. (1990, September 1). U.N. Secretary General meets with Iraqi offficial. The New York Times, p. 5.

Gordon, M.R. (1990, September 1). No war unless Iraq strikes, U.S. Gulf commander says. The New York Times, p. 6.

Burns, J.F. (1990, September 3). U.N. chief says his talks failed and looks to U.S.-Soviet effort. The New York Times, pp. 1, 4.

Sciolino, E. (1990, September 3). As 700 hostages fly to freedom, there is relief but little rejoicing. The New York Times, pp. 1, 6.

Shenon, P. (1990, September 3). Ex-hostages recall weeks of fear. The New York Times, p. 6.

Kifner, J. (1990, September 3). Throughout the Middle East, Iraq's challenge redraws the political lines. The New York Times, p. 5.

Ibrahim, Y.M. (1990, September 11). Bush, reversing U.S. policy, won't oppose a Soviet role in Middle East peace talks. The New York Times, pp. A1, A17.

Friedman, T.L. (1990, September 11). Baker will go to Syria for help against Iraqis. The New York Times, p. A16.

Teaster, J.B. (1990, September 11). Iraq offers free oil to nations that run embargo. The New York Times, p. A17.

Gordon, M.R. (1990, September 11). Fighting by night is Army's war plan. The New York Times, p. A16.

Krauss, C. (1990, September 14). U.S. warns Iraq on aiding terrorists. The New York Times, p. A10.

Friedman, T.L. (1990, September 14). More Syrian anti-Iraq aid reported. The New York Times, p. A10.

Apple, R.W. (1990, September 20). Criticism of U.S. Gulf policy growing louder in Congress. The New York Times, p. A10.

Rosenthal, A. (1990, September 20). Bush seems to toughen his approach to war. The New York Times, p. A10.

Gordon, M.R. (1990, September 26). U.S. plans to send carrier to Gulf to increase pressure on Baghdad. The New York Times, p. A8.

Burns, J.F. (1990, October 4). Hussein visits Kuwait force and makes defiant speech. The New York Times, p. A14.

Clines, F.X. (1990, October 4). Gorbachev sends a chief adviser to Iraq in new diplomatic effort. The New York Times, p. A14.

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Privatization In Indian Telecommunications: A Pragmatic Solution to Socialist Inertia

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Privatization in Indian Telecommunications: A Pragmatic Solution to Socialist Inertia

Abstract

India announced its plans for privatization in the telecom sector at the Europe-East Asia Summit in Singapore in October 1995. This paper examines the proposed model of privatization which defies precedents set by the U.S. and U.K. models, and discusses it as a pragmatic approach to lift Indian telecommunications out of a quagmire developed through years of sluggish socialism. The Indian National Telecom Policy is discussed and recommendations are suggested.

Privatization in Indian Telecommunications: A Pragmatic Solution to Socialist Inertia

Introduction

The Indian telecommunication sector has entered an exciting phase of liberalization and privatization -- liberalization in the industry as a whole, and privatization in its basic and value added services.[1] With the doors flung open for foreign investment, the government is optimistic that by the end of 1997, not only will faulty telephone connections be a thing of the past, but universal service will be achieved as well.

Telecommunications in developed countries include a wide range of services such as cable, television, radio, and telephone, whereas these services in developing countries are dominated by the telephone. It is the telephone network that is used for transmission of text, data, and images, and accounts for over 90 percent of investment and revenues in telecommunication. Osborn defines telecommunication as "the transport of information by common carrier or private network telephone and/or telegraph (data) as well as by way of broadcast radio or television."[2]

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[1] Liberalization, privatization and deregulation are terms that have been used to describe the Indian market. Privatization occurs when ownership of a government-owned industry, as for example, the Indian telecommunication industry, is transferred to the private sector. Deregulation applies only to industries that are already private, but that are regulated to a certain extent by the government in the public interest. Finally, liberalization may be used in the context of both private and government owned industries. Liberalization means that the government regulations concerning such industries are relaxed.

[2] Osborn, T.T. (1992). Better Telephone Service for the Have Nots: In Whose Interest, By Which Means, and Who Pays? Program on Information Resources Policy, Cambridge Ma.: Harvard University. See also Hardy, Andrew P. (1980). The Role of the Telephone in

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The Indian telephone industry is typical of telephone industries in developing nations. The telephones are concentrated in urban, metropolitan cities, and are primarily used by the business sector more than by private individuals. The industry is controlled by the government and receives low investment, thus leading to faulty connections and poorly managed lines.[3]

Operated by the Department of Telecommunications (DoT), the telecommunication network consists of 17,790 exchanges with 7.14 million working telephone connections. The network has been growing at the rate of 15 to 17 percent each year for the last two years.[4]

While demand is growing, supply is inhibited due to a lack of finances and technology. Telephone hookups lag miserably behind demand resulting in a waiting line of over 2 million subscribers. The waiting period may last upto 7 years. Obtaining a telephone is not the end of the problem, however. A telephone call may be disconnected in mid-conversation to clear up congested lines. Outdated equipment often results in static-filled lines, making a casual conversation a stressful and frustrating experience.[5]

There are two reasons for this sluggish state of affairs: first, the industry until now was government owned, and did not have the funds or facilities that may have been available in a

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Economic Development, Telecommunication Policy, December 1980.

[3] Pernia, E. Buck, E. Valdez, R., Epstein, J. (1984). The Social and Economic Impact of Telephones. Institute of Culture and Communication: Honolulu, Hawaii.

[4] Balakrishna, P. (April 1994). Passage through India: India's telecommunication network. Communications International, 21, 4, 57-63.

[5] Rockwell, M. (June 1990). Telecommunications in India: Bringing order from chaos. Telephony, 218, 26A, 26-33.

private enterprise, and second, the industry is still guided by the 1885 Indian Telegraph Act which was drafted in the authoritarian environment of the British Raj, making several sections unsuited to the present-day democracy.

In a bid to remedy the system, the Indian government led by Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao announced in 1991 that it would open part of the communications industry to foreign investment by private companies, and draft a new telecommunication policy. In January 1992, tenders were issued by the Indian government for cellular systems in Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. Companies had to be Indian registered, but had to have foreign partners for equipment supply, machinery operation, and for foreign exchange. In return, the foreign partners could own upto 51 percent of the enterprise, and keep 51 percent of the profits. This was an attractive proposition for foreign investors, especially since the Indian market is a seller's market.[6]

While such investment is to the benefit of foreign investors, the Indian people are also expected to gain from this privatization model presented by the Indian Finance Minister, Manmohan Singh, at the Europe-East Asia Summit in Singapore in October 1994. The model predicted that "Freedom of private enterprise and competition in the marketplace, combined with provision of essential public services by the government, would unleash initiatives of the individual, ensure efficiency of resource utilization and promote human development."[7]

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[6] Hunter, T.C. (November 1992). Favorable forecast for Indian telecommunications: India opens its door for foreign investment. Global Communications, 14, 6, 22-28.

[7] Sau, Ranjit. (January 1995). Liberalization, unemployment and capital reform. Economic and Political Weekly. p. 157.

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While the *objectives* of this privatization model echo those of similar models in other countries, the *model* itself is quite different. For example, in the United States, basic services are provided by Regional Bell Operating Companies while long distance and international services are provided by private companies such as AT&T, MCI, and Sprint. The Indian model however, presents a "bottom-up" approach to the conventional models. Private investment is solicited only for basic services while the government owned DoT holds a monopoly over long distance and international services. This model seems to defy precedents set not only by the U.S. telecom example, but also that of the U.K. telecom model which, in essence, gave the Indian telecom industry its pre-privatized structure.

In the first section of this paper, I will examine the nature of telecommunication models in the United States and United Kingdom, and will compare them with the Indian privatization model to highlight the unique characteristics of the latter. In the second section, I will critique the Indian model in an attempt to evaluate its efficiency and utility for the Indian environment. The paper ends with a discussion of the National Telecom Policy and policy recommendations.

I. Comparing U.S., U.K., and Indian Telecommunication Systems

A Technical Primer.

Telecommunication carriers may be one of two types: local service providers, and long distance carriers. Local service providers connect local telephone subscribers to each other. Calls from the telephone exchange to the subscriber are carried on these providers. Local service providers are also called switched systems because they connect subscribers through a central office where all lines to subscribers terminate. A large connection center usually cannot handle over 100,000 lines and therefore large providers use several central offices or telephone exchanges connected together as one central processing unit covering the area these providers service. Human operators were initially used in the exchanges and then were replaced by mechanical switches, and now, by electronic switching which is capable of handling digital signals as well. This allows it to handle digitized audio and video services and high-speed data transmission. The lines of long distance carriers terminate at or close to the telephone exchanges for the latter to carry the signal to the subscriber.[8]

The local service providers and long distance carriers offer a hierarchy of services. Basic services include such non-voice features as telegraph, telex and facsimile. These are transmitted by the common carriers through packet-switched and circuit-switched networks which are now based on digital switching and digital transmission technology. Value added services (VAS) are those that are supplemental to the basic functions and include storage functions, voice mail, call-forwarding, automatic redial, caller ID and so on. These are offered by VAS providers, common carriers, and private computer software.

Liberalization and privatization of the telecommunication market results in several advantages: greater diversification of basic services, more sophisticated VAS, and greater availability of global interconnections through local area networks (LAN) and private branch

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[8] Ginsberg, D.H., Botein, M.H. & Director, M.D. (1991). Regulation of the Electronic Mass Media: Law and Policy for Radio, Television, Cable and the New Video Technologies. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co. pp. 5-12.

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exchanges (PBXs).[9]

The U.S. Telecommunication System.

Deregulation in the U.S. is a relatively recent phenomenon. The Great Depression in the 1930s was marked by an anti-competitive sentiment. This sentiment persisted into the 1950s where criticism of regulations were limited to legal and academic circles. Analyses of the transportation industries in the late 1950s by such economists as John Meyer and Merton Peck showed that industries were becoming increasingly competitive and it was no longer economically viable for monopolistic control of the railroads.[10] The criticism directed at the transport industries received political recognition and by the late 1960s, a "new American populism ... burst forth (which) placed a high priority on direct participatory democracy, on economic equality, on hostility to business and the profit motive, on suspicion of certain features of big government."[11]

This pro-competitive spirit impacted the structure of telecommunications in a big way in the 1980s, resulting in the introduction of competition with American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) which had, until 1984, controlled over 80 percent of local telephone connections and 90 percent of interstate connections. Although deregulation in the United States began with the

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[9] Shukunami, Tatsushiro (1988). The Race for Value-Added Services: Challenges and Opportunities in the U.S., Japan, and the U.K. Program on Information Resources Policy. Center for Information Policy Research, Harvard University: Cambridge, Massachusetts.

[10] Altshuler, Alan. (1992). The politics of deregulation. In Harvey M. Sapolsky, Rhonda J. Crane, W. Russell Neuman, & Eli M. Noam (Eds.), The Telecommunication Revolution. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 11-17.

[11] Ibid, p. 13.

1956 Hush-A-Phone decision which released AT&T's monopoly over customer-premises equipment, it was only in the late 1970s, that the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia brought an anti-trust suit against AT&T. According to the 1982 agreement negotiated between the Department of Justice and AT&T (called the Modification of Final Judgment), the latter agreed to the divestiture of the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) which were its local exchange carriers. AT&T kept its long distance services and its manufacturing and research units.[12]

With a precedent set by MCI, the FCC accepted licence applications from several other carriers and classified them as Specialized Common Carriers. These carriers changed the fundamental supply structure of telecommunication services in the U.S.[13] AT&T is now the primary provider of long distance services in the U.S., but shares the market with several other common carriers (OCCs) such as MCI and Sprint. AT&T as well as the OCCs use coaxial cable, microwave, domestic satellites and fiber optics to carry their long distance messages.[14]

The divestiture of AT&T and the establishment of OCCs have led to predictions that telecommunication networks will soon be completely owned by large corporations. This has serious implications for policy since the corporations have come to wield political power as is evident in the International Communications Association which comprises 600 large corporations, and the Ad Hoc Telecommunications Committee, an organization of large corporate users with private networks which intervenes in regulatory proceedings of the FCC.[15]

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[12] Ginsberg et al., p. 6.

[13] Termin, Peter. (1992). Did regulation keep pace with technology? In Harvey M. Sapolsky, Rhonda J. Crane, W. Russell Neuman, & Eli M. Noam (Eds.), The Telecommunication Revolution. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 18-27.

[14] Ginsberg et al., p. 10.

The U.S. model of telecommunications is not fully competitive and has more of a quasi-oligopolistic structure in its inter-LATA or long distance market. With the 1996 Telecommunications Act however, both local and long distance markets are predicted to become more competitive.

The U.K. Telecommunication System.

Telecommunication services were supervised by the government-owned Post Office until 1969 when the Post Office Act enacted that year converted the Post Office from a government department to a public corporation. Public reaction to the commercial nature of the Post Office was highly critical because it was observed that the Post Office customer relations and pricing policy with respect to telephone services were not in the public interest. A Post Office Review Committee was set up in 1975 under the direction of Charles Carter which presented its report (the Carter Report) to the Parliament in 1977. The report recommended liberalization in equipment supply and the introduction of competition in small PBXs. To relax the telecom monopoly enjoyed by the Post Office, the government implemented the Carter Report recommendations in July 1980 and under the British Telecommunications Law in July 1981, separated the postal and telecom sectors of the Post Office. The new public corporation

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[15] Marvin, Sirbu A. (1992). The struggle for control. In Harvey M. Sapolsky, Rhonda J. Crane, W. Russell Neuman, & Eli M. Noam (Eds.), The Telecommunication Revolution. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 140-148.

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established to run the national telephone network was called British Telecom.

The British Approval Board for Telecommunications (BABT) was established as an equipment standards authority.[16] The BT still monopolised basic services, but competition was introduced into customer premises equipment (CPE)[17] provision and VAN service. Basic communication policy is directed by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). Telecommunication carriers and value added networks (VANs) receive licenses from the Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL). This office also controls the overall tariff charges.[18]

The DTI encouraged a collaboration between British Petroleum, Cable and Wireless, and Barclay's Merchant Bank to lay a long-distance optical fibre network to challenge BT in its provision of premium services to corporate customers. The intention was that the introduction of competition would encourage the modernization of BT's network and improvement in its customer relations. This adjunct service was called Mercury and was licenced in February 1982. It was initially restricted to three percent of BT's revenue and was not allowed to provide international services.[19]

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[16] Garrison, William Jr. (1988). Four Case Studies of the Structural Alterations of the Telecommunications Industry. The Annenberg Washington Program in Communication Policy Studies. Northwestern University.

[17] Customer premise equipment includes telephone instruments, PBXs, plugs and sockets, teleprinters, modems, fax machines, answering and call logging devices, payphones, and so on. See Chowdary, T.H. (1995). Telecom manufacturing industry. Information Technology, 5 (2). pp. 35-42.

[18] See Shukunami.

[19] See Garrison.

In November 1983, initiated by the Minister for Information Technology, a duopoly policy was established which stipulated that only BT and Mercury were licenced to operate national public telecom networks. The April 1984 Telecommunications Bill privatized BT as an integrated unit, obliged to provide universal service.[20] Under this Bill, the OFTEL was established as a non-ministerial government department to make sure BT and Mercury adhered to the terms of their licences. The Bill required the carriers to provide universal service and recommended services to rural areas. While BT's licence allows it to operate as a single business (the Systems Business), it also stipulates that the BT allow authorized competitive systems such as Mercury to connect to its system so that customers subscribing to different systems may communicate to each other (any-to-any principle), and customers may be in a position to choose their long distance carrier (customer choice principle).[21]

The Indian Telecommunication System.

In India, the first telegraph[22] line was established between Calcutta and Diamond Harbor as far back as 1851. In 1853, the first long distance overhead telegraph was opened between Calcutta and Agra. The Indian Telegraph Act (ITA) of 1885 and its supplements, The Wireles

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[20] See Shukunami.

[21] These regulatory structures are expected to change on January 1, 1998, with the liberalization of basic telephone service.

[22] The ITA defines telegraph as "any appliance, instrument, material or apparatus used or capable of use for transmission or reception of signs, writing, images or sounds or intelligence of any nature by wire, visual or other electro-magnetic omissions, radio waves, or Hertzian waves, galvanic, electric or magnetic means." The Indian Telegraph Act of 1885, India Cen. Acts 13, §§ 1-3.

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Telegraphy Act of 1933 and The Telegraph Wires (Unlawful Possessions Act of 1950), control the operation of telecommunication services within the country and abroad. The Department of Posts and Telegraph controlled telegraph operations until December 31, 1984. On January 1st 1985, this department bifurcated into two independent bodies: The Department of Post and The Department of Telecommunication (DoT). The DoT regulates five divisions of telecommunication services: 1) Wireless Planning and Coordination, 2) Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (overseas telecommunication), 3) Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. (domestic services to such metropolitan areas as Delhi and Bombay), 4) Telecommunication Consultants of India Ltd., and the 5) Hindustan Telephones Ltd.[23]

The VSNL, owned by DoT celebrated a decade of its existence on April 1, 1996. The main function of VSNL is to provide International Data Dialing (IDD) services. VSNL links India to 237 countries, and has grown from providing one international line for every 2000 domestic lines to one for every 900. Value added services account for two percent of the total revenue. VSNL has invested in transmission equipment, and has established three earth stations at Calcutta, Madras, and Dehradun. VSNL also provides connections to the internet and has 1000 subscribers with nodes in Bombay, Delhi, Calcutta, Madras, Pune, and Bangalore.[24]

The ITA was first drafted by the British Central Government in 1876. This Act did not give the government authority to erect telephone lines on private property or to regulate use of government lines by lessees. The Act was amended in 1885 to grant the Central Government exclusive right to establish, maintain and operate telegraph lines, and sole authority to grant licences to other operators. Though amended eight times, the Act is still in use today. In the environment of privatization, the DoT oversees long-distance and international services while private investors handle basic and value added services. The government has sought the establishment of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) to supervise the relationship between Indian companies and their foreign collaborators[25], and to levy licences and tariffs on the private investors. A lack of agreement between the two houses of Parliament -- the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha -- on TRAIs statutory functions has impeded its establishment.

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[23] Gaur, K.D. Law of Telecommunications and Broafdcasting in India. California Western Law Review, 27, pp. 137-158.

[24] Syngal, B.K. (December 1995). "We are doing business without being monopolistic". Dataquest, XII, (40). pp. 81-83.

The privatization of the Indian telecom industry has provided an enticing market for manufacturers and telecom companies from developed countries with somewhat saturated markets. To ward off unfair competition from foreign investors, the DoT's research wing, the C-DoT, has stepped up its own research and development and has established a complex validation process in the design of its machinery. To keep up with the pace of telecom technology, C-DoT has entered foreign collaborations with foreign companies such as Motorola's Wireless Base

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[25] Prominent foreign collabortaors are: Mortorola (USA) for paging; Alcatel (France) for EPABX, Wireless EPABX, key telephony systems, terminals for cellular telephony, Private Mobile Radio (PMC) equipment, digital telephones, answering machines, advanced analog phones and fax machines; Calysys Technology with Newbridge Networks Corp. (Canada) for ATM switches and routers; and BKS (USA) for fax view (a hand-held mobile fax machine). Companies such as Ericsson and Alcatel are vying for DoT's stamp of approval on its technology, especially for small exchange switch technology. The DoT is witholding its validation of the technology of these MNCs in the fear that the latter will overtake a major share of the small exchange market currently under the monopoly of the DoT. See "Alcatel to seek DoT's stamp". Voice and Data (December 1995), 2 (6). p. 14.

Station for its Wireless Local Loop project.[26]

The similarities and differences among the U.S., U.K. and Indian models may be discussed from the standpoints of market distribution, pattern of regulation, and universal service and equal access.

Market Distribution.

In the U.S. model, local connections are handled by RBOCs while competition is introduced in long distance and international connections in that they are handled by common carriers such as AT&T, Sprint, and MCI (See Figure 1.1). Similarly in the U.K. model, BT predominantly handles basic services[27] while competition enters the international and long distance arena with Mercury overseeing these connections (See Figure 1.2). In the Indian model however, the pattern is overturned. Basic and value added services are handled by the private sector while the DoT oversees long distance and international connections (See Figure 1.3).

The U.S. telecom market is segmented into intraLATA[28] and interLATA. Most of this market enjoys stiff competition except in the intraLATA market where the only other competitive element is the network bypass. The enhanced services market and the packet-switched network are dominated by VANs such as Telenet and Tymnet rather than common carriers due to judicial restrictions. In the U.K., the BT is facing increasing competition from

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[26] Pradhan, B.D. (December 1995). "We are re-orienting our strategies". Interviewed by N.C. George and N. Kumar. Voice and Data, 2 (6). pp. 83-84.

[27] The BT for the most part, oversees basic services except in cases where cable operators provide their subscribers with local telephone services.

[28] LATA means local access and transport area

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Mercury whose market coverage has grown from local, long distance, and international services to packet-switched services. While several VANs oversee such value added services as electronic mail, protocol conversion, and videotex, BT is a strong competitor in this market. Under the Indian model of liberalization, every state and territory will have one government operator and one private operator. Foreign companies enter the market as collaborators with Indian companies. Foreign equity is restricted to 49 percent in basic services such as radio paging and cellular phones (See Figure 2). In the value added services, foreign equity is allowed upto 51 percent (See Figure 3).[29]

The telecom markets of the U.S. and India are similar in that they both have multiple private competitors, and thus differ from the U.K. telecom market which is a duopoly. The Indian market differs from the U.S. and U.K. markets because it allows foreign investment as part of its privatization policy while the U.S. and U.K. telecom markets allow private investment from indigeneous corporations.

Pattern of Regulation.

In the U.S., dominant carriers are relatively strictly regulated. Regulation is conducted at two levels: at the federal level by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and at the state level by the Public Utility Commissions (PUCs). In this respect, the U.S. differs from the U.K. and India in that the telecom industry in the latter two countries are somewhat monopolistically controlled by the BT and DoT respectively. Thus the telecom industry in both

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[29] Takkar, T.K. (Dec 1995). The Indian Telecommunication Scenario. Information Technology, 5 (2). pp. 10-11.

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the U.K. and India have centralized operating bodies while that of the U.S is supervised by the FCC which has more extensive powers than the OFTEL or DoT, but is challenged by other supervisory bodies.

Universal Service and Equal Access.

While the U.S. carriers and the BT are obliged to provide universal service, this stipulation is still in the form of a recommendation in the Indian National Telecommunication Policy. It will be interesting to note whether universal service will be established as a law or formal obligation for private investors in the Indian telecom market.

In the area of equal access, the FCC has established equal access for all carriers as well as for enhanced service providers. In the U.K., equal access has not been stipulated for BT and Mercury. In the face of the yet inchoate telecom policy in India, the government's stand on equal access is unclear.

From the above discussion, the question remains: why has the Indian government chosen to allow the private sector solely into basic and value added services and not into long distance and international arenas? I will attempt to answer this in the next section.

II. Privatization in the Indian Telecommunication Context

Privatization is not new in India. In 1980-81, India accepted a structural adjustment programme proposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during which liberalization and privatization policies were introduced. These reforms were marked by uncertainty and fiscal crises and hence revised reforms were introduced a decade later. Unlike the IMF programmes that were aimed at stabilization of infrastructure, the 1991 reforms emphasized the expansion of public spending on the redefinition and modernization of infrastructure.[30]

The decision to revise reforms and reintroduce privatization was long overdue because the problems of the Indian telecommunication department are legendary: about 480,000 people are employed by the government to asssist in the working of the 8 million telephone lines. This means there is one worker for every 17 phones. However, less than 30 percent of the calls are successful on the first dialling, and about 400,000 out of the country's 600,000 villages still do not have phones.[31]

The Indian government expects that privatization will improve the quality of telephone lines. The telecommunications network uses outdated equipment, a major portion of which consists of manual and electromechanical switching systems. It was as late as the mid-1980s that electronic exchanges were incorporated into the local and long-distance networks. At present, 95 percent of the local lines are automatic. Long-distance dialling has been introduced in 850 towns and cities. However, only 50 percent of local switching 65 percent of long distance switching are digitized.[32]

With a population of 885 million, India has almost 75 percent of its population living in rural areas. Only 15 percent of the villages have access to telephone circuits. It is not surprising therefore, that the Indian government intends to begin with telephone services to rural areas.

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[30] Business Today, (Dec 1995). Impolitic Reform.

[31] International Herald Tribune, December 31, 1994.

[32] Balakrishna, P. (April 1994). Passage through India: India's telecommunication network. Communications International, 21, 4, pp. 57-63.

Compared to 1700 villages that were given phone facilities in 1990-91, 21,800 villages were provided with this essential service during 1991-92.[33]

The Indian model of privatization obviously does not fall back on precedents set by the United States, U.K, or more recently, Russia, where privatization was conducted across the board in that competition was introduced in all public sector enterprises. The Indian model of privatization may best be understood from the perspective of its socialist past.

Privatization in the Indian telecom market was proposed as a pragmatic solution to an economic crisis brought upon by decades of sluggish socialism. One of the objectives of the Preamble to the Indian Constitution states that all citizens should be given equal political, social and economic rights. The Directive Principles of State Policy of the Constitution stipulate that the State should promote the welfare of the people through protecting social order and justice. Article 39 of the Constitution advises the State to aim its policy at ensuring that all citizens have "the right to an adequate means of livelihood and that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good."[34]

India's economic philosophy is based on this "socialist pattern of society", which is

> the establishment of a social and economic order based on equality of opportunity and on social, economic and political justice ... (to) create conditions for full employment, (provide) equitable distribution of the national wealth (and) a bold decentralization of economic and political power.... In a socialist pattern of economy, the principle means of production will be under social ownership or control. The public sector, therefore, will play a progressively greater part, more particularly, in the

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[33] Hunter, T.C. (March 1994). Improving rural telecommunications in India. Global Communications, 16, 2, pp. 16-23.

[34] Narayan, S. (1960). Principles of Gandhian Planning. Allahabad: Kitab Mahal, p. 126.

> establishment of basic industries. The private sector including industrial cooperatives and village and cottage industries will, however, continue to have importance in national economy, while allowing legitimate freedom and initiative to the private sector, the State will exercise 'strategic controls' over the private sector for safeguarding the larger interests of the nation.[35]

India may also be called a welfare state where industry is encouraged so the redistribution of the economic wealth accrued from industry will be for the benefit of all. This requires the development of a government which would conduct its administrative duties consistent with the welfare and socialist ideals. With the increase in administrative functions, however, bureaucracy in the Indian government expanded. With an expansion in bureaucracy, corruption increased, and the government, which had assumed monopolistic control for, ironically, the greater good of the people, lost its sense of accountability. Public sectors were made to focus on social goals so much that economic tasks and functions were pushed to the background. With a focus shift from economic profits to the well-being of society, the country lulled itself into a false sense of altruism.

Venkatraman (1994) believes that to shake the country from its socialist past and yet keep its noble intentions of public service, it is important to pursue "the policies of economic liberalization that enables the private sector to take up responsibility for generating wealth, minimizing the role of the state in economic matters and evolving cost-effective approaches for the distribution of welfare benefits to the needy."[36]

From this perspective, it seems logical that the Indian government has chosen to privatize selectively. As a democracy, the nation cannot raise privatization to an overriding ideology. Certain sectors such as health services and agriculture cannot, on their own, meet demand, and hence require government funding and control. At the same time, however, the government has to increase its profits and revenue and hence has allowed the private sector to enter the more well-developed parts of the economy such as textiles, telecommunications, computers and other such industries. The advantages of liberalization and privatization as are recognized by the Indian government, are that new methods of redistribution are established, and oligopolistic behavior and cyclical instability are averted.

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[35] Ibid, p. 131.

[36] Venkatraman A. (April-June 1994). The crisis of the welfare state. The Indian Journal of Political Science, LV, 2, p. 165.

The developmental needs of the Indian telecom market forms the main reason for the privatization of basic and value added services and the monopolization of long distance and international services by the DoT. The focus is more on the establishment of basic telecommunication infrastructure to provide universal access to the people. Thus, investment is required for the construction and development of basic infrastructure. Installation costs absorb a majority of total costs whereas operation costs are minimal. With foreign investors bearing the brunt of installation costs, the Indian government may obtain its revenue from licences and tariffs. For example, the government receives custom duties of upto 80 percent for line equipment and 72.5 percent for radio equipment, and 25 percent each for electronic components and capital goods. Excise duty is as high as 25 percent each for rural telecom and radio equipment, and 20 percent each for line telecom equipment and optical fibre cables.[37]

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[37] Bhatia, B.B. (December 1995). Telecom regulatory policies: Emerging trends. Information Technology, 5 (2). pp. 43-46.

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India's intentions of being a strong contender in the global economy is another reason why private investment is crucial for basic telephone services. Foreign investment in basic services has opened the door to Indian markets since a well-developed telecommunication system is essential tool for global businesses interested in the Indian market. It seems feasible, therefore, for the Indian government to invite private investment for basic telephone services, switching, and transmission.

The extension of business networks into India require intra-corporate networks, gateways for public networks, private leased circuits, and VAS providers. Multinational corporations are investing more and more abroad while maintaining their databases at a single center.[38] Thus the need for a basic telecom infrastructure, especially if India is to enter the global economic market, is a pressing one, and by the privatization of basic and value added services, such an infrastructure may be established more quickly and efficiently than if the government were to undertake such a project.

Foreign investors are interested in the growing Indian middle class of 80 million. Equipped with increasing buying power, many middle class homes desire telephones for its prestige value as well as its social function.[39] By providing basic services now, the foreign investor may have a foot in the door for a possible share in long distance and international services in the future.

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[38] See Shukunami.

[39] Abrahms, D. (January 6, 1995). AT&T makes push into phone-poor India. Washington Times, p. B7.

III. Indian National Telecom Policy

The National Telecom Policy (NTP) introduced in the latter half of 1995 outlines several objectives. Primary among them is the goal to provide telephones-on-demand by 1997. The government hopes to provide public telephones in every Indian village and a public telephone for every 100 people (India lags far behind other developing countries such as Brazil and Malaysia which provide at least 6 telephones per 100 people). Finally, the government aims at establishing India as a major manufacturer of telephone equipment.[40] The NTP also proposes the demonopolisation of the DoT which will result in several advantages. First, there will be a growth of more than 80 private sector companies, many of which have their own well-developed R&D departments. Second, deregulation will lead to greater availability and diversification of equipment. Third, there will be an increase in capital. Specifically, more than Rs. 10 billion was invested in the last seven years alone -- a huge increase from the Rs. 4 billion that was invested in this sector over the last 40 years. Fourth, prices for equipment have already fallen drastically: by 15 percent for cables, by 60 percent for switches and by 75 percent for customer premise equipment and multi-access rural radio systems. Fifth, the quality of products is expected to improve and delivery periods are predicted to be shorter.[41]

The trend toward privatization and liberalization is what Eli Noam calls "normalization (which) simply means that telecommunications network provision will resemble much of the rest of the economy. The network environment will be essentially a pluralistic network of user associations, a network of networks that are partly overlapping and partly specialized along various dimensions such as geography, price, size, performance, virtualness, value added, ownership status, access rights, kind of specialization, extent of internationalization and so forth."[42] Noam provides a sound point of departure for policy recommendations. If telecom is to be treated as another player in a country's economy, then the recommendations for other industrial players in the field may be imported for telecom policy.

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[40] Takkar, p. 10.

[41] Chowdhary, T.H. (Dec 1995). Telecom Manufacturing Industry. Information Technology, 5 (2). pp. 35-42.

While the NTP has touched on several areas crucial for the fulfillment of India's development objectives, certain key areas such as R&D, privacy, access rights, and personnel training need attention.

Research and Development.

Indian economists are concerned that with economic liberalization and foreign collaboration in the electronics industry, India will become technologically dependent on foreign industries. The solution is to develop and sustain a vigorous in-house R&D sector. Chaudhuri (1995) discusses previous research on the relationship between indigenous research and development of technology imports to show that (i) a positive relationship exists between royalty payments and expenditure on the indigeneous industries' R&D; (ii) Indian technology firms could be placed on a dependence-independence continuum based on the emphasis on in-house R&D; and (iii) while a complementary relationship existed between import of technology and

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[42] Noam, Eli M. (1992). Beyond the golden age of the public network. In Harvey M. Sapolsky, Rhonda J. Crane, W. Russell Neuman, & Eli M. Noam (Eds.), The Telecommunication Revolution. London and New York: Routledge. p. 9.

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R&D effort in private sector units, the degree of complementarity was the weakest in the electronic sectors because of rapid advances in technology.[43]

In the Indian telecommunication industry, the entry of private sector in basic and cellular services will increase the demand for switching. Foreign corporations such as Ericsson, Alcatel, Siemens, AT&T are vying for a share of the Indian switching market. While earlier the 10,000 lines plus switch sector was opened to foreign companies, the government intends to open up the small switch arena (less than 10,000 lines previously under the monopoly of C-DoT) to MNCs as well. Switching represents the biggest sector of the communication equipment arena. While the intervention of the MNCs will help overcome the limitations of an inadequate production base, it is essential that R&D be stepped up in the manufacturing and switching equipment so the Indian telecom industry does not become dependent on the MNCs for its switching equipment.

The Indian industry has been criticized for its structural inadequacy and its failure to utilize the existing workforce to its fullest potential. Technicians, who ideally diagnose and correct major faults in sophisticated machinery, occupy a mid-position between skilled workes and scientists and engineers. The lack of design work in the current Indian industry relegates technicians to the roles of foremen and supervisors and thus fail to tap their skills and knowledge.[44] An R&D department will encourage indigeneous designing of products and thus utilize the skills of technicians to their fullest potential. The telecommunication policy should therefore require rigorous in-house R&D projects.

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[43] Chaudhuri, D.D. (February 1995). Technology capability in Indian electronics industry under electronic liberalization. Economic and Political Weekly, pp. 13-17.

[44] Bhagavan, M.R. (February 1995). Technological implications of structural adjustment: Case of India. Economic and Political Weekly, pp. 2-12.

Development of rural exchanges:.

The MTNL provides domestic service to such metropolitan areas as Delhi and Bombay. Rural areas are, for the most part, neglected. The development of rural exchanges is imperative for a country as large as India and with as high a concentration of population in rural areas. It is therefore important that the telecommunication policy stipulate that private investors providing basic and value added services be obliged to establish rural exchanges and thus ensure universal access by installing telephone booths in every village. The installation of telephone booths and exchanges in rural areas will bring the telecom industry closer to its goal of providing universal access by 1997.

Better facilities for engineers.

While collaboration with MNCs results in better technology and more efficient production bases, it also opens the door for the exodus of top engineers to MNC units abroad with the attraction of pay packets as much as five times higher than those offered in India. This brain drain may be capped by ensuring that the professional needs of engineers are met, and by providing challenging assignments so engineers benefit from using their intellectual capabilities. Better working conditions, modern and updated equipment and good salaries will also go a long way in keeping the engineers at home.

Greater autonomy for C-DoT

By taking on development projects for the DoT, the C-DoT, as a competitor with the

MNCs, can hope to generate revenue for itself and not rely solely on government for funding. However, the efforts of the C-Dot are to a great extent limited by the regulatory authority of the government, making the projects of the former move at a slow pace due to long waiting periods for approval and authorization. For it to participate as a strong and active competitor in the international market for Indian telecom services, the government will have to allow greater autonomy to the C-DoT. The telecommunication policy will have to provide a clear description of the functions and duties of the C-Dot, and at the same time establish that the government should relinquish some of its hold on this unit.

Establishment of an autonomous regulatory body.

The regulatory powers of the DoT are shrouded in controversy. As a competitor with the MNCs in the telecom sector, it has been criticized for its part in the drafting of rules for privatization. While the TRAI was proposed as an autonomous regulatory body, its establishment was stalled because one of the Parliamentary houses, the Rajya Sabha, refused to pass the Telegraph Act Ammendment Bill proposed by the other Parliamentary house, the Lok Sabha, on the grounds that the Bill relegated the TRAI to a non-statutory status. Thus, the right for regulatory rulings still lies with the DoT, the Ministry of Communications and the government. The power of the DoT in telecom decisions may create a hostile environment. Telecommunication policy will have to urge the establishment of the TRAI and lay down the limits of the DoT in regulatory decisions to retain its desired competition with MNCs in the undertaking of its basic and cellular services. Legislation pertaining to the Indian telecom industry has seldom been able to anticipate the advances in new communication technologies, and rules and regulations have often been drawn up after the fact. With the convergence of technologies and with privacy and national security being threatened due to the easy accessibility of information through the infobahn, the functions and the statutory powers of the TRAI become an important issue. The telecom policy will have to ensure that the TRAI is given statutory powers to be able to effectively function in the interests of indigeneous industries and national security.

Personnel with Job-Specific Training.

While India is among the top nations of the world in its technical expertise and its body of well-trained engineers and software designers, it lacks skilled workers at the lower level of the industrial hierarchy. India is primarily an agrarian economy. Historical employment patterns in industry indicate that as a nation becomes more industrialized, there is an increase in employment in the industrial sector. However, while employment in the agricultural sector decreased from 72.5 percent to 66.1 percent in the 1971-1981 period, employment in the industrial sector stagnated at 13 percent. These statistics predict that overall unemployment is likely to increase even in the 1990s. Bhagavan (1995) says, "there has been no structural shift within the Indian workforce in the direction of increasing total machine-related skill content."[45] The solution to the rising rate of unemployment despite increase in industrialization, he points out, may be to increase the level of education and thus increase the number of literate workers. However, graduates from secondary school are not necessarily vocationally trained. The discrepancy between education and job skills further resulted in unemployment. Thus, telecommunication policy should recommend that private industries, such as those producing switching and transmission equipment, provide training programs so that workers may develop skills specifically suited to the job.

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[45] Bhagavan, M.R. (February 1995). Technological implications of structural adjustment: Case of India. Economic and Political Weekly, p. 3.

Structural Linkages.

The Indian telecommunication industry lags behind those of its Asian models in Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. This is because the industry has not established sound linkages between its production and distribution sectors. Also, while Korea, Taiwan and Singapore have skilled workers for design and assemblage of electronic components, multinational firms in developed countries make use of the cheaper labor of engineers and scientists in newly industrialized countries such as India and Brazil. Thus, the Indian telecommunication industry has to concentrate on establishing strong connections between the production side and the marketing side of electronic goods and services. Coordination of these sectors will lead to greater efficiency and output. A policy will have to be developed that stipulates these crucial linkages be established.

International Connections and Privacy.

As India establishes interconnections with corporations all over the world, and as consumers connect through electronic mail and the Internet, privacy becomes an important policy issue. Telecommunication policy will have to take into account not only protection of interconnections, but access to various networks and services. Due to the global nature of these connections, the telecom policy will have to be extended to include recommendations by such

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agencies as the International Telecommunications Union, UNESCO and the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization.

Revisions in the ITA.

Finally, the ITA of 1885 was drafted by the British at a time when central control over communication systems was considered necessary. The rules and regulations were developed in the colonial, imperialistic context and are hardly suited to the present democracy. The powers granted to the government in the Act have been used to make a socialist argument (i.e, government control is necessary for the greater good of the people). The ITA grants the government complete power in matters pertaining to telegraphs which overrides individual rights in these matters. Thus, a revision of this Act in favor of the consumer is necessary as the latter rises as an important element in the telecommunication market.

IV. Summary and Conclusions

A comparison of U.S., U.K. and Indian telecommunication systems shows that the Indian model does not fall back on precedents set by the United States and the United Kingdom. While the U.S. and U.K. telecom sectors enjoy competition among private companies in long distance and international services, local connections are provided by the RBOCs and the BT respectively.

In India, however, the model of privatization allows for private investment in basic and value added services, while the government owned DoT oversees long distance and international services. Also, the Indian model invites investment from foreign collaborators of Indian firms.

This model provides a pragmatic approach to the fulfillment of the objectives of the National Telecom Policy which are, in brief, to provide a telephone in every village in India and at least one telephone per 100 people by 1997. Private investment in basic services seems a logical move for a developing country like India which lacks funds for installation and hookup of telephones, for manufacture of telecom equipment, and for switching and transmission. The government earns its revenues from licences and tariffs. With private investment catalyzing the modernization of telecom infrastructure, India can also move closer to its goal of being a strong competitor in the world market. Privacy and protection of interconnections become crucial issues in the environment of privatization. For a country as large as India, it is practical that the government control long distance and international services in the interests of national security.

An examination of the tentatively drawn National Telecom Policy shows that several key areas remain undiscussed. While the goal is to provide telephones in every village, the telecom policy has yet to demand that private investors develop rural exchanges and strive toward universal access. At present, private investors are allowed to choose their areas of telephone service, and, without a requirement that they serve rural areas, these investors may very well be likely to vie for densely populated metropolitan areas, leaving rural areas neglected.

Foreign collaboration also raises questions about the viability of indigeneous industries. Vigorous in-house R&D within switching and transmission manufacturing industries is important so that Indian industries may not become too dependent on their foreign partners for design and equipment. Training of personnel in skills specific to jobs in the telcom industry and optimum use of personnel skills are essential not only for greater productivity, but also to ensure

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that engineers are not lured away to the MNCs. Finally, a revision of the ITA is imperative for legislation to keep up with the changing telecom environment. Despite the problems that lie ahead, there is no denying that the next five years will probably be the most exciting and tumultous in Indian telecommunication history.

Figure 1.1: Distribution of the U.S. Telecommunication Market


CPE
AT&T
CPE mfr.
Mobile Phone
Radio Paging
Ancillary
RBOCs
Data Communications
IBM
Electronic Mail
Enhanced/
AT&T
MCI
Voice Mail
VAN
Videotex
Compuserve
Facsimile Net
GraphNet
International
International
Inter-national
Long Distance
Basic
Domestic
Domestic
Local (LATA)
Trans-mission
Telnet,
Tymnet
WUI
TRT
WU
MCI
Sprint
RBOCs
Packet Switching
Telegraph & Telex
Telephone & Leased Circuit
AT&T
AT&T

Figure 1.2: Distribution of the U.K. Telecommunication Market


CPE
Mobile Phone
Radio Paging
Data Communications
Electronic Mail
Voice Mail
Videotex
Facsimile Net
International
International
Inter-national
Long Distance
Local (LATA)
Domestic
Domestic
Packet Switching
Telegraph & Telex
Telephone & Leased Circuit
Ancillary
Enhanced/ VAN
Basic Trans-mission
BT
BT
VANs
BT
VANs
VANs
BT
VANs
VANs
Mercury
Reseller
Mercury
BT
BT
BT

Figure 1.3: Distribution of the Indian Telecommunication Market



CPE			Ancillary	Private Investors		
Mobile Phone Radio Paging				Private Investors		
Data Communications			Enhanced/ VAN	Private Investors		
Electronic Mail				Private Investors		
Voice Mail				Private Investors		
Videotex				Private Investors		
Facsimile Net				Private Investors		
International	International	International	Basic Transmission	DoT	DoT	DoT
Domestic	Domestic	Long Distance		Private Investors	Private Investors	DoT
		Local (LATA)				Private Investors
Packet Switching	Telegraph & Telex	Telephone & Leased Circuit		Private Investors	Private Investors	Private Investors

Figure 2

Distribution of the Indian Telecommunication Market for Basic Services



i63

Figure 3

Distribution of the Indian Telecommunication Market for Value Added Services



CARIBSCOPE - A FORUM FOR DEVELOPMENT NEWS?

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CARIBSCOPE- A FORUM FOR DEVELOPMENT NEWS?

In the 1970s, developing countries complained about the flow of news between their countries and the Western world. According to them, this news flow was predominantly unidirectional and it was controlled by western news agencies. News reported about their countries was often inadequate, biased and negative. Further, development news, or news about progress being made in their countries, was hardly ever reported (Stevenson and Cole, 1984). This situation prompted them to call for a New World Information And Communication Order (NWICO). They also established organizations that promoted regional news exchanges and served as alternatives news sources to the western news agencies (Stevenson and Cole, 1984). Among those countries complaining about inadequate coverage of regional news was the English-speaking Caribbean[1] (Roppa and Clarke, 1968). These countries later rallied behind the call for a NWICO and established organizations, namely the Caribbean Broadcasting Union (CBU), to promote regional news and program exchanges (Brown, 1990).

But while Caribbean countries complained about coverage of their news by western news media, scholars and some policy makers have observed that local media had not been doing much better at covering the region's news. One criticism was that development news was hardly being covered. In light of the position taken by countries of this region on the NWICO and given the observations made by scholars and policy makers about Caribbean media, this study examines how much development news is exchanged among Caribbean countries. More specifically, it examines how much development news is reported by broadcast journalists on Caribscope, the CBU's weekly news magazine program.

Background

The English-speaking Caribbean countries are Antigua and Barbuda, Anguilla, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos, the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands. The total population of the region is approximately five and half million. Although dispersed geographically, a common history, language, culture and social, political and economic characteristics bond these countries together. With the exception of Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands and Montserrat -- which are still dependencies of Britain -- all the other countries received their political independence between 1962 and 1983.

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[1] In this study, the terms English-speaking Caribbean, Caribbean and West Indies will be used interchangeably.

Inadequate Coverage of Regional News

Long before the call for a NWICO, countries of this region expressed concern about the inadequate coverage of regional news by western news services. In the 1960s, when such complaints were first articulated, most of the news about the region was being supplied by Reuters, a British news service. A number of surveys conducted of the region's media in the 1960s revealed that Reuters hardly covered regional news. For example, one survey conducted in 1967 of newspapers in Barbados, Trinidad and Jamaica found that there "were no feature articles on Caribbean topics appearing in any section of the press" (Roppa & Clarke, 1968 p. 7). Another study entitled "The Caribbean Broadcasting Project," noted that "an important deficiency common to existing broadcasting organizations is the inadequate use and treatment of regional Caribbean news" (Roppa and Clarke, 1968 p. 8). The report also noted that for a region which shared so many similar problems there was hardly any exchange of information among the countries (Roppa and Clarke, 1968). This situation so concerned Caribbean leaders that in 1967, at the Fourth Regional Heads of Government meeting in Barbados, they called for the creation of a regional news exchange facility and invited UNESCO to survey the region to determine its feasibility (Roppa and Clarke, 1968). In 1968 UNESCO commissioned Guy Roppa and Neville Clarke to conduct this survey. These scholars also found that there was very little coverage of regional news and recommended that the news exchange facility be established. This call did not go unheard and in 1970, the CBU, now with its headquarters in Barbados, was established to promote regional news and program exchanges among its members. The CBU's membership presently comprises of broadcast stations in the region (full members) and regional production houses and broadcast and cable organizations outside the region (associate members) (see table 1 for television stations and production houses from the English-speaking Caribbean that are members of the CBU).

Table 1

TV stations and Production Houses from the English-speaking Caribbean that are Members of the CBU

Country	Station	Ownership
Antigua & Barbuda	ABS TV	government
Bahamas	Broadcasting Corp. of Bahamas	government
Barbados	CBC TV	government
Belize	Belize TV	government
	Great Belize Productions (TV)	private
Bermuda	Bermuda Broadcasting Corp.	government
Dominica	Marpin Television	private
Grenada	Grenada TV	government
	Grenada Cablevision Ltd.	private
Guyana	Guyana TV	government
Jamaica	CVM TV	private
	JBC TV	government
	Creative Production & Training Centre (production house)	private
St. Lucia	Helen TV	private

St. Kitts	ZIZ TV	government
St. Vincent & the Grenadines	SVG TV	private
Trinidad	AVM television	private
	TV 6	private
	Trinidad and Tobago Television (TTT)	government
	Banyan Productions (production house)	private

Source: CBU List of Members Handbook, 1995

Absence of Development News

In spite of a regional news exchange organization having been set up most of the news about the region was still being distributed by Reuters in the early 1970s. In fact it was not until the establishment of the Caribbean News Agency (CANA) in 1974 that there became a regional alternative to Reuters. Thus in the early 1970s, Caribbean countries were still complaining about coverage of their news. One of the criticisms made was that news distributed about the region was often negative and sensational. This was one of the complaints made by Jamaica officials in the mid-1970s. Tourism officials in Jamaica argued that the negative news coverage of Jamaica's elections was responsible for the decline in tourists to that country in the 1974 (Cuthbert, 1976).

But while some Caribbean countries have complained about coverage by Western reporters some scholars and policy makers observed that Caribbean journalists were not doing much better at covering news about development. This was one of the observations made by John Lent in the 1970s, during his tour of the West Indies. According to Lent (1990) although Caribbean policy-makers have indicated that they would like to see and hear more development news reported, this was ever hardly done. Commenting on local media coverage during the 1970s, he noted that there was some discrepancy between what Caribbean governments and media said they wanted to do and what they actually did. While Caribbean countries wanted to report news on "topics of life and death consequences to as many people as possible without including foreign values and attitudes ... this is seldom ever achieved," reported Lent.

Some of the region' s policy makers have also been critical of local media's news coverage and they too have called for the reporting of more news that would contribute to development. For example, at their first regional meeting held in Antigua in 1980, the CARICOM Ministers of Information noted that Caribbean media needed to provide information that would contribute to the social, economic and cultural development of Caribbean peoples (Report of meeting of official preparatory to the first meeting of Ministers responsible for Information, 1980).

Literature Review

Development News On Regional News Forums

Several scholars have investigated whether Caribbean journalists report development news. One medium that has been the focus of attention is CANA. Defining development news as "all stories of social and economic growth where human planning and effort are involved," Cuthbert (1982) examined how much development news was reported on CANA. She found that only 9.5 percent of the news stories reported on CANA was development news. One of the shortcomings of this study was that the definition of development news was not all encompassing; it excluded news stories under such categories as politics, tourism and the environment. As Cuthbert (1982) herself pointed out, had other categories been included the percentage of development news might have been higher.

Another study examining CANA was conducted by Ogan and Rush (1985). These authors compared the amount of development news found on CANA and Interlink with that on western news services. They defined development news as "reporting on the ways in which society attempts to achieve self-reliance and to meet its peoples' needs." Ogan and Rush found that although CANA and Interlink carried more development news than the major western news services, they still had more non-development than development news. As far as CANA was concerned, only 44.8 percent of its news stories was development news and most of these fell under the topic of economics. Other findings were that one third of CANA's development news stories were either negative or balanced in tone, and that approximately one fourth of all development news stories related to a specific development project.

Caribscope has also been the focus of attention. Caribscope is a news magazine program produced by the CBU and is shown throughout the region at prime time. It has also been shown in Britain and Canada (Abend, 1994). Harewood and Hunt (1995) examined how much of the news on Caribscope fell under the category of "hard news" format versus the "developmental news format." Hard news was defined as news which placed emphasis on "an event which in some way disrupts legitimate order or threatens the community, is dramatic, conflict-filled or violent" (p. 10). Developmental news format was defined as news "which promoted development (good news about projects), political development (nation building); and protocol information (ceremonial comings and goings of public officials)" (p. 10) These authors found that 69 percent of the news stories were presented in the developmental news format, two per cent fell under the hard news category and 25 percent were categorized as other. The classification of "other" was not defined.

This study can be criticized on the grounds that it did not reveal much about the news that fell under "developmental news format." For example, it does not provide information about what percentage of the 69 percent was news about protocol information, about political development or "good news about projects". Such information is important because it can be argued that protocol information is not necessarily development news. Development, as Vilanilam (1979) pointed out, essentially entails moving from a situation that is deemed unsatisfactory to one that is better; what is better depends on the country's reality. Development news should thus be news which focuses on efforts being made in a country to improve unsatisfactory conditions for the people of their country. It can be argued that the ceremonial comings and goings of political officials is not necessarily development news unless such activities are somehow related to addressing development concerns. In essence, Harewood and Hunt's (1995) study only revealed that the majority of the news reported on Caribscope is not hard news but it discloses little about development and non-development news on the program.

Development News on International Forums

While some scholars have concentrated on the amount of development news reported on regional news forums, others have examined how much development news Caribbean journalists report on international ones. This was one of the objectives of Mc.Clean and Stewart (1995) who examined the amount of development news reported by Caribbean broadcast journalists on the CNN World Report. Drawing on the idea that development entailed improving conditions that are deemed unsatisfactory, these authors identified development issues in the region and then defined development news from that region's perspective. Development news was operationally defined as any news story which showed efforts to (a) improve the economic situation of Caribbean countries; (b) alleviate the unemployment problem; (c) improve and extend social services to the people; (d) protect the environment; (e) encourage local and regional television program production; (f) increase awareness of Caribbean culture among Caribbean people; (g) alleviate social and moral problems such as illegal drugs, teenage pregnancy; (g) bring about change in constitutional status of countries such as Montserrat, Anguilla, Bermuda, The British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, the Turks and Caicos islands, which are still dependencies of Britain.

Using this definition they found that during the first three years of the World Report program, (1987 - 1990), well over 50 percent of the news was development news. Between 1991 and 1992, however, only 39 percent of the news reported was development news. Although Mc.Clean and Stewart (1995) study expanded on previous definitions of development news, one criticism is that no information was provided about the character of such news. For example, how much of this development news examined the negative aspects of development efforts? Was it all positive reports? How much of it was mere talk about development as opposed to some action or project being implemented? The latter question is especially important in light of

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the recent report of the West Indian Commission. This Commission, was established as an independent body to propose measures for implementing the Treaty of Chaguramus, which established the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). The Commission's findings revealed that Caribbean people felt that policy makers talked more than actually did anything to address conditions in their countries (Massiah, 1994).

Given some of the shortcomings of past studies this study sought to provide more information about development news reported by Caribbean journalists. It further expanded the definition of development news used by Mc.Clean and Stewart (1995) and included the idea that development news can be critical. This was done because in a previous study by Cuthbert (1982), when some Caribbean media practitioners were asked to give their definition of development news they noted that it ought not to only concentrate on positive news but that it should also be critical of development. Further, in light of the report of the West Indian Commission, this study also focused on how much of the development news reported was mere talk about development as opposed to the actual implementation of some development project or program.

News stories submitted to Caribscope about the English-speaking Caribbean were analyzed. As was mentioned before, Caribscope is a news magazine production of the CBU. Members submit their news stories to the CBU, which then complies them into a news magazine format. Caribscope was chosen because it is the first regional television program which allows viewers in the Spanish, French, English and Dutch speaking Caribbean to see what is happening in other neighboring countries. The program is also an excellent choice because the stories aired are a true reflection of the stories submitted by television stations. This is because the CBU uses all the news stories it receives and it hardly has to edit them. Co-ordinator of Caribscope, Deborah Johnson, noted that the CBU is not overwhelmed by a large flood of stories so it tends to use all that it receives. The stories are only edited if they go beyond the maximum length of seven minutes and are only rejected if they do not meet the CBU's technical standards. Since 1989, the CBU and the Fredrich Ebert Stifung Foundation of Germany have been providing training for CBU members in the Caribbean, so the problem of news stories not meeting the CBU's technical standards rarely occurs (D.

Johnson, personal communication, May 1995). Caribscope is presently being distributed via satellite to the CBU's member stations. Given that countries of this region face similar development problems it would be interesting to see how much of the news sent to Caribscope is development news, or news about how they are addressing their development concerns.

Research Questions

The main research questions were as follows:

1. What percentage of the news stories submitted to Caribscope was development news?
2. What topics submitted to Caribscope fell under the category of development news?
3. Did journalists from government stations submit more development news stories to the program than those from privately-owned ones?
4. Who were the main protagonists featured on the development news?
5. Was the development news mainly talk about development or was some action being done to address the problem?
7. What percentage of the development news reported contained content that was critical of development efforts?

Definition of Key Terms

Topic. The term topic referred to the main subject matter of the news story.

Development News. Development news was defined as any news story which focused on measures (either in the present, past or in the future) to address development problems of regional or national concern in the English-speaking Caribbean. The definition was not limited to good news about development, but it also included news reports about the negative aspects of development efforts. In addition, it was not restricted to development measures taken by the government. As was the case in the Mc.Clean and Stewart (1995) study, mere identification of a development problem was not sufficient for a story to be coded as development news. The key to the definition was that some effort was made to address a problem of national and regional concern.

Government station. The term government station referred to a television station that was owned or subsidized by a national government, or which was governed by a statutory board.

Privately-owned station. The term privately-owned station referred to a television station that was owned by local private entrepreneurs. Stations owned by private foreign conglomerates or by Caribbean non-nationals were not included in this definition.

Protagonist. The term protagonist referred to the person or agency making an effort to address a problem.

Talk and Action Development news. Development news that was coded as "talk" referred to meetings, conferences, interviews about how a problem ought to be addressed, or how it was going to be addressed, how it has been addressed in the past or how it is being addressed presently. "Action" development news was defined as the actual implementation of a project, plan or some other action to address the problem.

Method

135 news stories submitted to Caribscope about the English-speaking Caribbean were content analyzed. The time frame used was May 1990 to May 1994; these dates were based on the availability of transcripts of the program. The CBU began transcribing episodes of the program in 1990 when television stations from the French-speaking Caribbean expressed interest in receiving Caribscope; the transcription was discontinued in May 1994 because of financial reasons (D. Johnson, personal communication May 1995). In addition to the content analysis, the researcher also contacted Deborah Johnson for information about some of the reporters who had not signed off for their affiliate station when reporting news on Caribscope.

Sample

To obtain the sample every fourth episode of the program was selected for analysis. Excluded from the selection were Caribscope special reports because these programs dealt solely with the CBU's production team's coverage of a particular event. In other words, these episodes contained no news stories that had been submitted by the CBU's members. An example of a Caribscope special report was the CBU's coverage of the 1994 Summit of the Americas. When one of these episodes was selected, the next one was chosen for content analysis. As noted before, only news about the English-speaking Caribbean were examined.

Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis was the news story. Each news story was coded by the researcher and two other Caribbean graduate students who attended Ohio University. With each story the coders recorded (1) episode number, (2) name of CBU member submitting news story, (3) ownership of TV station (where applicable) , (4) topic or the main focus of the story, (5) type of news or whether development or non-development news, (6) whether talk or action development news, (7) protagonist or person or agency addressing the problem and (8) whether the story contained information that was critical about development.

Sub-categories

Under the category of topic, news stories were further classified into one of the eighteen sub-categories listed below. The sub-categories were used in the study by Mc.Clean and Stewart (1995). The sub-categories were: 1. social services (news stories about the provision of housing, water, electricity, gas, services for the disabled, telephone services etc.); 2. sports (sporting activities); 3. education (primary, secondary, tertiary and pre-school, technical and vocational education); 4. health (health care, human diseases, medical research, nutrition and any other health related issues); 5. legal issues (law and order, police matters and the judiciary); 6. labor relations (strikes and other trade union issues, employer-employee relations); 7. transportation (air, sea and road transportation); 8. agriculture and fisheries (horticulture, fishing, animal husbandry); 9. tourism (growth and role of tourism; tourist attractions); 10. social and moral issues (rising population, drug- trafficking, vandalism, child abuse, crime, corruption, teenage pregnancy, homeless people, delinquency, etc.); 11. culture (cultural celebrations, independence celebrations, cultural habits and norms of ethnic groups in society); 12. economic issues (trade, investments, prices, exports and imports, trade commissions, economic aid, etc.); 13. natural disasters (hurricanes, volcanoes, and other such non-man made disasters); 14. environment (air, water, land pollution, global warming issues, preservation of endangered species, etc.); 15. politics and diplomacy (regional, domestic and international politics, elections, profiles of politicians); 16. human interest (profiles of non-political persons) ; 17. religion (matters pertaining to worship of a deity, religious celebrations and ceremonies); 18. communications (mass media, telecommunications, cable communications, the internet etc.).

After all the stories had been coded, the researcher cross-checked each person's coding on each category to see the extent of agreement in coding. Holsti's (1969) inter-coder reliability test was then performed to determine intercoder reliability. The researcher obtained an inter-coder reliability of 98 percent, which is acceptable as adequate reliability.

Analysis of Data

Data were entered into an IBM PC for analysis with the program SPSS-PC+. The frequency command was used to determine how often the categories and sub-categories appeared. The crosstabulation command and a Chi square statistics test were also used to determine whether some of the findings were significant. For example, the latter was used to determine whether the difference between the number of development news stories reported by privately-owned and government stations was significant.

Results

General Findings About Caribscope

With the exception of AVM TV in Trinidad, Grenada Cablevision, CVM in Jamaica and the Bermuda Broadcasting Corporation, all of the other CBU members submitted at least one news story to Caribscope. One story about Barbados was submitted by a non-CBU member - Artevision in Venezuela; this station was coded as other. In several instances, the CBU used its freelance reporters to do reports on some of the countries, especially those that are British dependencies. These reports were also coded as other.

In addition, with the exception of Bermuda, all the other English-speaking Caribbean countries were featured at least once on the program. The majority of the news stories, however, were about Barbados; this was probably because the CBU is located in Barbados and it was easier to get news stories from the television station there. The countries least featured on the program were those that are still British dependencies: the British Virgin Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands, Montserrat and the Cayman Islands. This study also found that in general the majority of the stories dealt with culture, followed by human interest, environment and politics and diplomacy.

Table 2

Topics reported on Caribscope

Topics	**No. of Stories**	**Percentage**
Culture	27	20%
Human Interest	18	13.3%
Environment	12	8.9%
Politics and Diplomacy	12	8.9%
Tourism	11	8.1%
Social and Moral Issues	10	7.4%
Economic Issues	8	5.9%
Agriculture & Fisheries	7	5.2%
Sports	7	5.2%
Health	6	4.4%
Religion	5	3.7%
Education	4	3%
Social Service	3	2.2%
Transportation	3	2.2%
Communication	1	.7%
Natural disasters	1	.7%

Amount of Development News Reported on Caribscope

Table 3 shows that the majority of the news about the English-speaking Caribbean was non-development news. 35.6 % fell under the category of development news, compared to 64.4 percent for non-development news.

Table 3

Type of News Stories Reported

Type of News	No. of Stories	Percentage
Development	48	35.5%
Non-development	87	64.4%
N=	135	100%

Development news topics

Table 4 shows that of the 48 development news stories, eight of them were concerned with economic issues; the remaining dealt with a variety of topics. Although the percentage of stories dealing with economic issues was low (17.%), it must be pointed out that this topic was the most frequent one.

Table 4

Topics Reported As Development News

Topics	No. Of Stories	Percentage
Economic Issues	8	17 %
Environment	7	14.5 %
Agriculture & Fisheries	6	12.5 %
Social & Moral Issues	6	12.5 %
Tourism	5	10.4 %
Health	5	10.4 %

Transportation	3	6.2 %
Politics & Diplomacy	2	4.1%
Communication	1	2%
Education	1	2%
Human Interest	1	2%
Natural Disaster	1	2%
Social Services	1	2%
Sports	1	1%
N =	48	100%

Type of station reporting development news

47.4 percent of the development news stories came from government stations, while 27.4% came from privately-owned stations. The remaining came from organizations classified as other; other consisted of the CBU and production houses in the region (see Table 5). Of the stories coded as other, only one was submitted by a production house; the remainder were done by a CBU's reporter. The fact that government stations reported more development news than privately-owned stations was not significant at a p value of .05. A crosstabulation of media ownership by type of news, reported a chi square value of .05985. It must be pointed out however, that although a large proportion of the development news came from government stations, these stations also contributed a large percentage of the non-development news stories (see Table 6).

Table 5

Type of Member Reporting Development News

Member	**Percentage**
Government station	47.4%
Privately-owned station	27.4%
Other	25.2 %

Table 6

Amount of Development and Non-Development News Reported by Government and Privately-owned Stations

Station	Development News	Non-Development News
Government	23	43
Private	10	28
Other	15	16
N =	48	87

Protagonists featured on the development news stories

Table 7 shows that the most frequently appearing protagonist was the local private sector. Other protagonists featured were regional organizations and individuals who were not affiliated with any organization or with the government. One story featured a Brazilian firm as the protagonist; this story was coded as other.

Table 7

Protagonist/Actors in Development News

Protagonist	No. of Times Featured	Percentage
Local Private Sector	15	31%
Government	12	25%
Individuals in Society	10	21%
Regional Organization	9	18%
International Organization	1	2%
Other	1	2%
Foreign Government	0	0%

Talk and Action Development News

Table 8 shows that the majority of the development news featured the implementation of some project or scheme to address a development problem, while 46% featured talk about development.

Table 8

Type of Development News

Type of Development News	No. of stories	Percentage
Talk	22	46%
Action	26	54%
N =	48	100%

News Critical of Development Efforts

Of the 48 development news stories only 6 of them contained content that was critical of development efforts. Grenada TV submitted two stories that had some content that was critical of some development program and TV 6, Guyana TV and CBC TV each submitted one; the other story was done by a CBU reporter. It must be pointed out that the criticism did not come from the reporters but from the sources used.

Discussion

This study found that more non-development than development news was reported on Caribscope by broadcast journalists from the English-speaking Caribbean. A number of factors may explain this finding: One is the definition of development news itself. Even though an attempt was made in this study to improve and expand on previous definitions of development news, the definition used was still limited: it was confined to a news story which specifically showed some effort to address a problem. Had a different definition been used perhaps other news stories could have been classified as development news. For example, the majority (20 percent) of the stories on Caribscope fell under the category of culture. Most of them featured the way of life and culture of the remaining Amerindian populations in Belize, Guyana, Dominica and St. Vincent. Others examined the history of places such as Tortola and the Turk and Caicos Islands. This information is generally not provided in Caribbean history texts, such as Greenwood and Hamber (1984) Emancipation to Immigration and Decolonisation and Development, which since 1984 have been the required history texts by the Caribbean Examination Council (CXC). CXC is the principal examination body in the English-speaking Caribbean. It is possible that information like this may not have been known to viewers prior to watching Caribscope. As early as the 1960s, there have been complaints by regional policy-makers that Caribbean people know very little about each other and that this has been a hindrance to regional integration (Roppa & Clarke, 1968). Had a different perspective been given of the word development, several of the news stories which fell under the category of culture could have been classified as development news because of their potential role in fostering regional integration. This might have yielded a different finding about the amount of development news reported.

Another possible explanation could be the de-emphasis on development communication since the 1980s. Cambridge (1995) noted that during the 1970s, one of the dominant paradigms was that the mass communication should be utilized to support the development process; by the mid-1980s, however, this thinking had been eroded by a free-market ideology. Thus, the lack of emphasis on the reporting of development news in the 1990s could perhaps be seen as an indication of the movement away from the development communication thinking over a decades ago. These are two possible explanations for the findings and they indicate that more research needs to be done using broader definitions of development and that future research can focus on the impact (if any) that the de-emphasis on development communication by policy-makers have had on the reporting of development news.

Another finding was that the majority of development news was about non-economic topics. This finding could be attributed to the fact that development is no longer perceived simply in terms of economic growth, but as a multi-dimensional process with a strong human and environmental focus. Former CARICOM Secretary General, William Demas (1990) in his "Towards A West Indian Survival." noted that development should no longer be considered merely in terms of economic development but it should have a strong human-comfort zone. This is because, Demas argued, for the 21 st century, economic development in the region will ultimately depend on the quality of the human resources. He also noted that for development to be sustainable it should take into account efforts to protect the environment. The fact that the seven of the 11 environment news stories dealt with efforts being made to protect the region's fragile eco-system and that many of the stories coded as social and moral issues focused on issues pertaining to women and children, can all be seen as a reflection of the changed ideas about development.

This study also found that the most frequently mentioned protagonist in the development news story was the local private sector. One factor that can explain this finding is the growing tendency towards privatization in the region since the 1980s. Since the 1980s, when governments began to experience balance of payments problems, several of them encouraged the local private sector to become more active in the development process. Hope (1992) argued that privatization came into mainstream development thinking because of the experiences developing countries encountered with state-owned enterprises having "failed to generate high rates of economic growth that are crucial to development" (p.19). West Indian scholar, Professor Carl Stone (1992), noted that this was the situation which prompted privatization in the Caribbean. The new thinking, according to him, was that the "private sector is better able to manage the productive assets owned by the state" (p. 12). Although there has been a trend towards privatization, national governments have naturally still been involved in the development process. This is because, as Stone (1992) pointed out, privatization still entailed the government playing a role in development, even if it was just that of providing a proper environment in which the private sector could operate. Thus, it was not surprising to find that the government closely followed behind the local private sector as the most frequently appearing protagonist in development news reports.

The finding that regional organizations such as CARICOM were featured as protagonists can also been explained. Since the late 1960s, regionalism has been one way by which countries of the region have sought to address many of their problems. This was reflected in the formation of organizations such as the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) and CARICOM (Erisman, 1992).

Another finding was that hardly any of the development news stories contained content that was critical about development efforts. A combination of societal and political factors can perhaps explain this findings. Caribbean journalists operate in small societies and are aware of the influence of politics and the media: they have been numerous examples in the region of journalists having been fired from their jobs or banned from reporting because they offended a politician. Thus the tendency of reporters not to be critical or to report on the negative aspect of development can perhaps be seen as a type of self-censorship that comes from living in small societies, where other factors such as high un-employment are evident. This is an area too that can be examined by future studies on development news.

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Ideology and Market: The political economy of Russian media industry

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Abstract

This study examines certain changes made within the media industry both before and after the political transformations occurring in the former Soviet Union. Although these changes began after Gorbachev came to power, the most dramatic change took place after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The political economy perspective shown here provides a useful means to explain the relationship between these socio-economic transitions and media industry. In the Perestroika period, the mass media played an important role in redefining Soviet socialism. Since the failed coup of August 1991, the Russian media has attempted to adapt to conditions persistent with the free market economy. As a result of the free market economy, the Russian media industry currently tends to depend on advertising revenue to survive.

Ideology and Market: The political economy of Russian media industry

Introduction

The original philosophy of the Soviet media was based on Marxist-Leninist principles. In other words, the task of media-ideological work was to instill an understanding of the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism within the public mind. As a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union, however, these principles no longer form the ideological core of the Russian mass media.

The purpose of this study is to compare the Russian media industry before and after its political upheavals, which include the official demise of the Communist Party as well as the breakup of the Soviet Union. In general, the above changes appear to have started during Perestroika, which entailed a revision of Marxism-Leninism. Today, Russia experiences social, economic, and political changes. The media industry is at the center of these changes. From this political-economy perspective, a theoretical framework is applied in this work to analyze the Russian media industry within both of these periods.

Method of Study

This study employs a historical research methodology. With this methodology, the construction of historical frameworks is needed for this study to properly ascertain the relationship between the political transitions encountered within post-Soviet media industry. Such a framework assumes that every event and image is historically concrete.

Tuchman (1994) gives an overview of this historical method. She argues that social phenomena must be studied within their historical context, which involves the use of both historical documents as well as written records of the past. To understand these historical documents, one must possess an interpretive point of view, which in turn shapes how one gathers, reads, and analyzes the historical materials at hand. As Nord (1989) asserts, "history is an empirical study that uses various levels of generalization to describe, interpret, or explain collections of data. Scholars with strikingly different goals and methods work within this catch-all category. All are historians" (p. 291). He emphasizes the importance of the nature of historical research in the study of both the historical institutions of journalism and the social process of communication.

Hsia (1988) also suggests that "one of the fondest dreams for many communication researchers is to conduct an empirical study in the Soviet Union. Nothing of that sort has ever been arranged. Indeed, no survey or experiment can be a tool to explore the causality of a unique social phenomenon, transcending both time and geopolitical confines" (p. 283). This is a major reason for our reliance on historical method.

This work examines the significant changes that have occurred within the Russian mass media system. This study is therefore divided into three major time periods to verify the relationship between the socio-economic transition involved and the accompanying media industry. More specifically, this study traces the changing economic relations affecting the Russian mass media. These three periods occur industry from the beginning of Perestroika (1985) through the August coup (1991), and up to the present situation.

Political economy approach to the media

Before performing an analysis of the economic relations relevant to the media industry, it is first necessary to deal with such theoretical backgrounds as a materialistic perspective of communication. According to Marxism, the mass media can be a means of production owned by the ruling class. In other words, the mass media simply disseminates the ruling class' dominant ideology. This notion concurs with the materialist stance that social being determines consciousness. This idea is in turn based on Marx's classical definition that the dominant ideology of a society is the ideology of its dominant class. In this sense, the mass media plays an important role to produce such as ideological power.

Next, the political economy approaches of the mass media tend to focus on that political implications of the media's economic structure. This perspective refers to mass media as the economic structure of the media organization, which considers ownership as the most influential form of control, drawing the conclusion that a profit-seeking industry produces its system-maintaining role. That is, the media industry is controlled by both economic processes and structures. Advertising also performs a crucial role in the media industry. Golding and Murdock (1991) emphasize that "corporations which are not directly involved in the cultural industries as producers, can exercise considerable control over the direction of cultural activity through their role as advertisers and sponsors" (p. 20). In general, political economists have regarded the media as an economic industry in an attempt to explain the relationship between mass communications and control. The perspective of this political economy therefore enables connections to be made between the issues of media ownership and control, as well as ideological power.

The Background of Soviet mass media

The Soviet mass media was reorganized after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, and furnished with a theoretical framework derived from the basic postulates of Marx and Engles, which also entailed the application rules of Lenin. First, Marx scarcely mentioned the role of mass media in this socialist country. It remained for Lenin to adopt Marxist doctrine to a newly emerging society after the Bolsheviks came to power. Here, the media's social role was stipulated in broad terms by Lenin's definition of a newspaper. For example, in Lenin's famous outline for revolution, Where to Begin, he argued that the press was a superstructure on which a political party organization could be built:

> The role of a newspaper, however, is not limited solely to the dissemination of ideas, to political education, and to the enlistment of political allies. A newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and a collective agitator; it is also a collective organizer. In this last respect it may be likened to the scaffolding round a building under construction, which marks the contours of the structure and facilitates communication between the builders, enabling them to distribute the work and to view the common results achieved by their organized labor (Lenin, 1964, p. 22).

Lenin stipulated that propaganda on questions of both political and party organization must take place among the broad masses of the working class. The task of the propagandist was therefore to present a picture of society and class struggle. The agitator, then, sought to convey a single idea to the masses, which the role of the organizer was to motivate the masses (Gaunt, 1987, p. 205). Through this organization, in similar fashion to a building under construction, the Communist Party experienced its different stages of evolution. Following the premises of this definition, Lenin assigned this same role to other such media as broadcasting and film, along with other forms of expression. Thus, the entire mass communication system was seen a primary vehicle for persuading, teaching, and indoctrination, in essence, for mobilizing all human and material resources available for building and improving the Communist society as a whole (Markham, 1967, p. 99).

Following Lenin's role of mass media under socialism, Hopkins (1970) noted how the personalities of the first three Soviet leaders influenced the mass media. He argued that neither Stalin nor Khrushchev significantly added to Lenin's press theory. First, Stalin saw the press as a prime instrument through which the Party spoke daily and hourly with the working class, where the press formed a vital transmission belt between the Party and the masses. Khrushchev also pointed to the press' position of prestige in its crucial communicative role. Just as the army could not fight without arms, he said, so the Party could not carry out its ideological mission without that efficient and powerful weapon of the press (Markham, 1967, p. 100). McQuail (1987) summarized the major postulates of Soviet mass media as follows:

> 1, The media should serve the interests of, and also be in control of, the working class. 2, The media should not be privately owned. 3, The media should serve a positive function for society by: socialization to desired norms; education; information; motivation; and mobilization. 4, The media should respond to wishes and needs of their audiences within its overall task for society. 5, According to Marxist-Leninist principles, the media should provide a complete and objective view of society and the world (p. 119).

Under these leaders, the Soviet press system had developed in a direction best calculated for its combined instrumental purpose as organizer, propagandist and agitator. This purpose was reflected throughout its organization and structure, from the largest to the smallest medium, as seen from the national networks to the wall newspaper (Markham, 1967, p. 110).

With this type of structure, there were no privately-owned newspapers allowed to exist within the Soviet Union. Here, all newspapers were published by the Communist Party, the state, or public organizations. Generally speaking, the press consisted of papers published at the various levels corresponding to the major administrative-territorial divisions supervising them. In other words, the press was horizontally structured according to geographical regions, and served from a central all-union media position to the local media positions.

Inkeles (1958) pointed out that each sector of the Soviet press placed a special role within this structure. This all-union press carried the message of the central authorities, and generally provided both the pattern and the main source for all newspapers of similar type in the provincial and local sectors. The provincial presses translated these materials for a particular region, while clarifying and discussing regional economic and political problems, propagandizing for the Party. The local press was then charged with teaching the masses translating either Party directives into daily life, although it could not discuss Party theory or other top level matters on a personal level of belief.

Ultimately, each level of the press was the subject to the direction, inspection, and control of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Karch, 1982). This Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) took the responsibility for the central, provincial, and local presses, of thus making it not only the sole political party of the Soviet Union, but also the single greatest mechanism of its country's power.

This controlled system placed all official newspapers directly under the Party's control. More specifically, three bodies were concerned with exercising control over the media. "One was the Chief Board for the Preservation of State Secrets in the Press (Glavlit), which was the official censorship body, exercising both pre- and post-publication censorship. The second was more important, namely, the Propaganda Department of the CPSU Central Committee, whose task was to set out fundamental guidelines that editors were to observe. The third was the State Security Committee (KGB), whose role enabled greater flexibility in dealing with problems than either of the first two, and the KGB could simply send its operatives to the editorial offices" (Downing, 1990, p. 145). Decisive control, however, was exercised through the KGB's nomenklatura (political elite class) system.

Another important control exerted over the Soviet media was derived from the fact that all journalists were gathered into a single professional union. This Union of Journalists contained some 74,000 members - 70 percent of the country's working journalists. Moreover, the Union was governed by a board representing the most powerful media personages, with the union as a whole being heavily saturated with CPSU members, comprising roughly 80 percent of its entire membership (Remington, 1988). Effective control of the Union, however, required extensive cooperation by volunteer activists, who conducted mass oral agitations while backing up the instructors supervising their contact with both party committees and newspaper staffs (Remington, 1985).

Glasnost and Perestroika: Phase One

Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the CPSU in 1985. At the epochal Central Committee Plenum April of that year, Gorbachev launched the Glasnost (openness) campaign. His economic reform policy was aimed mostly at the decentralization of management in the state economy so as to overcome numerous economic problems. Moreover, Gorbachev recognized the importance of providing his people with consumer goods as well as other basic needs. Actually, he borrowed the system of a central planning economy from capitalism itself.

In his famous book Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and World, Gorbachev stressed the role of both the Communist Party and the mass media in the process of Perestroika (restructuring). With respect to this superstructure, Gorbachev proposed to establish the unity of both word and deed in Soviet life, as well as to restore and purify the revolutionary essence of Soviet Marxism. In this sense, the primary objective of Glasnost was to reduce traditional constraints on the free flow of information.

Following Gorbachev's superstructure, a new law controlling the press was to be promulgated in 1987, although the official draft was published in 1990. Based on the new version of the program of the CPSU, the preamble should point out the greater role played by the press in socialist society, should note their ideological and political guidance by the Party, and articulate the basic tasks of Soviet law (Fedotov, 1988).

One of the most remarkable characteristics of the new press law concerned the change of ownership. In other words, the ownership of the newspaper which formerly belonged to limited party organizations was later expanded by the economic changes of Perestroika. According to this new law, "the monopolization of any form of mass media is not allowed" (Izvestia, June 20, 1990, p. 3). Consequently, the law also did not allow either news censorship or interference in mass media activities by the officials of state or other public agencies. At the same time, the law forbids use of the media to divulge information constituting states secret, a publishing activity previously conducted by the Glavlit (Izvestia, July 26, 1990).

After the new ownership law, the press seemed to get rid of both parts control and censorship. Beginning in 1985, all control agencies thus began to exert less control over the media's sphere of influence. At this point, the main controlling mechanism was the journalists censoring themselves, referred to as self-censorship: this mechanism was similar to the gatekeeper system in Western countries.

During Perestroika, an American-Soviet advertising collaboration began to take place in both print journalism and television. First, two large American-based advertising agencies courted by the Kremlin, Young & Rubicam, and Ogilvy & Mather, opened in Moscow. By 1989, Izvestia began to carry two full pages of advertising, which sold at the rate of $50,000 a page (U.S. News & World Report, January 16, 1989). During this period, little reason existed to offer commercial advertising, since all mass media depended exclusively on the state budget.

With print journalism's new-found independence from the state budget, a sharp rise in prices for newsprint paper and other printing materials subsequently led to a doubling or more of the prices for newspapers themselves. This inevitably affected the resultant newspaper subscription drive (see Table 1). For instance, Pravda's circulation had dramatically changed during the past four years, its declining appeal caused in part by higher subscription costs applied while the economy was virtually at a standstill. A more profound reason for Pravda's lesser appeal, however, was the simple fact that "Soviet citizens no longer needed to put up with an unappetizing diet of Communist propaganda" (Smolowe, 1990, p. 84). Pravda was still considered to be a voice of conservatism, with a similar subscription situation developing among other newspapers. For example, while there were 9,478,000 Izvestia readers in 1990, there were only 800,000 readers in 1993. This period was indication of many newspapers suffering from severe financial problems, with dramatic declines in both circulation and income. Moreover, the advertising of this period did not cover the operating costs involved, although advertising did help support press independence (Bohlen, 1993).

Insert Table 1 about here

During Glasnost's brief existence, however, Soviet newspapers became distinguishable. Without the ideological department's supervision, they began to discover their individual identity. Pravda, for instance, remained conservative enough to prove that Marxism-Leninism should be the best philosophy in the world. A number of newspapers expressed the same conservative views - Sovetskaya Kultura, Moskovskaya Pravda, and others. On the other hand, Literaturnaya Gazeta was on the "left democratic shore of the political river." Finally, Izvestia and Moscow News reoriented themselves and now supported the progressive wing of government (Zagalsky, 1991, pp. 28-29).

Next, television also followed suit with Soviet newspapers by gaining control over its broadcasting networks. Previously, television in the Soviet Union was a total monopoly, administered under the direction of the State Committee for television and Radio Broadcasting (Gosteleradio) and its branches. In this sense, the Soviet broadcasting's centralized structure left the medium at odds with Perestroika's principle of socialist pluralism. The struggle for power erupting in the wake of Perestroika, however, changed this situation dramatically; this struggle was reflected in the fact that different media were subject to criticism from different sectors of the political spectrum. For example, except for a few programs considered too liberal, television was hardly criticized by the authorities, since the television monopoly was a part of the Soviet power structure. The new forces of allowed commercial interests, however, questioned the TV system itself, applying for their share of existing channels or for the introduction of alternative ones (Androunas, 1991).

After the initial power struggles with Perestroika, both the prominence and decentralization of television was essentially ratified in a 1990 presidential decree that redefined the structure of the television industry as a whole. In short, it recommended that the Supreme Soviet passed a law on broadcasting regulations, and further asserted that state television and radio should be independent of any political party (Mickiewicz and Jamison, 1991). Under these conditions, it is not surprising that the idea of alternative television subsequently looked so attractive. This idea was first proposed by Vladimir Tsvetov in 1988, who proposed that only a second television service might be able to satisfy the desired pluralism by stimulating competition, thus providing the right of free choice to both journalists and the public as well (Muratov, 1991).

With this right of free choice, supporters of alternative television first had to come up with alternative sources of financing. As a result, commercial broadcasting appeared on Central television in 1989 (Moscow daytime channel 2X2). Here, the founders of cable TV considered soliciting the services of sponsors and later reintroducing a subscription policy. By 1990, approximately 500 systems were in operation, encompassing more than one and half million subscribers in 200 cities nationwide (Muratov, 1991).

From an overall perspective, Perestroika redefined the role of mass media in a process of political transition. During this period, however, authorities regarded mass media not as a "fourth estate" but rather as a powerful tool for mobilizing the masses. Jacobs (1986) argued that Glasnost was more narrowly-defined as that openness between government and the citizenry - a means by which society informed itself about government activities via mass information, oral propaganda, and visual representation. Here, Gorbachev encouraged the formation of privately-managed cooperatives with a profit motive. Owners could now begin advertising their restaurants, shops and other small businesses on TV. Redmont (1989) noted, however, that "Russian commercials were still only sporadic and were not very professionally produced" (p. 42). More specifically, Soviet commercial advertising consisted of "speech-like texts" in place of expressive copy with emotional appeal. Consequently, Soviet advertising continued to remain "unsophisticated" (Jacobs, 1986, p. 243).

The Soviet August Coup: Phase Two

Ever since Boris Yeltsin became president of the Russian Republic, Sovetskaya Rossia, the mouthpiece of the Russian Republic, experienced trouble making its reformist views agree with editorial policy. As a result of this conflict, Sovetskaya Rossia remained a vital support of the conservative part of the party. The reformers of the Russian Republic, on the other hand, launched their own newspaper, Rossia.

Later, only a few years ago, the liberal city council in Moscow helped set up new independent newspapers such as Komsomolskaya Pravda and Moscow News. The state, however, still maintained a stranglehold on paper supplies, distribution and printing plants (Smith, 1991). That is, many newspapers retained ties with Party explicitly for the purpose of ensuring a subsidized supply of paper. This limitation may be seen in Komsomolskaya Pravda, which emerged as the most informative of all Soviet newspapers, but depended on the Pravda printing house, which was owned by the Party. It was then reduced from six to five issues a week (The Economist, February 23, 1991), a circumstance closely related to the control of Soviet publishing equipment in general.

Although the coup brought people together to fight a common foe, the Soviet people were beginning to show the divisions that split their society as well as the government before the coup. Moreover, the coup was also reflected by the fact that this was a good example of the growing conflict between the conservative group and the reformist group. Following the failed coup, the Communist Party was considered effectively dead. In other words, Gorbachev was at that point no more than a figurehead, and Yeltsin was the hero of a new Russian revolution.

Under Yeltsin's rule, most Soviet businesses trusted in the emergent wild and primitive marketplace, without that most basic of capitalist tools - a reliable monetary system. To initially replace this tool, as a primitive form of market relations, a barter system began in 1991 that represented a hopeful development. This was the first stage in the reintegration of the Russian economy following the collapse of the central economy. A shift to a market system and abolition of state controls over prices would result in a drastic shift in economic power (The Washington Post, November 18-24, 1991).

Following the adaptation of capitalistic system, D'Istria (1992) argues that the Russian media industry currently exists in a bad state. Its transition to a market economy has brought up prices but also lowered the quality of publishing as well. As a result, newspapers now rely on subsidies and advertising to sustain their publications, with inflation imposing limitations on the print industry. Another interesting development in the industry is the emergence of papers covering sex and violence, where some newspapers turned to publishing articles about sex and crime to attract their readers. Benesch (1992) points out that "the most popular newspapers of all seems to be pornographic ones" (p. 41). As a result of this increase in pornography dissemination, the Minister of the Press and Information of the Russian Federation announced the government's new plan to subsidize and provide paper for newspapers deemed qualified for those subsidies. He also stated that purely commercial and pornographic publications would then not be subsidized (Demchenko, 1992).

Overall, the development of a Soviet market economy poses a new phenomenon to the country: commercialization. Commercialization is also related to the need for the Russian media to cope in a capitalist market place. The consequence of commercialization has been to drive Russian media relentlessly downmarket. In response, the mass media has been accompanied by the largely uncritical adoption of western news values and media styles, including sexism and sensationalism. Thus, many Russian newspapers are much more likely to focus on crime, economic troubles and sensational stories about celebrities to sell a valuable media commodity.

Since the failed coup of August 1991, the Russian media has been attempting to adapt to the condition of the market economy. We can now regard its advertising, which is developing just as rapidly, as an indicator of the market economy. Likewise, according to Vartanov (1991), "television is becoming a more decorative presence with more imaginative production values. Advertising has given birth to persistent myths through the portrayals of its stars" (p. 167). Following these adaptations, after many newspapers decided to use advertisements, Pravda followed suit in 1990. All these media activities, obviously, move toward a free market system of capitalism. As a consequence, the Russian mass media now considers advertising revenue as being in both the pursuit of profits and the "Russian dream."

Media industry in Post-Soviet Russia: Phase Three

The Russian media currently faces serious problems with price liberalization and hyperinflation. For newspapers, costs of production have risen rapidly, thus leading to corresponding rises in cover price. For the reader, "the cost of buying a newspaper rose faster than incomes. Subscriptions and circulations fell, leading to cash flow crises and the prospect of bankruptcy for many titles" (McNair, 1994, pp. 122-123). Moreover, Mickiewicz (1995) asserts that "if subscriptions and advertising revenues did not adequately assure the operation of many of the newspapers, there were other ways. Some newspapers encouraged their staff to take up additional work, such as guiding foreign visitors, the income of which could help to support the paper" (p. 161). It was under these situations, that the state began to support underlying costs of newsprint. Prices then became liberated. This support has reversed condition in the newsprint market from that of high demand to very low demand (Richter, 1995).

Both hyperinflation and the collapse of the ruble generated similar problems in the electronic media. Here, McNair (1994) states that "it became extremely expensive to produce television programs, particularly when these required travel and location shoots" (p. 123). In general, there was little possibility of overcoming these difficulties by attracting advertising revenues within the Russian media industry. McNair (1994) also notes as follows:

> While the advertising industry in Russia is expanding, and press and TV advertisements have grown substantially in volume, Russian media audiences are not yet sufficiently affluent or consumption-oriented to be salable to advertisers at prices which would finance high quality media production (p. 123).

Holm (1992) argues that Russian newspapers are trying to adjust to the effects of the new-found market economy. Advertising has now become an important source of income, but most newspaper companies nevertheless have limited advertising budgets, with readers complaining that newspapers are getting thinner, and also more expensive. Veselov (1993) asserts that the total advertising income generated by Russia's top 15 newspapers reached 600 million rubles in 1992, with advertising revenue increased by an aggregate of 85 million rubles, thus exceeding subscription revenues. For instance, Izvestia increased its advertising revenues by increasing advertising space to 50 pages per month. The weekly newspapers similarly increased their revenues by two-thirds by increasing advertising space and rates. These advertising rates in Russian newspapers are currently expected to increase constantly (see Table 2).

Insert Table 2 about here

Following these increases in advertising, advertisers in Moskovsky Komsomolets paid 70,000 rubles, for a small 1 1/2 inch by 2 inch ad, or 3 million rubles for a full page in 1992 - the demand for advertising, therefore, continues to surpass the available supply. Moskovsky Komsomolets cannot expand beyond four pages because of a backup at the state-owned printing presses. Advertising thus remains a relatively new game for the Russian newspaper, while agencies like O'Kei, which handled the advertising for Moskovsky Komsomolets, are playing an increasingly important role. These ads tend to be both primitive and diverse, reflecting the muddled identity of Russia's small business economy (Bohlen, 1993). Richter (1995) also claims that "advertising makes up the biggest share of revenues for major publications. At Argumenty i Facty, for example, advertising income covers 70% of all expenses of the newspaper. At Moskovskiye Novosti, 60% of revenues come from the ads, while 37% more are bought in by subscriptions, and the remaining 3% come from the street sale" (p. 14).

As Downing (1995) summarizes, "many newspapers and magazines, particularly in the regions, simply folded. Broadcasting scraped by. Advertising had to be discovered ab initio as a revenue source, and this in a period of extremely fast inflation that sharply skewed the learning curve" (p.12). Foster (1993) also suggests that "the combined effect of price liberalization and monopolization led to the virtual collapse of the newspaper empire. As a result, many publications were forced to cease operations either temporarily of permanently" (p. 686).

The other economic aspects of the media industry also indicates a move towards privatization. Here, the pioneer in this regard had been Kommersant, but others began to follow suit: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Yezhednyevnaya Gazeta, and Obshchaya Gazeta became independently financed newspapers. One of the more surprising developments was the bankrolling of Pravda for a while by a foreigner, in this case a Greek Cypriot Communist millionaire (Downing, 1995).

The most significant developments in this regard were the 1993 start of the private television channel, NTV. One of the Russia's largest banks, Mostbank, invested into the third largest TV company. Beginning in St. Petersburg with rented time on it received a Moscow license from Yeltsin on an experimental basis in 1993. The channel itself was owned mostly by a finance and construction consortium. The second entire commercially-owned TV channel in this early period was TV6. In 1993, it was initially a joint venture between Sagalayev's Moscow Independent Broadcasting System and Turner Broadcasting. In 1994, however, these partners separated, with Sagalayev seeking domestic funding sources. Programming up to this split, however, were largely composed of unoriginal American products (Downing, 1995).

In essence, Mickiewicz (1995) claims that "the growing importance of a television market dramatically altered the images and values of contemporary culture and many of the manifestations of the television culture are drawn from the United States model. The problem of America is not only a cultural phenomenon, but a profoundly political one" (p.172). Many of the economic, political and legal problems faced by the Russian media have cultural implications. Some have their roots in long-standing cultural traditions, which have been difficult to discard. This was noted by Kolesnik (1991), who stated as follows:

> The change in emphasis fundamentally alters the perception of mass culture in Russia. Instead of viewing mass culture as a purely Western phenomenon that provides to undemanding tastes, satisfies escapist demands, and nurtures conformity, Russians have come to understand mass culture more as multilayered, capable of supplementing and influencing high art as well as creating cultural values (p. 46).

The Russian people, however, are still very interested in Western-made products. Anti-Western statements by Zhirinovsky, who is an ultraconservative nationalist, did not stop Russians from buying many imported products during the Christmas holiday season. For example, of 500 Russian women surveyed in Moscow's department stores, 70% stated that quality was their first concern when purchasing a product, whereas only 5% said that price was the most important factor (Advertising Age, January 17, 1994). Consequently, the Russian people prefer the good quality of Western-made products.

Alternatively, the collapse of the investment firm MMM provides a good example of the dangers of Westernization. Foster (1994) argues that "the MMM case has important potential implications for the mass media. It brings to the fore the essential question of whether Russian should rely primarily on the market or on government regulation to sort out truth from falsehood in commercial information" (p. 2). MMM was the best-known investment company in 1994. Because its advertisements were more frequently broadcast and the most-watched on television, nobody had any idea what this triple M was, although they are used to the well-known copy - "MMM - no problem." This expression "no problem" differed from Russian traditional copy in advertisement. Actually, it is a direct translation from English. MMM tried to sell its belief and desire in itself, rather than take support from computers and stock. MMM thus turned out to be a huge pyramid company that finally collapsed. Its advertising strategy, however, was successful since its image was extremely powerful around the country.

Following MMM's example, Downing (1995) suggests that "Russian culture, traditionally richly logo-centric, was in the process of being transformed into an intensely visual social expressiveness" (p.26). In general, Westernized culture is necessary to this economy, both at the level of production (requiring style and design), and consumption (taste, lifestyle, language). The worldwide proliferation of standardized food, clothing, music, and TV mini-series, etc., create the impression of the new cultural homogenization. Now appearing, in this sense, Russia's Westernized culture is the outcome resulting from the proliferation of Western commodities such as Coca-Cola, McDonald's, and Pepsi in the market place.

Conclusion

The sphere of influence of the media industry was expanded by Gorbachev's Glasnost. Moreover, the mass media was freed from control and censorship by the Communist Party. The mass media also no longer was owned by the Communist Party. The subsequent changes effected media management policies created the salient events which appeared in advertisements in most media. The development of commercial advertising may be seen to affect the media economy, and also prove useful as a new avenues of future profits. The media revolution is merely that a radical transition in a whole nationwide system of mass media. Although the media revolution began after Gorbachev came to power, the most drastic change occurred as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Since the failed coup of August 1991, the Russian media has been attempting to adapt to market economy conditions. The Russian media system itself, however, remains in turmoil, with the advertising business currently undergoing a crisis. Here, the costs of printing are very high, with advertising, as a form of new propaganda, evoking negative feelings because of the excessive amount of its obtrusiveness and aggressiveness (Izvestia, April 18, 1995). In conclusion, Russian advertising is still in its infancy. The mass media industry, however, will offer more advertising as the economic structure of Russian media moves from state to private ownership. In addition, the Russian mass media also continues to move toward Westernization, with mass media providing a crucial part of a larger system of ideological change. It is difficult to presently conceive the near future of the Russian media industry, because Russia is an extremely dynamic society. As Russia is incorporated into a New World Order, its individual era of ideology may be over. Is the era of market, however, about to begin?

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(Table 1) Subscription Circulation Throughout the CIS
(thousands of copies)

Dailies	1990	1991	1992	1993
Trud	20,000	18,292	13,361	3,784
Komsomolskaya Pravda	20,354	n.a.	12,941	1,847
Moskovsky Komsomolets	-	1,538	1,720	1,210
Izvestia	9,478	3,873	3,000	800
Rossiskaya Gazeta	-	252	678	633
Pravda	6,480	2,221	983	473
Sovetskaya Rossia	3,018	1,321	850	404
Vechernaya Moskva	n.a.	n.a.	430	480
Nezavisimaya Gazeta	-	-	71	26

Weeklies	1990	1991	1992	1993
Argumenty i Facty	31,517	23,840	25,693	8,873
Moskovskiye Novosti	-	1,297	403	485
Ekonomika i Zhizn	-	515	620	583
Megapolis-Express	-	93	1,721	45

Source: Pulkhritudova (1991: 93); Pravda (October 12, 1990: 6) for 1990, Vachnadze (1992: 419-420) for 1991, Moskovskiye Novosti (January 24, 1993: 12) for 1992-1993.

(Table 2) Advertising rates in Russian newspapers (%)

Dailies	Dec. 1991	Dec. 1992
Izvestia	25.3	31.9
Kommersant	-	9.1
Vechernaya Moskva	25.3	21.4
Komsomolskaya Pravda	4.7	24.5
Rossiskaya Gazeta	18.8	9.8
Trud	6.6	18.5
Moslovsky Komsomolets	10.5	16.2
Nezvavismaya Gazeta	12.0	7.1
Pravda	15.7	5.1
Sovetskaya Rossia	10.6	5.2

Weeklies	Dec. 1991	Dec. 1992
Ekonomika i Zhizn	39.1	47.1
Kommersant	12.5	18.1
Moskovskiye Novosti	9.4	19.6
Argumenty i Facty	5.2	30.4
Nedelya	9.8	6.3

Source: Moskovskiye Novosti (January 31, 1993: 14).

The Construction of Cuba in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*

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The Construction of Cuba in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*

Abstract

This study examines the coverage of Cuba by *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* during sample periods in 1985 and 1992-1993. A content analysis found Cuba was "constructed" from a U.S. perspective: a heavy reliance on U.S.-based sources, especially government officials; and story subjects dealing primarily with issues of interest to the United States. The findings suggest the U.S. government has been successful in shaping the parameters of debate involving policy toward Cuba.

The Construction of Cuba in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*

Introduction

Bill Clinton is the ninth United States president to confront Cuba under the rule of Fidel Castro, and he has endorsed a basic framework for U.S. policy that was constructed by the Kennedy Administration. The policy aims to isolate Cuba from the international community and to undermine and destabilize Castro's internal hold on power. What makes U.S. policy toward Cuba so interesting is that it was built around the themes of the Cold War, but remains frozen in time after that war was declared over. Another constant during Castro's tenure has been criticism of American journalists for being "soft" on the Cuban leader and his government. But how legitimate are these accusations? Have American media indeed been sympathetic to Castro and his revolution, or have they adopted the vision of the United States government? Moreover, have the media created a "marketplace of ideas" that provides and challenges the public to consider a diversity of views, ideas and opinions so that citizens can hold their representatives accountable, which is, in theory, a cornerstone of self-government and democracy?

The question for this research, then, becomes whether the American media -- *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* in particular, as newspapers of record -- have thoroughly examined U.S. policy toward Cuba and questioned whether the U.S. government should consider other policy alternatives, or whether they have allowed official sources to reframe the confrontation between Washington and Havana so that the antipathy continues long after the Cold War has been declared over.

This study illuminates anew the subject of government influence upon public communication, and its implications for policy making. As Schudson has noted: "(T)he story of journalism, on a day-to-day basis, is the story of the interaction of reporters and officials."[1] Scholars have written in numerous contexts how reliance upon official sources is a journalistic routine that helps newspeople produce the news efficiently.[2] Stavitsky and Gleason found that even avowedly "alternative" news organizations (National Public Radio and Pacifica Radio) relied heavily upon official sources.[3] However, by granting government officials a "privileged voice in the news,"[4] to use Bennett's term, it has been argued that journalists afford officials an opportunity to "manage the news," to establish the parameters of debate about a given issue.[5] Looking at *The New York Times* coverage of the U.S. invasion of Panama, Dickson argued that the newspaper, while providing a forum for critics of the invasion, allowed the government "to define and dominate the political debate."[6] The case of United States-Cuba relations provides a fresh context, largely neglected by scholars in recent years, within which to re-examine these assumptions.

Previous Studies of U.S. Media Coverage of Cuba

There has been a dearth of scholarly research into the portrayal of Castro and Cuba in the U.S. media. Indeed much of the work dealt with the early years of Castro's regime, from January 1959 when he assumed power, through the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961. For example, Francis examined coverage of Castro in 17 U.S. newspapers during that period and concluded that journalists emphasized Castro's anti-American statements while neglecting the impact of his social and economic reforms.[7] Other studies reached similar conclusions.[8]

Though conservative commentators have criticized the U.S. media for lauding Castro,[9] little academic research has been conducted during the past three decades. Probably the most significant study was undertaken by Lenart and Targ, who studied *The New York Times* coverage of Cuba between 1982 and 1990. Their analysis found a distinct shift in the *Times'* portrayal of Cuba after 1985, when relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union warmed; Cold War themes were replaced by an increase in stories about Cuban human rights violations. Lenart and Targ concluded that "(t)he official U.S. position...is relayed by the media to the public with disturbing fidelity."[10]

Methodology

Samples were drawn from *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* to determine which primary news frames (defined as general themes and topics of stories) and which news sources were most prominent in the coverage of issues and events related to Cuba. Samples were drawn from two 12-month periods: January 1, 1985 through December 31, 1985 and September 1, 1992 through August 31, 1993. These periods were selected because they encompassed significant issues and events in the relationship between Cuba and the United States, as will be discussed below.

The units of analysis for the *Times* were all articles, including editorials and columns, listed under the heading of Cuba, or cross-referenced under another heading, in *The New York Times Index*.[11] The units of analysis for the *Post* were all articles, including editorials and columns, listed under the heading of Cuba, or cross-referenced under another heading, in *The Official Washington Post Index* (1985) and *The Washington Post Index* (1982 and 1993).[12] Since the *Post* was not cross-referenced as thoroughly as the *Times* index, however, additional articles from the *Post* identified through a search of the *Nexis* database in which Cuba was a primary topic were included in the sample.

A series of items were coded in each unit in the sample. These included the primary news frame and the specific news topic. The primary news sources, defined as individuals quoted or cited, were also coded. The final item that was coded in each article was the dateline.

The raw data derived from the content analysis were examined in various ways. The primary news frame, specific news topics, sources and datelines for the *Times* and *Post* were compared within each sample period. Those items were also compared between the 1985 sample period and the 1992-93 sample period to determine if there were any significant increases or decreases. A chi-square goodness of fit test, with a probability level of .05, was calculated for the comparisons between the two sample periods.

The empirical analysis of *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* produced a data set of 430 articles for the two sample periods combined: 247 articles for the January 1, 1985 through December 31, 1985 sample period, and 183 articles for the September 1, 1992 through August 31, 1993 sample. The first author coded all articles in the two sample periods, with 10 percent of the total sample double-coded for primary news frame and specific news topics to test intercoder reliability. The intercoder reliability was .90 for primary news frame and .80 for specific news topics.

Results for January 1, 1985 - December 31, 1985

The primary news frame results for the 1985 sample are displayed in Table 1, and they indicate a strong correlation between the issues being stressed by the Reagan Administration and those being covered by the *Times* and *Post*. This is most evident in the percentage of articles that related to Cuba's military involvement in Central America and Africa, which accounted for 28.7% of the total sample. The *Times* sample indicates an even stronger tendency to emphasize Cuba's military involvement, accounting for 31.3% of the sample, more than any other single category.

The 1985 sample also indicates a strong tendency to view Cuba from a U.S. foreign policy perspective. For the total sample, 29.1% of the articles addressed issues related to United States - Cuba relations, while another 17.3% involved domestic issues in the United States that related to Cuba, including deportation proceedings of Cubans who had arrived during the Mariel exodus in 1980 but were labeled by the United States government as "undesirables." But what is most striking is the dearth of articles in either the *Times* or *Post* in which domestic issues or events in Cuba were the primary focus. The four categories that were designed to contain such stories--Cuba: Politics, Cuba: Economics, Cuba: Social, and Cuba: Culture--combined accounted for only 13.0% of the total sample.

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INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

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Specific news topics stressed by the Reagan Administration were the most prominent in the sample. Twice during 1985, first in February and then again in December, the Reagan Administration requested that Congress allocate millions of dollars in military aid to the Contras in Nicaragua on the grounds that Cuban involvement had intensified. The Reagan Administration was also seeking aid for the UNITA rebels in Angola, and once again Cuban involvement was a central rationale. Based on the measurement for specific news topics in this analysis, the Reagan Administration was quite successful in making the linkage between Cuba and the conflicts in Nicaragua and Angola. Cuba's military involvement in Central America (15.0%) was the most prominent specific news topic in the total sample, followed by Cuba's military involvement in Africa (13.0%). The next four specific news topics in the sample all related to some aspect of U.S. policy toward Cuba, or a domestic issue or event in the United States.

Individuals quoted or cited were coded for all articles in the sample, with multiple sources being coded for an article when appropriate, which resulted in a total population of 363. The results are displayed in Table 2. The prominence of United States-based sources is most evident, accounting for 58.4% of the individuals quoted or cited in the total sample. And a majority of those individuals were U.S. officials, including those from federal, state and local governments, who accounted for 45.5% of the total sample, and 77.8% of the United States-based sources.

Given the Reagan Administration's aggressive campaign to link Cuban involvement in Central America and Africa with aid to the Contras and UNITA rebels, respectively, it is important to note that President Reagan and members of the executive branch of the federal government, including Secretary of State George Shultz and officials of the Department of State, accounted for an overwhelming percentage of the government officials quoted or cited. That was particularly true in the *Times*, where Reagan and representatives of the executive branch accounted for 69.7% of the 109 official sources quoted or cited.

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The percentage of Cuba-based sources was quite low, only 24.2% of the total sample. The percentage was even lower in the *Times* sample, just 17.0%. In fact, the *Times* was more likely to quote or cite non-United States-based and non-Cuba-based sources (19.6%) about Cuba than it was Cuba-based sources. The *Post* quoted or cited Cuba-based sources at a much higher rate (36.0%) and non-United States-based and non-Cuba-based sources at a lower rate (13.7%) than the *Times*. It should be noted that the U.S. government controls the access of American journalists to travel to and within Cuba, which limits their ability to utilize Cuba-based sources.

One group that was not quoted or cited in either the *Times* or *Post* during this period was Cuban dissidents. That is significant since there were dissidents in Cuba during the sample period, as well as human rights violations occurring, but those issues were not being stressed by the United States government. During the Reagan Administration, the primary conditions for a normalization of relations between Cuba and the United States were the removal of Cuban military personnel and advisors from Central American and Africa and a disengagement of Cuba from the

Soviet sphere. It was later, after these conditions had been met, that human rights issues became a centerpiece of Washington's stated policy.

Consistent with the results for sources quoted and cited were the results for datelines. The majority of articles that carried a dateline were written in the United States (62.4%), with only 19% of those articles written in Cuba. Once again, the *Times* was more likely to print articles with a United States dateline, and less likely to print articles with a Cuba dateline than was the *Post*.

The results for the 1985 sample period suggests that Cuba was represented in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* from an American perspective. The articles tended to cover those issues being promoted by the United States government, were heavily reliant on official sources in the United States, and were more often than not written in the United States.

Results for September 1, 1992 - August 31, 1993

The very foundation of international politics changed dramatically between the first and second sample periods, as the disintegration of the Soviet Union brought a sudden end to the Cold War. That development left Cuba without its staunchest economic supporter, but it also meant that Fidel Castro and the Cuban government could no longer be considered a military or political threat in the Western Hemisphere. Despite those changes, U.S. policy toward Cuba remained intact. Following the passage of the so-called Cuban Democracy Act in 1992, however, Cuba was not a priority in Washington. Five months after the Clinton Administration assumed power, one American diplomat said, "I don't think Cuba policy has even been considered yet. It's not a priority."[13]

The *Times* and *Post* continued to represent Cuba overwhelmingly from an American perspective during the second sample period. That is evident in the measurement of the primary news frame, displayed in Table 3. The majority of the articles related to Cuba involved issues that to one degree or another related to the

United States as well: relations between the two countries, the influx of Cuban refugees, and various domestic issues. Those three categories accounted for 60% of the articles in the total sample, and an even larger percentage (64.7%) in the *Post* sample.

There was coverage of internal developments in Cuba, but such coverage was far outweighed by other topics. The four categories designed to contain those articles -- Cuba: Politics, Cuba: Economics, Cuba: Social, and Cuba: Culture -- accounted for 32.2% of the total sample. A significant portion of those articles (20%) dealt with a mysterious illness in the spring and summer of 1993 that left tens of thousands of Cubans temporarily blind. Those articles, however, rarely dealt with the overall state of health care in Cuba or discussed a possible link between the U.S. - imposed economic embargo and the illness. The total also included a series of articles on Cuban athletes who were participating in the World University Games in Buffalo, New York in the summer of 1993.

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INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

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Once again, it is interesting to note what is missing. Those articles in which Cuba's involvement in the international community, either political and economic, was the primary news frame accounted for only 8.2% of the total sample. Such coverage supports the picture that the United States government presents of a Cuba isolated in the international arena, but it ignores important developments both on the island and in the Western Hemisphere. Cuba has reestablished diplomatic relations with a number of nations in Latin America and the Caribbean that had distanced themselves from the Castro government. For example, in July 1993 the Cuban government signed an accord with the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), a development that was not reported in either the *Times* or *Post* at that time. Nor did the *Time* or *Post* report on Castro's meeting with Colombia's president, Cesar Gaviria, and Spain's foreign minister, Javier Solanas, a month later, although the *Post* did have a short article on Castro being delayed at the airport in Cartagena, Colombia because Esso, Mobil and Texaco refused to refuel his airplane because of the U.S.-imposed economic embargo.[14]

The specific news topics that appeared most often in the *Times* and *Post* also related to United States policy and domestic issues. The U.S.-imposed economic embargo was the most common issue covered, as it was a primary topic in 24.0% of the sample. By contrast, the economic hardships that exist in Cuba was a primary focus in only 7.7% of the sample, and the relationship between those two was rarely broached. There was also considerable coverage of the influx of Cuban refugees (16.4%).

What is most striking is the number of stories that addressed the political activities of the Cuban-American community, which had become a formidable political force. There were many more articles with a primary focus on the political activities of the Cuban-American community (22) than there were on political leadership in the Cuban government (6). Moreover, there were also more articles on the political activities of the Cuban-American community than there were on all topics related to politics in Cuba. The most common specific topic that related to politics in Cuba addressed dissidents and human rights, issues that the United States government has raised on a repeated basis in the United Nations and elsewhere.

Sources based in the United States were most often quoted or cited in the *Times* and *Post* during the second sample period, displayed in Table 4. United States-based sources accounted for 67.6% of the total sample, compared to 27.9% for Cuba-based sources. But the breakdown within the United States-based sources is interesting. U.S. officials, including those within federal, state, and local governments, still accounted for the largest percentage of the total sample (23.4%), but sources from within the Cuban-American community assumed a significant role. The Cuban American community accounted for 20.4% of the total sample, with Cuban refugees, those who were quoted or cited upon their arrival in the United States, accounting for another 4.2%. The *Post* was more reliant on this group than the *Times*, as members of the Cuban-American community were quoted or cited more often than even U.S. officials, 23.9% compared to 23.3%.

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The Cuban-Americans appear to have filled a void left by the executive branch of the federal government, which was not as active in advancing a Cuban agenda as it had been during the Reagan Administration. President Clinton's only statement on Cuba that appeared during the sample period came during a news conference where he simply stated that he continued to support the so-called Cuban Democracy Act; that was reported within the printed transcripts of the news conference, not in a news article. The executive branch of the government, including the President, Secretary of State and officials from the Department of State, accounted for only 12.9% of the total sample, and virtually none of those individuals were of Assistant Secretary of State rank or higher.

The academic community also assumed a prominent position during this period. The category that included other U.S.-based sources, including scholars, researchers, former government officials, journalists and others, accounted for 19.8% of the total sample. Scholars alone accounted for 7.5% of the total sample, significantly more than Fidel Castro himself (2.7%).

Consistent with previous measurements, the datelines of articles related to Cuba indicated the dominance of those written in the United States. Articles with United States datelines accounted for 66.1% of the total sample, and 70.0% of the

Post sample. The two most prominent datelines within the total sample were, not surprisingly, Washington (25.1%) and Havana (22.8%), but Miami and other cities in South Florida, the heart of the Cuban-American community, accounted for 21.1% of the total sample. Those percentages shift dramatically when measuring articles with datelines and bylines, eliminating stories from the wire services which were, almost without exception, short articles that were contained within the news briefs. The percentage of articles carrying a byline and a Washington dateline accounted for 22.2% of the total sample, while Miami accounted for 15.8%. Havana, however, drops from 22.8% to 8.2% of the total sample when one includes only articles with bylines.

Comparison of Results

The balance of power in the international arena changed dramatically between the first and second sample periods, changes that had a dramatic impact on Cuba, both domestically and internationally. But it is interesting to note that, in many respects, the coverage of Cuba remained as stagnant as the U.S. government's policy toward Fidel Castro and his government.

Many of the trends found in the coverage of news related to Cuba in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* in the first sample period were also found in the second sample period, a comparison of which is displayed in Table 5. In each case, close to a third of all articles related to Cuba involved United States-Cuba relations, which indicates that Cuba in consistently viewed through the prism of U.S. foreign policy.

Statistically significant shifts in coverage can be found in the percentage of articles that addressed Cuba's international military affairs, and those that addressed the influx of Cuban refugees in the United States. One could argue that the shift in articles on Cuba's military involvement in Nicaragua and Angola simply mirrored a change in the environment the two newspapers were reflecting, since the Sandinistas were voted out of power in 1990 and the last Cuban troops left Angola in 1991. But considerable scholarship on the conflicts in those two regions suggests that Cuba's role during the first sample period was overstated in a bid by the Reagan Administration to garner support for military aide for the Contras and UNITA.[15]

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INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

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The decline in articles that addressed Cuba's involvement in the international community -- "Cuba: International Diplomacy" -- is also interesting because the Castro government has become less isolated internationally since it dropped any pretense of exporting revolution. This has been particularly true in the Western Hemisphere, where Cuba has reestablished diplomatic ties with various countries and signed an accord with the Caribbean Community. These developments, however, are in sharp contrast to statements by the U.S. government that Cuba is almost totally isolated internationally without its long-standing alliance with the Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe.

The measurement of sources quoted and cited over the two sample periods, displayed in Table 6, indicates some important shifts. The most significant shift was the decrease in the percentage of official U.S. sources, from 45.5% to 23.4%. That decrease was offset, however, with a statistically significant increase in the number of sources from within the Cuban-American community, from 4.7% in the 1985 sample to 20.4% in the 1992-93 sample. One of the objectives of the Cuban American National Foundation when it was formed in the 1980s was to transform Cuba from a foreign policy concern to a domestic issue, much as the Israel Public Affairs Committee has done with Israel. The increase in sources from within the Cuban-American community indicates the prominence which the group has assumed in the formation of U.S. policy towards Cuba, particularly at a juncture when the White House is concentrating on other issues.

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It is also interesting to note that despite the increase between the two sample periods in the number of articles that deal with Cuban domestic issues, the percentage of sources from the Cuban government remained constant. During the second sample period, however, the *Times* and *Post* relied more on members of the Cuban-American community and, increasingly, U.S.-based scholars to evaluate the current state of affairs in Cuba. What makes such a trend questionable is that most of the individuals quoted or cited are, like journalists, limited in their freedom to travel to Cuba. The measurement of datelines remained relatively constant between the two sample periods.

Conclusions

This examination of the coverage of Cuba and U.S. policy toward Cuba in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* brings to mind Cohen's oft-quoted analysis of the press and foreign policy: "It may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling people what to think about."[16] Based on the results of this study, it appears the issues and events that the *Times* and *Post* are telling people to think about in regard to Cuba are, for the most part, those that the U.S. government would like them to think about.

For example, press accounts reflect the view that the turmoil in Central America and Africa resulted from Cuba's promotion of revolution, not native insurgencies with deep historic roots and direct and indirect ties to the United States. Or press accounts leave the impression that the economic crisis confronting Cuba in the 1990s is the result of Castro's mismanagement, not the U.S.-imposed economic embargo. In fact, these issues are the result of many complex factors, including both Cuban and American complicity. But the United States government doesn't want the American people to consider its role in these developments, and, based on the results of this analysis, the *Times* and *Post* don't challenge them to do so. In this instance, there is no "grappling" between "Truth" and "Falsehood" in a "free and open encounter" as Milton envisioned 350 years ago.[17]

Gans viewed news as "information which is transmitted from sources to audiences, with journalists . . . summarizing, refining, and altering what becomes available to them from sources in order to make the information suitable for the audiences."[18] He concluded that the selection of sources was the most significant news filter. This empirical analysis of the coverage of Cuba and U.S. policy toward Cuba in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* supports that argument.

The results from both sample periods indicate the degree to which the *Times* and *Post* relied on U.S.-based sources, and the tendency of those two newspapers to concentrate on issues that involved the United States in the coverage of Cuba. But more revealing in this regard may be differences between the two newspapers in a given period. In 1985, the *Times* quoted or cited U.S.-based sources more often than did the *Post*, 63.4% to 50.4%, and was more reliant on sources from within the executive branch, which accounted for 33.9% of the total sample. The *Times* also devoted a higher percentage of articles to Cuban involvement in Central America and Africa than did the *Post*, and, in fact, Cuba's role in Nicaragua and Angola were the most common specific news topics in the *Times* sample. This is significant since the Reagan Administration made a concerted effort to link Cuba's involvement in those regions with economic aid for the Contras and UNITA rebels.

It is clear from the 1985 sample that the *Times* placed a greater emphasis on international news than did the *Post*, which appeared to concentrate more on policy debates in Washington. While the *Times* published more articles on Cuban involvement in Central America and Africa, the *Post* published more articles related to the three most prominent issues in United States-Cuba relations: immigration and repatriation, diplomacy, and Radio Martí.

The *Times*, however, covered international news from an American perspective, because the individuals it chose to quote or cite, deemed to be legitimate sources, were primarily officials within the U.S. government. Moreover, in its coverage of Angola, those individuals quoted or cited who were *not* members of the U.S. government tended to be members of the South African government, which, like the United States, was opposed to the Angolan government, or the UNITA rebels that the United States and South Africa supported.[19] The *Times'* reliance on official sources can be viewed as one of the strategic rituals that the media have created in the pursuit of objectivity.[20]

Entman argues that one of the ramifications of the quest for objectivity is that "truth often has less impact on the slant of a news report than skill at managing news."[21] The result, he argues, is that journalists will give spokespersons who are considered important and respectable their say, even when they offer "a feeble argument and flimsy facts."[22] The coverage of Cuban military involvement in Nicaragua in December 1985 is a prime example of this. Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams and Secretary of State George Shultz were allowed to state, as fact, that Cuban military advisors were involved in combat, even though the primary piece of "incontrovertible evidence" was a Contra claim that a helicopter pilot heard over a radio had a Cuban accent. Because of the status of Abrams and Shultz, their motives were not questioned, nor was the evidence examined.

The results also seem to support the argument advanced by Lippmann, and restated many times since then, that one of the primary failures of democracy is its inability to develop a "machinery of knowledge" that will present a "reliable picture of the world."[23] One must question whether the picture of Cuba created in the

Times and *Post* could be reliable when approximately 80% of the articles on that nation were written from outside its borders, and only 13% of the articles relating to it in a given year (1985) dealt primarily with issues and events in Cuba.

The argument is not whether Castro should remain in power, or be removed. The argument is not whether the United States should maintain the economic embargo, or it should be terminated. The argument is whether the American people are forced to evaluate Cuba and U.S. policy toward Cuba without an accurate picture in their heads. *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* present an image that has been sketched largely by United States foreign policy makers, with their inherent distortions and deletions. It is not a picture that makes democratic self-government possible.

This study does little more than scratch the surface in a needed examination of the nexus of the portrayal of Cuba in the U.S. media, and U.S. policy toward Cuba. An examination of the national news magazines and televisions networks is a logical next step. But also interesting would be an analysis of *The Miami Herald,* which functions in the heart of the Cuban-American community, to determine how its portrayal of Cuba and U.S. policy toward Cuba differs from that of the *Times* and *Post*. It would also be interesting to examine international wire services, such as *Inter Press Service* or *Agence France Press*, to determine how their portrayal of Cuba differs from the *Times* and *Post*, and, perhaps most important, which sources they utilize for information about Cuba.

TABLE 1. Primary News Frame of Articles in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* in 1985

	NEW YORK TIMES N = 143	*WASHINGTON POST* N = 104	COMBINED N = 247
United States-Cuba: Int. Relations	35 24.5%	37 35.6%	72 29.1%
Cuba: International Military Affairs	45 31.5%	26 25%	71 28.7%
United States: Domestic Issues & Events	31 21.7%	12 11.5%	43 17.4%
Cuba: International Diplomacy	14 9.7%	11 10.6%	25 10.1%
Cuba: Politics	7 4.9%	9 8.7%	16 6.5%
Cuba: Economics	5 3.5%	3 2.9%	8 3.2%
Cuba: Social	2 1.4%	5 4.8%	7 2.8%
Cuba: Refugees	2 1.4%	0 0.0%	2 0.8%
Other	2 1.4%	0 0.0%	2 0.8%
Cuba: Culture	0 0.0%	1 1.0%	1 0.4%
Cuba: International: Trade	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%

TABLE 2. Sources Quoted or Cited in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post in 1985*

	NEW YORK TIMES N = 224	*WASHINGTON POST* N = 139	COMBINED N = 363
United States-Based Sources			
U.S. Officials	109 48.6%	56 40.3%	165 45.5%
U.S.-Based: Others	21 8.4%	7 5.0%	28 7.7%
Cuban American Community	11 4.9%	6 4.3%	17 4.7%
Cuban Refugees	1 0.9%	1 0.7%	2 0.5%
TOTAL	142 63.4%	70 50.4%	212 58.4%
Cuba-Based Sources			
Cuba Officials	27 11.6%	30 21.6%	57 15.7%
Cuban Community	11 4.9%	20 14.4%	31 8.5%
TOTAL	38 17.0%	50 36.0%	88 24.2%
Non-United States- or Cuba-Based Sources			
Foreign Government Officials	39 17.4%	18 12.9%	57 15.7%
Foreign Investors & Citizens	4 1.8%	1 0.7%	5 1.4%
International Organizations	1 0.4%	0 0.0%	1 0.2%
TOTAL	44 19.6%	19 13.7%	63 17.4%

TABLE 3. Primary News Frame of Articles in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* in 1992-93

	NEW YORK TIMES	*WASHINGTON POST*	COMBINED
	N = 115	N = 68	N = 183
United States-Cuba: Int. Relations	34 29.6%	22 32.4%	56 30.6%
Cuba: Refugees	17 14.8%	13 19.1%	30 16.4%
United States: Domestic Issues & Events	14 12.2%	9 13.2%	23 12.6%
Cuba: Social	15 13.0%	6 8.9%	21 11.5%
Cuba: Economics	14 12.2%	5 7.4%	19 10.4%
Cuba: Politics	12 10.4%	5 7.4%	17 9.3%
Cuba: International Diplomacy	2 1.7%	4 5.9%	6 3.3%
Cuba: International Military Affairs	2 1.7%	1 1.4%	3 1.6%
Cuba: International: Trade	1 0.9%	2 2.9%	3 1.6%
Other	3 2.6%	0 0.0%	3 1.6%
Cuba: Culture	1 0.9%	1 1.5%	2 1.1%

TABLE 4. Sources Quoted or Cited in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* in 1992-93

	NEW YORK TIMES	*WASHINGTON POST*	COMBINED
	N = 178	N = 155	N = 333
United States-Based Sources			
U.S. Officials	41 23.0%	36 23.2%	77 23.4%
Cuban American Community	31 17.4%	37 23.9%	68 20.4%
U.S.-Based: Others	32 18.0%	34 21.9%	66 19.8%
Cuban Refugees	9 5.1%	5 3.2%	14 4.2%
TOTAL	113 63.5%	112 72.3%	225 67.5%
Cuba-Based Sources			
Cuba Officials	33 18.5%	18 11.6%	51 15.3%
Cuban Community	22 12.4%	20 12.9%	42 12.6%
TOTAL	55 30.1%	38 24.5%	93 27.9%
Non-United States-. or Cuba-Based Sources			
Foreign Government Officials	4 2.2%	4 2.6%	8 2.4%
Foreign Investors & Citizens	5 2.8%	0 0.0%	5 1.5%
International Organizations	1 0.6%	1 0.6%	2 0.6%
TOTAL	9 5.1%	5 3.2%	14 4.2%

TABLE 5. Primary News Frame of Articles in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* Compared Between 1985 and 1992-93

	1985 N = 247	1992-93 N = 183	X^2
United States-Cuba: Int. Relations	72 29.1%	56 30.6%	.02
Cuba: Refugees	2 0.8%	30 16.4%	4.87 *
United States: Domestic Issues & Events	43 17.3%	23 12.6%	.44
Cuba: Social	7 2.8%	21 11.5%	1.51
Cuba: Economics	8 3.2%	19 10.4%	1.04
Cuba: Politics	16 6.5%	17 9.3%	.16
Cuba: International Diplomacy	25 10.1%	6 3.3%	.92
Cuba: International Military Affairs	71 28.6%	3 1.6%	14.58 * * *
Cuba: International Trade	0 0.0%	3 1.6%	.05
Other	2 0.8%	3 1.6%	.01
Cuba: Culture	1 0.4%	2 1.1%	.01

* Statistically significant at .05 with 1 d*f*
* * Statistically significant at .01 with 1 d*f*
* * * Statistically Significant at .001 with 1 d*f*

TABLE 6. Sources Quoted or Cited in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* Compared Between 1985 and 1992-93

	1985 N = 363	1992-93 N = 333	X^2
United States-Based Sources			
U.S. Officials	165 45.5%	78 23.4%	9.77 * *
Cuban American Community	17 4.7%	68 20.4%	4.93 *
Others	28 7.7%	66 19.8%	2.93
Cuban Refugees	2 0.5%	14 4.2%	.27
TOTAL	212 58.4%	225 67.6%	1.69
Cuba-Based Sources			
Cuba Officials	57 15.7%	51 15.3%	0.00
Cuban Community	31 8.5%	42 12.6%	0.34
TOTAL	88 24.2%	93 27.9%	0.27
Non-United States- or Cuba-Based Sources			
Foreign Government Officials	57 15.7%	8 2.4%	3.54
Foreign Investors & Citizens	5 1.4%	5 1.5%	0.00
International Organizations	1 0.2%	2 0.6%	0.00
TOTAL	63 17.4%	14 4.2%	3.48

*Statistically significant at .05 with 1 d*f*
* * Statistically significant at .01 with 1 d*f*
* * * Statistically Significant at .001 with 1 d*f*

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James W. Markham Award Competition

Globalization of Mass Communications in the West and East Asia: Towards A New East Asian Model of Mass Communications

Abstract

The primary purpose of this paper is to explore the globalization process of modernity and postmodernity in the West and East Asia and to construct a new Asian model of mass communications. In the West, while the modernist globalization of mass communications has undergone the communications technology-institution coevolution process process, the postmodernist globalization of mass communications has been a counterpart of the modernist globalization process by emphasizing localization with different experiences of time and space. Overcoming this binary logic of the Western globalization, theoretical frameworks for a new East Asian model of mass communications comprise not only the adaptation of both modernist and postmodernist globalization processes in favor of structure-agency integration but also the concept of the nation-state in relation to East Asian culture.

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Submitted to International Communication Division
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Globalization of Mass Communications in the West and East Asia: Towards A New East Asian Model of Mass Communications

I. Introduction

Most recently, Halloran (1996), a correspondent with the New York Times, wrote about Asia in *Foreign Policy*. He is willing to see the twenty-first century as the rise of the East with such strength that it will break the monopoly of the West on world power, at the same time providing some critical warnings and tips for American policy towards Asian nations. This rising East era echoes in Naisbitt's book *Megatrends Asia* (1996) which addresses the eight Asian megatrends[1] that are changing the world. He strongly remarks that the modernization of Asia will forever reshape the world as we move toward the next millennium. The rising East has some variants such as the 'Asian Century' and 'the New Asia' (*Asianweek* Dec. 15, 1995), as a locus of trade and culture with its own value system. This rising East Era stems from the globalization process in which the rapidly increasing cross-border economic, social, and political interactions that are not originated by national governments take place (Lopez *et al*. 1995).

Radical Asian changes occurring in political, economic, and cultural arenas in the globalization and rising East Era obviously require to rethink the existing Asian model of mass communications, the model which was by and large conceived in the 1980s. The 1985 Asian Mass Communication Research and Information Centre (AMIC) conference on communication theory from the Asian perspective was a watershed of signaling a refusal of 'intellectual imperialism'[2] or 'research imperialism' (Halloran 1994) and of recovering Asian heritage.

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[1] For Naisbitt, eight Asian megatrends are: From nation states to networks; from export-led to consumer-driven; from Western influence to the Asian way; from government-driven to market-driven; from villages to supercities; from labor-intensive to high technology; from male dominance to emergence of women; and from West to East.

[2] See Hall, Stuart (1989). "Ideology and Communication Theory," *Rethinking*

Theoretical approaches to Asian communications research by all Asian scholars of the conference appear to have been spurred not only by revisionists of development communication and critical researchers but also by a series of events of the June 1983 "Ferment in the Field" issue of the *Journal of communication of communication* and the 1985 International Communication Association conference focusing on paradigm dialogues. Their attempts in search for an Asian perspective of communication theory emphasized the importance of the classical intellectual traditions of Asia (Dissanayake 1986), a balance of the traditions of both the East and the West (Chu 1986), and 'Another Communication' (Servaes 1986). These versions of constructing Asian model, however, are confined to the times of the Western or American, absolute hegemony and then appear to be unable to reflect the new emergent globalization and rising East Era. New wine is for fresh skins.

One of the major problems arising from the old Asian model is that its perspectives began from the critique of modernization and cultural imperialism occurred by a result of modernist globalization. However, today's globalization phenomenon entails another process, that is, postmodernist globalization. Globalization in the West, as Robertson (1992) states, "refers both to the compression of the world and to the intensification of the consciousness of the world as a whole" (p. 8). The globalization process toward the world as a whole encompasses both cultural homogenization and cultural heterogenization, universalization and particularization, modernization and postmodernization, or structure and agency (Friedman 1994; King 1990; Robertson 1992). In the globalization view, therefore, the old Asian model might be blind to the

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Communication, Vol. I, Eds., Brenda Devin, Lawrence Grossberg, Barbara J. O'Keefe, and Ellen Wartella, Newbury Park: Sage. He considers the great global expansion of communication studies under American sponsorship since the 1950s as intellectual imperialism. However, he also notes that the conception of intellectual work has increasingly been challenged by alternative models and theories.

heterogeneous, particular, postmodern, agent process of globalization. For example, Servaes (1986) seeks the third paradigm or 'Another Communication' for Asian mass communications theory and research by employing only a structural framework based on Wallerstein's (1979) world system theory.

The fundamental purpose of this paper is to explore both modernist and postmodernist globalizations of mass communications and to construct a new East Asian model of mass communications for the globalization era. The paper asserts that the emerging new East Asian model must consider an structure-action integration and the concept of the nation-state. It will rely largely on a conceptual and theoretical approach to the Western, binary globalization process of mass communications and the new East Asian mass communications model. This paper will first describe the globalization era with the rising Dragon and its resultant changes. Secondly, the paper will elucidate Western globalization processes in modernity and postmodernity regarding to mass communications. Finally, it will attempt at constructing a new Asian model of mass communications, pursuing structure-action linkage.

II. An Emergent Era of Globalization

Since the late 1980s, unprecedented changes in the world order and technological innovation have harnessed a New Era in which the much-heralded end of the Cold war, the reduction of superpower rivalry, the proclamation of democracy's 'total victory,' the rise of trade rivalries among Europe, North America and East Asia, and the proliferation of global communications media such as satellites and computers have taken place. The emerging New Era or the globalization era can be summarized by three major features of the end of the Cold war, the Rising of East, and the conflict of the universal and the particular.

A. The End of the Cold War and the Decline of American Hegemony

The peaceful conclusion of the Cold war has brought about the triumph of market economics and liberal free democracy across the globe. Representative of this euphoric period was Fukuyama's essay *The End of History?* (1989), which proclaimed the final victory of Western values and systems, and the 'new world order' advocated by President George Bush, who presided over the cold war's end and the ensuing conflict in the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, the post-Cold war world signified the relative decline of American hegemony because it removed key physical and psychological constraints from important American allies in the coordination of policies and interests with Washington. This implied a relativization of American influence in the global economy to the extent that the U.S. found it difficult to curb protectionism among Western Europe, Japan, and newly industrializing countries (NICs) (Mansbach 1993). At home, America has shown an inability to curb crime, violence, income inequality, and unemployment. As Gardels (1996) puts it, "Asian and European elites who once admired American society as the future that worked, now reject its *laissez-faire* formula as a recipe for social and moral chaos" (p. 2). In this vein, Lee Kuan Yew, senior minister of Singapore, sharply states that 'America is no longer a model for Asia' (*NPQ* 1996). The End of the Cold War and the Decline of American Hegemony

B. The Rising Dragon

In the emerging globalization era, 'the Rising East' (Halloran 1996; Naisbitt 1996) encompasses a vast triangle extending from the Russian far east, Korea in the northeast, Australia in the south, and Pakistan in the west. Halloran predicts that the twenty-first century will witness an ascendency of the East with such strength that it will strongly challenge the West for world power. According to Halloran, the driving force of the Rising East rests in seven revolutions:

Industrial, political, demographic, green, nationalistic, internationalist, and military. Naisbitt, in his book *Megatrends Asia* (1996), addresses the eight Asian megatrends that are changing the world: from nation states to networks; from export-led to consumer-driven; from Western influence to the Asian way; from government-driven to market-driven; from villages to supercities; from labor-intensive to high technology; from male dominance to the emergence of women; and from West to East. He concludes that the modernization of Asia will forever reshape the world as we move into the next millennium.

A key variant of the rising east is 'the New Asia'[3] (*Asiaweek* Dec. 15, 1995) as a locus of trade and culture with its own value system. The rapid emergence of the New Asia will be heavily dependent on domestic markets, high technology, sophisticated services, regional business and freer enterprise, instead of the old formula of export-led, state-run, aid-bankrolled development. With the advent of the New Asia, most Asian countries have exhibited the following changes:

- A change in national policies: Asian countries are implementing liberalization, privatization, and deregulation to support global cooperation and competition. These national policies differ from old ones with which Asian countries practiced protectionism and paternalism.

- The appearance of a middle class: Asian countries are experiencing the proliferation of a middle class through rapid economic growth (Holloran 1996; Naisbitt 1996; *Asiaweek* 1996). According to Naisbitt (1996), by the year 2000, Asia will have almost half a billion people who are what we generally understand as middle class. Its characteristics are consumerism, a desire for stability, and the balance of conflicting political affairs (*Asiaweek* 1996). The importance of the Asian middle class to the U.S. is manifest in Halloran's (1996) warning to American foreign policy toward Asia, a warning that the U.S. should intensify public diplomacy in order to sway the influential Asian middle because the vocal middle class exerts pressures that Asian governments do not disregard.

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[3] According to *Asiaweek* (Dec. 15, 1995), the term 'New Asia' is defined as a new Asian trend, which is characterized by economic growth and political democratization. Such a trend of course accompanies several derivatives such as consumerism, women ascendancy, religious resurgence, and China's rise as a superpower.

- The proliferation of democratization: Democratization in Asia is closely associated with the emergence of the middle class (Oh 1994). Democracy spread as economic progress fostered middle-class communities that formed centers of power in political parties, bureaucracies, business, labor, academe, and journalism (*Asiaweek* 1996). In 1986, Filipino People Power ended the Marcos era. In the next year, South Koreans staged their own People Power demonstrations to lead political democratization. Taiwan lifted martial law, allowed opposition parties to form and in 1992 President Lee Teng-hui instituted the island's first full parliamentary popular vote elections.

- The growth of a new nationalism: Before decolonization, nationalism was the prime inspiration behind movements for independence throughout Asia. It has also been an invaluable catalyst for nation-building after independence was achieved. Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia insist on 'soft authoritarianism'[4] under nationalism (Zakaria 1994). Japan's new nationalism, in contrast to the extreme pacifism that Japan imposed upon itself following its enduring trauma of its wartime defeat, means constructing an economy-oriented 'New Asianism' (Iwabuchi 1995) under which Japan's postmodern return to Asia connotes economic and cultural dominance over Asia through a strategy of 'global localization.'[5] China's

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[4] Soft authoritarianism means that human rights, housing, food, public health, education, employment, and public safety needs are met, but political freedoms are restricted.

[5] 'Global localization' or `glocalization' is a coined word made by Japanese business in the 1980s. In order to penetrate different local markets at once, global companies try to transcend vestigial national differences and to create standardized global markets, whilst remaining sensitive

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new nationalism replaced communism as a national ideology and with patriotic sentiments champions the idea of a 'Greater China' in which Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other overseas Chinese are unified. Although *Asiaweek* (Feb. 9, 1996) is optimistic that, properly tempered, Asia's nationalism is a powerful force for good, Mansbach (1993) remarks that Northeast Asia is home to simmering nationalist ambitions and revanchist sentiments that will eventually menace regional and global peace and stability. In reality, China's threatening behavior toward Taiwan, the unstable relationship between North and South Koreas, and the building of military arsenals in many Asian countries appear due to demonstrate clashing interests and rising nationalism.

C. The Issue of the Universal and the Particular in a Global Context

The issue of universalism and particularism rests at the center of the problems of the globalization era. Many countries today are experiencing 'the simultaneity of universalism and particularism' (Wallerstein 1984) with different entities, such as nation-states, multinational corporations and international organizations, which approach the global field with different resources (economic and cultural) and seek to set different agendas. The intensification of trans-societal flows or 'global flows' (Appadurai 1990) - in mediascapes, ethnoscapes, finanscapes and technoscapes - pushes towards a 'borderless global economy' (Ohmae 1987) and undermines the capacity of nation-states. This can be regarded as an outcome of the universal logic of Western modernity. On the other hand, the new nationalism movement of Asia, based on nation-states, represents 'the universalization of particularism' (Robertson 1992) that the local is itself a global product and the particular is an aspect of globalization. In the Japanese case, as

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to the peculiarities of local markets and differentiated consumer segments. This strategy has been named global localization. See Aksoy, Asu and Robins, Kevin (1992). "Hollywood for the 21st Century: Global Competition for Critical Mass in Image Markets," *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, Vol. 16, pp. 1-22.

Featherstone (1995) argues, nation-states possess widely differing national projects, which can themselves have a global impact on the shifting power balances which attempt to define the global field. In this sense, Huntington's (1993) thesis of a Western and non-Western civilizations clash fails to account for 'continuing geopolitical confrontations between nations'[6] because of its neglect of the nation-state as a bond of ethnicity, religion, or shared economic and political interests (Makoto 1994).

The result of the universal-particular issue may bring about a pluralization encompassing Asianization and Balkanization as well as Europeanization and Americanization. The globalization era, however, must not fall into the arbitrary logic of 'either-or.' According to Czeslaw Milosz (1996), a Nobel Prize Literature, "the big question is whether we can survive respecting each other, independent of our nationality, or whether we will all succumb to some version of Bosnia or America" (p. 56).

D. Rethinking Mass Communications Theory and Research in the Globalization Era

Along with the decline of American hegemony at the end of the Cold war, the Rising Dragon, and the issue of the universal and the particular, the emerging New Era identifies itself with the advance and proliferation of the global communications media. Today's global media, such as satellite and computer communications technologies, differ sharply from the old media of one-way transmission, top-down, and a one-to-many structure because they provide a many-to-many model in which interaction and dialogue between the sender and the receiver are possible and converge each into the new media (i.e., print-, broadcast- and telecommunication-based media). Especially, the global media has a greatly increased capacity to transmit sounds and images at low cost across frontiers and around the world, overcoming limits of time and space. Therefore, an effect of the global media is the trend towards internationalization of mass communication. The potential cultural effects flowing from this trend is the rise of a global media culture (McQuail 1994). This tendency of the global media has been, first of all, related to global economic systems whose structural changes have evoked the characteristics of the New Era.

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[6] The geopolitical confrontation among Asian nations has been long lasting even since the end of the Cold war. For example, incessant conflicts of China Vs. Taiwan, Japan Vs. South Korea, and North Vs. South Koreas. These conflicts can not be explained by cultural aspects alone.

There are four implications to be considered with the structural and cultural changes of the global media, the implications of which make the globalization era significantly distinct from the period of the middle of 1980s.

- Change in national cultural policy: Most countries in Europe and the U.S. have implemented policies of privatization, deregulation, and denationalization to encourage efficiency and competition and, in the case of the United Kingdom, to create a popular share-owning democracy as a political purpose (Smith 1991). These processes in turn have fostered those of other countries through various pressures on them. Many Asian countries, which have accomplished political democratization most recently, have to some extent liberalized and privatized their media system and market. This change in an Asian setting signifies a gradual shift from 'development journalism'[7] to freedom and responsibility journalism. Stevenson (1994) agrees with this shift, saying "development journalism has failed" (p. 18).

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[7] See Kunczik, Michael (1988). *Concepts of Journalism North and South*, Bonn: Courier-Druck. He has defined `development journalism' as "a notion of journalism according to which reporting events of national and international significance should be constructive in the sense that it contributes positively to development of the country concerned" (p. 83).

- Global culture and national culture: Even in the New era, global cultures, which have no boundaries and have fostered by transnational media corporations (TNMCs), constantly undermine national cultures which are "particular, timebound and expressive" (Smith 1990, p. 178). In contrast, as Smith (1990) contents, national cultures will continue to exist with their ethnic myths and memories in an increasingly interdependent world. Global cultures can help shape global community as a sense of positive global unity and at the same time challenge to national sovereignty. On the other hand, national cultures can be maintained by state control over the activities of the TNMCs and fostered by development of domestic media industries.

- The introduction of new communications technology into Asia: With the extraordinary economic growth and social change, many Asian countries have experienced a rapid diffusion of television sets, VCRs, and other video hardware, and a rapid growth of television advertising. Expansion of broadcast capacity and the development of cable, satellite, and computer communications technologies are now in progress or being planned in most countries of the Asian region in order to compete against transborder flow from the West and to meet their enlarged middle classes' diverse tastes. This multi-media and multi-channels situation will foster national media industry, culture, and research and at the same time might reinforce their dependence on imported programs which are cheaper than domestic ones.

- Change in mass communications theory and research: In the globalization process, the modernization paradigm of communication or cultural imperialism thesis is in question: that is, a crisis of modernity. This crisis has been accelerated by the rise of postmodernity which rejects the meta-narrative, universalistic, and structural approach to modern media theory and research. In other words, the dominant paradigm and political economy of communication are being challenged by postmodern theory and cultural studies. Current American media, culture, and society spawn uncertainty of the future within a tension between modernity and postmodernity. On the other hand, the two forces of modernity and postmodernity influence Asian mass communications theory and research. The modernist globalization provides structural levels for Asian perspectives of mass communications; the postmodern globalization offers a basis of resistance to the former to East Asian countries as agents. Therefore, a new Asian model of mass communications adopts simultaneously both globalization processes of modernity and postmodernity to link structure and agency. Besides the Asian adaptation of the Western trends, the new Asian model embraces Asian values regarding to philosophical-religious systems as well as the significant role of the nation-state as an agent which controls world order.

III. Globalization of Mass Communications in the West

A. The Modernist Globalization of Mass Communications

The relationship of modernity with globalization can be manifested by tracing its history. Marx noted on the emergence of a capitalistic society with a mode of production from the 1500s as the initiation of modernity. His historical materialism accompanies the global expansion of modern capitalism and in turn ends up with socialism and communism according to his class struggle theory and the contradictions of capitalism. In neo-Marxist line, Wallerstein (1979) sustains the world-systems perspective emerged since the sixteenth century. A difference between his world system theory and Marxism is that while the world system analysis defines capitalism as a system of exchange on a global level, Marxists think of capitalism as a mode of production at a national level (Servaes 1986). The main features of the world system perspective can be summarized by two: The one is that there has been one principal mode of production and that is the capitalist world economy; the other is that the former is a single division of labor within which are multiple cultures. The essential elements of the capitalist world economy are: Production for profit in a world market; capital accumulation for expanded production as the key way of maximizing profit in the long run; the emergence of three zones of economic activity (core, periphery and semi-periphery); the development over time of two principal world class formations (the bourgeoisie and the proletariat) whose concrete manifestations are complemented by a host of ethnonational groups. This historically unique combination of elements first crystallized in Europe in the sixteenth century and the boundaries slowly expanded to cover the entire world (Wallerstein 1979).

Giddens (1990) notes the inception of globalization and modernity from the 1800s, when industrial capitalism perpetuated rapidly in society. Instead of mode of production of Marxist concept, he takes a concept of 'space-time distanciation'[8] in order to differentiate types of societies and provide a road map of the historical trajectory of societal transformations. According to him, industrial capitalism extends the space-time distanciation to historically unprecedented levels: Production is organized globally and allocative time horizons extend over decades in some cases.

Tomlinson (1991) argues that globalization has been developed from the stage of from the stage of cultural imperialism. Unlike Robertson, he does not approve of the postmodern phase of globalization, in which nation-states become loose and ethnic, racial, and gender considerations are articulated. In particular, he insists that the globalization process renders the world as a 'single system' (Moore 1966) via the imperial hegemony of a single nation or a 'grand alliance' between two or more dynasties or nations. This perspective has been undertaken mainly in terms of the idea of the sociology of 'international relations' (i.e., transnational relations, supranational relations, world politics, and so on) and still remains strong. As a result, Pieterse concludes that "the modernity/gloablization view is not only geographically narrow (Westernization) but also historically shallow (1500 plus)" (p. 47). If allowing for Pieterse's timing of globalization, one can confirm the fact that the so-called short-term, historical trajectory of globalization is composed of three phases of modernization-cultural imperialism-globalization. In other words, modernization has begotten cultural imperialism and cultural imperialism has accelerated the modernist globalization. In this respect, it is no doubt that globalization is a 'consequence of modernity' (Giddens 1991) or 'an extension of modernization' (Beyer 1994).

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[8] By the concept of space-time distanciation, the control over any resource can be specified in terms of its extension over time and space. For example, hunting and gathering societies involve rather limited control over allocative resources in both time and space: Food is continually acquired in the present with relatively short time horizons, and trade over long distances is very limited. On the other hand, settled agriculture involves greater space-time distanciation.

There are three major ideologies embedded in the process of modernist globalization: Evolutionism, technological determinism, and Eurocentricism. Evolutionism is deeply rooted in Western philosophy. As a first source of evolutionism, Greek philosophy yielded the 'asymmetry paradigm' (Plato's ideal versus material worlds and Aristotle's real versus potential worlds) which led to the deduction that development was to be pursued by means of mimesis (Morrison 1982). The second source of evolutionism is located in the Judaeo-Christian tradition whose ultimate fulfillment is eschatological in the divine historical design. As Lasch (1991) puts it, "the idea of progress, according to a widely accepted interpretation, represents a secularized version of the Christian belief in providence" (p. 40). The third source of evolutionism stems from the European pansophism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Pansophists such as Francis Bacon and Johann Andreae envisioned an image of a utopian New World civilization called Pansophia, a civilization of universal knowledge, or wisdom (Segal 1985). The last source of evolutionism is found in thinkers of the nineteenth century, such as Charles Darwin, Saint-Simon, Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, and Karl Marx, and in those of the twentieth century, such as Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Toennis, and Talcott Parsons. According to these sources, the characteristics of evolutionism are seen as deterministic, unilinear, cumulative, and directional, moving from primitive to developed forms and from simple to complex states. As a result, evolutionary change is taken to be tantamount with progress, resulting in the constant improvement of society and the betterment of human life, along with a belief in the optimistic future.

Another ideology of the modernist globalization is technological determinism which seeks to explain social and historical phenomena in terms of one principal or determining factor. Technological determinists interpret technology in general and communications technologies in particular as transforming society at every level, including institutions, social interaction and individuals. Technological determinism has its intellectual background in Western religion and philosophy. First of all, it is originated from secularization of religion, by which Nasr (1989) means "the desacralization of the sacred" or "the devouring of the Eternal by the temporal process" (p. 241). The secularization of religion has been facilitated by Descartes's reduction of the divine knowledge to the functioning of the individual reason. The rationalism inherent in Cartesian epistemology has much contributed to scientific explanation, mono-causal explanation, reductionism, and quantitative paradigm of science, bringing about empiricism, positivism, and eventually technological determinism. Most recently, technological determinism has been highly reflected by futuristic commentators such as Toffler (1970; 1995) and Naisbitt (1996).

The last ideological implication of the modernist globalization is Eurocentricism. Eurocentricism is a set of empirical beliefs that postulate past or present superiority of Europeans over non-Europeans and closely associated with 'diffusionism' which is a theory about the way cultural processes tend to move over the surface of the world as whole. According to diffusionism, Europe, eternally, is 'Inside' as the source of most diffusions; non-Europe is 'Outside' as the recipient. Eurocentricism therefore is "the colonizer's model of the world in a very literal sense" (Blaut 1993, p. 10). A new and modern form of diffusionism is 'modernization theory' aroused in the late 1940s and the 1950s, the theory that the diffusion of European ideas, things, and influence would bring about the economic development of the non-Western world. The most influential of this theory was Rostow's work *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (1960). The book was a plain assertion that Europe's past formula for development, up to and including capitalism, was the only workable formula for non-Europe's future development. Rostow married world history to world development in a single diffusionist argument.

With these ideologies, the modernist globalization has had much to do with structural changes in religion, state, and corporation:

> the rise of capitalism as the dominant mode of economic organization, the development of the nation-state as the modal unit of political administration and action, the ending of religious monopolies over thought and knowledge and the emergence of a more fragmented and contested cultural field, in which contending discourses struggle for public visibility and authority (Murdock 1993, p. 523).

However, the modernist globalization process can not be do without taking the role of communications systems centrally into account. Certainly, the constitution of the modernist globalization is inexplicably bound up with the development of modern communication systems.

For example, Giddens (1991) states that the origins of 'high modernity'[9] are intertwined development of mass printed media and electronic communication. Especially, Innis (1950; 1951) contributed in a large extent to elucidate the impact of communications technology on the modernist globalization.

Harold Innis (1894-1952), Canadian economic and communication historian, was much influenced by Veblin regarding technological determinism (Rogers 1994). Innis's examination of the global history of communication revealed that the important media create a monopoly of knowledge, and that institutions which have control over the workings of a particular medium accumulate power. However, an institution which owns a new technology can break the traditional institutions' hold on the monopoly of knowledge. Communications technologies are under hegemonic struggles in terms of their own time and space biases, but the struggle process tends to lie in a continuum moving from time bias to space bias. According to Innis's communication bias theory, there are two kinds of media: Time biased-media and space biased-media. Time-biased media easily pass through time in the transmission of messages. Time-biased messages fade over space. Spoken language, clay, parchment, and stone are time-biased media. They are said to foster hierarchy, decentralization, and religious tradition (Innis 1951). Space-biased media easily extend in space in the transmission of messages. Space-biased media are ephemeral, and the messages they carry fade over time. Paper, celluloid, and electronic signals are space-biased media. They are said to give rise to centralization, bureaucracy, secularism, and imperialism. The two media exist in a continuum with the shift from time to space. For Innis, therefore, modern Western history began with temporal institution and media and ended with spatial institution and media.

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[9] Giddens rejects to enter a period of postmodernity and instead asserts a period of high modernity, when the consequences of modernity are becoming more radicalized and universalized than before.

Ultimately, Innis's historical analysis can illustrate the coevolution process of communications technologies and institutions. That is, it points to the historical outcomes of institutional changes with communications technologies: secularization of religion, nationalization, privatization of nation-states, emergence of networks of nation-states and multinational corporations, and privatization of other countries. According to Innis's viewpoint, the evolution of communications technologies becomes a cause of the evolution of institutions: The rise of the printing press as one of the space biased-media contributed to secularization of religion and nationalization of the state (Eisenstein 1991); the introduction of more space biased-media such as telegraph, radio, and television fostered denationalization (privatization) of the state (Murdock 1990); and the most space biased-media such as satellites and computers have brought with them about the proliferation of multinational corporations. The expansionist characteristic of multinational corporations, with the most space biased-media, has spurred other countries to privatization, through networking beyond nation-states.

Innisian interpretation of the communications technologies-institutions coevolution appears as valid in the Western theories of modernization and cultural imperialism. According to Innis, the modernization theory emphasizes the transition from traditional civilizations to modern ones through communications technology, with time and space biases. Innisian interpretation also contributes to a theoretical framework for imperialistic phenomena through 'spatialization of the media,' which refers to the replacement of temporally biased media with specially biased media. The 'spatialization of media' has played an important role in expansionism and imperialism, in particular cultural imperialism. According to Innisian analysis, therefore, the coevolution of communications technologies-institutions brings forth the modernist globalization of mass communications. Consequently, as mentioned early, the modernist globalization of mass communications has evolved from modernization through cultural imperialism. The globalization process directs toward 'global village' as one world. As a result, the modernist globalization process always puts pressure on non-Western countries to diminish their sovereignty and identity.

B. The Postmodernist Globalization of Mass Communications

The postmodern globalization appears as a counterpart of the modernist globalization process, celebrating cultural heterogenization. While the modernist globalization stresses economic and political structures and institutions, the postmodernist globalization concentrates on cultural autonomy and human agency. Postmodernism is a legitimate reaction to the positivistic, technocentric, and rationalistic, universal modernism, privileging heterogeneity, difference, fragmentation, indeterminacy, and intense distrust of all universal or 'totalizing' discourses (Harvey 1989). The relationship of postmodernism with globalization, as Robertson (1992) argues, is concerned with 'particularization of universalism' to extent which the global becomes the local. In other words, a matter of 'localization.' This relationship was derived from the emergence of 'post-industrial society' (Portoghesi 1992), of 'disorganized capitalism' (Lash and Urry 1987), and 'post-Fordism' (Harvey 1991). Lash and Urry see postmodernism as the culture of disorganized capitalism and the new post-industrial middle classes. Portoghesi notes that before a postmodern culture, there existed a 'postmodern condition', the product of post-industrial society. This postmodern condition is illustrated by Jameson (1984) and Harvey (1989), neo-Marxist theorists. They interpret the postmodern in terms of development of a higher stage of capitalism marked by a greater degree of capital penetration and homogenization across the globe. These processes are also producing increased cultural fragmentation, changes in the experience of space and time, and new modes of experience, subjectivity, and culture. These conditions provide the socioeconomic and cultural basis for postmodernist globalization theory. Under this postmodern condition of globalization, the typical institutions and practices of the nation state are correspondingly weakened (Bauman 1989) and the 'politics of difference' is promoted. Furthermore, the postmodernist globalization reverses some of the typical spatial movements and arrangements of modernity through movements of 'de-centralization' and 'temporalization of space' as a counterpart of globalization.

The postmodernist globalization is closely linked to the global networks of communication and information. This linkage with the mass media has a number of implications since they are building a new environment for us, one which demands a new social epistemology and a new form of response. Such implications are as follows:

> the symbolic forms transmitted by the technical media of mass communication are central to contemporary cultural forms; these developments greatly expand ideological scope since they enable symbolic forms to be transmitted to extended audiences dispersed in time and space; they permit new kinds of social interaction, what Thompson terms 'technically mediated quasi-interaction' (1990, p. 268); and most important of all they produce images and less in the way of ideas, images that are diverse, pluralistic and which overload the viewer (Lash and Urry 1994, p. 306-7).

It is obvious that networks of communication and information have created a new 'electronic reality', suffused with images and symbols, which has obliterated any sense of an objective reality behind the symbols. Baudrillard (1988) regards this reality as 'hyperreality' in which it is no longer possible to distinguish the imaginary from the real, the sign from its referent, the true from the false. The world of simulation is a world of simulacra, of images. In this world, the oppositions subject/object, public/private lose all meaning. That is the 'ecstasy of communication' (Baudrillard 1983). Another version of the electronic reality is Jameson's 'hyperspace,' 'no sense of place,' generated by practices of the late capitalism. The hyperspace transcends "the capacities of the individual human body to locate itself, to organize its immediate surroundings perceptually, and cognitively to map its position in a mappable external world" (Jameson 1984, p. 83). The postmodern hyper-space thus needs new 'cognitive maps' to negotiate, which causes in uncertainty. Although Harvey views the time-space compression as one of the postmodern condition of globalization, such a compression fosters not the disappear of time and space but new time-space 'zones,' a world of 'time-without-time' and 'space-without-space' (Ferguson 1990). As a result, temporal recalculation and spatial indeterminacy, hyperreality, and time-space compression bring about crises of identity and further a need for reformulating identity. This process appears to be a recovery of history and tradition, that is, 'temporalization of space' and a localization as a counterpart of globalization. Therefore, postmodernists of globalization focus local space for community, the place for regional resistance or the 'plane of contest' (Ashley 1987). In addition, they emphasize the respect of others' 'space' and insist on the preservation of their own 'place' (Rosenau 1992).

IV. An New East Asian Model of Mass Communications

Most East Asian countries have been much influenced by both modernist and postmodernist globalizations of mass communications in the West. On the one hand, they have traced the way in which the communications technologies-institutions coevolution process in the modernist globalization presents, and in turn are in the course of the privatization, liberalization, and denationalization process. For example, South Korea privatized the state-run television broadcasting media system and awarded a license to the Seoul Broadcasting System as a commercial television network in late 1989, due to spillover of DBS from Japan and Hong Kong and outside pressures from TNCs to open the domestic broadcasting market (Yoon 1994). On the other hand, most East Asian countries have given attention to the need for measures to resist and compete against the modernist globalization power. They have sought to keep their autonomy instead of being wholly absorbed into the global village. Such an effort has owed much to the postmodern globalization process, implementing national communication policy toward regulations of ownership and programming, promotion of the domestic media industry, and censorship. The result of the postmodernist globalization impact on East Asian countries is 'localization' or 'Asianization,' of Asia as a kind of 'upward globalization' or 'particularization of universalism' (Robertson 1992). It must be considered that East Asia consists of a considerable diversity of cultures, ethnicities and languages. In East Asian countries, there exist the irreducible cultural difference and people's preference for 'local' programs as well as each government's control, for example over STAR TV (Iwabuchi 1995). That is why the current strategy of STAR TV is changing localizing programs by finding local partners which assure them of local programs (Karp 1994). The localization of Asia therefore emphasizes the significant role of nation-states as well as the local.

Both modernist and postmodernist globalization processes of mass communications can be an appropriate reference framework for understanding the current East Asian mass communications process. Furthermore, the Asian adaptation of such a Western reference framework for constituting a new East Asian model of mass communications is inevitable for global competition and cooperation and in that it can overcome the Western polarization of modernity and postmodernity. Yet this Asian adaptation can not meet necessary, sufficient conditions of the new Asian model without considering a difference between the West and East Asia. A close look at such a difference will lead to an awareness of Asian importance of the nation-state concept in relation to culture. Therefore, the new East Asian model of mass communications will be built up with the adaptation of the globalization processes in the West and Asian uniqueness, pursuing a linkage of structure and agency.

A. Structure-Agency Integration for A New East Asian Model

Contemporary global system theories attempt to solve the problematics of the binary logic of homogeneity/heterogeneity, integration/disintegration, modernity/postmodernity, unity/diversity, and structure/agency, with a multi-dimensional approach to globalization. This attempt differs from Wallerstein's (1974) systems-theoretic approach to the constitution of the world-system, which explains the phenomena of socialization and culture in terms of their contribution to systems maintenance. While Wallerstein employs a view of culture as merely derivative and reactive to the 'brute and disinterested objectivism of world-systems theory' (Boyne 1990), global system theorists emphasize connections between institutional and cultural processes of globalization through a reconciliation of structure and agency. The potential of global system theories lies in the concept of global 'systemness,' which refers to the reproduction and transformation of a system through the conscious and routine practices of agents, to understand the contingent and dynamic relationships between global systems (Axford 1995). Although contributors of global systemness theory are some such as Giddens, Bourdieur, and Habermas, this paper will deal with only Giddens's stucturation theory.

Giddens distances himself from all theories typical of the 'orthodox consensus' which assume reification of social wholes and social determination of actors (Sztompka 1993). Giddens (1986) views structure not only as "both constraining and enabling" (p. 25) but also as reproduced through the concrete activities of daily life. In this respect, structures must be analyzed as historical formations that are subject to modification (Murdock 1989). This viewpoint objects to all forms of structuralism where agents appear as the bearers or performers of structures over which they have little or no control. Furthermore, it provides a possibility for a theory of structuration developed by Giddens. For him, the structuration theory aims "to explain how it comes about that structure are constituted through action, and reciprocally how action is constituted structurally" (1976, p. 161). In terms of the structuration of a social system, system is produced and reproduced in interaction via the application of generative rules and resources and in the context of unintended outcomes. On the other hand, the rules and resources that actors use are reshaped by the process of using them. Therefore, "the structural properties of social systems are both the medium and the outcome of the practices that constitute those systems" (ibid., p. 69). Eventually, the structuration theory is characterized as an emphasis of the dialectical and dynamic relations between agency and structure.

According to the structuration theory, the modernist globalization process structures institutions, such as religion, state, and corporation, through its differentiation and privatization processes; the postmodern globalization process reshapes the institutions by emphasizing several different experiences of human agents in time and space. In this sense, Harvey (1989) argues that postmodernist globalization generates localization. "The less salient the temporal and spatial barriers the greater the sensitivity of firms, of governments and of the general public to variations of place across time and space" (Lash and Urry 1994, p. 303).

In the case of the East Asian mass communications process, structures such as transnational media corporations (TNMCs) define both the rules guiding action, for example through World Trade Organization, and the resources such as hardwares and softwares empowering action. For example, with expanding TNMCs, the television industry in East Asia has undergone significant structural change. It is especially interesting to note that Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir, the anti-western nationalist, announced that Murdoch's global television networks STAR TV would be allowed to be officially broadcast in Malaysia, because he had openly expressed in 1993 that Murdoch's takeover of STAR TV represented the satellite-age chapter of media imperialism (Atkins 1995). On the other hand, Asian agents such as states also have the potential to reshape and control structures by engaging in reflexive action over time. The power of individual actors to change rules, however, may be limited because social relations are increasingly ordered without the benefit of intimate, face-to-face contacts. For example, Singapore and China governments' effort to legally ban DBS reception in home is gradually difficult for effective control. Yet Asian audience consumption pattern is changing from a 'cultural dupe' to a 'cultural subject' in terms of recognizing its identity. Thus, many Western companies customize shows and work to build footholds in the local markets. For example, NBC's Asian news channel will get input from six Asian cities, much of it supplied by local partners, and will carry soundtracks in Hindi, Mandarin and Japanese (McGrath 1995). This phenomenon is a sign of abandoning Western companies' pan-Asian broadcasting ideal.

Consequently, the linkage of structure-agency for the new Asian model can be a theoretical basis for accepting both modernist and postmodern globalization processes of mass communications.

B. Differences between the West and East Asia

Differences between the West and East Asia are largely due to their thought and culture. While the mass media of East Asia, like counterparts elsewhere, deliver information, convey opinion, offer entertainment and a marketplace for goods and services, they stand against a very different philosophical backdrop (Heuvel and Dennis 1993). Even though forms of mass communications are same in the West and East Asia, there is a great difference in their function.

Above all, there has to be the distinct differences between Western and East Asian ideals and a national planning for a mass communication policy. The Western thought has long been dominated by the Newtonian-Cartesian paradigm of fragmentation and reductionism and European Enlightenment, which fostered individualistic, democratic, egalitarian, and liberal traditions (Mehra 1989). The tendency to divide, separate, and isolate, however, has caused 'the state of disturbed mind' in light of Buddhist philosophy. On the other hand, the East Asian thought privileges to value its consensual, communal, autocratic, hierarchical, and conservative traditions with its emphasis on duties and obligations to the collective and social harmony (ibid.). All in all, the Western perspective is individual and atomic; the East Asian one is organic and holistic. From these perspectives, while a sensible dictum for Western liberal democracy is that "government is best which governs least," the East Asian perspective rejects the dialectic between the state and the individual and espouses the collective ends which inevitably limit personal freedom.

Secondly, it must be kept in mind that the social and cultural differences between East Asia and the West have given rise to the differences in both communication theory and national policy regarding the mass media. Media systems in the West have generally been formulated in terms of a libertarian philosophy, while those of East Asia in terms of governmental or social authoritarian philosophies (Siebert, Peterson and Schramm 1956). It is no surprise, therefore, to find some Western scholars criticizing Third World models of 'development journalism,' which accords the media a prominent role in national development, as a threat to the existence of a free press, and in East Asia itself as an obstacle to the development of free political and journalistic systems. Therefore, the Western model of free journalism, based on liberalism, feels challenged by East Asian development journalism which is characterized by a media-government partnership. According to development journalism of the past decades, East Asian countries such as South Korea and Taiwan were successful in restricting the inflow of foreign media products through censorship and the imposition of quotas on imported programming and the active fostering of indigenous cultural productions (Chadha 1995). This fact illustrates that state capacity and development strategies are the major governing variables in Korea and Taiwan (Kim 1989). Nonetheless, development journalism is no longer valid for the new model of East Asian mass communications in the globalization era. Unlike development of journalism, the new East Asian model not only advocates the free press principal and the liberal market policy coming up with the modernist globalization; but it also emphasizes social responsibility of the mass media by strengthening regional ties, with strong government for collective good, consensus and discipline.

Lastly, a difference in nationalism between the West and East Asia has to be analyzed. This analysis of nationalism may justify the first and second differences mentioned above.

According to Arnason (1990), Western nationalism is said to be more solidly grounded in social and political realities, whereas Asian nationalism compensates for its weakness in this respect by emphasizing cultural unity and specifity. Especially, East Asian nationalism is more conductive to anti-democratic attitudes than the Western type since it tends to consider the nation-state as the natural expression of a pre-existent unity which can serve to de-legitimize social and political conflicts. In this respect, one can understand why most East Asian countries have taken authoritarian regimes and why they put weight on the relationship between politics and Confucianism. For example, Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister of Singapore, insists that authoritarianism, whether as soft or new, is a condition for achieving economic growth while retaining political stability and control (Zakaria 1994). As another example, the ascendance of a 'new nationalism"[10] by the political leaders of China and the promotion of Asian values by East Asian politicians[11] demonstrates the continued vibrancy of the nation-state idea in Asia. This political conflict occurring in the globalization process is intimately geared to global or cosmopolitan cultures which influence national identity. Consequently, the analysis of differences between the West and East Asia sheds light on why the concept of the nation-state is indispensable for the new East Asian model of mass communications.

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[10] See Chanda, Nayan & Huus, Kari (1995). "The New Nationalism," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Nov. 9, pp. 20-26. China has replaced Marxism with the new nationalism with which in the post-Cold war era, in particular in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protest. China's new nationalism is bullying several Asian countries ranging from Tibet to Taiwan and Hong Kong. A Vietnamese diplomat says, "the fear of China is a new glue in Asia." China's growing economic strength will unavoidably increase its political and military influence in East Asia.

[11] Representatives of East Asian politicians clung to the Asian value are Lee Kuan Yew, senior minister of Singapore, and the Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir. Both of them have a common view on validity of authoritarianism for national development based on Confucianism.

C. A New East Asian Model of Mass Communications

As explained already above, theoretical frameworks for the new East Asian model comprise the adaptation of both modernist and postmodernist globalization processes, and the concept of the nation-state and Asian values. According to these frameworks, the new East Asian model of mass communications can be created as the following Figure shows.

Figure : A New East Asian Mass Communications Model


Space Biased-Media
Nationalization
Localization
Competition with Other Countries
Space Biased-Media
TNCs
Local Corporations
Privatization
Globalization
Regionalization

From the above Figure, the route from nationalization through privatization to globalization follows the modernist globalization of mass communications. In this process, space biased-media such as radio and television allowed the authoritarian governments of most East Asian countries to exercise the nationalization of their political power by the middle of the 1980s, exploited as an ideological instrument for disseminating the interests of the government. The model of mass media at the time was typical of developmental journalism which affords the media a prominent role in national development (Ayish 1992). In response to recent economic and technological developments such countries have revised their communication and information structures. They have come to practice the privatization process through political democratization and pressures from TNCs and local conglomerations to open their media market. This privatization process includes denationalization,[12] liberalization, and deregulation, through more spatially biased media such as cable, satellite, and computer communications technologies. The result of the privatization process has led to the globalization of mass media or networks in most East Asian countries. This globalization process will continue to diminish East Asian governments control over media industry and programming, and the leading stratagem would seem to be 'more market, less state.'

Resisting to the impact of the modernist globalization of mass communications, localization of the new East Asian model emphasizes the role of nation-states and active audience in keeping national sovereignty and cultural autonomy. Most East Asian countries put strict restrictions on foreign media ownership and on anti-national ethical content. Television industry in Taiwan is private but under strong interference from the government. Ownership of television is restricted to the three television companies designated by the government. The amount of imported program is also regulated to facilitate the development of local production. In the case of South Korea, the importation of programs cannot exceed 30% of total programming (Presidential Decree, Article 25) and the regulation of media ownership bans foreign ownership.

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[12] Murdock (1990) sees privatization including denationalization, liberalization, and deregulation. Especially, denationalization means selling shares in public companies to private investors.

The concept of the nation-state as agency to reshape institutional structures is very manifest in China's communication policy. Murduch, STAR TV owner, once announced in 1993 that satellite TV would topple totalitarian rule everywhere, that is, "satellite broadcasting makes it possible for information-hungry residents of many closed societies to bypass state-controlled television channels" (Karp 1993). Now, instead of helping to undermine China's Communist Party-dominated system, it appears that Mr. Murdoch might end up helping Beijing fulfill its dream of controlling foreign satellite broadcasts coming into the country (Brauchli *et al.*, 1996).

In addition to the significance of nation-states, Asian audiences within the postmodern time-space experience actively give priority to national or regional programming over its imported counterpart: that is, they rarely turn to imported programming when local alternatives are available (Straubhaar 1991). Audience preference is crucially determined by discourses rooted in language, class, gender, ethnicity and social experience, within time-space difference. This means that audiences tend to resist content originating outside their own culture and to gravitate toward programming 'relevant' or 'proximate' to their particular cultural context. This process appears to be a recovery of history and tradition, that is, 'temporalization of space' and a localization as a counterpart of the modernist globalization of mass communications. Especially, from a research on TV program flows conducted by Straubhaar *et al.* (1992), they discovered that prime time programming trends in South Korea over three decades was decrease of the proportion of U.S. programming. This means that nowadays not only the total amount of U.S. programming has been decreased, but also those remained U.S. programming are usually broadcast in less popular time.

Another strategy against the modernist globalization of mass communications is 'regionalization' as a national policy toward a regional grouping to escape the bilateral relationship with the First World. Many East Asian countries except for Taiwan joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), established in 1989. APEC pursues a regional trade liberalization agenda that will enhance Asia-Pacific integration (Clark 1993). One major characteristic of APEC is that "all-Asian voices within APEC would help balance the preponderant influence of the U.S." (*Asiaweek* 1994, p. 20).

So far in order to construct the new East Asian model of mass communications, this paper looked at the emergent globalization era, explored the modernist and the postmodernist globalization processes, and brought theoretical frameworks for the new East Asian model from the structure-agency integration theory, the concept of the nation-state, and the Asian value. However, the paper is confined largely to a conceptual and theoretical approach to the Western, binary globalization process of mass communications and the new Asian mass communications model. Future study of the paper, therefore, will have to focus on providing empirical evidence for examining how valid the new Asian model is in East Asian countries. Such a study may be multiple-case study to test the validity of the model.

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Agenda Setting in Japan:
A Framework for Studying the Media and Politics

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Agenda Setting in Japan:
A Framework for Studying the Media and Politics

Abstract: The basic agenda-setting hypothesis -- news coverage influences public perceptions of what are the important issues of the day -- seems more applicable to Japan than to the United States. But despite the dominance of Japan's five national newspapers, Western scholars have not explicitly studied agenda setting in Japan. This paper argues that the concept could serve as a heuristic device for better understanding the relationships among the Japanese media, public and government. In addition, much of the existing research on the Japanese media could be organized using the agenda-setting model. Some questions to consider include who sets the media's agenda and how Japan's policy agenda is set. Government officials, for example, greatly influence the media through the press club system. Other factors that influence the media's agenda include professional values and socialization in Japanese newsrooms. How those factors relate to each other should be studied further.

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Agenda-Setting in Japan: A Framework for Studying the Media and Politics

Much has been written about agenda setting in the West. However, little research is available on agenda setting in Japan. This is surprising, because the basic agenda-setting hypothesis -- that the pattern of news coverage influences public perceptions of what are the important issues of the day[1] -- seems even more applicable to Japan than to the United States. While the debate over the limited vs. powerful effects of the media continues in the United States, it's no surprise that many Japanese scholars have accepted the idea that the mass media have powerful effects, because the media overwhelm Japan's information environment.[2] Compared to the United States, Germany and Hong Kong, for example, the Japanese are more dependent on the mass media and less dependent on interpersonal communication and personal observation for information.[3] The Japanese media, particularly the five national newspapers, would appear to have great potential to influence what the public thinks about -- if not how to think.

Although several Western scholars have written about the Japanese media and political systems, they have not framed their discussions within the model of agenda setting. For example, Roya Akhavan-Majid argues that the media are an elite power group in Japan because of their concentration of ownership, integration with other elite power groups and their ability to exercise direct influence over government policy.[4] "The overwhelming prominence of these media conglomerates on the national scene implies strong potential power in exerting control on the flow of information," she says. "The executives and managing editors of these conglomerates hold the power to cover up or reveal any political scandal or to campaign for or against any interest."[5] In other words, one could argue, these media conglomerates have great potential to shape what is on the public's agenda.

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[1] Maxwell E. McCombs, "Explorers and Surveyors: Expanding Strategies for Agenda-Setting Research," *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol. 69, No. 4, Winter 1992, p. 813.

[2] Youichi Ito, "The Future of Political Communication Research: A Japanese Perspective," *Journal of Communication*, Autumn 1993, p. 69.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Roya Akhavan-Majid, "The Press as an Elite Power Group in Japan," *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol. 67, No. 4, Winter 1990, p. 1014.

Similarly, Ofer Feldman has studied relations between the Japanese Diet and the press, as well as media use as a predictor of political behavior in Japan. In the latter study, he and Kazuhisa Kawakami found that "more than television variables, attention and exposure to print media are the strongest predictors of knowledge, behavior, and interest among Japanese students."[6] Although the case can be made that Feldman's work ties in with the agenda-setting concept, the study was not couched in those terms.

Other scholars and journalists have compared Japanese and American journalism, and there are numerous critiques of the Japanese press club, or *kisha kurabu,* system. There have been a few content analyses comparing American and Japanese newspapers' coverage of trade and other issues, but "empirical studies of the media's coverage of, and impact upon, the U.S.-Japan relationship (are) still notably scarce."[7] And, if one does a computerized search of scholarly journals for agenda setting and the Japanese media, nothing surfaces.

For American scholars and policy-makers interested in Japan, agenda setting seems a natural area to pursue. Japanese scholars may have done work on agenda setting, but that work is not accessible in the West. In the meantime, much of the literature in English that exists on the Japanese media could be organized using the framework of the agenda-setting model. Researchers also could take advantage of the more than 220 studies on agenda setting in the West and apply the fruits of those efforts to Japan.

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[5] *Ibid.,* p. 1008.

[6] Ofer Feldman and Kazuhisa Kawakami, "Media Use as Predictors of Political Behavior: The Case of Japan," *Political Psychology,* Vol. 12, No. 1, 1991, p. 65.

[7] Stanley Budner and Ellis S. Krauss, "Newspaper Coverage of U.S.-Japan Frictions, Balance and Objectivity," *Asian Survey,* Vol. XXXV, No. 4, April 1995, p. 336.

Everett M. Rogers and James W. Dearing have divided the agenda-setting process into three components: public-agenda setting, media-agenda setting and policy-agenda setting.[8] Investigating each aspect of the process demands asking: How do the media set the public agenda? Who sets the media agenda? And, finally, what determines the policy agenda -- the agenda of those holding power in government? If scholars used this framework to study Japan, they would gain invaluable insight into the country's political system, as well as its relations with the United States and other countries.

An overview of the Japanese press

As a starting point, consider the potential for agenda setting in Japan. The Japanese media are dominated by five national newspapers, in order: the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, the *Asahi Shimbun*, the *Mainichi Shimbun*, the *Sankei Shimbun* and the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*.[9] The *Yomiuri* has a daily morning circulation of 9.9 million and an evening circulation of 4.5 million.[10] Among its closest competitors, the *Asahi Shimbun* has a morning circulation of more than 8 million and the *Mainichi* more than 4 million.[11] In addition to having some of the highest per capita circulations in the world, Japan's top five newspapers either own or are affiliated with Tokyo's commercial television networks.

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[8] Everett M. Rogers and James W. Dearing, "Agenda-Setting Research: Where Has it Been, Where is it Going?" *Media Power in Politics*, third edition, edited by Doris A. Graber, Washington: 1994, Congressional Quarterly, pp. 77-95.

[9] Masahiko Ishikawa, "Journalism Education in a Japanese Newspaper: A Case Study of the *Asahi Shimbun*," A Thesis presented to the faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Missouri-Columbia, May 1995, p. 43.

[10] *The International Yearbook 1995*, New York: Editor & Publisher Co., 1995, p. VI-75.

[11] *Ibid.*

Asahi is affiliated with TV Asahi, *Yomiuri* with NTV, *Sankei Shimbun* with Fuji Television, *Mainichi Shimbun* with TBS and *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* with TV Tokyo.[12]

Of perhaps even greater importance is that there is little significant difference in content among the top national papers with the exception of the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, which is a business newspaper.[13] The Japanese press, Dutch journalist Karel van Wolferen argues:

> is monolithic, since the five large daily newspapers speak with one voice -- their commentary on the issues of the day is almost indistinguishable, and their selection of what to report and what to ignore is virtually identical. The systematic and heavy self-censorship the newspapers engage in is without parallel in the industrialized world. Hence the press directly and decisively determines what others conceive of as political reality.[14]

Van Wolferen does not explicitly refer to agenda setting, but the concept is implied. In *The Enigma of Japanese Power*, he asserts that because of the national papers' dominance, "All Japanese read approximately the same things every day and have their opinions formed by what is in effect a single source."[15]

The public agenda

If the vast majority of the Japanese read the national newspapers and the content of those papers is largely the same, it seems implausible that the media would not influence what people think about and believe is important. Although scholars have criticized some of the earlier agenda-setting research in the West as too simplistic, it would still be instructive for American researchers and policy-makers to know what kind of correlation exists between the issues that receive the most coverage in the Japanese media and the issues the public considers most important. For example, how much news coverage is devoted to trade issues or the question of U.S. troops on Japanese soil? How important are those issues to the Japanese people themselves? Of course, correlation does not imply causation. "If the public agenda preceded media content, the latter could hardly cause the former."[16] Researchers need carefully designed studies to determine the time order. They also cannot assume exposure. The Japanese newspapers' tremendous circulations do not guarantee that political stories, for example, are well-read by most of the population. Researchers who wanted to fully interpret correlations would need good information about exposure as well.

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[12] Jon Vanden Heuvel and Everette E. Dennis, *The Unfolding Lotus: East Asia's Changing Media*, New York: Freedom Forum Media Studies Center, 1993, p. 88.
[13] Ishikawa, p. 46.
[14] Karel van Wolferen, "Japan's Non-Revolution," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1993, p. 54.
[15] Van Wolferen, *The Enigma of Japanese Power*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989, p. 96.

But what if the public is paying attention and the newspapers offer unbalanced coverage of an important international issue or never raise some issues? "Agenda setting is about more than issue or object salience," says Maxwell McCombs, a pioneer in the field. "The news not only tells us *what to think about;* it also tells us *how to think about it.* Both the selection of topics for the news agenda and the selection of frames for stories about those topics are powerful agenda setting roles and awesome ethical responsibilities."[17]

The 1990 national election in Germany is a case in point. Researchers concluded that the tone of political coverage, as well as its frequency, is important.[18] They found audience members' interest in the regular news coverage of politics was positively associated with the salience of the environment as a problem facing the country. On the other hand, exposure to campaign coverage in *Bild*, the national tabloid, correlated negatively with the public's concern about problems in the former East Germany at the end of the campaign.[19] In examining *Bild's* stories, the researchers found that most of the articles were "laced with intensely optimistic claims and predictions of a forthcoming economic miracle in the eastern part of the country."[20] The situation in the former East Germany was considered to be less important by *Bild's* readers over time because the tabloid had essentially told readers the problem would take care of itself. It wasn't the frequency of stories about East Germany that influenced readers' agenda as much as it was the content of those stories. "In short, the tone of the coverage seemed to be responsible for diminishing the importance of the situation in the former GDR as a problem in the eyes of *Bild's* readers."[21]

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[16] Rogers and Dearing, p. 87.

[17] McCombs, pp. 820-821.

[18] Klaus Schoenbach and Holli A. Semetko, "Agenda-Setting, Agenda-Reinforcing or Agenda-Deflating? A Study of the 1990 German National Election," *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol. 69, No. 4, Winter 1992, p. 837.

Another study found evidence that the manner in which American television news frames national issues alters individuals' explanations of those issues. In one of Shanto Iyengar's experiments, for example, beliefs about the causes of poverty:

> were significantly molded by the manner in which the news framed poverty. After watching accounts of specific homeless people, participants were especially drawn to poor motivation or inadequate skills as causal factors. After watching the news story that documented trends in the national poverty rate and federal spending on social programs, participants were especially drawn to economic and governmental/societal factors.[22]

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[19] *Ibid.*, p. 843.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 844.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 845.
[22] Shanto Iyengar, "Television News and Citizens' Explanations of National Affairs," *Media Power in Politics*, third edition, edited by Doris A. Graber, Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1994, pp. 139-149.

Bernard Cohen said in 1963 that the media may not be able to tell us what to think but are stunningly successful in telling us what to think about.[23] Many researchers no longer accept that statement.

If the media can influence what we think, then one recent content analysis of Japanese and American coverage of the trade issue raises some disturbing questions. In a collaborative effort with a Japanese research team, scholars examined coverage of three contentious trade issues in the 1980s in such newspapers as the *New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, USA Today, Asahi Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun* and *Nihon Keizai Shimbun.*[24] Among the researchers' findings were that the Japanese newspaper articles averaged significantly fewer words than those in the American press, and "American journalists are far more likely to cite sources in their stories than are their Japanese counterparts."[25] The researchers were encouraged to discover that "one-sided reports that only cite arguments from one side, usually those supporting the writer's own country, are a definite minority in both the American and Japanese samples." However, while American reports tended to achieve balance by citing arguments from both sides, Japanese reports often achieved balance by not mentioning arguments on either side. And, "those Japanese news stories that cited substantive arguments are far more likely to be one-sided than equivalent American reports."[26]

One would like to see the correlation between public attitudes about trade and the news media content. Stanley Budner and Ellis S. Krauss believe the Japanese tendency to report less on the specific arguments involved in trade disputes may help explain "the apparent confusion and difficulty that many Japanese have in understanding what the U.S. wants from Japan ... (N)ot having been exposed to the American perspective, many Japanese may be unable to understand the rationale (right or wrong) behind American demands."[27] The media's potential for influencing how public debates are framed -- and resolved -- is reason enough to justify a serious agenda-setting study in Japan.

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[23] Bernard C. Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 12-13.
[24] Budner and Krauss, pp. 338-339.
[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 340-341.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 342.

Who sets the media's agenda?

Just as the media can influence the public's agenda, the public agenda can influence the media's agenda. Rogers and Dearing explain:

> Media gatekeepers have a general idea of the news interests of their audience, and this perceived priority of news interests is directly reflected in the news values with which media personnel decide the media agenda. ... This influencing of the media agenda by the public agenda is a gradual, long-term process through which generalized news values are created.[28]

If and how this process occurs in Japan is worth exploring. Van Wolferen appears to have his doubts. He argues that there is an absence of public opinion in Japan. The Japanese, he says, "are as capable as people anywhere of discussing a great variety of subjects with indignation and candor, but Japan lacks the institutions to turn these privately expressed opinions into a shared public opinion."[29]

In any case, when considering who sets the media's agenda, the media's agenda has been transformed from the independent variable of agenda-setting research to the dependent variable.[30] McCombs argues that the process is multidimensional. To be understood, it must be peeled like an onion:

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[27] *Ibid.*, p. 355.

[28] Rogers and Dearing, p. 88.

[29] Van Wolferen, "Japan's Non-Revolution," p. 54.

> The outermost layer is the array of sources routinely used by journalists to obtain news. ... Another layer of this metaphorical onion is the diffusion of news stories, including angles as well as topics, among the news media themselves, an area of inquiry now called intermedia agenda setting. ... The innermost layer of this metaphorical onion consists of the professional core of journalism itself, those practices, values and traditions into which every journalist is socialized, beginning with his or her college days and continuing through daily experiences on the job. These attitudes and behaviours are the ultimate filters shaping the nature of the news agenda.[31]

While their work has not been framed in agenda-setting terms, several scholars and journalists have reported on the "array of sources routinely used" by Japanese journalists. These articles tend to focus on the Japanese press club, or *kisha kurabu,* system. Every major government department and agency and all significant business groups have their own press clubs. Since the 1880s, the press clubs have evolved from waiting rooms for reporters[32] to "almost exclusive channels of information regarding the pertinent institutions, and it is within the confines of the club walls that much of the reporter/official interaction takes place."[33] Generally, only journalists affiliated with the major media companies can belong to the press clubs. Magazine writers, free-lance writers and, until 1993, foreign correspondents, were not allowed to join, which meant they could not attend most news conferences, background briefings or receive news releases. The off-the-record news briefings are particularly important to journalists because the briefings are when "politicians and bureaucrats explain the real meaning of their often ambiguous official comments."[34]

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[30] McCombs, p. 817.
[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 816-817.
[32] Ishikawa, p. 94.
[33] Akhavan-Majid, p. 1010.

Scholars and journalists have pointed to several adverse consequences of the press club system. The *kisha kurabu* tend to encourage uniformity in reporting and discourage critical reporting. The news tends to be uniform partly because it originates from the same sources: Everyone attends the same news briefings and receives the same news releases. And, just as American reporters talk about not wanting to burn their sources, Japanese reporters, especially political writers, must cultivate the friendship of their news sources. Complicating the situation, Akhavan-Majid notes that political reporters are often assigned to a politician for the bulk of their careers, "tying the fortunes of the journalist to those of the official assigned to him."[35] The closer the reporter is to his or her source, another scholar observes:

> the greater the constraint he feels in reporting the information disadvantageous to his patron. Under such circumstances, he can either remain reticent or can go on to write only favorable stories promoting the political interest of his patron. Reinforcing a reluctance to write stories detrimental to one's subject politician is a cultural norm of obligation. ... A reporter's expose about his politician would be in violation of the unwritten code of conduct, and might jeopardize his future access to other politicians.[36]

The *kisha kurabu* system ensures that much of the news that is reported is initiated by the government and reported primarily from the government's perspective. As a result, the government has a strong role in influencing the media's agenda. For the most part, government officials, not journalists, decide which issues are salient and worthy of

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[34] Ishikawa, p. 102.

[35] Akhavan-Majid, p. 1011.

[36] Young C. Kim, *Japanese Journalists and Their World*, Virginia: University Press of Virginia, 1981, p. 176.

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discussion. All this said, it would be beneficial to study how and the extent to which government sets the media's agenda in a more quantitative or systematic manner. For example, one could measure the correlation between the amount of official news releases on particular topics and the amount of news stories written about those topics. It would be interesting to determine what percentage of news releases vs. percentage of news stories were about trade or U.S. relations with Japan, for example. The range of views expressed on trade and other international issues also would be worth examining.

Intermedia agenda setting

The government surely is not the only player setting the Japanese media's agenda. Another layer of McCombs' metaphorical onion deals with intermedia agenda setting -- how the media influence each others' decisions on what stories and what kinds of angles on stories to pursue. As mentioned earlier, Japan's national papers have been characterized as essentially uniform. They appear to influence each others' news judgments to the extent that no one wants to risk being different. "By the last morning edition -- read in the large cities -- there is a homogeneous approach to all but certain routine controversies ... Editors furiously read each other's early editions, and keep adjusting their own."[37]

But intermedia agenda setting may help explain another aspect of Japanese politics and media. Despite the significant influence politicians and bureaucrats appear to yield over journalists and despite the Japanese tendency to be nonaggressive and conformist, the country's political system has not lacked for scandal. The country's current prime minister, Ryutaro Hashimoto, is its eighth in nine years. He succeeded Tomiichi

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[37] Van Wolferen, *The Enigma of Japanese Power*, p. 96.

Murayama, who resigned after 18 months. Here's a brief look at the six prime ministers who preceded Murayama:

> (1) Takeshita Noboru, in office for 19 months, resigned in the wake of a scandal; (2) Uno Sosuke, in office for a mere three months, also resigned amidst a scandal; (3) Kaifu Toshiki, in office for 28 months, was ousted by his own LDP; (4) (Kiichi) Miyazawa, in office for 22 months, lost to a Diet no confidence vote; (5) (Morihiro) Hosokawa, in office for eight months, resigned amidst a cloud of scandal; and (6) (Tsutomu) Hata, in office for just two shorts months, was not able to fend off an unholy alliance between the LDP and the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDP).[38]

A natural question is, how did these scandals come to be on the public and media agendas if the press generally declines to report news that reflects negatively on the powers that be?

Of course, in politics when dirt is slung about an officeholder or candidate, someone -- usually someone in a rival political camp -- is doing the slinging. But when does that dirt become news if mainstream Japanese journalists are reluctant to print that which might embarrass or anger their sources? Intermedia agenda setting likely is part of the answer. In several instances, observers say, the mainstream Japanese newspapers picked up a controversial story only after it had first been reported by a foreign news organization or a free-lancer. For example, it was a magazine reporter who disclosed the financial scandal that led to the resignation of Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka in 1974. Press club reporters apparently knew about the scandal but chose not to print anything until after the magazine did.[39] In the 1990s, "the mainstream media recoil from breaking the first news of scandals but will enthusiastically cover them in great detail after the exposure."[40] In some cases, the Japanese media will cite coverage from British or U.S. newspapers instead of doing their own in-depth reporting. "Using the foreign media allows the local media to avoid direct confrontation with the large companies and government organisations with which they have close and important relationships."[41]

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[38] Glen S. Fukushima, Review Section, *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 1, Winter 1995, pp. 145-148.

[39] Ishikawa, p. 102.

Unfortunately, how scandals and other serious issues first surface in the Japanese media is not usually fully developed in the literature. It would advance the study of agenda setting in Japan -- indeed the study of the entire political dynamic -- if researchers were to undertake a case study of the media's involvement in the recent political turnovers, for example. Journalists at the top five national newspapers could be interviewed in-depth about their stories reporting on the scandals. Who broke the news of the scandals? If not the national media, then when did the national papers decide to pick up the story and why? Did mainstream Japanese journalists feel pressure to report certain stories for professional reasons? Do they have much interaction with foreign journalists?

Closely tied to intermedia agenda setting is what McCombs called the innermost layer of his metaphorical onion -- the norms, values and practices of the journalists themselves. Free-lance and Western journalists may influence mainstream Japanese journalists because they remind those journalists of professional norms such as being a watchdog of government and being objective. No matter how deferential a Japanese journalist may appear to someone with a Western perspective, Japanese journalists themselves believe in many of the same journalistic values. Indeed, nearly all the journalists asked in one survey said they should act as watchdogs over government,[42] and thirty-four of thirty-six characterized government-press relations as basically conflicting.[43] According to Young Kim, a Japanese journalist "generally holds an activist orientation, that he should shape public opinion, should attempt to influence government policy, and should act in the role of opponent and watchdog."[44]

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[40] Heuvel and Dennis, p. 76.
[41] *The Financial Times*, "Asia-pacific: Japan's media fight shy of Sumitomo affair," June 24, 1996, p. 3.
[42] Kim, p. 91.

Also shaping the attitudes of Japanese journalists is the socialization process that occurs at every newspaper. To get a job with a Japanese newspaper, applicants must first pass a highly competitive and rigorous exam. Those who succeed usually have similar, elitist educational backgrounds.[45] The new hires then learn how to do their jobs via on-the-job training -- not journalism school (a whole other kind of socialization). The process is virtually the same for all reporters at the major newspapers: They spend a year or two on a particular local beat and move up to a more prestigious beat every few years until they join the ranks of management. Like employees of most Japanese companies, they have lifetime employment -- plenty of time to be fully socialized into the norms of their organization and plenty of motivation to do so because they want smooth relations with their co-workers and superiors over the long term.

In addition to the press clubs and socialization within newsrooms, cultural ideas about what it means to be Japanese -- not necessarily what it means to be a journalist -- must also come into play when the media's agenda is being set. Japanese journalists live in a Confucian culture that places great value on the group over the individual and on harmony over conflict. In that context, it's little wonder that the "Japanese media attempt to preserve harmony in society by refraining from disturbing the status quo"[46] or that "senior Japanese newspaper editors view themselves as public guardians, entrusted to help maintain a disciplined society with a maximum of order and a minimum of conflict."[47]

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[43] *Ibid.*, p. 85.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 210.
[45] Ishikawa, p. 67.

Finally, although McCombs does not specifically mention financial concerns as influencing the media's agenda, J. Herbert Altschull most certainly does. The Japanese media are huge business conglomerates. While Altschull does not single out Japan, he believes, as did Paul Lazarsfeld before him, that "he who pays the piper generally calls the tune." Without getting into a debate about whether the media perpetuate the status quo in a society, it is safe to say financial considerations influence coverage. Compared to American newspapers, the Japanese national papers earn a larger percentage of their income from circulation than from advertising. Some scholars argue that this and other factors contribute to the homogeneity of the Japanese newspapers:

> The fact that Japan's national newspapers are characterized by intramural ownership in which key employees have a financial stake in the company, capitalization by debt, and dependence on sales for income fosters a cutthroat competition to attract and hold the same large pool of readers. Thus the papers must be extremely careful to avoid alienating any segment of their diverse nationwide readership by their content, style, or political slant lest their circulation and hence financial stability suffer.[48]

The policy agenda

Ultimately, what matters most is not the public's agenda or the media's agenda. Rather, it is a nation's policy agenda, which is influenced by the other two. Rogers and Dearing say:

> Agenda-setting researchers who conceptualize policy information as a dependent variable want to know whether the agenda items that are salient to individuals in

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[46] *Ibid.*, p. 101.
[47] Van Wolferen, p. 54.
[48] Budner and Krauss, p. 349.

> the public also become salient to policy-makers. Occasionally, policy agenda-setting researchers investigate the extent to which the media agenda influences the policy agenda.[49]

It is one thing for incessant media coverage to indicate a certain issue is important and should be high on the public's agenda. It is another thing altogether for talk to be translated into action. "The policy agenda, often measured in budgetary terms, is the final outcome of the public agenda-setting process."[50] In the United States, for example, the first two years of President Clinton's administration witnessed much talk about the importance of health-care reforms. The issue was high on the presidential agenda, the media's agenda and, probably as a result, on the public's agenda. And yet little came of the debate; the nation's policies did not measurably change. Understanding the dynamics of how national policies are set is crucial to effective leadership and citizenship.

To a large extent, a nation's policy agenda is influenced by who holds the reins of power, be it elected officials, longtime bureaucrats, behind-the-scenes power brokers or some combination of the three. In a democracy especially, an important question for researchers to consider is how much influence the public and the media have on those in power and, as a result, a nation's policy agenda. While the Japanese tend to defer to their elected officials to make difficult decisions, they:

> do speak out and express themselves in areas where they think they know best and can make up their own minds. Such areas include government corruption and misconduct among government officials. A powerful coalition of the mass media and the masses forced Premier Tanaka to resign in 1974, Premier Uno in 1989, Premier Takeshita in 1989, and Vice-Premier Kanemaru in 1992 -- all in the wake of scandals."[51]

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[49] Rogers and Dearing, p. 81.

[50] Jian-Hua Zhu, "Issue Competition and Attention Distractions: A Zero-Sum Theory of Agenda-Setting," *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol. 69, No. 4, Winter 1992, p. 826.

[51] Ito, p. 73.

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As mentioned earlier, an intermedia agenda setting effect may help explain some of the turmoil in Japanese politics. But there must be other factors at work as well. Some Japanese scholars have said there is a tripolar relationship among the mass media, the government and the public. Youichi Ito suggested that when two of three major components of political consensus formation agree with each other, *kuuki* (a Chinese-Japanese-Korean concept meaning an air, atmosphere, or climate of opinion requiring compliance) is created and functions as a social pressure on the third component.[52] His idea sounds similar to the agenda-setting process as described by Rogers and Dearing, and likely would lend itself to be studied under the agenda-setting framework. An analysis of the agenda-building process for Watergate, for example, found that:

> the mass media were only one element, along with government and the public, involved in a process through which the elements reciprocally influenced each other. Such multiple agenda-setting for an issue, with complex feedback and two-way interaction of the main components in the agenda-setting process, probably occurs in many cases. The media's influence upon policy-makers might be expected to be greater for quick-onset issues when the media have priority access to information; alternatively, when policy elites control the information sources, they might be expected to set the media agenda."[53]

How this applies to Japan where the policy-makers appear to have tighter control over information than in the United States would be a fascinating and useful area to explore.

Methodology

If one agrees that the agenda-setting model is broad enough and powerful enough to frame a meaningful analysis of Japan's political processes, the next question is how one would study agenda setting. No one method -- qualitative or quantitative -- would suffice. The first order of business would be an extensive literature review of the work already done in Japan by Japanese scholars. This would require language proficiency and/or a collaborative effort with Japanese researchers. Western scholars could then build on that research. At the very least, researchers would want to measure what issues are on the Japanese public's and media's agenda. Content analysis, surveys, case studies and in-depth interviews should be used.

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[52] *Ibid.*, p. 74.

[53] Rogers and Dearing, p. 90.

While much has been written from an anecdotal standpoint, more evidence is needed to support the conclusions of earlier research. Exactly how uniform are the five national papers? What do journalists believe are the top issues facing their nation? Are those the issues they report about? How is the media's agenda influenced by other factors, including the public, government officials, other journalists, and professional and personal values? Does the content and tone of the media's agenda appear to influence the public's agenda, and how does the public agenda get voiced?

Conclusions/Suggestions for Further Research

Such a multifaceted undertaking would undoubtedly take immense effort and time. Would it be worth it? Studying agenda setting is important for at least three main reasons: to develop a better understanding of another culture and the different ways a democracy can function; to assist in U.S. policy-making toward Japan; and finally, to help organize the body of research that has developed on the Japanese media and political system. Scholars' desire for greater cultural understanding and comparative analysis stands on its merits. No one society has all the answers and nothing to learn from another. The study of different cultures can provide enlightenment about what it means to be human and under what circumstances humans thrive or wither.

In less idealistic terms, however, understanding a particular culture can be critical to international relations. American policy-makers need a clearer understanding of how Japan's policy agenda comes to be. For example, how do the media agenda and the public agenda affect Japan's policy agenda on trade issues? Are those agendas entirely uniform? If so, why? American policy-makers would want to know if there is any possibility of influencing either the public or media agenda and thereby influence the policy agenda. A sharper understanding of the dynamics involved would help answer these questions.

For starters, is trade even a salient issue for the Japanese public? How about U.S. relations overall? Is that a salient issue on the Japanese media's agenda? How do these international issues rate on the Japanese public's agenda? Jian-Hua Zhu says agenda-setting is a zero-sum process: The addition of any new issue onto the public agenda is at the cost of other issues.[54] The public's attention span is only so wide. "The limits on the audience's resources include time, access and psychological capacity."[55] Unfortunately, Rogers and Dearing say, "agenda-setting researchers have tended to treat each issue on an agenda as if it were not dependent on the other items, which is a serious oversimplification."[56] When one issue jumps to the top of either the public or media agenda, another issue likely loses some salience.

In the last year, for example, trade issues appeared to take a back seat to the debate about U.S. forces in Japan -- an issue highlighted by the rape of a 12-year-old

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[54] Zhu, p. 825.
[55] *Ibid.*, p. 827.
[56] Rogers and Dearing, p. 84.

Okinawan girl by three U.S. servicemen. Is the debate over the American military a short-term or long-term phenomenon? Will it blow over or have long-term ramifications? Just what was the agenda-setting process? For example, did coverage of the rape spark public outrage, which then placed the rape case high on the media's agenda and in turn led to the issue of American troops on Japanese soil being moved up on the Japanese public's agenda? Was the outcry enough to influence the nation's policy agenda? An understanding of these dynamics could be critical to policy-makers trying to make predictions and examine the United States' policy options.

Finally, studying agenda setting in Japan would prove heuristic for media scholars and political scientists. Numerous scholars have studied some aspects of the Japanese media and political systems. Although their work has been worthwhile, it is somewhat scattered. The agenda-setting theory as it has evolved could provide a framework to both tie research together and spark ideas for future research. The basic question is, what is the interplay between the public agenda, the media agenda and the policy agenda. By examining this issue, researchers will find connections to past research and discover new areas to pursue. The result would be a cohesive body of research that advances both cultural understanding and the field of international communication research.

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Markham Competition

Japanese and American Coverage of the 50th Anniversary of World War II: Different Stories for Different Audiences

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Abstract

This paper is a pilot study for a text analysis comparing coverage of the 50th anniversary of World War II in American and Japanese newspapers. The authors focused on coverage of Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima in the *Washington Post* and *Asahi Shimbun*, papers of comparable stature and political ideology in their respective countries. Preliminary results suggest that ill feelings between the countries may be exacerbated by continuing biased coverage of the war.

Markham Competition

> In World War II . . . the United States bombed German cities and killed many civilians but did not use atomic bombs on the Germans. U.S. planes dropped them on us because we are Japanese. Every American I mention this to denies that race was the reason, but the fact remains that nuclear bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We should never forget this. The same virulent racism underlies trade friction with the United States.
>
> Shintaro Ishihara, *The Japan that can say no,* 1989/1991

> Today, 40 years after the end of World War II, the Japanese are on the move again in one of history's most brilliant commercial offensives, as they go about dismantling American industry. Whether they are still only smart, or have finally learned to be wiser than we, will be tested in the next 10 years. Only then will we know who finally won the war 50 years before.
>
> Theodore H. White, *The danger from Japan,* July 28, 1985

Introduction

For Americans the phrase "Remember Pearl Harbor" produces an instant mental picture of Japanese treachery. It tends to justify any action—including dropping atomic bombs—so long as the goal was winning what author Studs Terkel called *The Good War*. The Japanese have a phrase of their own: "No more Hiroshimas." It characterizes the Japanese as victims rather than aggressors, and de-emphasizes their responsibility for attacking Pearl Harbor and committing various war crimes against POWs and conquered populations. The same war obviously has different social and cultural meanings for the two peoples.

It seems the war is not yet over in the minds of both Americans and the Japanese. Some research suggests the media might be to blame for this state. Galtung (1993, p. xi) noted that the media have a "perverse fascination with war" and in their work tend to "amplify the sound of the guns rather than (mute) them." Perhaps the use of stereotypes by both sides could be explained best by Gans' (1980) description of enduring values in the news. One of the values Gans identified was enthnoctrism, and he noted that "the clearest expression of ethnocentrism in all countries appears in war news" (p. 42). According to this idea, journalists are less likely to write about atrocities committed by their own country's troops than those committed by the enemy's troops. Is it possible that the media of the United States and Japan are pandering to their respective audiences with jingoistic coverage?

The 50th anniversary of World War II provides an excellent opportunity to explore this question since the media of both countries produced a tremendous number of stories about the war in connection with anniversary ceremonies. This paper uses textual analysis to compare World War II anniversary coverage in an American and in a Japanese newspaper to investigate the ideological messages they sent to their respective audiences.

Literature Review

An analysis of Japanese and American media coverage of and public views of World War II must be placed in its historical context. The following review, though not comprehensive, traces the development of Japanese and American attitudes toward the war, particularly in reference to media coverage of the war.

Some Japanese media critics argue that immediately after the surrender, the Japanese media began examining its role in cooperating with the government in leading the nation to war. Despite the existence of some sound critique, media responsibility for the war (e.g., agitative glorification of death for the sake of the "Imperial Nation," uncritical transmission of outright propaganda manufactured by the Japanese military) has been infrequent. How did the media deal with their sense of guilt?

The wartime period was virtually a survival game for the media, and only obedient media institutions could exist. All the Japanese media were censored before publication for any expression of anti-war and communist opinion. Takasaki (1987) presents various examples of the era's "madness," in which even women's and adolescents' magazines inculcated intense antagonism against the United States and England and a willingness to die for the Showa Emperor (Hirohito) and the nation.

With the Japanese surrender, most daily newspapers apologized to the public in editorials and dismissed any management judged responsible for plunging the entire nation into war and devastation (Chamoto, 1984, pp. 352-359; Okazaki, 1981, pp. 14-18). The democratization of Japanese journalism, including the sudden emergence of labor movements, characterized the immediate postwar period.

But the GHQ's (Allied Powers General Command Headquarters) occupation policy changed with the start of the Cold War, which practically put an end to this journalistic soul-searching. The GHQ strongly enforced anti-Communist pre-publication censorship and oppression of freedom of expression just like in the wartime Japan (Matsuura, 1984). As a result, most media that supported the war remained unchanged, and thus, what happened to Japanese media after the war is completely different from the elimination in Europe of Nazi-supporting media (Chamoto, 1984, pp. 362-364; Okazaki, 1981, p. 67).

The foremost mistake Japanese media made during the war seems to be their uncritical reporting of the Supreme Headquarters' (the Japanese wartime strategic decision-making organization) propagandistic lies about victories and atrocities as "reality." Their fetishism for "reality" is similar to the postwar ideology of "objective reporting" (Okazaki, 1981, pp. 68-69) or the norms of *fuhen-futou* (nonpartiality-nonpartisanship) (Kim, 1981, pp. 199-204). The corollary is that the media are always deeply involved in the process of the "reality" creation, reproduction and follow-up with the authorities. Whether the authorities are the supreme headquarters, the GHQ, or the postwar Japanese government does not make much difference. In short, power is reality. Asai (1995) points out that the Japanese have a national propensity to be servilely humble to the powerful and arrogant to the powerless, and this tendency can also be seen in their media's reporting attitudes (pp. 44-45). Similarly, Monna (1995) states that both prewar and postwar Japanese journalism lacks the conception of "journalism for the populace," which treats others' pains and sufferings as its own (p. 14).

For instance, Awaya (1991) reports that when Hirohito passed away on January 7, 1989, "the newspapers were filled with feature articles on the emperor, and almost all of them praised Emperor Showa [Hirohito] for having brought peace and prosperity to the country," and "[s]ome individuals and groups voiced opposing views, demanding that the emperor's accountability for the war be questioned, but they were given little attention in the media" (p. 388). As the *New York Times* stated almost half a century ago, the elimination of Hirohito from the prosecution list of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) was simply in the best interests of the Allied Powers ("The Tokyo verdicts," 1948), or more specifically, because of the U.S. desire to smooth military occupation of Japan and to prevent its turning to communism (e.g., Awaya, 1991, p. 390; Awaya, 1994, pp. 88-93; Buruma, 1989, p. 12; Inouwe, 1991, pp. 1-4; Kurita, 1989, p. 190). Based primarily on the diaries and memoirs of certain persons who were close to Hirohito, Inouwe (1991), and Yamada and Kouketsu (1991) delineate Hirohito's active involvement in prewar and wartime Japanese political decision-making processes. These historical contexts illustrate the Japanese media's insufficient recognition of the feelings of Japanese-oppressed Asians, indicating Japanese arrogance toward Asians.

In addition, there seems to be a tendency among the Japanese and their media to overdramatize U.S. nuclear attacks and project the image of victims on themselves by touting the phrase "No More Hiroshimas." Thus, Hiroshima seems to have been fixated as a place of peace. Whose peace? Of course, this is the peace for people who live in Hiroshima (or more broadly Japan) and are Japanese. Miura (1995) presents a Korean's opinion about such Japanese general attitudes toward atomic bombs and world peace:

> The Korean Atomic Bomb Victims' Monument, which was built in 1970 by Koreans living in Hiroshima, stands *outside the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park* [italics added]. [The monument] was not permitted to be built within the park. Koreans in Hiroshima hold a memorial service before that monument every year, but the mayor of Hiroshima has never attended the service despite our annual invitations. The city authorities appeal to the world as if only the Japanese had been atomic bomb victims. To Koreans, it feels fake to tout "No More Hiroshimas" and world peace with such an attitude. This is merely hoping for peace only for the Japanese. Why aren't they willing to pray for world peace with Koreans? (p. 16. [author's translation])

Every year in August, some print and broadcast news stories report the results of public opinion polls framed in terms of apology and forgiveness between the United States and Japan, but not between Asian countries and Japan. The latter framework apparently is not worth considering because most Japanese conservatives, including veterans, lack a deep sense of guilt for wartime aggressions and hold non-Japanese Asians in contempt.

How is it possible to keep such a conservative view alive in the Japanese society? Okazaki (1981) suggests there is a vicious circle in which the recent right-leaning of Japanese politics makes the media more and more conservative, eventually making public opinion at large more conservative, and vice versa (p. 22). In this process, more and more liberal and left intellectuals have lost their critiquing spirits and have been arrayed into a sanction of "realism policy" that the media has frequently employed. In the context of the Japanese responsibility for the war, "realism policy" means the conservative fetishism that the Japanese government shall make no compensations for any foreign war victims at the individual level, because those problems were already settled by the San Francisco Peace Treaty. If Japanese society is in the process of becoming more conservative, it will probably take more time for the Japanese to reach self-critical recognition of themselves as aggressors. It has been often said that compared to Germany, Japan has done nothing to compensate for what it did during the war. Japan's insufficient soul-searching for war responsibility is being questioned all over the world, and so are its media.

On the other hand, American attitude toward Japan has been ambivalent since Commodore Perry first visited Japan in the 1850s. For example, Americans have sometimes admired the politeness of the Japanese while at other times believed this same politeness is a hypocritical cover-up of their true feelings (Johnson, 1988). Since 1945, these already ambiguous attitudes have been filtered through the horrors of World War II.

To understand American attitudes toward Japan today one must consider the ferocity of the way World War II was fought in the Pacific Theater. Racism on both sides, wartime propaganda, and revenge for real and imagined atrocities mixed to create a potion of hatred that made combatants on both sides drunk with rage.

One example of how this hatred was expressed was the American mutilation of Japanese corpses for souvenirs. Considering the Japanese to be subhuman, a number of American servicemen thought nothing of using Japanese skulls as desk ornaments, a practice documented in James J. Weingartner's (1992) "Trophies of War: U.S. Troops and the Mutilation of Japanese War Dead, 1941-1945." No comparable pattern of treatment of German and Italian corpses was reported during the war, which implies the Japanese were demonized in American eyes, and a dehumanized enemy is one whom it is easy to kill (Weingartner, 1992). Dower (1986) reported that American servicemen routinely tortured and killed Japanese prisoners, justifying their actions as revenge for similar Japanese atrocities. The Japanese often did not surrender because of their beliefs, but many also did not surrender because they—with some justification—feared they would be killed anyway (Dower, 1986). "The kill or be killed psychology was of course a vicious circle" that led to ever-more-brutal atrocities as the war dragged on (Dower, 1986, p. 67).

By the end of the war, the killing was completely indiscriminate. Although the Japanese announced they would surrender after the Aug. 10, 1945, atomic bombing of Nagasaki, both sides continued to fight. The cease-fire was finalized only five days later, but in between the Japanese executed 16 American airman (Dower, 1986). And the Americans launched a raid of more than 1,000 planes against Tokyo on Aug. 15. The unconditional surrender was announced by Truman "before all the planes had returned to their bases," (Dower, 1986, p. 301).

Despite the naked brutality, the occupation of Japan was surprisingly peaceful. The ambivalence of attitudes toward Japan was evident in how quickly the former enemies became allies. Dower (1986) attributes this turnaround mainly to the adaptability of racial stereotypes on both sides to peace as well as to war. The American media caricature of Japanese being ape-like was useful as portraying them as monkeymen snipers during the war, but immediately after the surrender the Japanese were pictured as "clever, imitative, domesticated" pets (Dower, 1986, p. 302). In a similar fashion, the demon common to Japanese folk culture has positive as well as negative powers, and the positive image—"large, powerful, human, protective, awkward, vaguely forbidding, generally but not entirely trustworthy"—was the side attributed to the American "demon" after the war (Dower, 1986, p. 305).

Of course these were not the only ways the two peoples saw each other. In her 1988 study, *The Japanese Through American Eyes,* Johnson argues that American attitudes have varied since World War II depending on the current situation. Americans, she writes, have felt rage, fear and shock during the war; pity and compassion during the occupation; admiration and curiosity during the late 1950s and early 1960s; and finally an appreciation of Japanese products from the 1970s throughout the 1980s. "None of these feelings, moreover, entirely superseded the preceding ones; instead they overlie one another in the complex pattern we see today" (Johnson, 1988, p. 3).

That these feelings are a web of emotions rather than a sequential progression from rage to guilt is evident from American coverage of Hiroshima. Johnson (1988, p. 43) notes that American perceptions of the bombing were "radically changed" by the 1946 publication of *Hiroshima*, John Hersey's account of survivors of the attack. She writes that American guilt was kept alive by various peace movements and media coverage of anniversaries of the bombing.

But we must again return to the theme of ambivalence, because Americans still have two contrasting opinions of the nuclear attack. While peace activists and revisionist historians charge that the bombing was unnecessary, repeated opinion polls show that the majority of Americans don't question the decision (Alperovitz, 1995). "Time and again, the question of whether the use of the atomic bomb was militarily required has become entangled with the quite separate issue of our anger at Japan's sneak attack and the brutality of her military" (Alperovitz, 1995, p. 628). In one of the most recent and massive volumes on the subject, *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,* Gar Alperovitz (1995) concludes the American public has been misled in great part because the media repeats without challenge facts that have been shown to be false—such as causality estimates for an American invasion of Japan.

Johnson (1988) wrote that she had thought wartime bitterness would recede as the generation that fought the war passes. Citing White's "The Danger from Japan," Johnson (1988, p. 37) wrote that she was "amazed and disturbed by the renewed virulence of World War II images and stereotypes."

Weingartner (1992, p. 67) concludes in his piece on American mutilations of war dead that "there is a kinship between the charred bones of Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the polished bones of souvenirs collected on Guadalcanal, New Guinea and Iwo Jima."

Weingartner fails to recognize that the charred and polished bones also have a kinship with the bones poking out of the emaciated flesh of American prisoners of war mistreated by the Japanese. But could such bitterness on both sides truly fade now that the war has been over for 50 years? Could the media of the two countries, producing copy aimed at their particular audiences, still be provoking the kind of distrust and demonization that produced wartime atrocities? And finally, are the media of the two main combatants ignoring the suffering of the non-Japanese Asian victims of the war? It is the purpose of this study to shed light on these questions.

Research Questions

There are two focal points in the present analysis to be noted here. First, while we tend to isolate historical facts to make them susceptible to convenient analyses, this often causes a void in historical continuity. As Tuchman (1994) states, "[a]ny social phenomenon must be understood in its historical context" (p. 306). Therefore, the Pacific War, which is usually demarcated by two incidents (i.e., the Japanese Pearl Harbor attack and the U.S. nuclear attacks on Japan), should not be insulated from the broad historical context of Asia. For instance, Awaya (1991) points out that more and more Japanese scholars have started employing the expression "Fifteen-Year War" instead of the Pacific War to emphasize the continuity among three interrelated wars—the Manchurian Incident in 1931, the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, and the Pacific War (p. 386). The point is that the Japanese should proceed to do critical reflection on their war responsibility in the broader historical context. How the media covered this historical continuity is an important question to probe.

Second, it should be remembered that in the search for ideology, there are always a variety of voices presented in the media. In both the United States and Japan, conservatives and liberals exist and form a confrontational structure that produces a multiplicity of opinions. Yet, when transnational debates on the Pacific War take the "apology" frame, a certain assumption always comes up. Yoneyama (1995) points out the semi-conspiratorial nature of the U.S.-Japanese management of the Pacific War (e.g., non-prosecution Hirohito). Therefore, Awaya (1991) rings an alarm bell against packaging the Pacific War as a unit of analysis:

> . . . It is not enough to remember the 50th anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack alone, like a ghost come back to haunt us at a new time of tension in Japan-U.S. relations. We must not forget how the war is recalled in Asia as well. The drawback of the term 'Pacific War' is that it may be interpreted to mean the war mainly between Japan and the United States. (p. 387)

In short, above the conservative-liberal, and U.S.-Japanese transnational presentation of their historical narratives of the Pacific War, there seems to exist the superstructure of American and Japanese "memory loss" of Asians who have been oppressed between two imperialistic countries (later we will explain this structure in more detail). In this respect, how well the media cover the sufferings of non-Japanese Asians constitutes an important element in this research. This research, therefore, addresses the following four research questions:

RQ1: How do American and Japanese media respectively present the history of the war and their peoples' opinions (both conservative and liberal)?

RQ2: What kinds of differences, if any, are there between American and Japanese coverage of the Pacific War?

RQ3: What kinds of tones—accusatory and self-critical—exist in the American and Japanese coverage of the Pacific War?

RQ4: How do American and Japanese media perform to expose actual sufferings of non-Japanese Asians in the long historical continuum?

Examination of media texts or narratives per se may not be a sufficient basis for characterizing their interaction with audiences (Larsen, 1991, p. 129). Some semioticians, such as Barthes and Derrida, focusing on the theoretically constructed unlimited power of connotations, uniformly celebrate "polysemy"—a "'triumphant plural' of signifiers which would 'float' above the signified, refusing to be in any way anchored down or constrained" (Silverman, 1983, p. 32).

Yet, it is also true that the audiences' understanding of media discourse is their sense-making process, thus being normally bounded to their cultural constraints. Otherwise, there would be "no" possibility that a society as a whole shares some agreed-upon cultural understandings; postmodern chaos would be the only attainable outcome. At the point of encoding, there are always dominant or preferred meanings embedded in media texts, narratives and images. Hall (1980) emphasizes the importance of the encoding-decoding relationship of dominant "mappings" in the audience's sense-making process:

> New, problematic or troubling events, which breach our expectancies and run

> counter to our 'common-sense constructs', to our 'taken-for-granted' knowledge of social structures, must be assigned to their discursive domains before they can be said to 'make sense.' The most common way of 'mapping' them is to assign the new to some domain or other of the existing 'maps of problematic social reality'. We say dominant, not 'determined', because it is always possible to order, classify, assign and decode an event within more than one 'mapping'. But we say 'dominant' because there exists a pattern of 'preferred readings'; and these both have the institutional/political/ideological order imprinted in them and have themselves become institutionalized. (p. 134).

The history of the past half a century since the end of the Pacific War seems to have aligned both Americans and the Japanese into several domains reflecting those "mappings." The convergence of our social cognitions within each domain is activated by the same fundamental interpretive framework that is called ideology. "Such an ideology features the basic norms, values, and other principles which are geared towards the realization of the interests and goals of the group, as well as towards the reproduction and legitimation of its power" (Dijk, 1991, p. 118). In the context of mass communication, "symbolic forms intersect with relations of power. . . . Ideological phenomena are meaningful symbolic phenomena in so far as they serve, in particular social-historical circumstances, to establish and sustain relations of domination" (Thompson, 1990, p. 56). In short, news as a symbolic form can be viewed as a site for the struggle for domination in the society.

When considering the media's presentation of the Pacific War, Yoneyama's (1995) analytical framework will help us delineate the ideological alignment structure of both the United States and Japan. She explicates four major points—domestic struggles between two ideological groups (i.e., conservatives vs. liberals/progressives), U.S.-Japanese transnational conservative disputes over authenticity of history, conservative co-optation of the other country's liberals/progressives, and semi-conspiratorial relationships between the two nations as oppressors. The last point especially serves to reinstate the long forgotten history of oppressed Asians in both American and Japanese historical narratives regarding to the Pacific War (e.g., imperialistic nature of the war as a whole, disregard of non-Japanese Asians in the process of the IMTFE).

However, she might have been misled in that she classifies as "reformists," "progressives," and "left" all the Japanese who have addressed reflective self-criticisms on Japanese aggressions, and they have been incorporated by U.S. conservatives. Since some of them, though a minority, are extremely critical of U.S. postwar management and its foreign policy as well as of Japan, they are not a group that can possibly be co-opted by U.S. conservatives. This group should be more appropriately called "radical" (e.g., the Japan Communist Party), and be separated from left-of-center "reformists," "progressives," and "left" (in this paper, they are called "liberals"). By the same token, there should exist American radicals who are critical of both Japan and the United States.

In addition, American "liberals" may not necessarily think that the Pacific War was an imperialistic war; rather, they might be sharing a view of a "sacred war" with conservatives. Thus, several appropriate modifications are in order. Based on Yoneyama's (1995) analysis, Figure 1 presents the schematic diagram of American and Japanese ideological structures and typical views of each ideological domain for the sake of analytical convenience (i.e., variations always exist in any diagram and the ideological range is continual).

In this diagram, conservatives in both countries represent national opinions and actively engage in transnational disputes over the authenticity of Pacific War history. Then the opinions of liberals are co-opted by the other country's conservatives to support their views. Completely discarded in the "memory loss" process of U.S.-Japanese war narratives is the history of the oppressed non-Japanese Asians, who are the focal point of radicals.

One of the most important modifications we have made is the existence of "radicals" as politically deviant in each country and who share the same view—critique of both countries' nationalistic assumptions and focus on oppressed Asians. Using Shoemaker and Reese's (1995) term, their opinions can be classified as "normative deviance—ideas or

FIGURE 1

Schematic Diagram of Ideological Structure of Americans and the Japanese regarding the Pacific War



SUPERSTRUCTURE (Memory Loss)

-Long history of imperialistic oppression of Asians (esp. Chinese)
-History of disregard of sufferings of Asians (e.g., the IMTFE)
-History of postwar anti-communist intervensions in Asia

U.S. Conservatives

-The Pacific War was a sacred war.
-The Japanese were evil aggressors; Americans were victims (assimilation to Asians).
-Innocent Americans were attacked by surprise — "Remember Pearl Harbor."
-A-bombs saved lives, including the Japanese, and prevented Japan from becoming communized.
-U.S. postwar occupation and military protection of Japan contributed to its economic prosperity.

Japanese Conservatives

-The Pacific War was a just war.
-The Westerners were real oppressors; the Japanese had to defend themselves & liberate Asia from white domination (assimilation to Asians).
-Pearl Harbor was basically nothing.
-A-bombs were inhuman ("No More Hiroshimas") -- the Japanese were victims.
-Japanese wartime occupation of Asian countries facilitated their independence and postwar economic prosperity.

U.S. Liberals

-Generally, they hold the similar views of the Pacific War as conservative ones — the distinction between good and evil.
-U.S. nuclear attacks of Japan still make them feel some moral stigma. This causes some to be less critical of Japan and more critical of the U.S.

Japanese Liberals

-Generally, they criticize Japanese wartime aggressions (including Pearl Harbor), and express their remorse toward Asians.
-Recent slanting toward right (e.g., sanction of the Japanese Self-Defence Army) makes them less critical of the U.S. foreign policy.

U.S. Radicals and Japanese Radicals

-They oppose any type of imperialism, colonialism and intervensions.
-They are very critical of both Japan and the United States for their wartime imperialism and semi-conspiratorial postwar management.
-They are politically marginalized; their voices have been subdued.

events that break norms or laws" (p. 48). When seeing historical narratives of oppressed Asians as represented by "radicals," media treatment of their voices will often show some delimiting propensity. White (1992) states as follows:

> The latitude of competing voices and positions constructed within the particular problematic presents itself as a totality precisely because different points of view are incorporated. In other words, the very incorporation of different positions and points of view conveys an impression of completeness, as if anything that might be said on the issue has been covered. But often only a delimited or circumscribed range of choices is in fact presented to begin with. Moreover, the presentation of multiple positions and points of view is often regulated or controlled by an implicit hierarchy that privileges certain positions over others. (p. 184)

Therefore, in addition to examining domestic controversies between conservatives and liberals and U.S.-Japanese transnational disputes over the Pacific War during two historical points of time-the 50th anniversary of the Japanese Pearl Harbor attack (August, 1991) and that of the U.S. nuclear attacks of Japan (December, 1995), it is also intriguing to delve into both peoples' "memory loss" of non-Japanese Asians oppressed by their imperialism in the long historical continuum, which is exactly the radicals' viewpoint.

Methodology

This paper is a pilot study for a larger text analysis comparing anniversary coverage in a total of three American and three Japanese newspapers representing the liberal, conservative and moderate political spectrums in the two countries. The selection of newspapers for the pilot study was dictated in large part by ready availability of Japanese newspapers to the authors. The only Japanese newspaper of national stature available to the researchers was the *Asahi Shimbun*, which has a liberal editorial stance. *The Washington Post* was selected for analysis for the pilot study because the researchers believe it is the American daily closest to the *Asahi Shimbun* in national stature and editorial stance; in other words, *The Post* is a newspaper with national reputation and an editorial page that often takes positions on the liberal or Democratic side of issues.

The period of analysis was Dec. 1-10, 1991, and Aug. 1-10, 1995, for both *The Post* and the *Asahi Shimbun*. The 10-day interval was chosen because it provided a large sample of the newspapers' coverage of the 50th anniversaries of Pearl Harbor and the 50th anniversaries of Hiroshima. A larger sample, such as all of August and all of December, would have been overwhelming for purposes of the pilot study. However, the researchers plan to expand the sample for a full month for the final study.

All stories pertaining to Hiroshima, Pearl Harbor, World War II, non-Japanese Asians oppressed during the war and present U.S.-Japanese relations were read by at least one of the researchers. In addition to examining the manifest content of the stories, the researchers noted the tone of stories, the placement and layout of the stories, and the type of illustrations, if any, that accompanied the stories. The researchers then jointly compared the coverage of the anniversaries in the two newspapers.

Results

(1) Text Analysis of *The Washington Post*

The most obvious characteristic of *The Post* coverage of the two anniversaries is difference in amount of coverage devoted to them. This paper is not a quantitative content analysis so stories were not formally coded and counted. But one cannot ignore that there were about 50 Pearl Harbor stories of five paragraphs or more compared to less than 20 of similar length on Hiroshima. Pearl Harbor stories were often labeled with the standing head "50 Years After Pearl Harbor," showing the reader that the stories were part of an ongoing project. In several instances, stories were grouped together to take up an entire page. Stories about Hiroshima had no standing headline, and in no case were more than two stories united by page layout.

It is obvious from the amount of coverage devoted to the two events that *The Post* considered Pearl Harbor much more significant for its audience than Hiroshima. Stories about the bombing of Hiroshima were scattered among the sample period and gave the impression that they were selected because they were of interest in and of themselves rather than as part of an ongoing event of great concern. The number and variety of stories on Pearl Harbor, on the other hand, was such that it could be compared to coverage of a presidential campaign or a disaster like the Oklahoma terrorist bombing of 1995. In fact, coverage was so intense that it seemed as if it were about a current event rather than the remembrance of a historical event. The coverage even included stories about the coverage. Reid (1991) noted that American readers "might be suffering from acute sensory overload because of the media's current obsession with Pearl Harbor," but that the obsession was even worse in Japan.

The obsession in *The Post* was illustrated by the variety of coverage as well as its amount. Practically every section of the paper at one time had a story related to Pearl Harbor. For example, the financial section included a column cautioning readers not to blame Japan for American's economic problems (Rowen, 1991). The television guide contained articles on several Pearl Harbor specials and appropriate videos to rent. The Parade magazine insert of December 1, 1991, featured a first-person account by author Alex Haley. Even *The Post's* "The Mini Page" insert for kids included a full page on the battle written in simplistic style: "Many children have grandparents or other relatives who remember Dec. 7, 1941" (Debnam, 1991).

The stories that ran on the news and opinion pages were amazing in their diversity of topics. As would be expected there were stories about Pearl Harbor survivors including one about a Japanese pilot. Another staple recounted the stories of people who were not at the battle but remembered clearly where they were when they heard the news and how it subsequently effect them. *The Post* ran a page and a half of such stories about Washington, D.C., residents on Dec. 7 alone ("Lives Changed Overnight," 1991). But *The Post* also sent a writer to Winfield, Kansas, to get first-person stories from middle America (Maraniss, 1991) and also ran a separate story on President Bush's memories (Young, 1991). Two of the more esoteric stories were a first-person account by Winston

Churchill's daughter-in-law about when Churchill heard the news (Harriman, 1991) and a feature about how the crowd at the Redskins-Eagles pro football game was kept uninformed of the news because the Redskins' owner didn't want the fans distracted from the game (Povich, 1991).

In comparison to the encyclopedic coverage of Pearl Harbor, *The Post* coverage of Hiroshima was positively ordinary. Almost all of the stories were exactly what a reader might expect: editorials on the decision to drop the bomb, straight news stories on the various anniversary events, and historical analysis stories. Conspicuously absent were any first-person accounts by survivors or Americans who had something to do with the bombing. As with the comparative amount of stories on the two anniversaries, the breadth of coverage illustrated *The Post* considered Pearl Harbor much more significant for its audience. The Hiroshima anniversary was handled as a straight news event that required only perfunctory coverage that might be devoted to any newsworthy topic. The Pearl Harbor anniversary was covered in almost crisis proportions: It was examined from every angle the editors could consider.

The overwhelming focus of the Pearl Harbor coverage was on the heroism and sacrifice of American servicemen. Many of the stories were quite moving, as when a nurse described caring for the wounded:

> 'One boy asked me to straighten his legs,' she recalled. So I raised his blanket. There weren't any legs there. He was gone. Another boy, hit in the stomach, asked me for a drink of water. he raised his head and said, 'Gee, nurse, I sure didn't do much for my country in this war.' And then he turned and died in my arms (Maraniss, 1991).

Even stories that would seem to be negative toward the U.S. focused on the heroism of Americans. For example, a story about a Japanese-American family interned in a relocation camp described how they did not want reparations from the American government and how two of their sons died fighting the Germans (Mathews, 1991).

But the Japanese were also humanized. A story on a Japanese pilot described him cutting a lock of his hair for his wife before attacking Pearl Harbor. He praised Americans for putting a marker on Hawaii for a Japanese pilot who was shot down, and he called America "a marvelous country" (Reid, 1991). Japan-bashing was rare as most stories included quotes from veterans calling for the two countries to forget their war-time animosities. Even a story about Bush angrily refusing to apologize for the atomic bomb attacks included a statement from him criticizing Japan-bashing in the United States ("Bush: No Apology to Japan for A-Bombs," 1991).

The four or five stories that were blatantly critical of Japan chided the Japanese for refusing to acknowledge their war crimes. One story included lengthy translation of a Japanese high school textbook that blamed the U.S. for starting the war ("Textbook's version: 'Japan had no choice,'" 1991). Still, such criticism was rare considering the volume of the overall coverage.

The Post coverage of Hiroshima included the same type of criticism, which had a much more accusatory tone. It did not focus on the debate about the necessity of the nuclear attack but rather focused on the culpability of the Japanese for starting the war and committing various war crimes.

The Hiroshima coverage was generally not sympathetic toward the Japanese, at least in comparison to the Pearl Harbor stories' treatment of Americans. There were very few detailed references to the sufferings of bomb victims, as opposed to several gory first-person American narratives about Pearl Harbor carnage. The only story that was a memoir was written by an American Army intelligence officer who concluded the bombing saved lives (Roberts, 1995). Even a half-page story about the controversy over the death toll at Hiroshima did not mention gruesome details or first-person narrative. In fact, the story charged that peace groups and Japanese officials have inflated the death counts for political reasons (Ringle, 1995a). The Hiroshima coverage in essence was more clinical than personal. The coverage suggested that *Post* editors believed their readers did not want to dwell on the carnage or guilt. For example, a review of a television movie about the bombing assured viewers that "Those wary of a grisly guilt trip can rest easy. The program . . . goes light on charred corpses and moralistic hindsight, without letting us for a moment forget the full consequences of what's taking place" (Ringle, 1995b).

All analysis and opinion pieces justified the bomb; one was illustrated with a particularly jingoistic drawing of a mushroom cloud in the shape of a fist. The drawing illustrated an article that argued that demonstrating the bomb in a test for the Japanese rather than using it on a city would not have convinced the Japanese to surrender. The article concluded sarcastically that "dropping the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were successful demonstrations" (Allen & Polmar, 1995).

Some stories were sympathetic toward Japan and focused on protest against the bombing. Stories on the ceremonies in Japan and protests in the United States focused on the death toll from the bombing with little if any mention of the reasons for it. Most of these stories—including a page of reviews of books criticizing the bombing—were written by T.R. Reid, a *Post* foreign correspondent writing from Japan. Reid's more sympathetic coverage confirms what Budner and Krauss (1995, p. 346) found in their comparative study of Japanese and American newspapers: "Articles with host-country datelines tend to ascribe less blame to the host nation than do other articles." Perhaps because of the familiarity that comes with living and working among a group of people, foreign correspondents seem to be more understanding of their host country's viewpoint.

Missing from both Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor coverage was any significant mention of oppressed non-Japanese Asians. Only one story out of about 75 examined for this paper focused on a non-Japanese Asian. It was the story of a Philippine woman who fought in the underground resistance against the Japanese (Meyer, 1991).

(2) Text Analysis of the *Asahi Shimbun*

Both the 1991 and 1995 coverage expanded the traditional myopic view of the Pacific War to cover the entire historical scope of a series of imperialistic invasions and wars waged by the Japanese dating from 1910 to 1945. (In reality, however, Japanese imperialism practically surfaced in Asia more than one century ago when the first Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1894, and Japan successively started occupation and rule of Taiwan in 1895.) These wars engulfed most Asian countries and caused unbearable sufferings to non-Japanese Asians. In other words, the *Asahi Shimbun* did not confine the Pacific War to the war that was fought between the United States and Japan. Nor did it restrict the coverage of this war to the period between 1941 and 1945.

Underlying this editorial policy seemed to be the newspaper's decided mission to make the Japanese recognize the fact that they were "aggressors in Asia" ("Chikakute toi," 1991). One editorial stated:

> National all-out wars and massive destructive weapons took lives of not only combatants but also civilians. This is not limited to only Japanese and Americans. The tragedies of [non-Japanese] Asians in the battlefields are too deep to be fathomed, and is heartrending. ("Nijusseiki no," 1991, p. 2 [translation])

This spirit continued in 1995 coverage. For instance, current Hiroshima Mayor Takashi Hiraoka (1995), who used to be a journalist at Hiroshima's regional newspaper, focused on Koreans who were killed by the atomic bomb but have been totally forgotten in the discussion of Hiroshima, and emphasized the history—Japanese colonization and invasions of Asian countries and conscription of non-Japanese Asians, especially Koreans, into forced labor—before the atomic-bomb devastated Hiroshima (p. 25). Different from former Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama who avoided this core issue, Hiraoka made one of the most candid apologies for Japanese-oppressed Asians at the 1995 Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony. "(With) the suffering of all the war's victims indelibly etched in our hearts, we want to apologize for all the unbearable suffering that Japanese colonial domination and war inflicted on so many people," Hiraoka said ("Genbaku no hi," 1995, p. 2 [translation]). The *Asahi Shimbun* ran the whole text of Hiraoka's "Peace Declaration" while presenting the summary of Murayama's address.

This editorial policy—focus on oppressed non-Japanese Asians—seemed to have affected the coverage of Pearl Harbor in a conspicuous manner. For instance, there were few detailed descriptions of American soldiers' experiences. Their opinions were presented only through interview segments within stories that were mainly about the framework of forgiveness and apology. In that context, former President Bush's functionalistic view of atomic bomb droppings as saving many lives (Muramatsu, 1991) and Pearl Harbor survivors' anger, such as "It's 50 years late that Japan apologize [to the United States]" (Mitsumatsu, 1991, p. 22 [author's translation]), were recurring themes.

Moreover, two of three panel discussions sponsored by the *Asahi Shimbun* were about the future relationship between the United States and Japan. Together with former President Bush's comment that he no longer had hard feelings about Pearl Harbor, the frame of these panel discussions seemed to make a closure on the war between the United States and Japan. In this sense, readers might get the impression that the American experience during the war was not very important. The Pearl Harbor coverage instead focused on soul-searching of Japanese oppression of non-Japanese Asians.

The December 1, 1991, issue introduced the fact that the Japanese had invaded Kota Bharu, Malaysia, more than one hour before they had attacked Pearl Harbor and pointed out that the phrase the "Asian-Pacific War" as describing the Japanese war in general was gradually gaining recognition (Kurosawa, 1991, p. 31). Especially what happened in Kota Bharu in 1941 and how its residents are now making an effort to promote world peace were repeatedly covered in the sample period.

The predicaments of Japanese-Americans also constituted another theme of the oppression of minorities by the Japanese. One article covered two Japanese-Americans who visited Japan to talk about their experiences during the war in internment camps in the United States. They wanted minorities living in Japan—non-Japanese Asians—to know how post-war compensations were realized ("Senso," 1991).

Koreans make up the largest number of war-related minorities in Japan. The 1991 coverage included stories about a group of Koreans who sued the Japanese government for their wartime suffering at the hands of Japanese soldiers. One of the biggest topics in the 1991 coverage concerned Korean women generally called "battlefield comfort girls," who were forced to serve the Japanese Army as prostitutes. The Japanese government usually takes a position that all post-war compensations have been settled, yet several guest editorials and staff-written newspaper editorials questioned the morality of the Japanese government's position.

For example, Shiba (1991) strongly contends that Japan should make compensation for the Koreans beyond the confinements of its political system (p. 22). One of the Korean victims made a speech about her experiences of forced prostitution during the war. This speech was covered extensively, and coverage included photographs of the weeping woman. One of her statements was quite moving: "When my children died, I also thought of death, but I couldn't. I had suffered by myself, being unable to talk to anybody about my past. My misfortune started with the Army prostitution house" ("'Han' no hanseiki," 1991, p. 23 [author's translation]).

Four years later, lawsuits about "battlefield comfort girls" were brought from Filipino and Chinese women. An article reported on a Japanese civic group that is helping impoverished Filipino women, who were forced to serve Japanese soldiers, because of the Japanese government's stubborn refusal to compensate them ("Firipin no moto," 1995, p. 10).

An imbalance of the number of news stories between the two research periods was found—more than 80 war-related stories in the 1991 coverage, and more than 50 in the 1995 period. Yet the latter devoted approximately 60 stories to nuclear arsenals—French and Chinese nuclear tests, protests against them all over the world, and activities and protests of Japanese anti-nuclear organizations. Although, the series titled "Postwar 50

Years" dealt with human sufferings from wars and famines from all over the world after World War II, one can still see the intense Japanese concern about nuclear arsenals.

In general, the 1995 coverage focused on the struggle of the Japanese, especially the problems of atomic bomb survivors. First-person accounts from ten people presented in "Hibakusha hanseiki" (1995) relate how terrifyingly destructive the atomic bombs were and how those survivors held intense grudges about the use of the weapons. (pp. 26-27). One old lady lived with a doll she has treated as her little sister who died because of the Hiroshima attack. She said, "Wars are bad. If only there hadn't been that atomic bomb. . . ." ("Hibakusha hanseiki," 1995, p. 27, [author's translation]). All but one of the first-person stories were about Japanese victims. The sole exception was a story about a Korean Nagasaki atomic attack survivor who was conscripted into forced labor and went through poverty after the war because of the Japanese government's discriminatory attitude toward foreigners.

As stated before, the *Asahi Shimbun* did not ignore the sufferings of oppressed non-Japanese Asians. Some of them, who attended the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony since they received invitations from the mayor of Hiroshima, were interviewed and expressed their indignation against the Japanese government's unwillingness to compensate them ("'Sengo' owaranu," 1995, p. 27). Further, in two guest columns, Ishida (1995a, p. 3; 1995b, p. 3) criticized the Japanese tendency to avoid confronting with their past, and strongly advocated the Japanese reflect on their history.

Yet, the *Asahi Shimbun* may have contributed to the creation of the myth that all Japanese feel the same way about the nuclear attacks. Although the apology-forgiveness frame was not found in the 1995 coverage, one of the editorials attempted to pit an unwarranted assumption of this Japanese communality against that of Americans ("Rakusa," 1995, p. 5). Together with the typical media expression "yuiitsu no hibakukoku Nihon" (the only country that experienced atomic bombs—Japan), this editorial, which also referred to the Smithsonian atomic bomb controversy, might impress

Japanese readers with the strong American conservative view of the use of atomic bombs. The majority of stories which referred to Americans in 1995 almost always presented the frequently used functionalistic view of the atomic bombs—these two bombs saved Japanese and American lives by ending the war quickly—which constitutes a juxtaposition against the Japanese feelings (for instance, see Ueharu, 1995, p. 11).

This clearly explicates the Japanese "special" feelings about atomic bombs, and thus necessarily goes back to the apology frame at the moral level. Yoneyama (1995) detects the general tendency to position different memories of atomic bombs in the framework of U.S.-Japanese dichotomous opposition, which paradoxically leads to a possibility of new "memory loss" of the history of oppressed non-Japanese Asians (p.174).

Compared to the small extent to which the sufferings and emotions of American Pearl Harbor survivors were depicted in the 1991 coverage, the experiences of atomic bomb survivors in Hiroshima and Japanese peace activities to ban atomic bombs can be said to have been overdramatized. On the other hand, it is noteworthy the *Asahi Shimbun* also delineates the sufferings of the oppressed non-Japanese Asians.

Conclusion

Since this is a pilot study, our conclusions are preliminary at this point. However, our research seems to confirm Gans' theory about enduring values in the news, specifically enthnocentrism. This was demonstrated in a variety of ways, perhaps most significantly in the difference in the emphasis on Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima in the newspapers examined in this study.

First, the *Washington Post* coverage of Pearl Harbor was much more dramatic and lengthy than its coverage of Hiroshima. Pearl Harbor stories frequently used first-person narrative, drawing the reader emotionally into the story. In contrast, *Post* stories on Hiroshima were often written in a straight news style that is not designed to emotionally effect readers. *Post* Hiroshima coverage also often mentioned the theme that the bombing was good for Japan because that it saved the lives of Japanese as well as Americans.

On the other hand, the *Asahi Shimbun* coverage of Hiroshima focused on the sufferings and historical narratives of Japanese atomic bomb survivors. This might give us the impression that all the atomic bomb survivors are Japanese, which is a mythical construction of reality. Compared to this heavy emphasis on Japanese sufferings, the experiences of American servicemen were extremely de-emphasized. Even first-person accounts of American servicemen were framed in the apology/forgiveness context.

Second, this research seems to confirm that the conservative ideology is dominant in both countries. This finding is all the more significant because the newspapers selected for the analysis are generally considered to be liberal to left in their respective countries. (See Figure 1). This was especially evident in the *Washington Post*, which did not print a single opinion piece questioning the decision to drop the atomic bomb. The dominant conservative frame of atomic bomb survivors—that they are victims—was covertly presented in the *Asahi Shimbun*. In this sense, coverage in the two newspapers confirmed Johnson's (1988) comparison of American-Japanese reaction to Hiroshima to a couple caught in a bad marriage. One side tries to make the other side feel guilty. The guilty party then hates the other side for producing this sense of guilt.

Finally, it should be noted that what was found in the case of the *Asahi Shimbun* might not be representative of Japanese media. Contrary to our initial expectation, the sufferings and struggles of oppressed non-Japanese Asians frequently were presented in the *Asahi Shimbun*. It might be because the *Asahi Shimbun*, as its editorials generally indicate, seems to be on a mission to educate Japanese people about their role in the war.

Future research should shed light on those ideological questions presented in this paper when we examine the complete ideological range of newspapers in both countries.

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David and Godzilla: Anti-Semitism and *Seppuku* in Japanese Publishing

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

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Clockwise from Top: Title Page of "No Gas Chambers" article; Marco Polo February cover; stacked canisters of Zyklon-B gas illustrating article.

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David and Godzilla: Anti-Semitism and *Seppuku* in Japanese Publishing

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AEJMC 1996

Introduction

Two months before the March 20, 1995 Aum Shinrikyo attack on Tokyo's subways using Nazi-developed sarin poison gas, a leading Japanese news magazine published a story "There Were No Nazi Gas Chambers!" in World War II. Ironically, large ads for the Holocaust-denial article hung in hundreds of subway cars throughout Tokyo's myriad mass transit system. The magazine, Marco Polo, was on sale at numerous newsstands in the cavernous Kasumigaseki station, the gassing target where three major subway lines meet and thousands of officials and workers disembark beneath the metropolitan government complex.

Anti-Semitic books and articles are not uncommon in Japan. Most tend to favor conspiracy theories of international Jewish control of political and economic forces, and attempts to subdue the Japanese economy. Most, like the Marco Polo article, are one-sided, riddled with historic inaccuracies, and lack any semblance of substantiation. They are met with official protests from the Israeli Embassy, and occasionally the U.S. Embassy, who traditionally ask for a public, published apology and a subsequent corrective article that cites historic record. The "No Gas Chambers" article also brought a strong protest from the Simon Wiestenthal Center in Los Angeles, who called for an advertiser boycott.

The response by the Marco Polo parent company, publishing giant Bungei Shunju, was as surprising as it was swift: In abject apology, Marco Polo would cease publication. The magazine would be completely disbanded. All unsold issues would be recalled. Its editor would be transferred to a non-publishing research section, and its staff dispersed to other Bungei publications. The top officials at Bungei Shunju would take hefty salary cuts as personal penance.

The termination of the 250,000 circulation Marco Polo was an unprecedented response, stunning both its admirers and critics. But was the killing of the magazine a symbolic *seppuku* -- ritual suicide as the ultimate apology -- on the part of Bungei Shunju, or was it more of a case of cosmetic surgery -- to rid the publishing house of what had become an increasingly irritating, unsightly, and unprofitable, lesion on its otherwise respectable product and record? Was the action face-saving or spiting? An examination beyond the headlines and beneath the public atonement reveals several layers of manipulation and power-brokering, both internal and external, domestic and international, and diplomatic and economic. There were numerous excesses in marketing and managerial, as well as in journalistic, professionalism.

This study was conducted primarily in Tokyo, Japan, three months after the demise of Marco Polo. Japanese and American journalists, and embassy officials from the United States and Israel were interviewed. Additional interviews were conducted with, and materials gathered from, the Los Angeles-based Simon Wiesenthal Center. News stories about the Marco Polo controversy were analyzed from the English-language editions of four Japanese newspapers as well as from reports filed by the Tokyo bureaus of four major American newspapers, one wire service, and the international edition of one news magazine. Background information on the Bungei Shunju publishing company and its nine magazines, including Marco Polo, was obtained from Japanese magazine and advertising sources. The "No Gas Chambers" article in Marco Polo was analyzed for content, as was newspaper advertising in one of Japan's leading national dailies for an anti-Semitic book. Background was gathered and analyses made of Japanese perceptions of Jews from several Japanese and U.S. published books and articles, and from interviews with Japanese, U.S. and Israeli officials.

Anti-Semitism in Japan

With only about 1,000 Jews living in Japan, the Japanese have little first-hand experience in relating to Jewish people and culture. There have been, however, numerous books and magazine articles published in Japan about the Japanese and the Jews, or *Nihonjin* and *Yudayajin*. These writings have increasingly, within the last decade, adopted anti-Semitic themes that blame shadowy international Jewish cartels and conspiracies with Japan's current economic problems. Whole sections of bookstores, since the mid-1980s, have been given over to books about *Yudayajin* with such titles as: The Jewish Plot to Control the World, The Expert Way of Reading the Jewish Protocols, and The Secret of Jewish Power That Moves the World.

The anti-Semitic tone of such books, educators, authors and officials believe, is borne not so much out of hatred as out of ignorance and economic uncertainty. Goldstein credits it "not (to) race or religion, but economics" (1989, 22). A Japanese professor of Jewish history says "The Japanese don't know anything about the Jews. That's why they imagine things" (Sakamaki, 1995, 17). David Goodman and Masanori Miyazawa, in Jews in the Japanese Mind, write "Various attempts have been made to account for the intensity of Japanese interest in Jews, and particularly to explain the persistent chimerical belief in a global Jewish conspiracy bent on destroying Japan" (1995, 11). Arie Dan, First Secretary for Press and Information of the Israeli Embassy in Tokyo notes that "Japanese high school students do not study World War II. They have no sense of their, or anyone else's history" (1995).

Still, the pervasiveness of the "Jewish Conspiracy" sentiment is alarming, called by an American journalist "a persistent theme in Japanese intellectual life that has taken on a new virulence since the Persian Gulf War" and by a Japanese journalist "not a fad but a dangerous phenomenon that needs to be stopped. "(Goozner, 1989, 22) . Two books by Masami Uno, the leading anti-Semite author, have sold more than 1 million copies, If You Understand the Jews, You Will Understand the World, and If You Understand the Jews You Will Understand Japan. Arie Dan points out that millions more Japanese are familiar with Uno's claims against the Jews because they are highlighted in lengthy advertisements for the books carried -- uncritically, Dan complains -- by Japan's leading newspapers. "They see the headlines in bold type: statements that the Jews are responsible for Japan's economic crisis. That's all they see, that's all they know, that's what they come to believe." Dan recounted his own two years of graduate study in Business Administration at Tokyo's prestigious Keio University: "In my classes, my own professors, learned men, would espouse international Jewish conspiracy theories to control the Japanese Economy" (1995).

Yoshito Takigawa, a former journalist and chief information officer for the Embassy of Israel adds his dismay that the newspaper advertisements for Uno's and other conspiracy theory books also boost their sales "from under a total of 5,000 to 30,000 or more a month," giving them an aura of credibility as best-sellers. Because of the increased sales following the advertisements, "the newspaper itself starts quoting the book's thesis as valid economic theory. The Yomiuri (Japan's largest newspaper: 10 million daily circulation) did that," Takigawa said, a concern echoed by Goodman and Miyazawa, who also noted that Uno's theories were given credibility through inclusion in Bank of Japan discussions and that Uno himself was subsequently invited to a lecture series by the then-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (1995).

The Nihon Keizai (Nikkei) Shimbun, Japan's counterpart to the Wall Street Journal, carried a one-third page ad in 1993 for Get Japan, The Last Enemy: The Jewish Protocols for World Domination, described by Goodman and Miyazawa:

> Emblazoned with Jewish stars and an image of Satan, the ad claimed that 'Jewish cartels surrounding the Rothschilds control Europe, America, and Russia and have now set out to conquer Japan!' It outlined the Jewish scenario to destroy the Japanese economy, blaming the Jews for everything from the cut in Japanese interest rates in 1987 to the Gulf War and predicting the 'reoccupation' of Japan by Jews by the end of the decade (1995, 245).

The anti-Semitic success phenomenon is not restricted to relatively unknown authors boosted to fame through media advertisement and coverage. The Secret of Jewish Power to Control the World was written by Eisaburo Saito, a member of the Upper House of the Japanese Diet. A book by Yoshio Ogai, an influential official of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party, prescribes Hitler as a role model for winning office in Hitler Election Strategy: A Bible for Certain Victory in Modern Elections.

The conspiracy theories have their roots in a belief of a powerful Jewish cartel with immense economic and geopolitical control. Uno, for instance, claims that the U.S. Reagan and Bush administrations were merely puppet governments responding to the strings pulled by the Jewish shadow regime. That brings a handy anti-American overtone to the theories as well. Jewish interests, he claims, control IBM, General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Standard Oil, Exxon and AT&T. "Jewish" mass media in the United States manipulated public opinion to get Bill Clinton elected president so that he could carry out cabal instructions to enact economic policies to ruin Japan. Anyone viewed as working against contemporary or historic Japanese interests, in Uno's books, is declared a Jew, including Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Rockefellers and the Morgans, Vladimir Lenin, and, inexplicably, former Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Sheikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani (Goodman & Miyazawa, 1995). William Morgan, U.S. Embassy press attaché, feels the Japanese have been historically fond of or "susceptible to conspiracy theories," citing the historic ABCD theory (attempts at containment by the Americans, British, Chinese and Dutch) as justification for attacks on China and expansionism in Asia in the 1930s. (1995).

Uno and other anti-Semitic theorists speculate the conspiracy to destroy Japan is rooted in a hatred by Jews for Japan's joining the Axis Powers in World War II and its adherence to all OPEC conditions of trade embargoes with Israel during the oil crises of the 1970s. Ironically, one historic precedent for the theories of Jewish economic and geo-political influence comes from the financing and fundraising by American Banker Jacob Schiff for Japan's 1904-05 war with Russia. Inherent in many books and magazine articles is a begrudging respect for what is perceived as Jewish economic prowess, an image the Japanese like to picture in themselves. This is reflected in such works as Make Money With Stocks the Jews Aim At, and in the boastful descriptions by leading executives such as Den Fujita, president of McDonald's Japan, who calls himself the "Ginza Jew."

Not all the published works in the "Jewish Corners" of Japanese book stores deal with conspiracy theories or anti-Semitic themes. Some represent what Goodman and Miyazawa call "philosemitism." Ann Frank: Diary of Young Girl is one of the major best-sellers in Japan, as is The Japanese and the Jews, an adulatory work by Shichihei Yamamoto, writing as Isaiah Ben-Dasan. There is also a national fascination with links between Japanese and Jews that is reflected in popular *Yudayajin* books and magazine articles through three major themes:

* **Lost Tribe:** Some authors have speculated on an anthropological link between Jews and Japanese under the theory that the Japanese are descendants of the seventh, or "lost tribe" of Israel that migrated eastward across Asia, through China and into Japan. One author draws support from the similarities between the Kagome family crest (symbolizing basket weaving) and the six-pointed Star of David (Ben-Dasan, 1971) Some speculate the indigenous Ainu, eventually driven to the northern island of Hokkaido, are the descendants of the Lost Tribe. One theory holds that Christ himself was buried in Japan following his flight from the Holy Land after his brother James was crucified in his place.

* **Japanese Schindler:** Although Japan sided militarily with Nazi Germany in World War II, it did not accept the Third Reich's policy of persecution -- and extermination -- of Jews. A Japanese counterpart to Oskar Schindler, who saved the lives of thousands of Jews, arose in the form of Chiune Sempo Sugihara, Japan's consul in Lithuania, who saved as many as 8,000 Jews by issuing them exit visas, allowing them to emigrate to Japan. Although Sugihara was acting against national policy, the Jews who used Japan as a wartime waystation were not isolated or persecuted by the government. Nearly all left Japan by war's end.

* **Fugu Plan:** Although the Japanese held no racial animosity toward the Jews in World War II, the government saw some potential for its own empire building while helping Nazi allies remove Jews from Europe. The Japanese had seized the vast province of Manchuria from China and renamed it Manchukuo. But the government had few citizens to spare, or who were interested, in settling in the Chinese mainland and converting it into a Japanese economic stronghold. The Fugu Plan was designed to resettle 50,000 persecuted European Jews in

Manchukuo, who would also act as a buffer against the neighboring Soviet Union. It never got off the ground, but is often cited as an example of a legacy of wartime compassion.

The Japanese character is often described in terms of contrasts and paradoxes . "Anti" and "philo" Semitic sentiments can be held, and published, simultaneously. The same publishing house released Ann Frank, a major "Lost Tribe" treatise, and the "No Nazi Gas Chambers" debacle: Bungei Shunju.

The Bungei Empire and Rise of Marco Polo

Bungei Shunju is a powerhouse of a publisher in Japan, comparable to Time-Life in the United States. It published nine magazines up to the elimination of Marco Polo. Its flagship magazine is the self-titled Bungei Shunju, a monthly with 550,000 circulation, described by the Japan Magazine Advertising Association as "the most prestigious general interest magazine in Japan, reflecting the opinions of the intellectual elite of the country" aimed at "readers in their 40s and 50s with annual incomes of $90,000. . . ." (1993, 24).

Bungei also publishes some of the oldest and most established magazines in Japan, including All Yomimono (92,000 circulation) , featuring light fiction, and Bunga Kukai (50,000 circulation), serious Japanese and international fiction. Both were started in the 1930s. Bunga Kukai is regarded as one of the most respected magazines in Japan.

The publishing house also produces popular journals of analysis and commentary. The Shokun! (145,000 circulation), a "national forum for national debate and summary of ideas," and Shukan Bunshun (704,000 circulation), featuring "social, political, economic, sports and health issues; feature articles and opinions by world renowned novelists; and critical essayists" (1993, 28).

Bungei has engaged in successful niche publishing for specialty topics and audiences, including a Sports Illustrated-modeled Sports Graphic Number (280,000 circulation), Crea (250,000 circulation), a woman's magazine, and No Side (80,000 circulation), for "sophisticated and wealthy readers over 45 . . . with quality articles (that) help readers lead more comfortable and healthy lives" (1993, 26).

In 1992 Bungei began publishing Marco Polo, aimed at the market its other magazines were missing: young adults in their 20s and 30s. This lucrative market was weaned on *manga*, or comic magazines and graphic novels, which they continue to read into adulthood. To reach them, Bungei designed its new magazine to present stories visually, with plenty of photos, illustrations and graphic type. It described its content as: "Articles (that) deal with lifestyle, love, fashion, car, entertainment, domestic and international politics and the economy. Practical, informative, yet enjoyable stories to fill the need of reading pleasure" (Japanese Magazine Advertising Association, 1993, 26). Several Japanese and American journalists in Tokyo likened Marco Polo to People magazine in the United States. The name Marco Polo was selected to emphasize a sense of discovery and internationalism.

The book and magazine market in Japan is huge. The Foreign Press Center reports in Japan's Mass Media (1994) that magazines sell 3.7 billion copies a year. Most are sold in retail bookstores, so rely on intensive advertising campaigns to support single-copy sales. Subway and rail cars are prime advertising space, with 10-12 placards per car hanging from the ceilings, as well as dozens more framed on the upper walls.

Marco Polo began as a semi-monthly, but its younger audience was not as easily drawn or loyal as the publisher hoped. It quickly changed to a monthly, with a respectable 500,000 circulation. But by the time of its demise, it had dropped its circulation by half , had undergone several design changes, and relied more heavily on sensational and attention-grabbing stories that could be boldly proclaimed in subway placard ads. The ones appearing January 20, 1955 to promote the February issue proclaimed: "The Greatest Taboo of Postwar History: There Were No Nazi 'Gas Chambers.'"

"No Gas Chambers"

Masanori Nishioka is a physician and amateur historian. He had been unsuccessful in finding a home for his freelance holocaust-denial treatise until he received an acceptance from Marco Polo editor Kazuyoshi Hanada.

The article appeared in the February 1995 issue of Marco Polo. An editor's note introduced the article:

> On January 27, the Auschwitz concentration camp will observe the 50th anniversary of its 'liberation.' However, here the greatest taboo of postwar history is being kept a secret. . . . There can be no mistake that jews died tragically. However, there is scant evidence that they were systematically killed in gas chambers. After the war's end, it was proved that no gas chambers existed in any of the concentration camps situated in the West. . . . Actually, these type of suspicions have been subjected to the scrutiny of journalism in Europe and the U.S. . . . Why is it that only Japan's mass media that does not write anything on this subject? Here is the new historic truth that a young doctor has taken it upon himself to investigate as an individual (1995).

The title pages were illustrated by the headline overlaid on a graphic photo of a pile of concentration camp corpses in striped uniforms, with eyes and mouths open, transfixed in death. Other photo illustrations included stacked canisters of Zyklon-B (hydrogen-cyanide) gas, and the brick crematorium ovens and smokestacks.

Nishioka claimed these images, as shocking as they are, are misleading. Although Jews were imprisoned by the Nazis in World War II, he contended, they were not summarily destroyed in gas chambers. The gas chamber taboo, or myth, he claims, was started by the Polish communist government to legitimize itself by heaping more hate on the Nazis.

Yes, Nishioka admits, many Jews died in the camps. But their deaths were the result of septic diseases such as typhus, resulting from their cramped and unsanitary conditions. And yes, according to Nishioka, such casualties of disease were cremated in the ovens.

But the idea of gas chambers just doesn't make sense, according to Nishioka. The cyanide gas was there because it was used, in low strengths, for delousing. The tales of high-strength gas pouring from shower heads or ceiling spigots defies Nishioka's scientific sense: Such gas is lighter than air, he claims. It would not fall and settle efficiently on the prisoners for mass killing. And besides, Nishioka triumphs, the gas is highly flammable. The "shower rooms" are pictured next to the crematoriums: If gas were dispensed there, it would ignite and explode, destroying the buildings.

Some excerpts from Nishioka's article:

> A gas chamber in Auschwitz has no structural features needed for gassing people to death. . . . The Holocaust was a fabricated story. The gas chambers and so on at Auschwitz and the other concentration camps didn't exit. The 'gas chambers' currently open to the public at the remains of the Auschwitz concentration camp in Poland were built either by the postwar Polish Communist government, or else by its patron, the Soviet Union. Neither at Auschwitz nor anywhere else in territory occupied by Germany during World War II, did even one 'mass extermination of Jews' occur in 'gas chambers.'
>
> I have absolutely no intention of defending wartime German policy toward Jews. Although the mass extermination of Jews in concentration camps never took place, it is a clear historical fact that innocent jews were made to suffer by Germany. . . . (But) forget Schindler's List -- a movie is not history.
>
> The story of gas chambers was propaganda, one of the psychological strategies used in wartime . . . . The Holocaust is nothing but a story which has become 'history' after the war without being given investigation (1995).

Despite his attack on "manufactured history" and his analysis of the layout, structure and administration of Auschwitz and Dachau, Nishioka admitted he never visited any of the concentration camps, Poland, Germany or any European country. He never talked to a camp survivor, guard, or liberator. Most of his research was drawn from well known Holocaust denier Arthur Butz' The Hoax of the Twentieth Century and similar writings by Thies Christophersen, author of The Auschwitz Lie. (Hoffman 1995; Takahama 1995) He never did original research or "investigation."

The Response and Protests

The "No Nazi Gas Chambers" article in Marco Polo was published 50 years to the month marking the liberation of Auschwitz. Ironically, the camp complex at Dachau was liberated by the *nisei* Japanese-American forces of the 522nd Field Artillery Battalion, a unit of the famous 442nd "Go For Broke" Regimental Combat Team, who had made a recent celebrated visit to Japan to "talk story" about their experiences (Chang, 1991; Dan 1995).

On the day of publication (January 20 in Japan, January 19 in the United States), Rabbi Abraham Cooper, associate dean of the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles, protested to Takakazu Kuriyama, Japanese ambassador to the United States and asked the Japanese government to publicly condemn the article:

> It is almost beyond belief that the magazine Marco Polo would present to the Japanese public a ten page essay which seeks to deny the murderous gassings of Jews at the Auschwitz death camp. . . . Under the guise of a serious investigation, the author has simply repeated outrageous fabrications of Holocaust deniers to create his 'new historic truth.
>
> Mr. Ambassador, this article is more than a cruel joke. It is a monstrous attack on history and the innocent victims of Nazism that slanders an entire people. It was timed to appear at the very moment that world leaders gather at Auschwitz . . . to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the liberation of that death factory and the innocents who were systematically murdered there.
>
> For the survivors of the Holocaust, the Marco Polo article is akin to a public denial of the dropping of the A-bomb on Hiroshima and the death and suffering which is wrought on the Japanese people.
>
> . . . We hope that the government of Japan will publicly condemn through the appropriate Japanese governmental agency, the views expressed by these hate mongers (1995a).

Israeli Embassy First Secretary Arie Dan filed an oral protest on January 20 with the Japan Foreign Ministry. Dan said he was particularly upset with this article because "Marco Polo was the mainstream press. Usually such articles are a marginal phenomenon, limited to the fringe press. Not this time." Dan was also shocked by the sensational ads for the February issue and the "No Gas Chambers" story hung throughout the subway and rail systems. "Millions saw it -- statements that 'There were no gas chambers. Jews are lying.' Dan was also aware of the target audience of Marco Polo, the affluent, but historically naive young adult. "This would be the only source of their knowledge about the Holocaust," he complained. He visited the Marco Polo offices on January 20 and demanded a retraction, but was rebuffed. After meeting with deputy editor Seigo Kimata, Dan said "The man did not react. He did not apologize." Dan said he went to the magazine expecting the usual response -- "an apology and a subsequent article laying out historical facts. In the past, editors have said 'Oh, we're only printing the author's view. We didn't know the other side. Please write your own article and we'll print it in the next issue.'" (1995)

Former journalist and Israeli Embassy spokesman Takigawa said Marco Polo Editor "Hanada acted as if this was breaking news -- the first time such facts had been revealed. He wouldn't back down. That was very unusual" (1995). Hanada went a step further and publicly defended the article, telling the Associated Press "It's not good for everything about a certain subject to be taboo. Maybe Israelis and Japanese have different ways of thinking about that" (1995).

The Japanese Foreign Ministry responded to the Israeli Embassy protest by calling the article "extremely improper." Kunihiko Saito, vice foreign minister, said "The government thinks that the content gravely lacks consideration and is extremely improper." The Japanese Embassy in the United States responded to the Simon Wiesenthal Center protest by saying "We strongly oppose any form of discrimination whatsoever." (Holocaust Denial 1995). Foreign Ministry Spokesman Terusuke Terada said it is "very important to help deepen in Japan an accurate understanding of the tragic history of the Holocaust of Jews in Europe. We trust that the Japanese people will exercise a sound judgment, based on historical perspectives, of whatever they read" (Associated Press 1995).

Rabbi Cooper of the Wiesenthal Center said:

> We never contacted Marco Polo. That was my call. The editors of the magazine wrote a lead-in to the article that was an endorsement, saying 'Finally the last taboo has been broken.' So we decided there was nothing to say to them. We'd been through the whole cycle before: outrage, apology, new outrage, new apology, like with the anti-Semitic book ads in the Nikkei.
>
> We found out about the article right after the Kobe earthquake. Because of that, I felt on a moral level, because so many people were trying to find out about their families and loved ones, it was inappropriate for us to badger the Japanese Embassy and Consulate here. So I sent one letter. But I wanted to find a way to get out of the outrage-apology cycle (1995c).

So Cooper turned up the heat by asking several international corporations, whose advertisements appeared in the February Marco Polo issue, to boycott the magazine. The request to ". . . immediately decide to stop all future advertising in Marco Polo, a publication which sadly has chosen the path of hate mongering" (1995b) went to Microsoft, Philip Morris, Philips Electronics, Cartier, Mitsubishi and Volkswagen. The latter three pulled their ads over a period of January 23-30, adding to the pressure on Bungei. Volkswagen Chairman Ferdinand Piech responded:

". . . I am also appalled and angered by the irresponsible statements made in the article. . . . The tragedy of the holocaust and of the war must never again be repeated. Please let me assure you that Volkswagen has taken all the steps required to cease advertising in the Japanese magazine Marco Polo until the incident has been unambiguously clarified" (1995).

Taizo Yokoyama of Mitsubishi released a statement that concluded "Mitsubishi Motors of Japan has decided to cease advertising in the Japanese magazine 'Marco Polo' until the incident has been clarified" (1995).

The "clarification" came quickly. Bungei Shunju would shutter Marco Polo.

Demise of Marco Polo

Bungei Shunju President Kengo Tanaka announced on January 30, 1995, that the company would shut down Marco Polo and, effective the previous Friday (January 27), all unsold copies of the February issue had been recalled. "We came to know of the very deep pain and agony inflicted by the Marco Polo article," Tanaka said. "It was as if we were hit by an iron club in having our eyes opened" (Watanabe, 1995). Tanaka gave few details of the extreme decision to close the magazine, but said, "After rereading the article, we found it had a superficial understanding of Jewish issues and lacked fairness. On reflection, we decided to discontinue the publication" (Hoffman 1995).

Tanaka confessed to Rabbi Cooper of the Wiesenthal Center:

> The article in question was written by a civilian Japanese who took a view inconsistent with solidly documented facts about the mass murder of Jews and others in the gas chambers of Nazi concentration camps during World War II. His essay was based on the discredited writing of a small number of historical revisionists in Europe and the United States who assert the Holocaust did not take place.
>
> . . . We regret very deeply that the article has caused immeasurable pain not only to Jews who have suffered more than enough, but also to millions of others dedicated to truth and decency. We fully realize that no apology can fully undo the damage that has been done (1995).

Tanaka held a subsequent news conference, February 2, with Cooper, who flew to Tokyo, to show conciliation and promised, "We will set up stronger checking procedures and an ombudsman system" to avoid future errors (Karasaki, 1995). Tadashi Saito, a Bungei spokesman, added "All the editors and workers of Bungei Shunju accept the responsibility for publishing this biased article (which shows) the low understanding among Japanese about the Jewish people and the victims of Nazi camps" (Pollack 1995).

The Marco Polo staff, Tanaka announced, would be dispersed among the other Bungei publications, but editor Kazuyoshi Hanada would be moved to a non-publishing position in the company's historic research and archives section. Tanaka took a self-imposed six-month pay cut and Bungei Supervising Editor Nobumitsu Sakai took a three-month cut. Tanaka resigned the title of president, but maintained his status as company chairman (Bungeishunju Executives 1995).

Tanaka distanced the publishing house from the Marco Polo editors and at the same time pledged Bungei's sincerity in finding accommodation with Rabbi Cooper and the Wiesenthal Center when writing to Cooper:

> Regrettably, the editors of 'Marco Polo', lacking proper perception regarding a wide range of matters relating to Jewish history, published the article, wrongly believing that it represented 'a new set of facts hitherto undisclosed in Japan.'
>
> That such an article was published not only points up a serious problem with the editors of 'Marco Polo', but also reflects an overall lack of understanding on the part of Bungei Shunju Ltd., regarding the Holocaust and the historical facts surrounding this outrage against humanity.

> . . . Japanese history and culture are so widely different and removed from those of the Jews that a proper perception of the realities involving the Jewish people will be possible here only through an extensive educational effort with the assistance of organizations such as yours. In this program we invite your guidance (1995).

Hanada was not allowed to attend the news conference announcing the killing of Marco Polo, nor would he comment later, other than to say that although he found the decision extreme, he would accept it. Tokyo journalists saw Hanada's lateral move as tantamount to a firing. Although he was given a desk and salary, he had very few duties and was regarded as a pariah in the publishing house. It was expected he would wait a "face saving" period and resign and move on (Takigawa, 1995). He shortly began appearing on television as a commentator.

The killing of the magazine surprised not only Hanada, but the major critics of the "No Gas Chambers" article. "We only demanded that the magazine take responsibility and apologize. We never demanded that it be abolished," said Dan of the Israeli Embassy (1995), echoed by Cooper of the Wiesenthal Center, "I was shocked!" (1995c).

Dan feels the Marco Polo case was not handled well and suspects more was going on behind the scenes at Bungei Shunju than concern about advertiser boycotts. Takigawa and other journalists in Japan confirm there were several internal power plays as well as external pressures -- not all of them economic.

Behind the Headlines

Was the death of Marco Polo the contemporary extension of some kind of samurai code -- ritual suicide as abject apology and restoration of the "family" honor -- in this case the Bungei Shunju publishing family? While those elements are certainly present on the surface, a deeper investigation reveals this extreme action rose out of an inability to handle the external pressures on Bungei, and at the same time as a solution to the internal pressures the company faced.

Several journalists in Japan report that Marco Polo had been the source of economic and political strife within Bungei Shunju. The magazine had become a drain on the publishing house's resources. Because of the heavy emphasis on photos and graphics, Marco Polo had been expensive to produce, but had yet to show a profit after three years. The magazine went through several redesigns, first in an attempt to boost sales, later to cut costs.

A year earlier Bungei had moved Kazuyoshi Hanada, a well-known and respected journalist, to the editor's post. Hanada had been the top editor at Bungei's Shukan Bunshun, bringing that magazine to the top in weekly magazine sales through several news scoops and exclusives, such as sumo wrestler and national hero Takanohana's engagement to a popular actress. Hanada continued to deliver "sensational," but well-documented reports in Marco Polo, such as the expose of a "sex island" off the coast of Japan, frequented by high government officials to enjoy the services of prostitutes. "I subscribed Marco Polo because its articles challenged a lot toward so-called taboo topic for the mainstream Japanese publishing industry," said Naomi Uzumi, an advertising executive. "In the past, Marco Polo featured stories about cults in Japan. It was interesting to read. But this controversial feature about Nazi, I thought it was *taishitakoto-nai* -- not so worthy reading" (1995).

The earlier stories made Hanada popular in the investigative journalism community, but not in the staid and conservative editorial departments of his own company's other magazines, particularly the mainstay literary journals. This is not unique to Bungei. In Japanese journalism, investigative journalism falls to magazines. It is rarely done in daily newspapers, whose reporting is often constrained by their journalists' memberships in *kisha kurabu,* or press clubs, which put self-imposed limits on the flow of news from government and business. In exchange for regular briefings and access to news sources, the newspaper reporters agree to withhold certain news and not to pursue "news scoops" in competition with each other. As a result, newspaper journalism in Japan tends to be both homogenous and flaccid among the national dailies. (Yamamoto, 1989; Japanese Mass Media, 1994). The "mainstream" press were aware of the "sex island" story, for example, but refused to report on it (Kaplan, 1995).

Some newspapers publish their own magazines to print, at arms length, the kinds of stories they can't in their own columns. Work on these magazines is considered "second class," at best, among the journalistic elite. Although immensely popular, hard-hitting, and sometimes precipitating reforms, investigative magazine journalism is looked down upon by traditional editors, even in the magazine trade. Heuvel and Dennis quote a mainstream newspaper senior editor: "We believe in covering politicians from the waist up. What they do from the waist down is generally none of our business" (1993, 82). The "waist down," sometimes literally, has become the central business of the investigative magazines.

Investigative magazines, such as Marco Polo, do not belong to industry associations, which exert a considerable degree of standard-setting and regulatory control, such as the Nihon Shinbun Kyokai, or Japanese Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association, does on newspapers. The lack of an industry association contributes to a free-for-all in the editing and marketing of magazines, often marked by exaggerated and misleading claims. Hanada "fell into the common pitfall of Japanese magazine reporting and ran anything that looked good, without worrying about the facts. They are willing to run almost any story, no matter how irresponsible it is, as long as it boost sales. In addition, they will run almost any story as long as it is written in Japanese under an 'island mentality'" (Takahama, 1995). The sensational bent in stories is exacerbated by excesses in marketing them. David Kaplan is a highly regarded investigative journalist whose book The Yakuza is considered the definitive study of Japanese organized crime. While Marco Polo was running, and promoting, the "No Gas Chambers" article, Kaplan's series on psychological warfare conducted by the United States Information Service in the 1950s and 1960s was running in Views magazine, the flagship monthly of Kodansha, one the top three publishers in Japan. "Even those solid reports would get headlines (translated into ad placards) that absolutely lied about the contents. It's pure hype and typical of Japanese magazine publishing" (Kaplan, 1995).

Dan, Kaplan, Takigawa, and other journalists also point to an insular mindset of Japanese journalists that hold a general assumption that what they write won't be read outside of Japan, particularly if written in Japanese, and so would face no challenge. Isuki Iwata, Los Angeles bureau chief for The Yomiuri Shimbun writes "The (Marco Polo) incident . . . reveals that the logics of Japanese society does not always apply in the international community" (1995). Tatou Takahama, a senior fellow at the Yomiuri Research Institute, writes, "The publisher may have thought the controversy would not spread overseas since Marco Polo is a Japanese-language magazine" (1995).

The protests over the "No Gas Chamber" article were not the first, nor isolated, objections to content that Bungei had to face. The publishing house had been amassing an embarrassing number of complaints and apologies (Morgan, 1995). In the last two years Bungei publicly apologized to Japan Railways and to the Imperial Family for inaccurate reporting. Shukan Bunshun publicly apologized for cruel references to sufferers of autism. Bungei was also smarting from criticism over a previous revisionist World War II article by a former education minister that argued "the Rape of Nanjing didn't violate international law" (Sakamaki, 1995). And Bungei was also reminded in the course of the Marco Polo criticism that its subsidiary book publishing arm had published a leading "Jewish Conspiracy" book, The Jewish World Empire's Plot to Invade Japan (Sutel, 1995). Bungei has a reputation of being "rightist" in Japanese politics. The "No Gas Chambers" article opened up a new round of criticism of all rightists and revisionist government policies, such as the reluctance to apologize for World War II excesses, by such "leftist" publications as the powerful daily Asahi newspaper, also owner of TV-Asahi, which treated the controversy as major news (Dan, 1995).

The pressures inside the publishing house were mounting. Hanada was viewed as an out-of-control editor who did not fit the conservative Bungei profile. The financial failure of

Marco Polo was draining resources from other editors' magazines and projects. Bungei found itself as an unwitting avenue for political attacks on its conservative government friends and in the process being held up to ridicule by competing news agencies. Bungei was becoming isolated. Government officials and publishing colleagues were distancing themselves from the company. The intense criticism and protests from the "No Gas Chambers" article were staining Bungei internally, domestically, internationally -- and economically.

Advertiser boycotts are virtually unknown in Japan. Just as publishers often distance themselves from criticism of individual articles by crediting all claims to the authors, advertisers take no responsibility for the contents of the magazines they advertise in. The moral arguments of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, however, overrode the traditional distance. The appeal was particularly felt by Volkswagen, a German company, and Mitsubishi, an auto and electronic conglomerate with international sales. Although Mitsubishi and Volkswagen stated publicly they would withdraw all advertising from Marco Polo, the threat extended to all Bungei publications. Guy Ley Marie of Cartier Japan, Ltd., was specific: ". . . we have stopped immediately all the advertisement programs with this magazine and the others from this publisher" (1995) Rabbi Cooper said he was told that media buyers in Japan for these international advertisers told Bungei officials "clean this up, or we're out of here completely -- out of all Bungei publications," (1995c).

"The lawyers for Bungei just couldn't handle negotiations on such a scale and in such a short time. The Japanese prefer drawing out negotiations. This came on them too much and too fast," says Arie Dan of the Israeli Embassy. "If they only had to deal with Mitsubishi, they could have come to a 'Japanese-style' accord. But they had to deal with international corporations as well. And Bungei used the same lawyers to handle the protests from the (Israeli) Embassy, passed through the Japanese Foreign Ministry. They were overwhelmed" (1995). Added Rabbi Cooper, "It dawned on me . . . we pushed buttons more profoundly than we had ever assumed. We were impacting the lives of people in such expanded ways." (1995c).

The "Japanese-style" resolution Dan refers to is described by sociologist Takeshi Ishida as the *uchi-soto* and *omote-ura* dimensions of Japanese conflict resolution and accommodation. *Uchi-soto* is literally "in-out" and *omote-ura* "front-back." Ishida's paradigm places relationships horizontally in terms of in- and out-groups, and vertically in terms of formality and authority that comes with rank, each with flexible boundaries. Conflicts can be resolved or accommodated by encompassing adversaries within the "insider" group, or by relaxing the formal distance between superior and inferior, or by a combination of boundary flexing. Ishida's paradigm is graphically portrayed as (1984, 17):

	Omote (surface or formal arena)	***Ura*** (background or informal arena)
Uchi (conflict among in-group members)	No conflict should exist	Conflict does exist but is usually solved implicitly.
Soto (conflict with outsiders)	No concession should be made	Negotiation is possible if neither party loses face and both can maintain integrity.

In Ishida's paradigm, Bungei Shunju's internal conflict, including negotiations with Mitsubishi, would be placed in the *uchi-ura* stage and solved there, most likely through staff realignment at Marco Polo. But the publishing house was unable to simultaneously handle the *soto-ura* dimension of conflict with "outsiders" in dealing with the multiple demands of the Israeli Embassy, the Wiesenthal Center and the international advertisers. Bungei's first response was, in fact, in the *omote-soto* dimension of denying a response to the Israeli Embassy's request for apology and corrective article. The ideal stage, according to Ishida, is *omote-uchi*, where all elements of the conflict can come into harmony and -- just as important -- all be considered "insiders" to prevent future conflict by working toward common goals.

The shuttering of Marco Polo certainly accomplished the *omote-uchi* goal by short-circuiting all other stages of the process. Although the Wiesenthal Center had not asked for the magazine to be cut off, Bungei Chairman Tanaka invited the Center's Rabbi Abraham Cooper to stand by him at the press conference announcing not only Marco Polo's demise, but also an educational seminar series for all Bungei journalists on Jewish history, culture, and international relations. Bungei and the Wiesenthal Center were effectively turned from adversaries to partners, and the Center an "insider" in Bungei's *uchi-soto* dimension. By embracing the Wiesenthal Center, Bungei eliminated any need to continue dealing directly with the Israeli Embassy and indirectly with the Foreign Ministry. Since the advertising boycott was at the behest of the Wiesenthal Center, it was called off by Cooper without the need for Bungei to deal directly with the disaffected advertisers.

Could all of this have been accomplished without Bungei's corporate serving up of the head of Marco Polo to placate its adversaries? Perhaps. But balancing internal realignments with external concessions would have left the publishing house wounded in image in the publishing and political worlds and continuing to hemorrhage money with a financially and journalistically damaged product. The decision to kill Marco Polo put the control of the headlines, and through them the reputation of the company, back in Bungei's hands. Bungei Shunju lost a magazine, but no face.

But did the death of Marco Polo for the "No Gas Chambers" article signify a change in Japanese attitudes toward the Jews? The reviews are mixed.

Aftermath: Education or New Life for a Conspiracy?

Marco Polo has become a double-edged legacy in Japanese publishing. The high-profile news coverage of the Marco Polo incident did much to educate Japanese readers about Jews and Jewish history, citing historic record of the Holocaust and the lack of any record for the various "Jewish Conspiracy" theories. But at the same time, the author of "No Gas Chambers," Masanori Nishioka, outraged by the killing off of Marco Polo because of his article, told reporters he felt "deep anger" that rather than challenging his ideas with debate, the forum for any debate was cut off. He claimed the "Jewish lobby used the ads to kill Marco Polo, and Bungei Shunju gave in" (Sakamaki, 1995). Nishioka voiced what many Japanese, including journalists, openly believe: The Marco Polo incident is yet more evidence of Jewish control over Japanese life.

David Goodwin, writing in the Asahi Evening News, reports:

> The closure only appears to prove what anti-Semitic conspiracy theorists say is true, that the Jews want to control the world. When I asked some of my Japanese friends why they thought Marco Polo was closed down they said it was because Jewish people controlled most of the banks, media outlets and other institutions in the United States, stating this as if were fact (1995).

Arie Dan of the Israeli Embassy is concerned about this double effect, but admits others don't share his worries. "Others, like Rabbi Cooper, say it's a good thing -- a strong signal to the Japanese media that you can't publish such stories. If they want to think it's because we're powerful, that's fine. The important thing is to stop the stories" (1995). Tomoo Ishida, professor of Jewish History at Tsukuba University, predicts Cooper will be right. "Major publishing houses will be careful how they handle Jewish issues in the future because they are afraid of ad boycotts" (Sakamaki, 1995). Naomi Uozumi of the Asahi Tsuushin-sha advertising agency in Tokyo said "The incident reminded me of the big power of sponsors against Japanese press" (1995).

Cooper also said he hoped his seminar series on the Holocaust and Jewish society with Bungei editors and officials would influence future reporting: "I feel optimistic. . . . There is no environment of hate (toward Jews) in Japan. But it does have enormous stereotypes" (Karasaki, 1995). "For whatever reason, anti-Semitism sells. The challenge is understanding why it sells and what we can do to change that" (Sutel 1995).

Many journalists do not share Cooper's optimism. The Yomiuri Research Institute's Takahama wrote, "While I applaud (Bungei President) Tanaka's action, I do not think the irresponsible attitude of Bungei Shunju, showed by publishing the article in the first place will be corrected just by closing down one magazine" (1995). David Goodwin, in the Asahi Evening News, agrees:

> Committing ritual magazine suicide because an editor made a grave error does nothing to inform the Japanese people about a subject which desperately needs to be discussed here. Most Japanese know virtually nothing about Jews and Jewish history and I think that the most responsible action for Marco Polo to have taken would have been to set the record straight. But it can't now, the magazine is dead, and so is the issue (1995).

Echoing Takahama and Goodwin, Hajime Takano, editor in chief of the internet-based Insider, writes, "In choosing the most simple way out of the problem Bungei Shunju has committed suicide twice over" (1995).

Arie Dan admits the killing of Marco Polo has had a positive impact in at least one aspect of his work. "Whereas protests over (anti-Semitic book) ads were met with indifference, now the newspapers are calling and asking for review and comment." The Yomiuri Shimbun called him regarding such an ad, Dan reported. He told the newspaper it was definitely anti-Semitic. "Yomiuri refused to run it. But that's now," he cautions. In six months or a year, they'll stop calling and another article or ad will appear somewhere else. We need education, not sanctions" (1995).

Rabbi Cooper holds that his seminar series produced some "person-to-person, real contacts. We discussed not only Holocaust history, but the standards of journalism. When one of the editors stood and asked 'why didn't you just send us this information and we would have published it,' I replied 'It was your job as editor to check out the information you had. Why didn't you do your job? What was done wasn't journalism.' "

Cooper said the timing of the May seminar series, immediately after the arrest of Aum Shinrikyo doomsday cult leader Shoto Asahara in the subway sarin gas attack, drove home the point. "When I showed them a canister of Zyklon-B, they wanted to touch it, to sniff it. Gas chambers became very clear after the Aum attack" (1995c).

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BURMA OR MYANMAR ?
DETERMINANTS OF COUNTRY-NAME USAGE BY INTERNATIONAL NEWSPAPERS AND NEWS AGENCIES

A Research Paper Submitted to the
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Abstract

This study examines the choices that 24 newspapers and new agencies from 14 countries made in using "Burma" or "Myanmar" in copy. Trade statistics were analyzed and indicated news organizations countries having a strong economic relationship with Burma/Myanmar were more likely to use the name preferred by the Burma/Myanmar government. Content analysis and interviews with journalists also were conducted to better understand name-choice significance and the connection between international news coverage and foreign policy.

Introduction

William Safire's "Law of Nation-Naming" is enforceable only in the realm of the New York Times writer's own columns. Safire would give countries "only one crack at a new name in each century" (Safire, 1989, p. 14). Violators could be found guilty of what Safire calls "cavalier place-renaming."

Hiroshi Kume, a popular and outspoken Japanese television news anchor, rankled the Southeast Asian nation's military junta with his blunt refusal to switch from using "Burma" to "Myanmar," as those leaders have requested. Instead, he protests the government there by referring to it as "that country" or "the country west of Thailand" (Sherman, 1995, pp. 11-12).

No matter whether the phenomena fits Safire's *corpus juris* or Kume's politics, nation name-changing is undoubtedly a fixture of an ever-evolving world. What a country is called can reflect its history and hopes; it can demarcate a legacy of tragedy or of achievement. Country names are symbols that get daily use and carry as many meanings as they do emotions (Chang, 1988). The choice of names or labels can reflect pleasure or displeasure with a foreign government or a group outside of government. Indeed, one need look only at the words that the U.S. government used during the 1980s to describe various players in Central American conflicts to see how such labeling can be a well-worn part of a foreign-policy strategy (Sumser, 1987).

Just as names have meaning to the country, its allies and enemies, the names chosen for use in news stories also are significant. Though most editors will say their choices are not made for political reasons, there is cause to believe that is not always the case. The New York Times shunned "Kampuchea," the name the Khmer Rouge used for the country during its bloody reign and stuck with "Cambodia." Did the personal involvement of its former reporter Sidney Schanberg and current photographer Dith Pran, as portrayed in the movie, "The Killing Fields," prompt the newspaper to resist the name used by the Khmer Rouge?

Burma/Myanmar has a rich and turbulent history. Archeology dates the earliest civilization, thought to have been formed by the Pyu people, to at least the 8th century. Fighting was a constant, with various groups jousting for power, so that a politically united Burma, led by the Burmese ethnic group, did not emerge until 1044, though it would break apart and come back together again. In 1886, the British began ruling the country.

Nationalist yearnings appeared during the 1930s and produced a generation of Burmese leaders who, after World War Two, helped guide their country to independence. One of those leaders was Aung San. Aung San did not live to see his homeland gain its freedom. About five months before the country became the Independent Union of Burma, Aung was assassinated.

Fighting within Burma/Myanmar continued into its constitutional democracy. Aung San's old party was still governing, though precariously so, in 1958 when the then-prime minister asked Gen. Ne Win to form an interim government and arrange for new elections. In 1962, the general overthrew the democratic government and instituted a one-party state. Since then, Burma has been ruled by the military.

A pro-democracy movement arose in 1988 and led to clashes between the military and civilians, mostly students, the most deadly of which resulted in police killing more than 1,000 people. One of the most popular pro-democracy leaders was Aung San's daughter, Aung San Suu Kyi. Also in 1988, a new military government took over and called itself the State Law and Order Restoration Council, or SLORC. In June 1989, it decreed that the country's name would be Myanma (or Myanmar) and the name of the capital would be Yangon rather than Rangoon. In July, the SLORC put Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest. Despite her detention, her party overwhelmingly won elections in 1990, but the military refused to relinquish power. The SLORC released Aung San Suu Kyi in June 1995.

overwhelmingly won elections in 1990, but the military refused to relinquish power. The SLORC released Aung San Suu Kyi in June 1995.

Many newspapers and wire services reported the democracy demonstrations, the arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi and the name change. Some newspapers and wire services around the world began using "Myanmar" relatively soon after the SLORC announced the change. Some adopted it over the course of several years. Still others continue to use "Burma."

Fredholm (1993) attempted to explain the meanings of "Burma," "Myanmar" and their derivations. To be Burmese is to be a citizen of Burma, while a Burman is a member of the Burman ethnic group. Burmans, however, speak the language of Burmese. Because there are numerous ethnic groups in the country, not all citizens speak Burmese. When the SLORC issued its name-changing decree in the summer of 1989, it said that "Myanmar" and "Yangon" would be the proper terms to use in English-language texts. The definition of "Myanmar" in the Burmese language is "fast" or "strong." Fredholm himself rejected using "Myanmar" because it is "neither consistent with English usage nor used or even accepted by all ethnic groups in Burma..." (p. 7).

Purpose and significance of the study

Several factors make news organizations' choice of "Burma" or "Myanmar" worth examining.

- Foreign news coverage often has mirrored the policy of the organization's home country.
- News organizations traditionally have a close relationship with foreign policy officials.
- Linguistic symbols are an important form of communication (Arakawa, 1995).
- The choice can and is seen by some as taking a political stand.

This study examines the following presumptions:

- The proximity of the news organization's home country to Burma/Myanmar influences which name is used.
- The greater the amount of exports from the news organizations' home country to Burma/Myanmar, the more likely the news organization is to use the name preferred by the leaders of Burma/Myanmar.
- The tenor of the coverage – favorable or unfavorable – influences which name the news organization chooses to use.

In looking at these ties, this study adds to research into the relationship and mutual influence between news organizations and foreign policy-makers and goes further by using "extra media data" (Rosengren, 1977) as a basis for analysis and comparison.

Related Studies

Relatively few studies have been done on a microscopic level looking at name choice and usage by news organizations. Chang (1988) found that how The New York Times and The Washington Post referred to China and Taiwan through the course of 35 years of U.S.-Sino relations (Nationalist China versus Taiwan, for example, or Communist China versus the People's Republic of China) reflected U.S. policy toward China through that period.

Sumser (1987) saw news coverage reflecting U.S. foreign policy when it came to how The New York Times and the New York Post referred to various players in Central American conflicts in 1983. He looked for key words such as "leftist" or "rebel" that were used to describe those players. Sumser found that political labels were used only in reference to those groups or governments that were not on the side of U.S. policy.

The New York Times' coverage of Germany and the former USSR during the 1940s also indicates the use of name and word choice reflect those countries' relations with the United States.

Keddie (1985) concluded that countries whose society and interests were similar to the United States' received more favorable coverage than those who were perceived as different or as "enemies." Thus, those countries portrayed as "friends" tended to share many characteristics with the United States, while the reverse was true for those portrayed as "enemies."

Cultural identity often is summed up in a single word for immigrants, such as "Vietnamese," "Asian" or "American" (Yost, 1985). Labels and names were used in newspapers in the 19th century press to frame an image of Native Americans as part of an ideological process (Coward, 1989).

Discourse and rhetorical analyses are useful methods for determining how the culture and society of the news organization affects the way it assembles its stories (Kim, 1992). Kim found that different newspapers portrayed different pictures and images of the world that reflected their own cultural and societal viewpoints.

Van Dijk (1988) used thematic, schematic and local semantic style as analytical standards in his extensive study of news reports from more than 260 papers representing about 100 countries. He found that foreign coverage has a lexical style all its own. "Not only are the words used in accordance with the formal style of news writing in general but also the account of international politics ... requires both delicacy and some typical political jargon borrowed from diplomats and politicians" (Van Dijk, p. 108).

The macroscopic perspective that Van Dijk employed provides more research on the relationship between foreign affairs and international coverage. Cohen's classic examination of that topic, The press and foreign policy, called the press "a sort of intelligence agent to the process" of foreign policy-making (1963, p. 7). It is a symbiotic relationship in which policy-makers-as-sources contribute to news coverage and the press provides a basis of information that policy-makers use in their deliberations.

Cohen noted the relationship's complexity, including the interactions among reporters and their foreign policy sources, as well as the tension created by the privacy that diplomacy often requires and the openness inherent in a healthy democracy. Still, he concluded, the press has substantial influence in the foreign policy-making arena. "...it seems clear from this analysis that the press itself is such an important institution in the policy-making network that *any* pattern of press coverage would leave a substantial mark of one kind or another on the participants and thus on the process" (p.269).

Some of Cohen's assertions still hold today, O'Heffernan says, but must be updated to take into account new technologies, new definitions and the rise of television news as the main source of international news coverage (1991). O'Heffernan proposes a new two-step-flow theory of how the audience gets its foreign affairs information with the network news anchor serving as the public's intermediary.

Borquez (1993, p. 38) also refers to Cohen's examination. The work of Cohen and others can be viewed as a foundation for bettering the dialogue between policy and media specialists. Borquez suggests that there may be times, despite competing interests, when the two might have to cooperate on "the interpretation and framing of ideas and issues."

Berry (1990) analyzed New York Times' foreign coverage to revisit two traditional roles the press has been said to play in foreign policy: the press as a participant in the policy process and the government as a manipulator of the press to further its foreign policy aims. He found both of those roles false – and true. "The press, I propose, is neither a powerful force in foreign policy nor is it managed by the government in what it reports about foreign policy" (p. xiii).

Methodology

This study starts out with a content analysis of 460 stories in which Burma/Myanmar is mentioned. Babbie (1995) gives credit to Eugene J. Webb and his 1966 book on social research for describing content analysis as an "unobtrusive" form of research. Indeed, learning newspapers' and wire services' choice of "Burma" or "Myanmar" could easily be determined without talking directly to reporters or editors. Again, Babbie refers to Webb: "Webb and his colleagues have played freely with the task of learning about human behavior by observing what people inadvertently leave behind them" (Babbie, 1995, p. 306).

Sample selection

This study used the Nexis-Lexis and Dialog computer databases to categorize what 24 newspapers and wire services from 14 countries "left behind." The search term of "Burma or Myanmar" was used to cull the appropriate news articles. Two time periods were chosen: the period immediately following the SLORC's announcement that it was changing the country's name in June 1989 and the period immediately following Aung San Suu Kyi's release from six years of detention in July 1995. Specifically, the first 10 stories after June 19, 1989, and the first 10 stories after July 9, 1995 from each news organization were used in this study. These dates were chosen because they represented important events in Burma's/Myanmar's recent history that could influence name choices. The six-year span also gave news organizations plenty of time to settle on a name usage and see that choice reflected in their text. Ten was set as an adequate number of stories necessary to determine usage. Only one story per day was used. Book or movie reviews were omitted, since a newspaper or wire service would not, for example, change the film title "Beyond Rangoon" to "Beyond Yangon" to conform to its style policy.

Historical references also were omitted so as not to count stories referring to military titles or entities like World War Two's "Burma Road." This exception became especially important in the 1995 articles, when the world was honoring the 50th anniversary of that war. Obituaries also were not used since the reference usually related to World War Two.

Newspapers and news agencies were chosen largely for their availability through electronic databases, particularly for 1989. Additionally, both newspapers and news agencies are vitally important sources of international news. News agencies are used by electronic as well as by print media. "Today, no news organization that aims to inform its consumers about world events can afford to be without the services of at least one major news agency" (Merrill, 1995, p. 36). Three news agencies that Merrill called "major world agencies" (p. 37) were studied: the Associated Press, Reuters and Agence France Press. Additionally, TASS was considered to be a major world agency until the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The first criteria for the newspapers included in this study was that they covered Burma/Myanmar. Those newspapers generally were some of the largest international newspapers, such as The New York Times. Newspapers in countries that were close in proximity to Burma/Myanmar, such as The Bangkok Post also had sufficient coverage to merit inclusion in this examination. Financial newspapers were included because of the push for economic growth in many Southeast Asian nations, and because economic data were used as a basis of analysis. An effort was made to get as much of a geographical representation as possible among the news organizations studied. Finally, print media was particularly of interest to the researcher, whose professional background is as a print journalist.

The following newspapers were studied: The Australian Financial Review (Australia), The Bangkok Post (Thailand), Business Times (Singapore), The Christian Science Monitor (United States), The Daily Telegraph (Great Britain), The Daily Yomiuri (Japan), Financial Times (Great Britain), The Independent (Great Britain), The Jerusalem Post (Israel), Korea Economic Daily

Britain), The Independent (Great Britain), The Jerusalem Post (Israel), Korea Economic Daily (Korea), The London Times (Great Britain), The Los Angeles Times (United States) The New Straits Times (Malaysia), The New York Times (United States), The South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) and The Wall Street Journal (United States). The following news agencies were studied: Agence France Presse (France), Associated Press (United States), Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Germany), Inter Press Service (international), Kyodo News Service (Japan), Reuters (Great Britain), TASS (former Soviet Union/Russia) and Xinhua (China).

Content analysis and coding

Content was analyzed for whether the first reference in the body of the story was to "Burma/Rangoon" or "Myanmar/Yangon," whether the other name was used at all in the story and whether the topic and the tone of the story presented Burma/Myanmar in a "favorable," "unfavorable" or "neutral" light. This information was entered onto a sheet that listed all 10 articles reviewed from a single organization for either 1989 or 1995. Therefore, for example, The Daily Telegraph has two sheets: one for the 1989 stories and one for the 1995.

Stories from 1989 were not available on the databases for some news organizations, such as Agence France Presse. In those cases, the first available year within two years of 1989 was used. If articles still were unavailable, 1989 was omitted for that news organization rather than eliminating that news organization from the study if that meant narrowing the geographic diversity represented.

"Favorable" stories were those that portrayed Burma/Myanmar constructively or as an unexceptional member of the community of nations. Stories about business arrangements made up the bulk of "favorable" stories. "Unfavorable" stories were generally those that highlighted political or military oppression, or dealt with accusations of human rights abuses. Stories with the same topic, such as the release of Aung San Suu Kyi could be either "favorable" or "unfavorable" depending upon the article's context. In stories categorized as "neutral," Burma/Myanmar generally played a peripheral role, such as a story that listed the nationalities of victims who died in an earthquake in Japan.

Economic data

Economic data were taken from the International Monetary Fund's Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook for 1990 and its Direction of Trade Statistics Quarterly for September, 1995. Figures used were the exports to Myanmar from each country in which one of the studied news organizations was based (hereafter called "the home country") and the imports from Myanmar into each home country. Statistics from 1989 reflected year-end totals; 1995 statistics were through April 1995. These years coincide with the years of the newspaper stories studied.

Interviews with foreign editors and reporters

Foreign editors and/or reporters from eight of the news organizations in this study were interviewed over the telephone. Questions asked included:

- What is/was your news organization's official policy regarding use of "Burma" or "Myanmar" in 1989 and 1995?
- What is the reasoning behind your news organization's decision of which name to use?
- What is the significance of the names and words that newspapers/news agencies choose to adopt in their copy?

Questions were few and purposely open-ended to stimulate a free-flowing conversation. This method produced some fascinating observations, which will be discussed later in this paper.

Finally, some diplomatic information was collected from embassies regarding home countries' official political relationships with Burma/Myanmar. Questionnaires were sent to 15 embassies in Washington DC or permanent missions to the United Nations. Responses were discarded from two of the responding embassies – Belgium and Italy – because news organizations from those countries ultimately were not included in this study. In total, only five embassies or permanent missions – Burma/Myanmar, Japan, Malaysia, Germany and the United States– returned the questionnaires or provided appropriate information. That information will be referred to, but it is not a major set of data in this analysis.

Statistical tests performed

The content analysis was totaled to indicate how many news organizations used "Burma" and how many used "Myanmar" for 1989 and for 1995. Statistical tests were performed to determine general characteristics of the data and whether there was any relationship between various factors. Standard deviations were calculated to ascertain name preference among the stories and determine if any trends emerged. A chi-square test was performed to examine the relationship between "favorable," "unfavorable" and "neutral" stories versus name usage. A two-sample t-test was used to relate economic data to name choice.

Reliability and validity

Several steps were taken to heighten reliability and validity. In telephone interviews, editors and reporters were asked only about their newspapers' policies and their reasons or thoughts on why their news organizations made the name decision. Journalists were not asked for any information that was not relevant to them and their positions. In the content analysis, the co-coder was trained to understand the aim of this study and the coding categories. There was not much room for confusion in determining whether stories used "Burma" or "Myanmar." The two co-coders engaged in lengthy discussions on what constituted "favorable," "unfavorable" and "neutral" stories to reach common definitions. The mutual understanding was further checked by having both coders code 20 of the same stories independently. Those tests showed consistency in definitions and coding.

Validity was enhanced by the coders judging each story's content individually, even on common topics, such as Aung San Suu Kyi's release. That individual judgment was essential, as some stories portrayed the release as a completely positive development and some couched the action as indicative of what they saw as other problems still existing within the country.

Lastly, it should be noted that the author has attempted to show no favoritism for one name or the other by referring to the subject country as "Burma/Myanmar" when such a reference was made outside of direct quotations or story content.

Results

Content analysis

General characteristics of data

Out of the 220 stories analyzed from 1989, "Burma" or "Rangoon" was used as the first reference 71% of the time. "Myanmar" or "Yangon" was the first reference in 29% of the stories. In 1995, the first-reference usage of "Myanmar" or "Yangon" rose to 41%, while 59% still used "Burma" or "Myanmar" in the first reference. The first reference was generally the name used throughout the story, except in direct quotations or proper names, such as names of business firms. Table 1 shows a summary of the results.

Table 1: Summary of results

		1989					1995				
	News Organizations	Burma	Myanmar	f^+	u^+	n^+	Burma	Myanmar	f^+	u^+	n^+
1	Agence France Press *	10	0	4	6	0	10	0	4	6	0
2	Associated Press	10	0	1	8	1	10	0	4	6	0
3	Australian Financial Review	6	4	8	2	0	8	2	5	3	2
4	Bangkok Post	9	1	8	2	0	10	0	8	1	1
5	Business Times (Singapore)	9	1	9	0	1	0	10	10	0	0
6	The Christian Science Monitor	10	0	0	9	1	10	0	5	5	0
7	The Daily Telegraph	5	5	0	10	0	10	0	2	6	2
8	Daily Yomiuri	0	10	8	2	0	0	10	7	2	1
9	Deutsche Presse-Agentur	**					1	9	3	4	3
10	Financial Times	10	0	1	9	0	10	0	5	4	1
11	The Independent	10	0	1	8	1	9	1	7	2	1
12	Inter Press Service	9	1	1	7	2	10	0	7	3	0
13	Jerusalem Post	8	2	2	2	6	6	2	3	0	5
14	Korea Economic Daily	5	5	9	1	0	1	9	10	0	0
15	Kyodo News Service	2	8	2	6	2	0	10	7	3	0
16	London Times	10	0	0	9	1	10	0	4	5	1
17	Los Angeles Times	4	6	0	9	1	1	9	4	5	1
18	New Straits Times (Malaysia)	**					0	10	7	0	3
19	New York Times	5	5	0	7	3	5	5	6	4	0
20	Reuters	6	4	0	5	5	10	0	7	2	1
21	South China Morning Post	10	0	3	7	0	9	1	9	1	0
22	TASS	4	6	4	5	1	0	10	8	2	0
23	Wall Street Journal	10	0	2	8	0	10	0	9	1	0
24	Xinhua	5	5	1	7	2	0	10	7	2	1
	Totals	157	63	64	129	27	140	98	148	67	23

* Used 1991 stories instead of 1989

** 1989 Stories unavailable

[+] f, u and n denote favorable, unfavorable and neutral stories

Summary	1989					1995				
	Burma	Myanmar	+	—	|	Burma	Myanmar	+	—	|
All News Organizations	71%	29%	29%	59%	12%	59%	41%	62%	28%	10%

The standard deviations were calculated for three categories of data: the entire sample; organizations using primarily "Burma;" and organizations using primarily "Myanmar." These calculations were used to demonstrate that the newspapers and news agencies used one name or the other and to show that the trend to use one or the other was stronger in 1995 than in 1989. As seen in Table 2, the mean number of stories using "Burma" in 1989 was 7.14 and the standard deviation was 3.0. In 1995 the mean and standard deviation were 6.3 and 4.0. The high standard deviations for 1989 and 1995 indicate that news organizations tended to use either "Burma" or "Myanmar" in their copy. When the results were divided into organizations using "Burma" and those using "Myanmar," the standard deviations for uses of "Burma" are much smaller, supporting the claim

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that organizations use either one name or the other. These calculations also indicated that sloppiness or inconsistency were not statistically significant factors for either year in name usage.

Table 2: Mean number of stories using "Burma" and standard deviation

	1989		1995	
	Mean Frequency of "Burma" Uses*	Standard Deviation	Mean Frequency of "Burma" Uses*	Standard Deviation
Entire Sample	7.14	3.04	6.32	4.42
Organizations using "Burma"	9.07	1.44	9.43	1.16
Organization using "Myanmar"	3.75	1.83	0.8	1.55

* Out of a possible ten articles

Regional results

News organizations were grouped according to their geographical home region (Asia, Europe or the United States). Eight organizations were listed under "Europe," five under "United States" and nine under "Asia/Oceania." These groupings were done to determine whether proximity to Burma/Myanmar played a statistically significant role in whether the news organization chose the name requested by the government of Burma/Myanmar or maintained previous usage.

The results of which name was used were nearly identical for news organizations in the Europe or the United States, with "Myanmar" employed 25% of the time versus 75% usage for "Burma" in both 1989 and 1995. The figures were slightly different for Asian news organizations: "Myanmar" was used 42% of the time in 1989 (Burma was used 58% of the time). "Myanmar" was used 69% of the time in 1995 (Burma usage was 31%).

“Favorable” versus “unfavorable”

News organizations were divided into groups using “Burma” predominantly or “Myanmar” predominantly. The number of stories coded “favorable” and “unfavorable” were compared using a chi-square test (Table 3). One chi-square value was calculated for 1989 and one for 1995. There was virtually no difference in name usage patterns between those stories that were judged “favorable” versus those stories that were judged “unfavorable” between the two groups (those that used “Burma” and those that used “Myanmar”). The analysis shows this claim is supported with a high level of statistical significance in 1989 and a somewhat lower level in 1995.

Table 3: How type of coverage influenced name selection

	1989							
	Stories in the full sample	% of favorable, unfavorable and neutral	"Burma" Group			"Myanmar" Group		
			Actual fequency	Theoretical frequency	χ^2	Actual frequency	Theoretical frequency	χ^2
Favorable	6.4	29.1%	4	4.07	0.001	2.4	2.33	0.002
Unfavorable	12.9	58.6%	8.2	8.21	0.000	4.7	4.69	0.000
Neutral	2.7	12.3%	1.8	1.72	0.004	0.9	0.98	0.007
Total	22	100.0%	14	14	0.005	8	8	0.009

$\chi^2 = 0.005 + 0.009 = 0.014$ degrees of freedom = 2
$0.99 < p < 0.995$

	1995							
	Stories in the full sample	% of favorable, unfavorable and neutral	"Burma" Group			"Myanmar" Group		
			Actual frequency	Theoretical frequency	χ^2	Actual frequency	Theoretical frequency	χ^2
Favorable	14.8	0.622	8.1	8.58	0.027	6.9	6.22	0.075
Unfavorable	6.7	0.282	4	3.88	0.003	2.2	2.82	0.134
Neutral	2.3	0.097	1.7	1.33	0.101	0.9	0.97	0.005
Total	23.8	1	13.8	13.8	0.131	10	10	0.214

$\chi^2 = 0.131 + 0.214 = 0.345$ degrees of freedom = 2
$0.8 < p < 0.9$

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Economic data

Once again, news organizations' home countries were grouped into those that predominantly used "Burma" and those that predominantly used "Myanmar." The two groups were then ranked according to the dollar value of trade (imports and exports) between Burma/Myanmar and individual home countries for 1989 and for 1995 through April of that year (hereafter referred to simply as "1995"). The average U.S. dollar value of imports and exports from home countries whose news organizations used "Burma" was $14 million for 1989. The average import/export dollar value for countries whose news organizations used "Myanmar" was $34 million. Those figures were $5 million and $40 million respectively for 1995.

A two-sample t-test (Devore, 1991) was performed to test the null hypothesis: "Organizations with high export amounts to Burma/Myanmar are equally likely to use 'Burma' as organizations from countries with low export amounts." T-test results are summarized in Table 5.

T-test results refuted the null hypothesis for both 1989 and 1995. The following alternative hypothesis was supported: "The home countries of news organizations that used "Myanmar" were likely to have higher export amounts to Myanmar." Conversely, the news organizations in countries that had lower export figures with Myanmar were more likely to use "Burma." The level of significance of these findings were 0.10 in 1989 and less than 0.05 in 1995.

Table 5: T-test showing the influence of exports to Burma/Myanmar on name use

1989

Countries Whose News Organizations Predominantly used Myanmar

	Countries	Exports* to country by B'ma/M'mar	Imports* from country by B'ma/M'mar
1	Japan	22.39	76.21
2	People's Republic of China	24.60	51.43
3	Korea	8.50	9.52
4	USSR	6.66	4.95
	Mean	15.54	35.53
	Standard Deviation	9.26	34.25

* in millions of $US

t-test statistic: 1.346 degrees of freedom: 3.56

$p < 0.1$

Countries Whose News Organizations Predominantly used Burma

	Countries	Exports* to country by B'ma/M'mar	Imports* from country by B'ma/M'mar
1	Singapore	25.32	36.96
2	United Kingdom	4.02	23.38
3	United States	4.48	9.18
4	Thailand	15.37	5.96
5	Hong Kong	16.82	2.08
6	Australia	0.17	2.38
7	Israel	0.04	0.2
	Mean	9.46	11.45
	Standard Deviation	9.75	13.69

1995

Countries Whose News Organizations Predominantly used Myanmar

	Countries	Exports* to country by B'ma/M'mar	Imports* from country by B'ma/M'mar
1	People's Republic of China	31.34	104.87
2	Singapore	31.36	98.15
3	Malaysia	9.7	54.47
4	Japan	17.79	20.87
5	Germany	4.18	8.43
6	Korea	0	0
	Mean	15.73	47.8
	Standard Deviation	13.49	45.6

* in millions of $US

t-test statistic: 2.005 degrees of freedom: 5.22

$p < 0.05$

Countries Whose News Organizations Predominantly used Burma

	Countries	Exports* to country by B'ma/M'mar	Imports* from country by B'ma/M'mar
1	Hong Kong	16.9	17.09
2	France	1.88	16.85
3	Unied Kingdom	3.07	5.91
4	Israel	0.09	2.53
5	Australia	1.34	1.91
6	United States	22.24	0.88
7	Thailand	0	0
	Mean	6.5	6.45
	Standard Deviation	9.12	7.42

Interviews with editors and reporters

Nine reporters or editors from news organizations were interviewed over the telephone or via electronic mail about their organization's policies on usage of "Burma" or "Myanmar." The journalists interviewed were: Derry Hogue, foreign editor of The Australian Financial Review; Thomas Kent, international editor for the Associated Press; Pichai Chuensuksawadi, editor of The Bangkok Post; Kashmira Baldauf, Asia editor of The Christian Science Monitor; Thomas O'Dwyer, foreign and Middle East editor for The Jerusalem Post; Frank Taylor, executive foreign editor of The Daily Telegraph; Chris Gollop, deputy regional editor for the Inter Press Service in its Manila bureau, Dean Toda, assistant foreign editor of The New York Times and Youfu Lu, a staff member for the Xinhua News Agency in the United States.

Comments indicated several reasons why news organizations chose "Burma" or "Myanmar."

"Burma is much more familiar to our readers," Kent said.

Kent said that the AP embraced some name changes immediately, such as when Upper Volta became Burkina Faso. But the AP did not go along with the Ivory Coast's request to be referred to by the French form of its name, Côte d'Ivoire. The AP never changed to using "Kampuchea," the name the Khmer Rouge preferred.

"Here's the AP's position. We feel linked to the public's perception – what's familiar to the reader does make a difference," he said.

Kent said that if a hit movie, book or song came out that made "Myanmar" common usage, then the AP might adopt it. Still, he acknowledged, the names news organizations use do carry some significance. For example, after Israel withdrew some of its troops as part of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, AP decided to stop using "Occupied Territories" in datelines. It now uses "West Bank" and "Gaza Strip." There was some further discussion, Kent said, as whether to call the Palestinian-run areas, "Palestine," as in "Gaza City, Palestine." The answer was no. "Our feeling was it has not been declared "Palestine" by anybody. It has not been declared a sovereign state."

Hogue gave a different reason for the Australian Financial Review's policy to use "Myanmar."

"I suppose the policy is what the nation wishes to call itself. It may be unpleasant that a certain group rules," Hogue said. "Should the next person in control call it 'Burma' then I think we have to give due recognition to the people who are in control, democratically or otherwise, in that country."

have to give due recognition to the people who are in control, democratically or otherwise, in that country."

Hogue said there had been some inconsistency in various areas of the newspaper's style. The stylebook was recently revised to remedy any unclear points. In a list of countries included in the revision, the country is listed under "Myanmar." In another section of the stylebook, however, the country is listed under "B" with this entry: "Burma (capital city: Rangoon); but Burmah Oil Co" (1996, p. 64 and 105).

O'Dwyer said The Jerusalem Post has continued using "Burma" because the newspaper tries not to change its style too frequently. The last time its stylebook was revised, which included adopting different names for some countries, was around the time of the former Soviet Union's collapse. The paper immediately adopted all of the names of the former Soviet states. However, he said, if a dictator suddenly appeared in Africa and renamed the country, "We tend not to take it too seriously." O'Dwyer did not say that was the reasoning for the newspaper's continuing use of "Burma." Rather, what to call that country did not loom particularly large as an issue because the newspaper does not run many stories about it.

O'Dwyer said the names of geographical areas can be extremely significant – and sensitive in Israel. The paper, for example, called the West Bank and Gaza Strip the "Administered Territories" rather than the "Occupied Territories."

"We don't like putting the stigma of occupation" in the name, he said.

The New York Times has used "Myanmar" since the name change was announced in 1989 by the Burma/Myanmar government. The Times still uses "Burmese" as the adjective.

"Our policy is generally to follow the preference of the organization. There are some exceptions, all intended to make the news more easily readable to the reader," Toda said. The newspaper doesn't always accept the names new governments give their countries, he said, but "we

"It's hard to follow a consistent style on place names without upsetting somebody. South Korea objects that we call it the Sea of Japan; the Saudis complain that we call it the Persian Gulf; Ivory Coast wants to be called "Côte d'Ivoire; Bombay wants to be called Mumbai, etc., etc. But our goal has nothing to do with choosing sides – we want to be understandable, which generally means following conventional usage without compromising the truth," Toda said.

In Great Britain, which once ruled Burma, no one would know where the newspaper was referring to if it used "Myanmar," said Frank Taylor, executive foreign editor of The Daily Telegraph. "We tend to use what is familiar to the reader. If we started to use "Myanmar" in the media, especially here in Britain, no one would know what we're talking about. ...It's not even called "Myanmar" by the government," Taylor said. "It's rather like any new word that creeps into the vocabulary, like the ridiculous phrase, 'information superhighway.' That's a pure American invention, but unfortunately, it's creeping into the vocabulary here."

As their comments indicate, the editors said their news organizations' policies were based on considerations other than the politics of who was in power and whether they agreed with circumstances. Several said they did not think there was any great significance to the decision. Three organizations did not fit that pattern.

The Bangkok Post's policy is to use "Burma." Chuensuksawadi said there was a simple reason for that choice: "There was a democratically elected government that was overthrown. I think we have a position and we have stated it." That decision, however, has not hampered his newspaper's efforts to cover its neighbor to the west. "We still have access to Burma in the sense that a number of our journalists have been able to cover Burma from inside," Chuensuksawadi said. He also said his newspaper has hosted visiting Burmese journalists in Thailand, and has sent Thai journalists to visit "Burma."

The Thai government uses the "Union of Myanmar." Still, Chuensuksawadi said, the government has not pressured The Post to adopt the same form. "I think the Thai government understands the print media has become very independent media organizations," he said.

Which name to use has been the subject of much debate at The Christian Science Monitor, Baldauf said. For now, the newspaper uses "Burma" and generally puts the phrase, "now called Myanmar," into the copy as well. "Our main reason for going with 'Burma,' however, is that we don't want to go along with the whims and fancies of military dictators who decide to change the names of countries, capitals, cities – especially if it's going to make it more difficult for the reader to identify the newly named place," Baldauf said.

Baldauf said that The Christian Science Monitor editors think closely about these types of choices. In this case, Baldauf said, "I asked one of our staff correspondents visiting Burma last year to do some research. He brought up the issue of changing Burma's name to Myanmar in an interview with the recently released dissident, Aung San Suu Kyi." She said that although she was not necessarily the name "Myanmar," she did object to the military rulers' imposition of the new name without any national dialogue on the subject.

The Inter Press Service is a different type of news organization than the others in this study. IPS is a non-profit organization with headquarters in Rome that is the sixth largest news agency in the world. It specializes in socio-economic issues in Africa, Asia and Latin America, including environment, development, women and human rights.

"Most Asian newspapers use Myanmar, but IPS, being an international news agency, sticks with the use of a recognized regime. And the SLORC is not really recognized for its human rights," Gollop said.

Name choices are significant, he said, and that's why IPS puts "Myanmar" in parentheses and sometimes even refers to the country as "Myanmar."

The other type of news organization in this study is typified by China's government-run Xinhua News Agency. Youfu Lu, a staff member of Xinhua in the United States, said the news agency's policy was to use the name, "Union of Myanmar." That mirrors the government's policy.

Discussion

Rosengren encouraged the use of "explicit and preferably quantitative standards, drawn from outside the media whenever possible" (1977, p. 67). That is why economic data were analyzed in comparison to the actual usage of "Burma" or "Myanmar" in stories. Rosengren went on to say, in that very same sentence, that "The goal of the study of international news, however, should be explanation." That is why editors were questioned about their news organizations' policies as well as about their opinions on the significance of one type of word choice that they make.

Most of the journalists interviewed said their decisions were not based on judgments about how the SLORC got into power or what it had done during its reign. News organizations', or at least, the reporting side of the operation, are not supposed to let their opinions influence their work. That assertion is supported by an unexpected finding in this study that disproved one of our hypotheses: the use of "Burma" or "Myanmar" did not correlate with the number of "favorable" or "unfavorable" stories.

Rather, there are unique sets of considerations, such as common usage or what the country in question puts on its letterhead, that journalists often employ in making the kinds of decisions that end up in stylebooks. Journalists regularly take such factors as familiarity and proximity into account on word and name choices, or story selection.

The economic data, however, indicates a more expansive and subtle definition of what constitutes political influence or taking a stance. The economic data gives reason to believe there is a relationship between how much trade countries do with Burma/Myanmar, and which name news organizations used. Analysis by region shows that countries closer to Burma/Myanmar were more likely to call it by the name that the SLORC chose; that proximity suggests closer trade ties, as well. Closer trade ties suggest stronger political ties.

China, Singapore, Malaysia and Japan were the four top trade partners with Burma/Myanmar in 1995. The news organizations in those countries also used "Myanmar," the choice of the SLORC, predominantly in their copy. These trends also follow those countries diplomatic stance toward Burma/Myanmar, according to information from the embassies of Japan and Malaysia.

These trends, as well as the interviewees' comments examined more closely, indicate that politics is, indeed, a significant consideration in name usage, whether or not that influence is overt. The findings of this study point to a loop of adoption when it comes to country name choice. An event, place or person moves into that loop temporarily and inserts an issue. The issue then circulates through policymakers and the media and, perhaps, into common usage. The question of common usage recalls those editors who cited "familiarity to readers" as a reason for choosing either "Burma" or Myanmar." The question next becomes how is that familiarity achieved?

The SLORC simply announcing such a change over government-run radio certainly is not enough to make "Myanmar" a part of the working vocabulary of publics in Tokyo, Kuala Lampur, Moscow or Jerusalem. A reasonable scenario is that governments and internationally recognized institutions accept the change and then their representatives begin to use it in their written and verbal statements. Those comments, since they are coming from government officials, are likely to be covered at some point by the local media. Even if the news organization changes the name in most instances to fit its style policy, it generally does not make changes in direct quotations. At some point, if the new name continues its spread, as Kent from the Associated Press intimated, it may well become a part of the popular lexicon. At that point, it is difficult to imagine that a news organization would continue to publish a word that its readers no longer commonly used. The cycle of adoption, nurtured at one point by foreign policy, is complete.

Editors' comments raise another interesting point. Even if the journalists themselves, and perhaps their organizations' home countries, don't see their decisions as taking a political stance, the subject country – in this case, Burma/Myanmar – very well might.

Hogue, of The Australian Financial Review, said it is the newspaper's policy to use "East Timor" as the name for the nearby former Dutch colony that Indonesia has claimed as its own. Pressure has been put directly on the newspaper to shun that reference, Hogue said. The objectors do not like public reminders about East Timorese efforts to gain independence. The reasoning behind that objection seems somewhat akin to the reasoning in The Jerusalem Post's usage of "Administered Territories" rather than "Occupied Territories."

Those examples support the findings of Chang (1988) and others that name and "label" choices are significant. They also support Cohen's (1963) early assertion and Chang's finding that international news coverage often mirrors government foreign policy or practice. Many governments use media, whether in their own country or another country, to get their perspective across or influence policy (O'Heffernan, 1990). Certainly, the use of "Administered Territories" conveys a different and specific viewpoint to readers than does "Occupied Territories."

Future research

If that connection exists, then researchers should use extra-media data to test whether other communication theories, most notably agenda-setting, are relevant in the name/word usage decisions news organizations make. In O'Heffernan's study (1990), 82% of foreign policy officials said that while media coverage of regional issues can put them on the national foreign policy agenda or raise their prominence, the media does not often cause policy to be changed. Further examination into the relationship and ramifications of foreign policy and international reporting is particularly appropriate as media organizations, particularly television news outlets, become more concentrated and globalized. Researchers should look bring in linguistic principles to better understand the grammatical and symbolic implications.

Future research also should profile all or most of the major news organizations in single countries. Such an examination is a limitation of this research, and might provide a more holistic look at the relationship between news organizations and their home countries' foreign policy.

It also is worthwhile to complement statistical data with comments from some of the subjects involved in the issues. O"Heffernan (1990) surveyed foreign policymakers. Hess (1996) elicited comments from foreign correspondents. Interviews can flesh out the on-the-ground information that statistics do not always reveal. Conversely, statistics can keep journalists "honest," that is to say, they can draw connections that journalistic instincts, traditions and pride might cause to be overlooked.

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The Impact of Cultural and Market Distance on International Advertising: An Content Analysis of Ad Appeals in Ads from US, Japan and Korea

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The Impact of Cultural and Market Distance on International Advertising: An Content Analysis of Ad Appeals in Ads from US, Japan and Korea

Abstract

This study examined the impact of cultural and market distance on ad appeals of international advertising by identifying variables related to cultural characteristics and market conditions. A content analysis of 234 magazine advertisements for common multinational brands was performed. Results showed that US ads were more likely to use hard-sell appeal and Korean soft-sell. Similar finding was found for Japanese/Korean ads comparison. In addition, comparative appeal was found significantly more often in US ads than its Japanese and Korean counterparts. Data from concept mapping were used to validate the statistical analysis and a consistent result was found.

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The Impact of Cultural and Market Distance on International Advertising: An Content Analysis of Ad Appeals in Ads from US, Japan and Korea

Introduction

The development of cross-border communications, global media and advanced technologies has led to a single global marketplace. Such a trend seemed to generate the driving force for the demand for universal brand and uniform advertising within the multinational arena. However, psychological or perceived barriers between country borders still remain. Regional differences have resulted in a variety of different cultural and socio-economic models which in turn have impacted the configuration of multinational networking in all types of marketing communications. They came to recognize that markets around the world are moving from mass products to specially tailored products designed to meet highly differentiated consumer needs in a variety of cultural settings (Homma, 1991). This transition further prompted Transnational Advertising Agencies (TNAA) to become motivated in communicating effectively with consumers from a wide variety of cultures on behalf of their global clients. The goal of TNAA is to develop international advertising campaigns to communicate their global clients' message to consumers (Mueller, 1987). Thus, their immediate tasks focused on the key question of devising advertising campaign performance for foreign markets: should the targets be considered as a separate individual consumer or as collective global consumers?

To explore this question, this study will examine cultural and market-related factors as major possible explanatory variables for the diverse performance of advertising campaigns in international contexts. Specifically, the study will focus on the impact of these factors on the type of advertising appeals employed in transnational advertising campaigns. In addition, this study will also examine how cultural distance and market distance between cultural groups influence the practice of standardization versus localization in international advertising.

Conceptualization

Cultural Distance

As Samovar, Porter and Jain (1981) proposed, the degree of influence culture has on intercultural communication situations is a function of the dissimilarity or distance between cultures. Cultural distance is concerned with the degree of dissimilarity between message senders and message receivers. So, as the cultural distance is similar - socially, politically, psychographically and demographically - the more the communication repertoire of behavior is likely to be.

Based on the concept of cultural distance, Mueller (1987) compared ads from U.S., Japan and Germany in order to examine the relative degree of standardization of ads between countries. She found that overall usage of standardized campaigns was more common for messages transferred between Western nations than for messages transferred between Western and Eastern nations. This suggests that the cultural distance between Western countries tends to be less than the one between Western countries and Eastern countries. It further suggests that a standardized advertising campaign is more common between countries where there is less cultural distance.

Cultural Scale

Based on the concept of cultural distance, Samovar et al(1981) suggested the use of a measuring scale assesses the variation of cultural distance between cultures. The amount of difference between two cultural groups can be seen to depend on the relative social uniqueness of the two groups. Such a social uniqueness is qualitatively and subjectively determined by a number of cultural factors which are subject to variation: physical appearance, religion, philosophy, social attitude, language, heritage, basic conceptualizations of self and the universe, and degree of technological development (Samovar et al, 1981).

Although this scale is rather unrefined, it does provide insights into the effect of cultural differences. For example, from this scale, a maximum difference exists between Western and Asian cultures. In contrast, an example nearer the center of the scale is the difference between American culture and German culture, where less variation is found.

Cultural Characteristics

More than three decades ago, McLuhan (1964) noted that advertisements are the richest and most faithful daily reflections that any society ever made of its entire range of activities. Lazer et al (1987) suggested that while Western communication appeals tend to be more verbal, with a logical direct message, Japanese appeals are more emotional, suggestive and indirect.

One of the earliest cross-cultural studies (Lenormand, 1964), maintained that cultural differences such as basic customs, religious beliefs and living standards are too great to overcome. In the early 1970s, Britt (1974), Green and Langeared (1975), and Green, Cunningham and Cunningham (1975) reported that because consumers evaluated the attributes of the same product differently across cultures, this fact should be reflected in different advertising approaches.

Other studies have compared Eastern and Western cultural traditions or standards to assess major differences in ads (Hong et al, 1987; Mueller, 1987, 1991, 1992; Sriram et al, 1991; Chang, 1991). They argued that distinct cultural characteristics are embedded in advertising appeals, which are used in varying degrees to convey advertising messages of various cultures : these are emotional and cognitive orientations, soft-and-hard sell appeals, power distance, individualism-collectivism and uncertainty avoidance. Martensen (1989) and Kweon et al (1992) added the concept of contextual culture and time perception, from which clear difference between East and West was found.

As such, criteria for cultural dimensions had mixed agreement and support among researchers primarily because these are never completely exclusive and independent. However, Zandpour and his associates(1994) systematically restructured the criteria for cultural characteristics into four distinct categories: Individualism-collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance and perception of time. The representativeness of these cultural dimensions has already been tested and substantiated in terms of whether it was able to explain differences in consumer behavior (Lynn, Zinkhan and Harris, 1993). Thus, although there are more cultural characteristics that may be relevant to advertising, these four characteristics seemed to be the most parsimonious criteria used to classify the different patterns of advertising expressions among cultures. Therefore, the present study will build on Zandpour et al's cultural criteria by examining the following cultural characteristics which have been utilized as the common denominators in cross-cultural studies of advertising: Individualism-collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance and perception of time.

Individualism-Collectivism. Individualism-collectivism has been suggested to be the major dimension of cultural variability identified by theorists across disciplines (Zandpour et al, 1994). Individualism is defined as "a situation in which people are supposed to look after themselves and their immediate family only," whereas collectivism is defined as a "situation in which people belong to in-groups or collectivities which are supposed to look after them in exchange for loyalty (Chang, 1991; Hofstede and Bond, 1984). The emphasis in individualistic societies is on a person's initiative and achievement, relying on factual information for decision-making as opposed to seeking group harmony and consensus (Zandpour et al, 1994; Gudykunst, Ting-Toomy & Stewart, 1985). Further, the individualistic society emphasizes the articulation of messages, whereas the collectivistic society is characterized as nonverbal and less articulate in communication (Gudykunst & Kim, 1984; Zandpour et al, 1994). Western societies are mainly regarded as individualistic societies as opposed to Eastern ones which are collectivistic (Frith et al, 1991, Hofstede, 1984).

Individualistic societies are more likely to put more emphasis on individual differences or strength in argument, and instead put less emphasis on shared feeling and consonance among persons when they process persuasive message such as advertising. Ogilvy (1985) asserted that in an individualistic society such as US, advertising should be written not to multiple readers, but to single individual reader. He argued that it is because when people read advertising copy, they are not together but merely alone. In line with this, Wolburg and Talyor (1994) explored the depth and the ways that American television advertising reflected individualism. They further found that regardless of the nature of the product, advertising appealed heavily to self-interests.

Power Distance. Power distance is concerned with the relationship between authority and social perception (Hofstede, 1991). In high-power distance cultures, people tend to obey the recommendations of authority figures such as parents, teachers and bosses in comparison to cultures that have little tolerance for authority (Hofstede, 1991; Zandpour et al, 1994). In this culture, people tend to emphasize the basis of facts and reasoning.

Zandpour et al's (1994) study confirmed that power distance was a significant factor affecting advertising difference among cultures. They found that high power distance culture tended to use more celebrities with various kinds of authorities and rely on more psychological appeals, compared to low power distance culture. Sriram et al (1991) and Frith and Wesson (1991) also substantiated the influence of power distance on advertising. In particular, Sriram et al (1991) found that from a discriminant analysis, power distance was a significant determinant for clustering 40 countries into six groups within each of which standardization could be attempted.

Uncertainty Avoidance. Uncertainty avoidance is the degree to which people prefer structured to unstructured situations, and ranges from extremely rigid to relatively flexible (De Mooiji, 1994; Hofstede & Bond, 1984). Cultures with high levels of uncertainty avoidance need to rely more on formal rules, absolute truth and advice of those whom they consider to be experts (Hostede, 1980; Rubin 1992; Zandpour et al, 1994).

Learning by trial and error and experimentation, searching for innovation, and acceptance of a high level of mobility, all express an easy attitude toward insecurity. Instead of engaging in decision-making, people avoiding uncertainties are more likely to rely on rules, precedents and patterns. They tend to avoid making assessment and assumptions, and do not like to publish or discuss their plans before these are complete (De Mooiji, 1994). This cultural value is clearly reflected in advertising, than any other values, because it is more closely related to communication patterns and comprehensibility of messages.

Perception of Time. Different cultures have different concepts of time. Time is used as a measuring instrument and a means of controlling human behavior by setting deadlines and objectives (De Mooiji, 1994). Although it might be devised only from Western perspectives, Hall (1990) argued that time is tangible; like an object, it can be saved, spent, found, lost and wasted. He describes this way of handling time as **monochronic** as opposed to **polychronic.** People from monochronic cultures tend to do one thing at a time; they are organized and methodical, and their workdays are structured to allow them to complete one task after another. Polychronic people on the other hand tend to do many things simultaneously. Polychronic cultures rely more on implicit and nonverbal information as opposed to monochronic cultures that seek explicit communication (Hall, 1983; Zandpour et al, 1994). In particular, Zandpour et al's (1994) study found that monochronic cultures (e.g., North America and European countries) with linear perception of time tended to rely more on direct, rational, argumentative and explicit advertising appeals, as opposed to polychronic culture with nonlinear perception of time.

Market Distance

As Johansson (1994) argued, culture alone does not explain the unique nature of a country's advertising. To develop a deeper understanding, it is reasonable to investigate market conditions related to advertising industry, which might play a role as another explanatory variable for ad dissimilarity. Market distance is defined as dissimilarity or difference between markets in terms of market conditions which are generally defined as visible or invisible factors directly or indirectly related to economic market or relevant environment in a country (Schiffman and Kanuk, 1991; Kotler, 1984). In general, these focus on six broad areas : 1) institutional arrangements (e.g., advertisers and ad agency structure, Johansson, 1994), which suggests that the institutional setup leads to the creative freedom in advertising; 2) legal environment or government regulation (Cutler, 1992; Boddewyn, 1988; Lorimore, 1979; Miracle, 1968), which suggests that the extent of government control for advertising results in creative diversities; 3) media characteristics (Rau and Preble, 1987; Sorenson and Weichman, 1975; Lenormand, 1964), which summarizes that media-related factors affect the development of international campaign; 4) product positioning (Jones, 1992; Moriarity and Duncan, 1990; Sorrenson and Weichman, 1975), which asserts that products are diversely positioned according to consumers' use and gratification in an international context; 5) different product categories (Chang, 1991; Cutler, 1991; Stern, Krugman and Resnik, 1981) and the Product Life Cycle (Miracle et al, 1991; Chang, 1990), for which different message strategies are required.

As a step toward more specific approach out of the above listed categories, Zandpour et al (1994) identified and examined seven elements related to advertising industry environment. Under the category of institutional arrangements, they expanded it with advertising expenditure per capita, presence of US advertisers, advertising personnel shortage and US advertising agencies. Under the category of legal environment, government control was included. Under the product category, they identified the type of product. And the type of commercial breaks was identified as major operational variable of media characteristics. These categories seem to be more specific and exclusive in a sense that they focused more directly on advertising industry-related classifications.

Therefore, their approach will be used as a conceptual building block to examine market conditions in the present study. Only categories relevant to this study will be used as explanatory variables for the difference of advertising. Among them, commercial break, which was originally used in their study was excluded because this study will focus on print medium.

Advertising Expenditure Per Capita. In industrialized countries, consumers have greater per capita income with which to purchase goods, and the marketplace is more consumer oriented. Thus, it is natural to assume that in more industrialized countries firms employ advertising more extensively to improve or hold their competitive position in the marketplace. Cutler (1991) found that in countries where advertising expenditures per capita are high, there are more extensive use of hard-sell advertising techniques to cut through the clutter of advertising. Zandpour et al (1994) demonstrated that greater per capita advertising expenditures was associated with higher levels of advertising sophistication and consumer acceptance of advertising as a legitimate medium.

Presence of US Advertisers. Since US advertising has by far the largest ad expenditure and has dominated the world market, their advertising policies and strategies could influence the advertising of a target country. Levitt (1983) said that if they are looking for a standardization approach in advertising message, the number of US advertisers in target countries may be a major indicator to consider. Zandpour et al (1994) found that the presence of US advertisers was a significant factor affecting advertising informativeness and style among countries.

Advertising Personnel Shortage. Advertising personnel is concerned with the potential of human resources in advertising industry. This potential might determine the quality of advertising in a market. Zandpour et al (1994) argued that availability of skilled advertising personnel in a market could independently impact the quality of the creative work in that market. This might be greatly different from country to country. In fact, Shao and Hill (1992), and Zandpour et al(1994) found that there was a significant difference in availability of such skills around the world. In particular, Zandpour et al (1994) found that access to a ready supply of advertising personnel - measured by the total number of areas among the fifteen advertising professions that were short in each country - meant more informative, argumentative, symbolic and less dramatic advertising.

US Advertising Agencies. US advertising agencies exist almost ubiquitously. They are primarily taking charge of controlling advertising strategy, policy and management in accordance with the guidelines from US-based headquarters. For the most part, advertising for US brands tends to be controlled by US advertising agencies even in countries outside US. Often they tend to follow the standardized guidelines set by US headquarters especially for economic reasons. Zandpour et al (1994) found that television commercial in markets with a strong presence of American advertising agencies were more factual and did not have any reasoning or conclusions. Therefore, it is expected that the more US advertising agencies there are within a country, the more advertising become Americanized and standardized.

Government Control. The legal regulation by the government is always a barrier in international advertising. Government control is defined as any form of restriction exercised by the legislation, court, consumer protection, and administrative department in the government of a target country (Cutler, 1991; Boddewyn, 1981). The degree of restriction on advertising varies according to the country. Advertising in the United States is the most unrestricted (with the exception of deceptive advertising) by both the government and by media practices (Cutler, 1991; Boddewyn, 1983). Boddewyn (1983) discovered that India had minor legal restriction but major media restriction. Many studies found that there are substantial advertising regulatory differences across countries and thus, this would greatly hinder international advertising, especially standardized advertising (Boddewyn, 1981; Boddewyn and Marton, 1978; Luqmani, Yavas and Quraeshi, 1989; Zandpour et al, 1994). In particular, Zandpour et al (1994) found that the extent and nature of government control of advertising was significantly related to advertising messages. Specifically, they found that when marketers were confronted with strict government control of advertising, they tended to use psychological and symbolic associations and were less likely to use dramatic testimonials and wordy commercials.

Type of Products. Advertisers may impact the nature of advertising through the type of products that they advertise (Zandpour et al, 1994). Ryans (1969) suggested that product type should be one of the main determinants for advertising standardization. However, in the case of all durable products and most non-durable products, standardization is quite questionable. Jhally, Kline and Leiss (1985) found that in the United States, the use of appeals varied drastically by product category. Similarly, Link (1988) suggested that globalization process must be tailored to the specific needs of each product category.

Zandpour et al (1994)'s study found that product categories have independently affected information content, creative strategy, the style of ad messages. In particular, Food-beverages was more likely to be presented in a dramatic format, providing little visual information with very little chance of being advertised in a news format. Personal care-cosmetic and drug advertising, however, was more likely to use visual information. This category was also less likely to be presented in a news format as opposed to service, car and car products that were more frequently advertised in terms of conceptually unrelated facts with little visual information.

To summarize, this study explains the difference of advertising from the conceptual framework of the combination of cultural distance and market distance. Simultaneous examination of both cultural distance and market distance will provide a more explanatory power for the difference of advertising. It is because both variables are not correlated and thus, independent and mutually exclusive. Furthermore, which variable has more impact on ad difference cannot be always determined.

Advertising Appeals.

The advertising appeal in this study is defined as persuasive techniques that advertisers use in the advertisement in the hope of attracting their A.I.D.A (attention-interest-desire-action) (Aaker and Meyers, 1987). The advertising appeal can be multi-dimensional as it contains both the intended message and the process for delivering the message (Cutler, 1991). There are a number of classification systems which have been developed for describing advertising appeal (Jhally, Kline, and Leiss, 1985; Norris, 1981; Fletcher and Zeigler, 1978). Among many executional appeals, however, this study will categorize them into hard or soft sell, direct response, and comparative appeal which have been most frequently used in cross-cultural studies of international advertising.

Hard and Soft-Sell Appeal. The terms hard-sell and soft-sell advertising are defined as relative terms which describes an overall set of advertisements and techniques rather than any specific ad or technique. Hard-sell advertising consists of advertising which takes a direct, short-term, approach to the actual sale of a product (Cutler, 1991; Wells, Burnett and Moriarity, 1989). Such advertising is generally described as focusing on rational, factual, logical reasons for purchasing the product. Soft-sell advertising will be defined as advertising which takes an indirect, long-term approach to the sale of the product through the establishment of association between the product and positive feeling for a person, situation or item (Cutler, 1991). Soft-sell ads tend to be associated with an emotional appeal, as opposed to hard-sell ads using a rational or product-oriented appeal.

Lannon (1986) characterizes the dominant United States hard-sell approach as fact based, while the more soft-sell approach exists in the U.K.'s humor. Roth (1982) characterizes the U.K.'s style as more participative, implicit, nonverbal and visual than the United States ads. Similar contrasts between hard-sell and soft-sell are made in many of the studies of Japanese advertising. Mueller (1987) found that the soft-sell approach was used three times as often in Japanese ads as in the United States ads. Helming (1984) notes that Japanese commercials do not mention price and are low-key on the emphasis of brand names. Roth (1982) described American ads as direct, visual and explicit, with bold headlines and type, while Japanese ads were more non-verbal, visual, intuitive, and emotional.

Direct Response Appeal. Direct response is defined as a direct action request, such as a coupon or an invitation to write or call (Wells, 1988; Cutler, 1991). Ads containing direct response requests are oriented to the short-term and direct and can be measured for results. This direct action orientation is highly structured, and appears to fit within the conceptualization of hard-sell (Mueller, 1991; Cutler, 1991). Martensen (1987) found that advertising in the United States had a 22 percent higher individualism score than Sweden and used direct response ads 29 percent more often than Sweden.

Comparative Appeal. Comparative appeal is defined as an appeal which explicitly compares the brand to a competitor's brand by name/picture, the term brand X competitors' brands, or implicitly by stating that the brand is better than all others. The explicit or implicit comparison of one brand to another brand in an ad has been examined by a number of researchers (Miracle, 1988; Miracle and Nevett, 1987; Boddewyn, 1983; Boddewyn and Marton, 1978). The regulatory situation is substantially different in each country, and in this case the regulatory factor was expected to dominate over both economic and cultural indicators (Boddewyn, 1983). The United States uses this appeal or technique more predominantly than any other country in the world. Mueller (1991) and Cutler (1989) argued that while ads in individualistic culture such as the US frequently use comparative appeals, ads in collectivistic societies may not need or desire specific comparative appeals.

Country Profile

Three countries were selected from North America and Asia, the two largest marketable continents. They are the US, Korea and Japan. From a cultural perspective, Korea and Japan represent traditionally Eastern cultures, while the US represents the West (Mueller, 1987; Chang, 1991, Frith and Frith, 1991; Frith and Wesson, 1992).

Type of Culture

The communication objectives in Asian cultures are directed toward achieving consensus and harmony in interpersonal relations and social circumstance (Lin, 1993). For this reason, Korean and Japanese cultures are found to be collectivistic in emphasizing these values. In contrast, the United States is considered a culture that relies heavily on its Western rhetoric and logical tradition to relate thoughts and actions to people and their environment (Hall and Hall, 1987; Wells, 1987; Lin, 1993). Therefore, US culture is regarded to be highly individualistic (Hsu, 1981; Hofstede, 1980; Bella, 1987; Shiffman and Kanuk, 1978; Chang, 1991).

Korean culture is even more collectivistic than Japanese culture (Gudykunst, Yoon and Nishida, 1987; Hofstede, 1984). This finding was confirmed by Klopf (1981) who reported that in Korea, the family unit is more important than the individual, and decisions are made in favor of the entire family, rather than for the sole benefit of a single individual of the family. Both Korean and Japanese cultures have mostly been influenced by Confucianism which stresses the importance of maintaining proper human relationships. This tradition results in the implicitness and indirectness of the Korean and Japanese languages (Yum, 1987). On this side of Pacific, the Western spirit of adventurism and conquest guides US culture to express more challenges and confrontation to the status quo (Lin, 1993). Thus, US culture is characterized as direct, explicit(Frith and Wesson, 1991) and as distrustful of authority (Shils, 1956, Norton, 1964).

According to Hofstede's (1984) survey, Asian countries tended mostly to be in high-power distance cultures, whereas most of Western countries were more likely to belong to low power distance cultures. His study also found that the Korean and Japanese culture were high power distance cultures, showing scores of 54 and 60 respectively on a power distance scale, compared to 40 of the United States.

Americans live easily with uncertainty and base many of their daily decisions on probabilities (De Mooiji, 1994). The Asian people, on the other hand, shun insecurity. Hofstede (1984) showed that Asian tended to have a strong need to avoid uncertainty than people of any other nationality. The uncertainty avoidance indexes of Korea and Japan were 85 and 92 respectively, whereas it is 46 for US. Consequently, Japanese and Koreans have much higher uncertainty avoidance, compared to US (Hofstede, 1984).

In the perception of time, the Americans have a linear time concept, with clear structures, such as beginning, turning point, climax and end (Hall, 1989). Thus, they tend to do one thing at a time in the way of handling time called "monochronic." On the other hand, Korean and Japanese are more likely to be "polychronic" which means that people tend to do many things simultaneously (De Mooiji, 1994; Hofstede, 1984).

Market Sophistication

Regarding market conditions, US is the leader especially in advertising industry environment at the 21st century, but is closely followed by Japan. For instance, in the area of advertising expenditures, US is the top market with Japan a distinct second largest market, whereas Korea was marked as the 9th market in the world (Advertising Age, August 14, 1994).

Overall, general trade volumes and economic indicators show that US and Japan were sharing the leading positions in the world markets, compared to Korea. According to Kotler (1992)'s definitions of market level based on the concept of product life cycle, both US and Japan may be advanced market dwelling on the maturity stage of product life cycle (PLC), whereas Korea is more likely to be a far developing market in the stage of growth of the PLC. Government control in Japan and Korea is similarly stricter than US which is much more moderate than any other country (Boddeywn, 1986; Cutler, 1991).

In regard to domestic institutional arrangement, the typical Western ad agency is independent of the media and considers it unethical to accept as clients firms competing in the same market (Johansson, 1994). However, the ad agencies in Korea and Japan do not face this limitations. The larger agencies have direct influence in the media and customarily maintain business relationships with competing advertisers. In terms of media availability and patterns, Korea has only 197 consumer magazines (Ad Yearbook, 1993), which is far behind US (2,869) and Japan (2,424) (Ad Age, August 1994). Korean consumers get information about products and services mostly from newspapers, whereas Americans and Japanese do so from magazines (Hong et al, 1987; Moon and Franke, 1987). It might be partly because US and Japanese magazines are more narrowly targeted based on more specialized topics than those in Korea. In terms of ad personnel shortage, US had more abundant access to a ready supply of advertising personnel, compared to Japan and Korea (Zandpour et al, 1994). Even Japan had a higher advertising personnel shortage than Korea.

From the comparison, the US-Japan dyad has more in common than the Japan-Korea or US-Korea dyads. Basically, these countries share certain characteristics and yet are differentiated by others. Japan and Korea share cultural perspectives but differ in market conditions. US and Japan have similar market conditions, but exhibit diversely opposite cultural characteristics.

For these two comparisons, the relative influence of two variables is hard to establish in terms of which has more impact on difference of ads between countries, because these are not mutually correlated by any means. However, this study expects that cultural distance will largely - but not absolutely - be more impactful than market distance for the following reasons. First of all, major criteria for cultural distance were originally related to socio-cultural uniqueness which encompasses all the consumer-related factors such as language, values, attitudes, and other psychological variables. In contrast, market distance or conditions are expected to form the external structure of advertising, which is more directly related to the industrial environment of advertising than to the consumer environment. Thus, these arguments will boil down to the question of which influence had more priority in creating difference of ads : consumer factors or market factors?

Assuming that advertising is a purposeful and consumer-oriented communication means between advertisers and consumers, advertising is more likely to be reflective of cultural distance or characteristics, as a primary influential agent of ad dissimilarity. Factors of market distance associated with market conditions play only a secondary role in measuring or evaluating ad differences. Therefore, in this study, it is expected that cultural characteristics or cultural distance are more impactful than market conditions or market distance.

When applying this to the cultural and market distance scale as in Figure 1, if there is any difference of ads between US and Japan, that will be attributed to the difference of culture or characteristics. Also, any difference of ads between Japan and Korea will be ascribed to the dissimilarity of market conditions. Finally, the difference between US and Korea will be explained by the difference in both cultural characteristics and market conditions.

Based on the above discussion and findings, the following hypotheses are stated :

H1: US magazine ads will have more hard-sell, comparative and direct response appeals than Korean magazine ads.

H2: US magazine ads will have more hard-sell, comparative and direct response appeals than Japanese magazine ads.

H3: Japanese magazine ads will have more hard-sell, comparative and direct response appeals than Korean magazine ads.

So far, a distance pattern between individual countries has been predicted on the basis of their predicted interaction among cultural characteristics, market conditions and advertising. The next step is concerned with a distance pattern between country dyads - country pairs - which is the question of where in the cultural and market distance scale each dyad could be positioned. Further, it is expected that advertising difference will vary according to cultural and market distance between country dyads. Among the three country dyads, the US-Korea comparison is at the maximum difference level because of difference in both cultural and market distance, while the Korea-Japan comparison is at the minimum difference level because of difference only in market distance, according to the distance scale. Thus, applied to an advertising context, it can be expected that advertising difference between US and Korea will be greater than the one between US & Japan or Korea & Japan. Further, it can be also predicted that advertising difference between US and Japan will be greater than Korea and Japan. Therefore, the hypotheses will be as follows:

H4: The differences between US and Korean ads are greater than those between US and Japanese ads in ad appeals.

H5: The differences between US and Korean ads are greater than those between Korean and Japanese ads in ad appeals.

H6: The differences between US and Japanese ads are greater than those between Korean and Japanese ads in ad appeals.

Method

Magazine ads from US, Japan and Korea constitute the units of analysis. This study content analyzed magazine advertisements (at least half-page in size) that were for multinational common brands from US, Japan and Korea.

US, Japanese and Korean advertisements were obtained by purposive sampling, i.e., advertisements selected on the basis of specific characteristics or qualities and eliminated those which failed to meet these criteria. Thus, advertisements for common brands sold in these three countries in Winter (January), Spring (March), Summer (June), and Fall (September) 1995 were obtained in order to control for possible seasonality effects. Editions from as many titles of magazines with mass circulation as possible were used to obtain the latest number of common ads. As a result, 243 magazine ads were collected from US (n=81), Japan (n=81) and Korea (n=81) from a total of 65 magazine titles - approximately 500 issues.

Coding Scheme

Sets of common brand ads in the US, Japanese and Korean sample were content analyzed for a number of variables. These included three types of ad appeals: 1) hard sell / soft sell, 2) comparative appeal, and 3) direct response appeal, as well as 4) the degree of similarity between country dyads.

The ad appeals were nominally coded: 1) hard / soft sell appeal was coded "0" for hard-sell and "1" for soft-sell appeal; 2) comparative and 3) direct response appeal were measured as follows: "0" for absence and "1" for presence.

To code ad-related factors, three independent coders, unaware of the objectives of the study, were recruited. Fluency in Japanese and Korean was a requirement for the coding of those ads. High intercoder reliability was found using Scott's pi procedure: American/Korean (87.9%), American/Japanese(85.7%) and Korean/Japanese(86.7%).

The degree of similarity in ads between country dyads was measured on the basis of coding results. Particularly, this was coded by a primary coder after comparing pairs of common brand ads in the US and Japanese sample, the US and Korean sample and Japanese and Korean sample. The evaluation was done on the basis of a 5-point scale ranging from totally dissimilar to very similar . The assessment was determined by the percent of agreement in coding 14 information cues of paired samples of ads. That is, if their codings in ads between paired countries were in 81 - 100% agreement, it receives a "5"(very similar). Likewise, a "4" is used for 61 - 80% agreement, a "3" for 41 - 60% agreement, a "2" for 21 - 40 agreement and a "1" (totally dissimilar) for 0 - 20%

agreement. In addition, type of product among market conditions was excluded from analysis due to the sample characteristics.

With regard to statistical measures, chi-square, t-test were used to test the study hypotheses.

A New Approach with Concept Mapping

As a way of comparing countries' unique meaning vis a vis ad-related factors, this study proposes the use of a computerized concept-mapping program called VBPro (Miller, 1993). Concept mapping is a multidimensional scaling procedure developed for the specific purpose of analyzing natural language text through computer program (Miller, 1991).

The scaling was made by the mechanism of factor analysis. The program creates a term-by-term cosine matrix based on the frequency of their occurrence and co-occurrence and extracts the first three eigenvectors of this matrix. The eigenvalues are standardized to unit length (that is, the sum of their squares equals one). This standardization minimizes differences in derived values that are due solely to differences in frequency occurrence (Andsager and Miller, 1994). The formula for the co-occurrence cosine matrix is as follows where A and B represent the respective terms (Salton, 1982).

$$\text{Cos} = \sum AB / \sqrt{(\sum A^2)(\sum B^2)}$$

The values for the first eigenvector depend primarily on the frequency and number of co-occurrences of each term and are interpreted as the prominence or "size" of that term or concept (Andsager and Miller, 1994). The second and third eigenvectors are interpreted as dimensions to project the words into a two-dimensional space (Andsager and Miller, 1994). Therefore, concepts appearing close to each other could be said to represent a cluster and are related through co-occurrence (Chew and Kim, 1994).

For the most part, the usage of concept mapping has varied according to analytic purposes and media characteristics. In general, concept mapping has been used to analyze the relationship between attributes and objects in media content and among perceptions of population subgroups (Miller, 1991; Chew and Miller, 1992; Chew, Metha, and Kim, 1992; Chew, Metha and Oldfather, 1993; Chew, Metha and Oldfather, 1994;). Themes and categories in contents were usually the variables under examination. However, the present study used concept mapping to analyze the dynamic pattern between attributes and objects. Unlike the previous studies that focused on texts in media coverage and open-ended data from respondents, this study analyzed the creative patterns in magazine advertising among countries. Specifically, it examined how ad-related attributes will co-occur and be associated with specific countries (the objects). Spatial plots were used to show the distance (closeness or separateness) of specific elements or factors related to advertising from each country.

Data from original coding instrument was entered and transferred from SAS to VBPro, the computer program for concept mapping (Miller, 1995). Data was reformatted from the number to actual term representing it in an ad. After data were entered and processed in a specific format required by VBPro, VBPro coded the data on co-occurrence of each country and frequency distributions of categorical attributes. As mentioned earlier, standardized principal components of the co-occurrence matrix were created based on the interactions between these country variables and categorical attributes, which subsequently demonstrate the relationship clusters of selected terms and their standardized loadings. These loadings produced three dimensional coordinates, among which the second and third coordinates were the horizontal and vertical dimensions respectively. In this study, the standardized loadings were reexpressed as bubble coordinates with a variety of different radia on the chart. This process resulted in the position of the spatial plot which was the rendezvous point of two dimensional coordinates. It further provides comparative insights into what types of categorical attributes occur more frequently among the three countries. Specifically, it compared country to country in regard to preplanned categorical attributes by doing maps for all three countries.

Results

US and Korea

As expected, US ads were more likely to use hard-sell appeals (75.3%), whereas Korean ads tended to use soft-sell appeals (58.0%). The result of chi-square test showed there was a significant difference between US and Korean ads (X^2= 18.6, p<.01, see table 1). In addition, US ads tended to use comparative appeals more frequently than Korean ads (33.3% vs. 18.5%, X^2= 4.6, p<.05). However, no significant difference was found in direct response appeal between these two countries (see Table 2). Thus, Hypothesis 1 was partially supported.

Table 1 about here

Table 2 about here

US vs. Japan

As expected, US ads tended to use hard-sell appeal more than Japanese ads (75.3% vs. 60.5%, X^2=4.08, p<.05). However, contrary to the prediction, Japanese ads were more likely to use hard-sell appeal rather than soft-sell appeals (see Table 3).

US ads also had more comparative appeals than Japanese ads (33.3% vs. 11.1%, X^2=11.6, p<.05) However, no statistical significance was found in direct response appeal between US and Japanese ads (see Table 4). Thus, these findings provide partial support for Hypothesis 2.

Table 3 about here

Table 4 about here

Japan vs. Korea

The result showed that Japanese ads used more hard-sell appeals, whereas Korean ads had more soft-sell appeals (X^2=5.59, p<.05, see Table 5). Korean ads were more likely to use comparative appeal than Japanese ads (X2=18.5, p<.01). On the contrary, no significant difference was found in direct response appeal between ads in Japan and Korea (see Table 6). Overall, these provided partial support for Hypothesis 3.

Table 5 about here

Table 6 about here

Degree of Similarity Between Country Dyads

Comparison between US/Korea and Japan/Korea

No significant difference was found in ad appeal between ads in US/Korea and US/Japan (Mean = 4.03 vs. Mean = 4.14, t (160) = -.71, p<.23, see Table 7). When profiled by product category, a significant difference was found only in alcohol-tobacco ads (see Table 8). The result showed that ads between US and Japan for this product were more similar than ads between US and Korea. This provides partial support for Hypothesis 4.

Table 7 about here

Table 8 about here

Comparison between US/Korea and Japan/Korea

The result shows no significant difference in ad appeals between ads in US/Korea and Japan/Korea (Table 9). However, when profiled by product category, a significant difference was found in jewelry ads. That is, ad appeals between Japanese and Korean ads for jewelry were more similar than those between ads in US and Korea for the same product (Table 10). Car ads approached statistical significance ($p <.063$) and thus indicated that ad appeals between Japanese and Korean ads for cars may be more similar than those between US and Korean ads for the same product.

Table 9 about here

Table 10 about here

Comparison between US/Japan and Japan/Korea

There is also no significant difference in ad appeal between US/Japan and Japan/Korea dyads (Table 11). However, a significant difference was found in alcohol-tobacco ads.

As in information content, ads in US and Japan for alcohol-tobacco were more similar than those between Japan and Korea for the same product (Table 12). This showed the opposite direction of Hypothesis 6, which was not supported.

Table 11 about here

Table 12 about here

Concept Mapping

Figure 1 based on standardized loadings (Table 13) displays the attributes associated with ad appeals as they co-occur with countries. The "soft-sell" appeal was closer to Korea, whereas the "hard-sell" appeal was closer to U.S. Further, a cluster of hard-sell appeal is located relatively closer to Japan, compared to Korea. "Comparative" appeal was closer to U.S., and "direct response" appeal was located at the center of the map and thus, had almost equal distance from three countries. These results provide partial support for Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, and are closely consistent with the chi-square results.

Figure 1 about here

Table 13 about here

Discussion

Chi-square tests suggested that US ads were more likely to use hard-sell appeals and Korean soft-sell. Also, US ads tended to use hard-sell appeal more than Japanese ads.

Furthermore, Japanese ads used more hard-sell appeals, whereas Korean ads had more soft-sell appeals. In addition, comparative appeal was found significantly more often in US ads than in Japanese and Korean ads. However, no significant difference was found in direct response among three countries. Data from concept mapping were consistent with such results.

Hard-Soft Sell: It was expected that hard-sell appeal was more likely to be employed in monochronic and individualistic cultures with linear logic and explicit conclusion and low power distance, whereas soft-sell appeal was more likely to be used in polychronic and collectivistic cultures with indirect and suggestive communication tone or style. In addition, hard sell appeal was more likely to be employed in markets with high advertising expenditure per capita, more types of products and less strict government control of advertising. Thus, difference in hard-and-soft sell appeal between US and Korean ads can be explained by both cultural and market differences. In addition, difference in such appeals between US and Japanese ads can be explained more by cultural distance. As expected, such a difference between Japanese and Korean ads may be explained by market distance.

Noteworthy is that Korean ads had more soft-sell appeal, though they were found to be significantly more informative. This is contrary to the notion that hard-sell ads tend to have more information cues, while soft-sell ads had fewer. However, looking especially at Korean ads, artifacts such as price, components or contents, and availability information cues were more consistently found than in other countries'. As was already operationalized, these factors were not considered as contributing factors to hard-soft sell appeals.

Comparative Appeal: Results showed that US ads tended to use this appeal more frequently than did Japanese and Korean ads. Contrary to the expectations, no significant difference in comparative appeal was found between Japan and Korea. Concept mapping also indicated that comparative appeal was distinctly clustered more closely to US, compared to Japan and Korea.

Comparative appeal was expected to appear more often in monochronic cultures with individualism. In addition, this appeal was more likely to be used in competitive markets with abundant types of products and less strict government control of advertising as well as in those with available advertising personnel. Possibly, individualism-collectivism as well as strict legal regulation of advertising are major determinants for difference in comparative appeal and for localization between ads in US and Japan, and US and Korea. Also, this reflects the Japanese and Korean "cultural characteristics of avoiding confrontation"; in addition, the Japanese and Korean do not want competitors to lose face (Wagenaar, 1978). Accordingly, comparative ads in Japan and Korea tend to be legally restricted by their governments and to be both explicitly and implicitly avoided by advertisers as well as consumers who favor group harmony over individual self-interest and desire.

Thus, differences in comparative appeal between US and Korean ads can be explained by both cultural and market distances. In addition, difference in such appeals between US and Japanese ads can be explained more by cultural distance and partly by market distance especially in legal regulation of comparative appeal in advertising. However, no significant difference in comparative appeal was found between Japanese and Korean ads. This is another example that as mentioned in the above, cultural similarity had more overriding power than market distance.

Direct Response Appeal: Contrary to the expectation, chi-square results showed no significant difference in any paired comparisons of countries. Concept mapping indicated that this cluster is placed at the center of the map, i.e., it tended to co-occur with equal frequently with US, Japan and Korea.

This was more likely to be used in monochronic cultures emphasizing linear, logical, direct and explicit communication style. Also, this appeal was expected to be used in markets with more US advertisers - originally invented and got fully oriented to this selling technique - as well as in those with high advertising expenditure per capita and many types of products. However, the expectation was not supported. One of the reasons may be that such expectations mostly resulted from studies on domestic brand ads in each specific country, rather than on multinational brand ads. Thus, characteristics of ads may be one explanatory factor. Perhaps direct response may be the least sensitive appeal to cultural and market conditions and instead, be the common denominator for multinational brand ads which were generally new to consumers and tend to solicit their high involvement-decision making and further inquiries for more information.

Similarity of Ad Appeals

Overall, no significant differences in similarity ratings of ad appeals were found between any country dyads. However, when profiled by product category, ad appeals between Japanese and Korean ads for jewelry turned out to be more similar than those between US and Korean ads. This provided partial support for the expectation that ads between Japan and Korea which have cultural similarity but market distance, would be more similar than those between US and Korea which have both cultural and market distance. This finding suggests regarding jewelry ads, ad appeals can be more standardized between ads in Japan and Korea than between ads in US and Korea. Such a difference between US and Japan or Korean ads might possibly be explained by difference of gender roles specific to them.

For example, Korean and Japanese women in collectivistic cultures with authoritative and hierarchical structure - i.e., high power distance - tend to pursue their ideal self-image to be recognized their social positions or status in their groups, while American women in individualistic cultures with more horizontal and informal relationship - i.e., low power distance are more likely to look for their actual or realistic self-image and self-interest, and tend to ignore the formality. Thus, this trend may have contributed to the differences in ad appeal for jewelry ads among them.

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In addition, ad appeals between US and Japanese ads for alcohol-tobacco were found to be more similar than those between US and Korea, and Japan and Korea. For this market sensitive product, market similarity between US and Japan had more explanatory power than cultural similarity between Japan and Korea. Thus, ad appeals between US and Japan could be more similar than those between Japan and Korea. Plausibly, the industries relevant to these products are fully deregulated to private companies: thus free market competition is ensured. These two countries have been enjoying a relatively free trade system for these products, compared to the Korean alcohol-tobacco industry which is still under regional cartel system or restricted by the government. Also, these products in both US and Japan are generally similar PLC which is on the maturity stage, whereas those in Korea is still on the growing stage. Thus, as far as alcohol-tobacco products are concerned, more similarity can be found between US and Japan than between US and Korea, and even between Japan and Korea. Contrary to our conceptual prediction, this suggests that at least for ads of alcohol-tobacco which tend to be sensitive more to market conditions, market similarity is more useful to predict the degree of campaign performance in ad appeals, rather than cultural similarity.

Hard-and-soft sell appeal was significantly different among three countries. Thus, a localized approach is obviously suitable, between these paired countries, for ad messages using such appeals. Dissimilarity in comparative appeal may be the reason that advertising message should be localized between US and Korea, and US and Japan. Also, similarity in this appeal between Japan and Korea may be a reason that ads between them should be more standardized. In addition, it was found that product types were major contributing factors to decisions for standardized or localized approach, because they differ significantly in their sensitivities to either cultural or market conditions.

Overall, similarity and dissimilarity of three major advertising factors among US, Japan and Korea were examined and discussed with the emphasis on their associations with cultural and market conditions. The expectations clearly supported that differences in cultural characteristics and market conditions lead respectively to cultural distance as well as market distance between different cultural groups. Further, an inductive inference from these results suggests that the combination of such cultural distance and market distance should ultimately lead to "advertising distance" between cultural groups - here expressed as the degree of standardization and localization: if it becomes closer or shorter between countries, ads tend to be more standardized, whereas if it becomes farther and wider, then ads are more likely to be localized.

Limitations of the study

A primary weakness of this study is the small sample size. An examination of 243 magazine ads for common multinational brands (81 sets) from three countries might weaken the reliability of the obtained results. Also, this small sample size might have increased the likelihood of a type II error. With 81 sets, the statistical tests undertaken may not reveal significant differences when, in fact, such differences indeed exist in the population. Also, since these ads were obtained by purposive sample, they may not be representative of all ads in countries, rather mostly represent elite market. However, since the major purpose of this study was to observe and analyze ad transferability between countries, such a sampling technique was unavoidable.

In addition, what this study did not address and was not designed to address was to investigate the effectiveness of ad campaigns on consumers. This is a question particularly worthy of exploration. For the advertising practitioner, an understanding of which technique in ad is more effective is also important.

Another major limitation is that although this study was conceptually based on cultural characteristics and market conditions, it could not provide an ideally objective guideline for their interactions - i.e., when both conflict in explaining ad difference or similarity. However, the results of this study are believed to provide a helpful direction for future work. In line with this, this study focused on only three specific countries as samples and even country group with both cultural and market similarity could not be included into sampling frame. Thus, the results of this study might have a weak external validity.

Also, this research was based on only magazine advertisements to compare ad transferability. However, it is ideal to compare and ensure the applicability of the results to a variety of media such as TV, newspaper and radio.

Another weakness was regarding the classifications of ad appeals. Ad appeals in this study had no proper classification categories which were exclusively and exhaustively designed. This might have hampered more robust statistical analysis. Future research needs to add more appeals such as sex appeal, humor appeal etc., in addition to the three appeals investigated in this study.

Summary of Results and Implications

Discussions based on study results showed mixed and intertwined arguments against or for the expectations for this study. These can be summarized according to the order to conceptual process model that this study developed earlier for its utility test. Briefly stated, difference/similarity of cultural and market conditions will lead to cultural and market distance respectively. Such distances were expected to not only determine clustering patterns of countries, but also a degree of campaign performance such as standardization and specialization. This process was predicted to influence execution and development of ads. From each specific stage, managerial implications may be more efficiently provided.

Cultural Characteristics and Market Conditions

This study generally identified a set of cultural and market dimensions that could explain the different natures of magazine advertising among three countries. Specifically, it demonstrated that cultural characteristics such as individualism-collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance and perception of time independently and in an integrated form, affected differences in ad appeals among ads from US, Japan and Korea. In addition, market conditions such as advertising expenditure per capita, presence of US advertisers and ad agencies, government control of advertising, advertising personnel shortage and product type were also major contributing factors to such differences of magazine advertising messages. In addition, this study found additional intervening cultural and market variables affecting such differences which were media type, media usage pattern, product life cycle, product category, social attitude toward product and gender role.

Cultural and market conditions could lead to significant difference in hard-and-soft sell appeals between three countries. US ads had more hard-sell appeals than Japan which had more than Korean ads. As such, hard-sell appeal was used in US ads - i.e., monochronic and individualistic cultures and market with less strict legal regulation of advertising, than Japan - i.e., polychronic and collectivistic cultures with mature competition - and Korea - i.e., polychronic and collectivistic culture with low advertising expenditure per capita and strict government control of advertising. In comparative appeal, US ads had this appeal more often than did Japanese and Korean ads. As expected, comparative appeal was found in monochronic and individualistic cultures with less strict regulation of advertising.

Cultural and Market Distance

The study's proposed theoretical framework of cultural and market distance overall predicted that differences in cultural and market conditions would lead to advertising distances. Cultural and market distances were predicted by their conceptual scales and thus, measured differences in ad appeals between country dyads through similarity test.

Ad appeals between Japan and Korea for jewelry ads turned out to be more similar than those between US and Korean ads for the same product. For this product, ad appeals between the dyad with cultural similarity and market distance are more similar than those between the dyad with both cultural and market distance. In jewelry ads, ad appeals between Japan and Korea where only market distance exists were more similar than those between US and Korea where cultural and market distance co-exist.

As noted, it is generally clear that difference and similarity in ads between country dyads could be explained by cultural and/or market distance between them. Before reaching this observation, what is important for advertisers is that they should understand the relative importance of the various factors influencing advertising difference /similarity. Further, the relative extent of such difference/similarity in ads varies in certain elements and certain condition - i.e., according to the interaction of country dyads with a variety of cultural and market conditions.

Country Clustering and Degree of Campaign Performance

Country clustering or grouping was expected to be based on relative degree of cultural distance/similarity and market distance/similarity. Study results on these offer a guideline for decision-making on the degree of standardization or specialization.

Although cultural and market conditions could not lead to advertising distance between the analyzed countries, they could lead to a significant difference in cultural and market distance for alcohol-tobacco and jewelry. Specifically, in regard to ad appeals in alcohol-tobacco ads, US and Japan can be clustered into the same group and thus could be more standardized, compared to Japan and Korea. For ad appeals in jewelry ads, Japan and Korea could be in the same cluster and their ads could be more standardized than ads between US and Korea.

Overall, it is clear that this model was relatively well tested, though the results were not based upon fully deductive reasoning. Although three countries were chosen for the study, each represents typical pattern of global country components and clusters. Also, the results of this study provide the practitioner with a glimpse of the current state of international advertising.

Nonetheless, as far as results from this study were based only on content analysis of current ads, rather than measuring effectiveness of ads on consumers, absolute recommendations for advertisers may not be valid. Thus, presuming that the practices of ad campaigns by a number of famous and prestigious multinational brands could be relatively more typical and exemplary, this study would suggest some implications and recommendations.

Although results tend to provide partial answers for the multitude of questions that practitioners are likely to have regarding standardization vs. specialization, the glimpse should be sufficient to caution them against an overly optimistic embrace of the extreme position of globalization or specialization of international advertising. Further, on the basis of results, it is expected that this study can offer a framework for international advertisers in doing business, and for academics in crystallizing a universal framework for international advertising. These are:

I. Decision for standardization or localization needs to be based on degree of advertising distance determined by double-edged aspects of cultural and market: from cultural similarity and market similarity for full standardization ----> cultural similarity and market difference for less standardization ----> cultural difference and market similarity more toward to localization ---> to cultural and market difference for full localization. However, such decisions may depend on ad-related factors and product categories.

Localization may be suggested but varies in type of appeals. Hard-soft sell appeal is expected to be localized among three countries. This appeal needs to be all differently prescribed between individual country dyad. Comparative appeal can be localized between US and Korea as well as US and Japan. These results are true especially for alcohol-tobacco and jewelry ads. Comparative appeal may be more standardized between ads from Japan and Korea. It is also expected that direct response appeal may be more standardized among the three countries in all product categories.

As mentioned, these suggestions are based on the analysis of reality. In order to validate their practicalities and applicability into this reality, an effectiveness study of ads on consumers should follow. Nevertheless, presuming that what has been going on in international advertising could be what advertisers for multinational brands have chosen to support, such fact-driven suggestions may be more practical, useful and less risky.

II. Further, it is suggested that to see their dissimilarities between cultural groups, their similarities should be first considered and vice versa. More important, for standardization, advertisers need to look into the similarity which could override the difference either in culture or market. Also, for localization purposes, advertisers may need to look for the difference which could override the similarity either in culture or market.

Therefore, beyond the prevalent notion of regional proximity for clustering countries, this study suggests that a relativity of distance in culture and market should be considered in evaluating clustering pattern of countries and determining degree of campaign performances.

Conclusion

There seems to be a major controversy between the advocates of think global and the proponents of "think global but act local." The results of this study would support the latter argument. This slogan might suggest that "thinking global" reflects the strategic objective of international advertising campaign which is its global reach-out beyond the differences, whereas "acting local" is concerned more with tactical execution in implementing such a strategic objective. Although cultural and market differences seem to dictate the strategy and execution of advertising among US, Japan and Korea, certain commonalities in each advertising approach are apparent. This implies that there is always inherent common ground rooted in modern materialism across cultures. This is because differences between national consumer cultures and market environments are not absolute but a matter of degrees on a continuum (Lin, 1993). In other words, it can be argued that extreme performance of ad campaign - i.e., either completely standardized or localized - does not exist in international context. Instead, the decision should be adjusted through relative appraisal of cultural and market distance scale between individual country dyads.

Therefore, when developing customized ads for local markets, cultural characteristics, market conditions and other intervening variables such as media type, PLC, product type, gender, and other cultural traits related to communication patterns and styles etc. should be defined and evaluated in terms of their weighted magnitudes of impact between different cultural groups. Noteworthy is that as contemporary market conditions around international environment is rapidly evolving, ads may develop more toward standardization. In other words, advertising similarity due to evolving market conditions could predominantly override advertising difference caused by cultural characteristics. It is further expected that dominance of market conditions over cultural characteristics will reemerge as another issue-provocative agenda in international advertising.

As seen from the results regarding the similarity of ads, localization and standardization approaches are not mutually exclusive, but co-existent. International marketers should capitalize on which approach and what should offer in each local market. More importantly, when they consider either approach, it may be a good idea to take advantage of relative advertising distance and its operational scale between many cultural groups. Toward that end, a combined approach - weighing cultural and market distance - could be proved as a significant step toward a viable strategy in an approaching global era.

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Table 1. **Hard-and-Soft sell Appeals**

US vs.Korea

	US	Korea
Hard Sell	75.3%	41.9%
Soft Sell	24.7%	58.0%

$X^2 = 18.6$, df=1, $p < .01$

Table 2. **Comparative Appeal and Direct Response**

US vs.Korea

	US(%)	Korea(%)	Significance level
Comparative Appeal	33.3	18.5	$X^2 = 4.6, p < .05$
Direct Response	55.5	58.0	$X^2 = .2, p < .63$

Table 3. **Hard-and-Soft sell Appeals**

US vs. Japan

	US	Japan
Hard Sell	75.3%	60.5%
Soft Sell	24.7%	39.5%

$X^2 = 4.08$, df=1, $p < .05$

Table 4. Comparative Appeal and Direct Response

US vs. Japan

	US(%)	Japan(%)	Significance level
Comparative Appeal	33.3	11.1	X^2= 11.6, p <.05
Direct Response	55.5	58.0	X^2= .2, p <.63

Table 5. Hard-and-Soft sell Appeals

Japan vs. Korea

	Japan	Korea
Hard Sell	60.5%	41.9%
Soft Sell	39.5%	58.0%

X^2 = 5.59, df=1, p < .05

Table 6. Comparative Appeal and Direct Response

Japan vs. Korea

	Japan(%)	Korea(%)	Significance level
Comparative Appeal	11.1	18.5	X^2 = 12.5, p <.001
Direct Response	58.0	58.0	X^2 = 0.0, p < 1.0

Table 7. **Mean Similarity[a] of Ad Appeals US/Korea vs. US/Japan**

	US/Korea	n	US/Japan	n	t	1 tailed p.
Mean Similarity	4.03	162	4.14	162	- 0.71	p <.23

[a] Dyad ads were rated on a 1 - 5 scale where 1 indicates "very dissimilar and 5 indicates "very similar."

Table 8. **Mean Similarity[b] of Ad Appeal by Product Category US/Korea vs. US/Japan**

	US/Korea	n	US/Japan	n	t	1-tailed p.
Food-Beverage[a]	3.6	3	4.6	3		
Alcohol-Tobacco	4.1	7	4.7	7	-2.45	p<.012*
Personal Care -Cosmetics	4.2	20	4.0	20	0.61	p <.27
Clothing	3.9	15	3.8	15	0.33	p <.42
Jewelry	3.5	14	4.0	14	-1.26	p <.10
Car	4.2	7	4.1	7	0.32	p <.37
Electronics	4.6	11	4.4	11	0.56	p <.28
Travel Services[a]	3.0	4	3.7	4		

* $p < .05$

[a] Cells were too small for statistical analysis

[b] Dyad ads were rated on a 1 - 5 scale where 1 indicates "very dissimilar and 5 indicates "very similar."

Table 9. Mean Similarity[a] of Ad Appeals US/Korea vs. Japan/Korea

	US/Korea	n	Japan/Korea	n	t	1-tailed p.
Mean Similarity	4.03	162	4.07	162	-0.22	p <.43

[a] Dyad ads were rated on a 1 - 5 scale where 1 indicates "very dissimilar" and 5 indicates "very similar."

Table 10. Mean Similarity[b] of Ad Appeal by product category US/Korea vs. Japan/Korea

	US/Korea	n	Japan/Korea	n	t	1-tailed p
Food-Beverage[a]	3.6	3	3.6	3		
Alcohol-Tobacco	4.1	7	3.7	7	1.34	p <.10
Personal Care						
-Cosmetics	4.2	20	4.3	20	-0.16	p <.48
Clothing	3.9	15	3.7	15	0.48	p <.31
Jewelry	3.5	14	4.4	14	-2.13	p <.021*
Car	4.2	7	4.7	7	-1.64	p <.063
Electronics	4.6	11	4.1	11	1.23	p <.11
Travel Services[a]	3.0	4	3.0	4		

* p < .05

[a] Cells were too small for statistical analysis.

[b] Dyad ads were rated on a 1 - 5 scale where 1 indicates "very dissimilar" and 5 indicates "very similar."

Table 11. Mean Similarity[a] of Ad Appeals

US/Japan vs. Japan/Korea

	US/Japan	n	Japan/Korea	n	t	1-tailed p.
Mean Similarity	4.14	162	4.07	162	0.44	p <.32

[a] Dyad ads were rated on a 1 - 5 scale where 1 indicates "very dissimilar" and 5 indicates "very similar."

Table 12. Mean Similarity[b] of Ad Appeals by product category

US/Japan vs. Japan/Korea

	US/Japan	n	Japan/Korea	n	t	1-tailed p
Food-Beverage[a]	4.6	3	3.6	3		
Alcohol-Tobacco	4.7	7	3.7	7	2.94	p <.006*
Personal Care -Cosmetics	4.0	20	4.3	20	-0.82	p <.21
Clothing	3.8	15	3.7	15	0.30	p <.38
Jewelry	4.0	14	4.4	14	-0.81	p <.21
Car	4.1	7	4.7	7	-1.28	p <.11
Electronics	4.5	11	4.1	11	0.72	p <.23
Travel Services[a]	3.7	4	3.0	4		

* p < .01

[a] Cells were too small for statistical analysis.

[b] Dyad ads were rated on a 1 - 5 scale where 1 indicates "very dissimilar" and 5 indicates "very similar."

Table 13. Attributes Associated with Ad Appeals by Country

Standardized Loadings: First Three Coordinates			
HARD	0.90	-0.42	0.15
SOFT	0.60	0.80	-0.11
COMPAR	0.81	-0.46	-0.36
DIRECT	0.99	0.10	0.13
KOREA	0.59	0.62	-0.52
JAPAN	0.53	0.19	0.83
USA	0.74	-0.60	-0.31

Figure 1 Concept Mapping from Attributes Associated with Ad Appeals by US, Japan and Korea